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Summary 
The key question of the dissertation is whether arbitration of international debt is viable. 
Overall, the thesis argues that global arbitration of debt would ease the pressures on the 
present ways of dealing with problem debt. Currently, there are two contending 
approaches to sovereign debt restructuring. The first is that debt relations are restructured in 
line with economic reason and sustainability, and the second is that restructuring should be 
assessed against considerations of justice and procedural fairness. More specifically, the 
thesis argues for an international arbitration mechanism that translates the principles of 
Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code into a global framework. 
This thesis is centrally informed by the dynamics of global current account imbalances, as 
described by John Maynard Keynes, deficits that send nations down the slippery slope of 
debt. The core argument is based on Kunibert Raffer‘s initial work on arbitration of 
sovereign debt, but the approach is wider. In addition to economics, the approach of the 
thesis includes political, philosophical and legal dimensions of arbitrating problem debt. 
The political-philosophical dimension analyses the viability of global arbitration in a world 
with sovereign nation states and motivates dealings with problem debt by seeing it as a 
negative duty by the rich toward the poor and relies on the work by Thomas Nagel and 
Thomas Pogge. The legal dimension addresses the institutionalization of debt arbitration 
and separates the questions of odious debt from economic insolvency. It also speaks for 
debt arbitration as a way of introducing rule of law. Further, the thesis analyses the impact 
arbitration of debts would have on the neighboring financial fields of sovereign debt, here 
categorized as development aid, trade and future access to credit. Throughout, the focus is 
on global mechanisms and the experience of and policies behind problem debt especially in 
poor countries, starting with their debt crisis in 1982, but stretching back into the 
immediate pre-Bretton Woods era. 
In this thesis, I outline the key elements of a workable, efficient, just, universal, and 
market-oriented approach to arbitrate international debt, which includes the following: 
● An introduction to the rule of law in dealings with problem debt, for instance by 
introducing debtor protection. 
viii 
 
● A commonly agreed way of dealing with debt in the form of a collective authority 
providing equal consideration for all concerned under the rule of law, suffocating holdout 
problems and allowing for speedier proceedings according to a known process.  
● A universal mechanism not allowing for competing interpretations by plural centers, or 
‗jurisdiction shopping‘. 
● A referee that meets the criteria of dealing with debt on multiple legal strands, and is thus 
able to deal with claims of odious debt and debts that are economic unsustainable. 
Global arbitration of international debt is indeed viable both from the point of view of 
economic reason and global justice, if implemented with certain qualifications, as specified 
in this thesis. 
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1. 
Introduction 
 
 
 In the second decade of the 2000s, the geography of problem debt is changing. This 
observation is made in an economic climate where rich countries‘ debts are predicted to 
reach 100 per cent of their GDP by 2014 (IMF 2010). This is in contrast to poor countries, 
where their debts have today decreased to around 45 per cent.
1
 In the Euro zone, some 
members of the monetary union have run high economic deficits and their economies are 
spiraling out of control. Euro-zone problem debt is shaking not only the future of the 
common currency, but also the global financial system. Simultaneously, concerns about the 
growing deficits in the USA make the headlines.  
The Euro crisis of the early 2000s repeats in broad pattern much of what happened in the 
crises of problem debt in poor countries, a crisis that had broken out nearly three decades 
earlier, when Mexico declared default in 1982. Importantly, it is a repetition of the pattern 
laid out at that time, constituted by treating crises of insolvency as temporary crises of cash-
flow. In poor countries, this crisis carries over into today and to a situation of chronic 
indebtedness and economic fragility where various economic shocks regularly lay bare 
economies.   
Borrowing by governments has always been a feature of international finance. But with the 
crisis of indebtedness in Europe and the Euro zone, the question of how to deal with 
problem sovereign debt has again surfaced. The structural causes behind sovereign debt, the 
policies and administration systems of it, along with the proposed solutions are central to 
understanding the global economic and financial system. The Euro-zone crisis has brought 
renewed interest in this system. This is an order that rests on pillars devised in the aftermath 
of World War II and that was set up favouring the interests of the winners of the war, or 
                                                 
1
 Alongside these figures, of course, one has to point out that emerging economies are at risk of default at 
substantially lower levels of debt than advanced economies. For instance, a 60 per cent debt-to-GDP-ratio in 
Europe − which was the ratio before the financial crisis of 2008 − did not yet make the European economy at 
risk of default, whereas similar levels of debt in a poor country increases the risk of default substantially 
(Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig 2003). 
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those who at the time were likely to be creditors rather than debtors in the world economy. 
Consequently, instead of being part of a system operating according to a common goal of 
global economic balance, the zones of economic deficit were to carry their deficits 
themselves. Further, during the Cold War, both the East and the West used political supply-
driven lending – rather than demand-driven borrowing on economic grounds – as important 
instruments in this conflict. What is more, the world economy has gone through two oil 
crises with each event bringing about accumulated debts for deficit countries. Matters have 
not been helped by the problem of many dictators signing off loans for personal 
consumption rather than for investments – even if in the name of the populations of their 
countries.  
The prolonged and difficult situation of high debts has generated a poverty spiral for poor 
countries, from where there is no easy way out. In a direct sense, the financial fragility of 
poor countries‘ economies leads to higher interest rate premiums on new loans. In turn, this 
increases the price and access to funding for investments, the engines behind economic 
growth. In this way, problem debt stands in the way of economic development of poor 
countries, thus leading to increased poverty. This is problematic also in a less direct sense, 
meaning that not only are problem debts too large in terms of national economic 
sustainability, they are also too large to ever realistically be repaid. Equally, there may be 
substance behind claims that the ways in which debt has been dealt with may actually have 
had a negative effect on debt burdens. At the very least, it is safe to say that international 
policies of problem debt stand in contradiction to not only orthodox economics, where 
policy is context specific, but also to the theory of efficiency on the one hand, and to 
considerations of justice and procedural fairness on the other. But perhaps above all, and 
from an ethical and human rights perspective, the high debt-servicing costs are linked to 
poverty and human suffering. The debt overhang of the African continent, for instance, 
poses major obstacles to the region‘s prospects for the necessary increased savings and 
investment, economic growth and poverty alleviation (UNCTAD 2004a: 9). This hinders 
public investment in infrastructure, while simultaneously failing to attract investors. 
Naturally, this has affected not only economic growth but importantly also health, 
educational and social services in the countries. Consequently, problem debt has attracted 
significant international public attention for several decades. Accordingly, since the 1970s, 
debt maintains its position as a central focus of the economic agendas of social movements 
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and non-governmental organizations – including most recently the debt of European 
countries. These civil society actors remain loud, calling for the addressing of perceived 
injustices in the global economic structure, an order they see as favouring rich nations. 
They maintain that national poverty, or debt, cannot be reduced to accident or national 
collapse. Instead, economic deficit is a consequence of a range of intertwined issues, such 
as general developments in the financial markets, particular composition of national 
exports, fluctuations in commodity prices and access to credit markets. Common to these 
factors are that they operate in areas where the rich countries, or institutions dominated by 
them, have the final say. Civil society also calls for the revisiting of loans made to poor 
countries under dubious circumstances.  
Since the default of Mexico in 1982, the initiating event of what is referred to as the debt 
crises of poor countries, the world has seen reoccurring financial crises – perhaps exceeding 
a hundred such crises – both in the poor countries and in the rich financial centers. These 
crises include a second default by Mexico (1995), the Asian financial crisis (1997-8), the 
Russian financial crisis (1998), the Argentinean default (2001-2) and more recently the 
global financial crisis (2008) and the Euro zone crises (2010). This means, among other 
things, that the geography of problem debt is spreading from having concerned poor 
countries to now also encompassing the Euro zone. 
Since the Mexican default of 1982, little has changed in the international community 
regarding the way international debts are dealt with. Rather, international debts are 
administered according to and operate within structures and by the support of policies 
created in the period between 1945 and the 1980s.
2
 These policies were created by surplus 
nations at the time. Since then, perhaps the main shift within this architecture is of an 
administrative kind, with global problem debt of poor countries now having been placed 
under the heading of official development aid. Over time, the focus has remained steady on 
schemes of financial rescue packages or debt relief and occasional debt cancellations. 
While these measures bear many similarities (they have all been designed by creditors and 
for reasons of charity, among other factors), they differ in their motivations (some were 
economically motivated, others were driven by political reasoning). In the Euro-zone, 
                                                 
2
 Supporting evidence of this can be found for instance in the fact that Lipson‘s article from 1981 reflects 
much of the reality of today.  
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citizens in member states with an economic surplus question their participation in financial 
rescue packages in the zones with deficits. In relation to sound economics regarding policy, 
the intuitive question following from this is that since money is repeatedly poured into debt 
relief for poor countries, how is it possible that the poorest countries are still suffering from 
problem debt.  
Meanwhile, as the circles of discussion evolve, so does the nature of debt. Among other 
things, since the 1980s, the structures of debt have returned toward the bond financing of 
the 1930s. Importantly, though, this process contributed to a recomposition of debt, setting 
off a trend where private lenders and domestic debt feed off official loans and external debt. 
This brings with it a new set of vulnerabilities for highly indebted nations. The risks have 
not clearly been identified, and are perhaps not even known (Panizza 2010). The point of 
this is that, as time goes on, problem debt becomes even more complex. Simultaneously, 
world poverty is being increasingly addressed through an expanding array of efforts.  
Ultimately, this leads to the fundamental economic question as to whether the current 
international system of dealing with debt is economically viable. In fact, in poor countries 
many of the measures taken and instruments established within the regimes of trade and aid 
can be interpreted as correcting measures for the failings of the present system. Debt-relief 
programmes stand out as one example of such imbalance correction. Are the numerous debt 
relief programmes and other ad hoc debt cancellations economically sound and reasonable? 
And how just are they? 
A response to these questions suggests the need for careful construction of a system 
allowing not only for the restructuring of debts, but also for mechanisms involving the 
rights of the indebted – in line with statutory insolvency laws. The fundamental dilemma of 
the structures and mechanisms of financial globalization is that regulation and supervision 
remain national, while financial markets are international. The failure to set up a 
coordinated, fair and democratic decision-making forum for dealing with debt in a 
sustainable manner has fuelled civil society‘s perception of problem debt as a political 
problem above all else. To begin with, there is no international bankruptcy system that sets 
out the rights of debtors and creditors in such cases. In retrospect, for instance, one is hard-
pressed to find support for a view diverging from the opinion that had an orderly and 
institutionalised option for restructuring procedures been available for Greece early on, 
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some of the Euro-zone headaches of the early 2000s may have been less severe. 
Meanwhile, the effects of recurring financial crises are felt far and wide. 
The specific research question  
The issue underlying this thesis is whether the economic organization and international 
administration of problem debt are efficient and sustainable and if these procedures are just 
and justifiable. This means that there are two contending pressures on solving the issue of 
sovereign debt restructuring.
3
 The first position is that restructurings are solved in line with 
economic efficiency, including considerations regarding the supply and price of credit. The 
second position is that sovereign debt restructurings are assessed against considerations of 
justice and procedural fairness.
4
 Given these pressures, the key question of this thesis is 
whether arbitration of international debt is viable. Responding to this question involves 
addressing not only the relationship between the pressures of economic efficiency and 
global justice, but also the balance between them. 
Discussions of both efficiency and justice cover a range of notions, some are 
complementary and some are conflicting. Here economic efficiency is approached in a 
minimalist way. The aim of this thesis is not to assess the trade-offs between creditors or 
borrowers with negotiations resulting in Pareto efficiency of a situation where no one is 
getting better off without someone else getting worse off. This would require assessing 
whether the maximum amount the gainers are prepared to pay is greater than the minimum 
amount that the losers are prepared to accept (the Kaldor criterion), or whether the 
maximum amount losers are prepared to offer the gainers to prevent the change is less than 
the minimum amount the gainers are prepared to accept as bribe to forgo the change (the 
Hicks criterion).
5
 Neither is the aim of this thesis to take a stand on laissez-faire economics, 
                                                 
3
 By ―debt‖ I mean external debt, unless otherwise indicated. In terms of a precise definition of external debt, 
I mean all debt issued under foreign law, and rely on the justification for this as provided in UNCTAD (2010: 
2). 
4
 The balance between social justice and economic fairness – or growing tension between social and financial 
risks – as an entry point into the discussions on the debt problem is also briefly addressed by Palley (2003) 
and Soederberg (2005). 
5
 Put differently, the Hicks compensation test is from the losers‘ point of view, while the Kaldor 
compensation test is from the gainers‘ point of view. If both conditions are satisfied, both gainers and losers 
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or other economic theories. This is because the focus of this thesis is neither to assess social 
developments or economic welfare in a particular nation or region, nor is it to contribute to 
the theory in these areas. Rather, in this thesis, economic efficiency is approached through 
the analytical environment of economic reasoning with a focus on the particular policies of 
international lending that are applied by the creditors in their lending to countries suffering 
from problem debt.  
In relation to global justice, the thesis asks if principles of justice and rule of law, including 
the rights of the indebted, are applicable also internationally. If so, which are the 
considerations and what adaptations would be required? What are the conditions? And what 
are the limitations? The thesis begins by asking whether, given the political system of 
sovereign nation-states, global arbitration of international debts is defensible? A catalyst to 
this discussion is an understanding of the important role played by transnational webs of 
global forums. In terms of the scope and angle, the thesis relies on Thomas Pogge‘s (2008a; 
2008b) framework of negative duties by the rich countries toward the poor. According to 
Pogge, the rich have a duty to lift the current burdens of injustices pressing on the shoulders 
of the poor. Here, dealing with debt is seen as one of these burdens. Not only would 
arbitration ease the material burdens on the shoulders of poor nations, but to an extent, it 
would also open up to discussions about past injustices in the name of global finances. To 
what extent have the earlier mechanisms been just – and what about the present ones?  
An additional explanation is perhaps necessary. Building on the above, the minimalist way 
in which economic efficiency and global justice are seen to be connected is through the 
concept of fairness. In a similar minimalist way, fairness is also at the core of discussions 
on democracy. Although democracy is not the focus of this thesis, the concept is mentioned 
because of the gate this thesis provides towards that area. 
Simultaneously, and as a subtheme of the research question, the thesis provides an analysis 
of the manner in which these two criteria, economic reason and justice, can be qualified. 
These pressures are qualified as a function of the implementation of arbitration of 
                                                                                                                                                    
will agree that the proposed activity will move the economy toward Pareto optimality. This is referred to as 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or at times also called the Scitovsky criterion. 
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international debt and its effect on the regimes of trade, development aid and policies for 
international lending. By passing trade, international aid, and lending markets through the 
filters of economic efficiency and justice, as defined in this way, two kinds of disentangling 
take place: on the one hand, cross-conditionalities are separated from debt reduction 
policies and on the other, corrective measures balancing the current regimes and eschewed 
markets are separated from from fair and efficient procedures. 
In setting the stage, it is noteworthy that in national financial systems, debt-restructuring 
procedures for individuals and corporations have some historical reach. But on the global 
level, the financial system lacks a commonly negotiated and shared framework for dealing 
with defaults of nations. Rather, governments usually borrow without posing collateral, and 
there is no legal mechanism to reinforce payments. The incentive is merely an assumption 
that governments will fully service their debts to ensure continued access to credit, an 
assumption that certainly is doubtful (Stiglitz 2010a: 51). A counter position to this can be 
found in historical sources. Looking back through time, attitudes towards debts and the 
forgiving of debt can be traced to religious sources providing backing for the non-payment 
of debt in cases where the livelihood or survival of the debtor is put in jeopardy. For 
instance, the Judeo-Christian concept is rooted in the recognition that there is a limit 
beyond which the debtor, the community or environment will withstand the pressure of 
collection (see Herman 2007; Veerkamp 2007). The preservation of the actors requires not 
only a stop to the collection but also that all which has been lost in debt bondage be 
reinstated. More contemporary legal principles –– for instance the doctrines of Forza Major 
and that of Rebus Sic Stantibus –– establish grounds for debtor protection in the event of 
overbearing or radically changed circumstances. These principles lend moral strength to 
applying the framework on negative duties to the policies of the present international 
financial framework.   
Finally, to understand sovereign default, it is important to place international lending and 
problem debt in a historical context, a setting that stretches farther back in time than 1982. 
In doing so, a pattern of reoccurring sovereign defaults emerges. Lending booms are 
followed by waves of defaults by nations. Often, these defaults were regional and they 
occurred throughout most decades in the 1800s, and during many decades of the 1900s. The 
debt crisis of the 1930s differed in being wider in geographical terms. Yet, during this time, 
Argentina, Australia, Canada and most of the Central American republics continued to 
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service their national government debts (Eichengreen 1991: 155; see also Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009). In observing this pattern, it is important to make connections with what has 
been established above, namely that defaults are the surfacing signals of deeper structural 
causes. It is also of interest to note that in the 19
th
 century, the leading borrowers were the 
US, Canada, Australia and Russia.
6
 Simultaneously, though, beneath this relatively stable 
surface, a sea change was taking place. The US was transforming from debtor to creditor, 
and New York was taking up the competition with London as a leading financial centre. 
(Eichengreen 1991: 150-1)  
This is also the time where the temporal roots of this thesis are set. The thesis begins in the 
immediate pre-Bretton Woods era, and analyses the mechanisms that this era has brought 
with it. The analysis explains the background to what is the focus of this thesis: the drawn-
out and serious situation of problem debt of poor countries, and the particular ways in 
which sovereign debt is being dealt with. This prolonged and unresolved situation, or 
aggregation of a series of crises in several countries, has transformed into a state of chronic 
indebtedness for many of the poor countries. 
The theoretical approach 
This thesis hopes to provide a critical perspective on international political economy, thus 
contributing to the broad discourse on the study of global governance. Given the 
assumptions of the current market-based economy and its present regimes, the hope is that 
the thesis will contribute to further and related studies by not only economists and political 
economists but also political scientists. The approach is continuous with the body of work 
arguing for reforms of the global order. This thesis shows both appreciation of and 
sympathy with this line of work in that it shares the goal of global institutional reform 
toward introducing democracy into the global regime.
7
 Yet, rather than aiming at covering 
                                                 
6
 None of these defaulted on their principal in the second half of the 19
th
 century. During this time, European 
lending to these countries fluctuated in tune with lending to defaulting regions, Latin America and the Near 
East. Yet, somewhat unexpectedly, as signals from defaulting regions reached Europe, these affected 
Europe‘s willingness to lend to other parts of the world. 
7
 More generally on global democratization, see for instance Archibugi (2008) making a case for 
cosmopolitan democracy, or Smith (1997) for a discussion on more direct participation. For more pragmatic 
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the global regime on a general level or in a holistic way, the entry point is problem debt 
with a particular focus on the participation and decision-making mechanisms for the poor 
countries.  
The thesis brings in an interdisciplinary approach that encompasses economics, philosophy 
and politics, law, as well as a historical perspective. As a point of orientation, the approach 
of this thesis is motivated by the fine comprehensive method founded on historical and 
institutional elements of Robert Cox (2010), albeit without necessarily subscribing to his 
point of departure. Theoretically, the frame combines orthodox macroeconomics with 
political philosophy. To explain and justify this combination, it is of importance to first 
clarify the two main general, yet fundamental, theoretical schools of orientation that 
concern sovereign debt. One school represents the assumption that reasons for increased 
borrowing can derive from speculative or corrupt activities, or in national causes, such as 
growth performance and derive from particular choices of monetary and fiscal policies (see 
Cline 1995; Draghi et al.` 2003).
8
 Building on this assumption, Draghi et al. (2003) explain 
how risk exposures to sovereign debt especially in emerging markets can be measured, 
hedged and transferred through the use of derivatives, swap contracts, and other contractual 
agreements. The central point uniting this school is that the causes of borrowing are 
national and that therefore, the duty to repay the loans are with the indebted nation. 
The other school relates to global disequilibria causing virtually automatically sovereign 
debts in some countries (Keynes 1938; 1943; Raffer and Singer 2001; Raffer 2010). Global 
disequilibrium affect national accountancy by way of imbalances in trade and in doing so, it 
causes balance-of-trade deficits. The borrowing can relate to unexpected changes in the 
interest rates on international loans, or differences in capital market access. Importantly, 
this orientation departs from the one above in that according to this school, due to its 
                                                                                                                                                    
accounts, there is a wave of publications on and from within the World Social Forum-process, see for instance 
Smith and Karides (2007). 
8
 As David Felix (1987) does in his analysis of Latin American growth as associated with particular choices 
of monetary and fiscal policies. The contribution by Draghi et al (2003) is of central importance, not only in 
an academic sense, but also because in November 2011, in the midst of the Euro crisis, Mario Draghi was 
appointed president of the European Central Bank, a central position for devising the policies of dealing with 
the crisis.   
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particular composition of trade, nations are unable to autonomously control its national 
balances and thereby, its need for additional borrowing. We can debate the exact pressures 
of triggering factors and national circumstances in each case, but looking deeper into the 
systemic causes, we cannot escape the dynamics of global current-account deficits that 
centrally inform this thesis.  
This theoretical approach to systemic deficits in the global economy opens up to the need to 
include philosophy and politics into the analysis of sovereign problem debt. Problem debt 
stands out as a particular definable global injustice and the focus is on how this injustice 
can be removed. This particular focus is different from addressing global justice at large. 
Rather, by way of its links to world poverty, problem debt is seen as a global concern that 
takes place beyond the sovereign nation state. In this vein, Amartya Sen‘s (2010) approach 
to global justice goes beyond John Rawls‘s (1971) conception of an original position, 
which aims at ‗perfect justice‘.  
Working towards global justice in this way, and partly relying on Adam Smith‘s work, Sen 
(2010) speaks of the need for an impartial assessment by an overarching authority. 
Consequently, the theoretical frame employed in this thesis is stretched to cover also the 
principles for addressing appropriate institutional arrangements, perhaps most importantly 
the rule of law. The institutional analysis is inspired by Susan Strange‘s (1994; 1996; 1997; 
1998) multidisciplinary work, and her focused attention to ethics and equity, justice and 
efficiency. 
The theoretical approach of this thesis also intersects with some elements of theories of the 
accumulation of debt, and financial risk and uncertainty in particular. As problem debt 
spreads to the Western world, these theories have attracted new attention. Here, the 
accumulation of debt is seen as a key mechanism pushing an economy towards a crisis 
(Minsky 1982: 66-8; see also Hennigan 2008 for paralleling Minsky‘s teachings to the 
financial crisis of 2008). Elsewhere, financial crises in their full global scale have been 
addressed both historically (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) and prescriptively (Roubini and 
Setser 2004; Roubini and Mihm 2010). Here, the focus remains on the global and the 
theoretical and leaves aside short-term financial speculation and cataloguing of financial 
crises fall (as carefully done by Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). The larger context of 
economies in depression has provided inspiration in particular regarding the analysis of the 
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consequences and subsequent policies for dealing with debt (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005; 
1986). Lastly, a listing of financial theories would not be complete without the mentioning 
of Kutznets‘s swings, named after Simon Kuznets who detected a pattern of economic 
cycles repeating every 15-20 years (Eichengreen 1991: 150). In these cyclical processes, 
defaults are integral. It is the question of how we should deal with these defaults that 
constitutes the interest of this thesis. 
Centrally, excessive debt accumulation unites a vast range of crises. Financial crises vary 
both in their causes and in their consequences and can, for instance, be divided into 
currency crises, stock market crashes – or sovereign defaults. It is important to point out 
that not all financial crises result necessarily in sovereign default. Nevertheless, this thesis 
is interested in financial crises as far as they share a few common features. In an immediate 
sense, all crises are marked by a surge in demand for foreign currency (Roubini and Setser 
2004: 16). The precise source of this surge varies, and so does the interpretation of the 
source, but importantly, this ties back to the previous features, and consequently, so does a 
country‘s ability to emerge from the crisis. This is, in turn, a function of not only the size 
and composition of debt, but also a result of the composition of the economy. This function 
leads us back to the dynamics of global current account balances, as introduced above.  
Because of the practical nature of the work, the construction of formalized mathematical 
models or econometric analysis is not the most appropriate method in assessing the 
research question. Yet, this thesis relies on econometrically estimated results as regards the 
consequences of debt-relief programmes and asymmetrical information in the markets. 
Thus, part of the methodology involves abstracting from empirical details. The qualitative 
causal model of viable international debt arbitration is constructed based on the criteria 
identified as fulfilling the economic, political and legal perspectives of being economically 
sound while just. 
The final theoretical element is legal. Narrowing the focus to insolvency procedures alone, 
in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith was the first to propose bankruptcy for nations as 
the least dishonorable for the debtor and the least hurtful for the creditor. It would take a 
good 200 years, and the emergence of the debt crisis in the 1980s, before others developed 
an interest in insolvency procedures on national levels and discussions began to consider 
their application on an international level. Among the contemporary proposals, analogies to 
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the US Bankruptcy Code are particularly popular. Interestingly, there have not been similar 
attempts sprouting from other countries‘ legislation. One explanation could be that most 
countries‘ insolvency laws are based on principles close to ‗Chapter 11‘ of the US Code 
(see Schwarcz 2000: 119). The proposals reflecting international versions of the US Code 
can perhaps best be divided into two groups. On the one hand, there is a line of discussion 
referring to ‗Chapter 11‘ of Title 11 of the Code on business restructuring (in addition to 
the already mentioned Oechli 1981; and Rogoff and Zettelmeyer 2002; see for instance 
Cohen 1989; and Dickerson 2007). Most of these contributions propose some kind of entity 
to deal with debts on a case-to-case basis. For instance, Cohen (1989) calls for a ‗Chapter 
11‘-based International Debt Restructuring Agency (IDRA). But on the other hand, there is 
a discussion rooted in ‗Chapter 9‘ of the same Code, where Raffer (1990) proposes a debt-
arbitration panel to rule what debts should be repaid. ‗Chapter 9‘ refers to insolvency 
procedures for municipalities, which, in comparison to ‗Chapter 11‘, includes features more 
familiar to that of a state. One of the major differences between ‗Chapter 9‘ and ‗Chapter 
11‘ is that the former respects the governmental powers of the indebted. Further, a ‗Chapter 
9‘ approach would cover all debts, private and public. However, from a practical-political 
standpoint, in order for a ‗Chapter 9‘ type approach to be adopted, important connected 
reforms would have to be considered simultaneously, one example being that poor 
countries may not be likely to put their debts to the multilateral institutions up for 
arbitration unless they have access to funding from elsewhere. 
Finally, the analytically critical perspective of international political economy is further 
enforced by some of the arguments relying on the support of often elsewhere overlooked 
multi-disciplinary, historical, detailed and globally focussed European contributions on 
sovereign debt, specifically from the German-speaking region. I am thinking of Christoph 
Paulus (2005), Kunibert Raffer (1990; 2010), Hanspeter Stamm and Christian Suter (1992). 
The research process undertaken  
Methodologically, the thesis subscribes to the tradition of political economy where 
economic, political, and legal dimensions form a synthesis. As laid out above, this thesis 
fits into a frame of critical international political economy. The basic methodology 
constitutes of an assessment of present practices of dealing with international debt against 
the criteria of economic reasoning and justice, here united in the minimalist way of fairness. 
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The angles of my thesis are procedural, institutional and normative. These angles form a 
mutually constitutive relationship bearing back on the economic, political and the legal 
dimensions. Dressed in mainstream terminology, economics is not about social issues of 
redistribution, but about economic efficiency. Problem debt, in turn, extends beyond 
economic efficiency and social issues to include also dimensions of global justice. 
However, the thesis goes beyond weighing proposals for sovereign debt restructuring 
against each other. Rather, the aim is to weigh the properties of the proposals against 
considerations of economic reason and global justice. By merging these two approaches, 
the thesis subscribes to an analytical method. The approach strives at forming a synthesis of 
fair and sound principles from a range of initiatives.  
The first perspective is about economic reason, and relies John Maynard Keynes‘s Global 
Plan (1938; 1943) to show analytically and historically how economic structures drive 
deficit countries down the slippery slope of debt. This is done by tracing the roots of 
present practices of international debt relief and cancellation from economic, political and 
legal angels, to then mirror these against developments on the national level. 
Internationally, the purpose is to enquire whether current economic arrangements, and the 
mechanisms built into these, may generate and explain imbalances as predicted by Keynes. 
This enquiry is done by contrasting the current order to Keynes‘s Global Plan of setting up 
a supranational Bank and Clearing Union designed to create global macroeconomic 
balance. This means that the emphasis is not on Keynes‘s economic theory in general, but 
specifically on his Global Plan and elements of economic philosophy where he places 
economic action in a social and political context. The aim is not at expanding, updating or 
testing Keynes‘s plan, but rather, at placing its perceived probable and practical 
implications against the global economic imbalances of today. It is not necessary to review 
Keynes‘s economics in detail, nor is this thesis an attempt to enter, let alone add to, the 
theoretical discussions on global Keynesianism or of locating the argument within neo-
Keynesianism or post-Keynesianism.  
The second perspective is about global justice, and more precisely, on decreasing global 
injustice. The thesis refers to Amartya Sen‘s (2010) concept of justice where instead of 
seeking ‗perfect justice‘, the aim is at decreasing injustice. In addition to just institutions, 
decreasing injustice can be done by separating between charity and justice, and with the 
support found in Sen and Martha Nussbaum‘s capability approach stating that the 
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appropriate ―space‖ for such a task is that of the substantive freedoms, or capabilities, to 
choose a life one has reason to live (Sen and Nussbaum 1993; Sen 1999: 74). These 
functional capabilities can be seen in contrast to utility or access to resources. From this 
follows that poverty can be seen as capability deprivation. Pragmatically, Thomas Pogge 
emphasizes structural reforms that would not channel charitable money to the global poor 
but which would lift from them burdens that the North currently imposes on them for the 
benefit of the rich (Berges 2007: 2). Problem debt constitutes one such burden, and dealing 
with it in a just manner would decrease injustice. Consequently, in this thesis, the choice is 
to rely on the frames provided by Pogge (for instance 2008b) as the negative duties he 
discusses involves structural reforms of the world systems.  
Questions of justice stretch beyond debt relief, charity and social structures in poor 
countries. To be precise, these issues should be seen in the context of the various 
instruments through which the richer countries of the world deal with the poorer countries. 
The aim is at outlining a framework for solving problem debt as a negative duty of the rich 
countries toward the poor. This makes the operational task of assisting poor countries more 
complicated than simply calling for greater debt relief. The aim should be to get the 
country‘s debt to a sustainable position while dealing simultaneously with the broader 
needs of the country through the full spectrum of aid and other available mechanisms. In 
this instance, a minimal form of Pogge‘s angle is helpful and useful, but, his normative 
contention is left aside. Partly against this background of negative duties, debt relief 
measures are critically assessed with regards to universal human rights. Here, theories of 
institutions provide me with the leverage to look at transporting the principles of debt 
arbitration internationally.  
Despite its partially normative approach, the thesis does not provide a catalogue of potential 
cases of international debt arbitration. Nor does this thesis pretend to create an illusion or 
pander to simplistic notions where solving problem debt alone equals a solution to every 
problem or even to that of eliminating poverty. Rather, as provoked throughout the thesis, 
the aim is to sharpen the thinking around arbitration as a particular insolvency procedure 
for nations as a conceptual and complementing framework for dealing with debt. The 
framework is neither exclusive nor complete. Instead of aiming at presenting the whole 
story, this thesis provides the first chapters only. These chapters do, however, lay the 
groundwork for framing a structure without which other measures cannot be well designed 
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or fitted in. The obvious key challenge is to strike an appropriate balance between common 
international regulations on the one hand, and space for domestic approaches that may 
diverge from harmonized regulations, on the other. With this in mind, and in the grand 
scheme of things, arbitration can indeed stand by itself, addressing multiple aspects 
simultaneously − such as assessing problem debt for its odiousness or on the grounds of 
economic sustainability. However, for dealing with the overall system of the global 
economy, arbitration would have to be accompanied with qualifications in the type of 
measures or reforms of various enhancement and supportive mechanisms in the 
neighbouring financial environment of trade, aid and the overall policies of international 
lending. A holistic approach to policy-making in trade, development aid and finance can 
bring substantial improvements in ensuring systemic coherence and providing more 
efficient and fair outcomes than approaches designed and implemented in isolation. In this 
thesis, though, sovereign debt is singled out as a specific area of finance, an area that is at 
the core of the global economy. 
In terms of definitions, two notes are in order. First, the term ―poor‖ country is used instead 
of the elsewhere often used ―developing‖ country.9 The reason for this choice is to avoid 
the perception of situating countries in a hierarchical order where the ―developed‖ countries 
could in some sense be seen as superior to inferiorly perceived ―developing‖ countries.10 
Against this justification, the definitions follow the World Bank, where middle and low-
income countries, defined in terms of Gross National Income per capita, form a group of 
poor countries. The premise is not only that most countries which were relatively and 
absolutely poor in the middle of the 20
th
 century remain so today, but it is also that they are 
stuck in poverty traps due to various economic gaps and require assistance to break free 
                                                 
9
 The definition of poverty is not central to this thesis. But the World Bank‘s threshold of a US dollar, or two, 
a day is not the ultimate indicator of poverty. In fact, this measurement is perhaps most accurately described 
as a ―summary measure of welfare, standing in place of everything an individual, or a national economy, can 
theoretically access in a market economy‖ (Freeman 2009: 1428). Morally, though, poverty stretches beyond 
a low monetary income. In the language of Amartya Sen (1999: 20), for instance, there are good reasons for 
seeing poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities, rather than merely as low income. 
10
 I also use ―Southern‖ countries interchangeably with ―poor countries‖ and by ―Northern‖ countries, I refer 
to countries mainly located on the Northern part of the globe, including the usual exceptions and additions.   
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from these. Rather, the theoretical and normative questions discussed are closely related to 
pressing debates that we now face and which deal with the urgent issue of world poverty.  
The core argument  
This thesis inquires into support for and the implications of introducing international debt 
arbitration. It is orientated towards exploring a possible set of principles on which the 
argument that international debt arbitration should be based. International arbitration 
implemented in this way would constitute one way of introducing global justice into the 
present de facto global order. Overall, and against the general aim of global justice, on its 
own, debt arbitration remains insufficient. However, it does serve as a positive step towards 
a process of global justice.  
As for the practical-political dimension, the inquiry of the thesis goes beyond questioning 
the status quo. The political feasibility of arbitrating international debt shifted from the 
abstract to the concrete in 2001 when the IMF presented a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism, SDRM, echoing elements of elsewhere presented proposals for insolvency 
mechanisms for indebted poor countries. The SDRM reflected academic discussions 
drawing analogies between principles for national insolvency and the US Bankruptcy 
Code.
11
 In addition to the proposal of the SDRM,
12
 the Euro zone crisis sparked The 
Economist (2011) and The New York Times (Williams Walsh 2011) to call for a permanent 
debt restructuring facility. This proposal makes the question of the political possibility of 
setting up an insolvency mechanism secondary. Rather, of essence are the features, 
principles and processes of which such a mechanism would be comprised. These 
considerations necessarily link to the justifications and arguments behind establishing the 
arbitration procedures. Consequently, the discussion is not about whether to introduce 
insolvency mechanisms, but what kind of mechanism to introduce. Or to be precise, 
according to which principles the mechanism should be introduced for it to be viable. 
Arbitration of international loans is, of course, a balance between power and rights. This 
thesis is an attempt at lining the factors of the equation in a way that will make the 
                                                 
11
 For a discussion on the reasons of political timing and conflicting interests of various involved parties 
behind the SDRM falling through, see Setser (2010). 
12
 The SDRM recently resurfaces in a regional context as a European mechanism for sovereign debt crisis 
resolution: a proposal (Gianviti et al. 2010). 
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assessment of the operation feasible. Based on observations of systemic deficit for poor 
countries and the challenge that debt relief policies pose on economic reason, the thesis 
argues for the viability of debt arbitration in closing some of these gaps. By doing so, the 
thesis proposes a particular framework for closing the economic, political, legal, and 
normative gaps in the research on problem debt. This framework would not determine 
outcomes, it would only establish what makes the procedure for determining debts payable 
or not. Instituting insolvency procedures for countries in a coordinated and formalized 
manner is not only viable but also necessary. Further, with certain qualifications, sovereign 
debt restructuring is not only necessary but also urgently desirable. The argument stands on 
the interpretation of problem debt having its roots in chronic crises in the balances of 
payments, crises which are, in turn, a consequence of the principles behind the international 
economic system. Following on from this, and from a global justice point of view, this 
thesis also argues that in the search for solutions to these different situations of problem 
debt, it is essential to argue for principles that stand the test of universal scrutiny. 
More specifically, the thesis argues for the introduction of internationalizing the principles 
of ‗Chapter 9‘ of Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code for determining the economic 
sustainability of problem debts. This procedure would also allow for dealing with the 
alleged odiousness of certain debts. While the Euro crisis has brought topicality to the issue 
of problem debt, the focus of this thesis is on poor countries and their outdrawn debt crises. 
This is because the historical distance to the actual crisis in combination with the empirical 
outcomes available today provide solid research material to draw from.  
The argument is for a form of coordinated negotiation of agreed principles to deal with 
sovereign debt restructurings, allowing for equal treatment of all parties. It should not only 
be a process of arbitration based on rule of law, including debtor protection. It should also 
allow for the protection of governmental powers of the indebted. Further, the equal 
treatment of all parties stretches to include also all creditors. The procedure must address 
economic sustainability and justice − including procedural fairness and accountability of 
both lenders and borrowers. A parallel, separate but connected procedure must also allow 
for dealing with questions of odious debt. Arbitrating international debt proposes a formula 
intended to give effect to both those imperatives. However, because they are housed in 
different jurisdictions, it is of central importance to separate insolvency proceedings from 
measures of dealing with odious debts. It is neither economically nor legally convincing for 
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an insolvent country to excuse its economic woes by claiming its debts odious. Similarly, 
odious debts should not be argued for on grounds of economic sustainability. Rather, the 
viability lies in not confusing the arguments.  
Compared to the deep entangled history of religious roots and debts, the particular notion of 
‗odious debt‘ is a fairly recent concept, dating back to the early 1900s (see Sack 1927). The 
argument here is that odious debts and economic unsustainability can be dealt with under 
the umbrella heading of an international arbitration panel. One of the features must be a 
temporal aspect, so that odious debt is dealt with first, and remaining problem debt are dealt 
with next. This is because odious debt is independent of a state‘s economic situation, and, 
therefore, suspicions of a debt being odious should first be eliminated.  
As for the contributions on odious debt, the discussions necessitate the separating out of the 
claims behind the proposals regarding problem debt on the grounds of economic 
sustainability on the one hand and odiousness on the other. Discussions without such a 
separation prove messy and confusing. Yet, an approach to solving problem debt without 
mechanisms for addressing both odious debt and economic insolvency remains incomplete. 
Bearing in mind the temporal factor, dealing with sovereign debt through a mechanism of 
international arbitration would open up the possibility of addressing both insolvency and 
odiousness under one umbrella while respecting their different legislations. 
In terms of economic unsustainability, the triggers of the process are a country‘s failure to 
meet its financial obligations upon finding itself in default. Although the practical 
difference between a state facing a liquidity crisis as opposed to an insolvency crisis is 
diffuse, and perhaps legally irrelevant, the argument is that economic analyses of the 
payment crises are important in order to assess the consequent options. Odious debt should 
be dealt with regardless of a default.  
For a nation to declare insolvency, and if combining rule of law with principles for 
bankruptcy, among other considerations, there would need to be an independent entity 
adjudicating what and how much of the debts to repay. Also, odious debts would have to be 
dealt with by an impartial entity. In a sense, this leads to two sets of questions. Firstly, this 
opens up a question regarding the process itself and its potential institutionalization, or 
whether this matters. Further, would the most appropriate process be formal or informal, or 
put differently, would the process be institutionalized in principle, rather than in an 
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organization? Importantly, the thesis sees arbitration of international debts as a process of 
introducing certain principles, a process that may change shape over time. In focusing on 
the process, the detailed legal technicalities of arbitration fall outside the present scope. 
Secondly, different proposed models for arbitration provoke different consequences. Here, 
rule of law is seen as a prerequisite for fairness, and in its basic form, and in this particular 
context, rule of law stands for ensuring equality of the rights of the indebted to those of the 
creditors. Fairness is also a minimal condition for democratization, including global 
democratization, a process that, in turn, may shift the dynamics of the global order perhaps 
even in a profound way. Yet, as stated, this thesis resists the temptation of entering the 
discussion on different democratic theories. Having set the frame of my research question 
in relation to fairness, the central pillars of my argument support for the implementation of 
an international debt arbitration panel mirroring the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘. This explains 
not only the framework for the approach but also the positions relevant to this thesis.  
In focusing on the international application of principles of bankruptcy procedure, and 
rather than concentrating on certain geographical regions, the thesis maintains a global 
scope. It should go without saying that the focus of a universal standard does not mean 
nullifying specific historical or cultural national developments regarding the accumulation 
of debt. For the sake of the task at hand, the focus is on problem debt. This does not mean 
that the reasons behind the economic development in each country are identical, or even 
similar. However, the economies of these countries meet at a point where debt servicing 
constitutes an important part of the national budgets. Accordingly, the thesis traces general 
trends and examines the global context and the international breeding ground for deficit 
countries to foster problem debts. This thesis deals with the treatment of international debt 
only insofar as it is lifted in the international realm. It deals with the principles, procedures 
and premises of sovereign debt as part of the global order. One way this is seen in is the 
abstraction from empirical details.
13
 Another is the fact that cultural conditions are omitted 
from the analysis.  
                                                 
13
 For instance, discussions about early warning mechanisms regarding sovereign debt crisis fall outside this 
scope. For an empirical study on the predictability of sovereign debt crises by investment banks and investors 
in this regard, see Nieto Parra (2008). 
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As a guide to what follows, and as a way of demonstrating my own argument and approach, 
I turn to the contribution to knowledge I seek to make.  
The contribution to knowledge  
While discourses on governmental insolvency have developed in somewhat linear fashions 
(one stream promoting ‗Chapter 11‘ procedures versus another one proposing ‗Chapter 9‘), 
contributions have of course emerged also elsewhere. To this group belongs, for example, 
the proposal of an SDRM, also mentioned above, which would have excluded debts to 
multilateral organizations, an exclusion which fails the SDRM from fulfilling the criteria of 
treating all creditors equally. This translates into the exclusion of options allowing for the 
addressing of responsibilities and past injustices regarding the questioning of lending 
policies. Another category of examples are various conventions, codes and laws. An 
immediate concern for the implementation of these, though, is that they result in slow 
processes. One proposal within this category would be that of implementing public law 
through a sovereign debt restructuring treaty or convention (Schwarcz 2004). The 
provisions of the convention would have three normative constraints: to foster the state‘s 
economic rehabilitation, to minimally affect contractual incentives of creditors, and to 
require only minimal adjudicatory discretion in their administration. Apart from time, 
another factor is the relationship between the conventions and other bodies – the United 
Nations system immediately springs to mind – and the political-power dance that may be at 
play behind closed doors. In a way, the recent initiative, the Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets, or other similar types of Codes 
of Conduct for resolving sovereign debt crises, boils down to a normative summary for and 
by the creditors (see Herman 2010). Thus, the codes themselves are designed outside much 
of the democratic principles for decision-making or participation by the borrowers. 
The 1990s saw accounts of the dealings with the Latin American debt crises in the 1980s 
and subsequent debt-relief initiatives (see for instance Cline 1995 for a thorough analysis 
from a liberal point of view; and Corbridge, 1993, providing not only a free market 
interpretation of the crisis but also a Keynesian ―system-correction‖ and a Marxian 
―system-stability‖ approach). Since then, the heightened interest in problem debt has meant 
that contributions have widened both regarding geographic scope (from Latin America to 
Africa, for instance, and recently stretching into Europe) and thematic focus (from private 
23 
 
to public debts, and from the impacts of debt on social expenditure to peace, among others). 
Some adopt a polemic approach where they call for not only the cancellation of the debts of 
the South, or outright repudiation, but also for compensation from the North (Alternatives 
Sud 2002). Others look at debt relief initiatives specifically on the African continent, 
including extensive national and local case studies (see Mulinge and Mufune 2003), at 
times refined with econometric data and analyzed against economic growth (see Addison et 
al. 2004b; UNCTAD 2004a). Increasingly though, commentators move beyond post-crises 
historic accounts by taking a normative position, for instance by seeing or labeling 
excessive indebtedness as an ethical issue and thus galvanizing approaches for lifting debt 
burdens on moral grounds (see Barry et al. 2007), or by looking at debt sustainability 
through a lens of international financial architecture in search for cross-cutting 
comprehensive solutions on a general level (Herman et al. 2010a).
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For this thesis, among the most relevant works is that of Kunibert Raffer (Raffer and Singer 
2001; Raffer 2010) who, by addressing three main gaps in the Bretton Woods system, 
provides an extensive account of economic divisions between the South and the North. As 
part of the remedy for closing the gaps, his books justify the creation of an international 
debt arbitration mechanism inspired by ‗Chapter 9‘ of the US Bankruptcy Code (for details 
of the proposal, see Raffer 1990). These books intersect with the economic dimension of 
this thesis, and touches upon some of the other sub-questions. Raffer, however, does not 
address questions of global justice or political dimensions either leading up to the 
implementation of international debt arbitration, nor in terms of the consequences of the 
process. On the surface, perhaps the most intimately linked work is that of Mäkipää (2003) 
who compares proposals for sovereign restructuring mechanisms. He uses a practical 
political lens and concludes that the most feasible proposal is found among the most 
discussed proposals thus omitting justifications such as global justice, economic rationality, 
participation mechanisms and steps of practical implementation. Mäkipää also leaves out 
the creation of and politics behind the present structures and the effects an international 
insolvency mechanism would have on these. Palley (2003) and Soederberg (2005) arrive at 
conclusions resembling those of Singer and Raffer (2001), but leave out the effects 
international debt arbitration would have on trade or aid or future lending. To complete this 
listing, two edited volumes must be mentioned. First, Herman et al. (2010c) build a strong 
                                                 
14
 In this thesis, I contend to defining moral as an obligation to take responsibility.  
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case for introducing international sovereign insolvency mechanisms on a general level, but 
leave the reader to judge on the model and underlying specific principles. Second, Primo 
Braga and Vincelette (2011) place the Euro crisis in a recent historical perspective and 
draw important parallels and insights from the past. With the exception of a paragraph in 
Herman et al. (2010a), and a sentence of definition in Primo Braga and Vincelette (2011), 
all four works exclude considerations linked to odious debt. In this context, Raffer (see 
especially 2006; 2007a and 2007b) and Jeff King (2003; 2007a and 2007b) stand out, not 
only as ones among few who connect odious debt with sovereign bankruptcy, but uniquely 
do so by way of disentangling the concepts and by providing each a legal territory of its 
own. By suggesting a reinterpretation of sovereignty regarding sovereign debt as based on 
the rule of law, Lienau (2008a) provides inspiration for that path.  
The literature provides streams of perspectives on odious debt, institutionalizations and 
procedures regarding economic insolvency mechanisms and restructuring processes, but the 
debates do not intersect. This thesis adds to the scarce literature of examining problem debt 
on the aggregate level of the world economy. My thesis contributes to this body of 
literature by providing a comprehensive synthesis by way of a dynamic approach of 
bringing together economic, political and legal perspectives of international debt 
arbitration, and under the headings of economic efficiency and international justice. 
During the past decades, problem debt has attracted widespread attention. Following the 
debt crisis of poor countries as it emerged in the 1980s, economists produced a flood of 
reports linking debt servicing and debt relief to not only economic growth, but also to the 
economic and social developments of the indebted nations. Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs, 
and Joseph Stiglitz became high-profile theorists of debt of poor countries. Against the 
international breadth of the crisis, Sachs (1984) was the first to suggest a centralized 
solution. Stiglitz (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Eaton et al. 1986) developed new thinking on 
asymmetrical information, problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the 
international financial markets and lending activities in particular. Krugman (1988) 
introduced debt forgiveness and suggested that forgiving should be applied alongside 
financing. Soon after, Sachs (1989a) took a step further by suggesting that debt reduction 
could create favourable economic incentives in an indebted country. It was also now, in the 
1980s, when the first tentative inroads for comprehensive dealings with debt restructurings 
in the form of analogies to the principles of national insolvency laws emerged, the case in 
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point being the US Bankruptcy Code (Oechsli 1981; Raffer 1990; see also Rogoff and 
Zettelmeyer 2002).  
Since the 1980s, research on problem debt has been conducted under three headings. In one 
group, the focus has been on country-specific situations and the consequences of debt. 
Many of these contributions are structured around econometric modeling. Another set of 
linked work is on the assessments of debt and the impacts of particular debt relief 
programmes and initiatives in poor countries. Works in this group have also brought to 
light critical analyses on the lending policies of the international financial institutions (see 
for instance Addison et al. 2004b; Theunissen and Akkerman 2004). With the Euro zone 
crisis, this pile of work on country-specific analyses has grown high. Part of this work on 
debt-relief programmes and particular countries bridges to the third group, contributing 
actively to discussions on odious debt. In recent years, this discussion has resurged 
especially among legal scholars. 
Legal scholars have approached problem debt by reviving concepts and discussing 
mechanisms related to international debt. Specifically, they have blown life into the concept 
of ―odious debt‖, and current debates revolve around its place and role in international law. 
In a way, these debates continue the analysis of lending policies, as some of this work is 
related to the legality of national regimes and international law of contracts.
15
 These 
discussions were fuelled further by the practical dimension brought about with the 
cancellation of Iraq‘s debts (see for instance Gelpern 2005).16 As these debates gather 
momentum, they echo equally accelerating discussions within civil society. A common 
denominator of these arguments is found in Patricia Adams‘s (1991) revival of the concept 
of odious debt as determined by Alexander Nahum Sack. According to his thinking, Sack 
(1927) believed that debts accumulated due to reasons outside the interests of the state 
should not be repaid. These debts include loans accumulated to strengthen a despotic 
regime or to oppress the population. Today, the legal debates branch in three main 
                                                 
15
 I see a regime as a body of formal and informal rules. 
16
 Some of this debate emerges in special editions of journals dedicated particularly to the topic, among them 
70 Law and Contemporary Problems 3 (Summer 2007) and 4 (Autumn 2007) and North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation, 2007, vol. 32, no. 4, Summer. See also 67 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 4 (Summer 2004).  
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directions. The first direction is about linking odious debts to democracy, opening up the 
possibility of odious debt being used ex ante to steer loans away from non-democratic 
regimes toward democratic ones (see Khalfan et al. 2003; Kremer and Jayachandran 2002; 
Jayachandran and Kremer 2006; and Pogge 2008a). Others have investigated the 
responsibility of lenders as opposed to borrowers (most importantly Hanlon 2006a and b). 
Among other things, this casts reasonable doubt on the present system where the debtor 
alone is responsible for the debts. A third branch focuses on attempts at redefining and 
reinventing the concept of odious debt (see for instance Ochoa 2008a).  
Insolvency procedures for nations also meet outright resistance. Within civil society, some 
social movements and organizations express reservations regarding the concept of 
insolvency and bankruptcy, a term they refer to as stigmatized and humiliating. 
Increasingly though, an international adaptation of the principles behind ‗Chapter 9‘ has 
gained ground, be that under the heading of a Free and Transparent Debt Arbitration 
Process (as proposed by Afrodad 2001 and Erlassjahr 2001), a Board of Arbitration based 
on a Financial Code (as suggested by Acosta and Ugarteche 2007), or something else. 
Consequently, there is a growing body of analyses by civil society, analyses often tied to 
calls for structural changes in the economic order. Among these agencies, processes, codes, 
conventions, boards, models and mechanisms, the argument of this thesis is set to navigate 
analytically, systematically and in a contemplative way towards a possible process that 
would be economically efficient while withstanding the test of justice and procedural 
fairness.  
Somewhat surprisingly, among political scientists and even political economists, problem 
debt has received far less attention than it deserves.
17
 Instead, the issue has been discussed 
primarily by economists and lawyers. Yet, the treatment of problem debt is indeed a highly 
political matter. Not only does it involve relations among states, even if private entities are 
part of the deal, but problem debt of poor nations has also become the focus of persistent 
international  movements (Herman 2010: 4). At its core, the movements are driven by a 
political concern: the international process lacks justice. There is a clear need for input 
regarding the political dimensions of global justice in relation to problem debt and the 
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 Exceptions include Lipson (1981); George (1992); George and Sabelli (1994), Soederberg (2005) Lienau 
(2008a); and Helleiner (2008). 
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implications on sovereignty and legitimacy. More specifically, the demand is for a dynamic 
cross-disciplinary approach, bringing together not only the economic, political and legal 
perspectives, but built on synthesized justifications and normative prescriptions for solving 
problem debt in a coherent and sustainable way.  
The chapter structure  
In expanding the scope of looking at sovereign debt in this way, the thesis is structured in 
eight chapters, where each of the six substantive chapters addresses a sub-question 
regarding a particular dimension of problem debt. Each chapter also includes an element of 
normative approach of what arbitration of international debts would mean for the world‘s 
economic, political and legal system, respectively. The emphasis on the normative becomes 
stronger as the argument builds up throughout the thesis. In Part II, the chapters serve to 
qualify the implications on the related regimes of trade, aid and international lending, based 
on the conclusions of the chapters in Part I.  
Each chapter can be read separately, but the sum, however, is hoped to be more than the 
individual parts. In fact, the proposal of arbitrating international debt rests on the results of 
a critical analysis of the economic, political and legal dimensions of the current order. 
Regarding the movement of the argument, the viability of arbitration of international debt is 
analysed by way of posing six sub-questions, which are dealt with in two stages. Firstly, 
Part I provides an analysis of the proposal for international insolvency procedures from an 
economic, political, and a legal dimension. Part II qualifies this analysis by looking at the 
impact of arbitration of international debt on the regimes of transfers between countries, 
transfers involving trade, aid and financial flows. The chapters follow a tripartite structure, 
beginning with an analysis of historical developments, followed by an inquiry into 
contemporary practices as tested against the criteria of economic reason, justice and 
fairness and concluding with a normative approach. Further, the proposal for a ‗Chapter 9‘-
inspired arbitration panel builds up throughout the thesis so that the various aspects of the 
proposals as they are introduced in the chapters are eventually assembled in chapter 7 as 
part of a normative vision discussing what lending and borrowing might look like in the 
future. Throughout this thesis runs the thread of normative assessment regarding the effects 
of international arbitration on the movement of capital and profit. 
28 
 
Part I begins with a chapter on the economics of sovereign debt and analyses the 
sustainability of the present system of dealing with debt by looking at the history of its 
creation and the consequences as they appear today through a Keynesian lens. Second, the 
thesis asks how the pattern of issuing continuous debt relief relates to economic reason? 
Thirdly, cases of de facto national insolvency procedures are discussed. Would formalized 
arbitration of international debt make economic sense – and is it viable?  
The political question shifts the focus to sovereignty of nation states and asks if arbitration 
of debts is defensible. The chapter begins by placing problem debt in a global justice 
framework, and argues that the rich have a negative duty towards the poor. Universal 
human rights are placed in relation to problem debt. Second, the focus is shifted to 
sovereignty in relation to sovereign debt under the argument  that due to the international 
web of forums, the sovereignty of nation states is actually subordinated to global 
governance. Finally, it is argue that arbitrating international debt would increase the 
sovereignty of nation states. The current ad hoc nature of debt reorganization calls for some 
kind of common and just framework based on procedural fairness. 
The legal question revolves around setting an institutional framework for international debt 
arbitration. This is done by asking if established principles of rule of law can be transported 
internationally, and if insolvency procedures can be applied to states. The question of 
national insolvency differs of course from that of individuals or corporations already since 
nations cannot be liquidated and because of the exclusive right of the state to tax its 
populations. What would the implications of the various proposals be? Would these make 
sense, and would they bring about international rule of law? From this follows the question 
of how the concept of odious debt should be approached and dealt with, and how it stands 
in relation to sovereign insolvency. Further, the thesis looks into the issue as to if the 
insolvency procedure arbitration would be placed in an institution or not – and if this 
matters. Importantly, such an institutional framework must address the above questions, 
address the appropriate jurisdictions while simultaneously, it must fill the missing gaps in 
the present global economic architecture.  
Problem debt is often discussed together with its close counterparts, trade, aid and access to 
future funding. This brings us to Part II, the supportive leg of the thesis, where the three 
sub-questions evolve around the neighboring fields and regimes of trade, aid and the 
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organization of international lending. In order for debt rescheduling to be successful in the 
long run, it must be accompanied by transformations and reorientations in these 
neighboring fields. While these changes fall outside the purpose of this thesis, the aim of 
this part is to identify the effects the implementation of an international debt arbitration 
mechanism would have on these regimes. Simultaneously, Part II contextualizes the 
concept of international debt arbitration by assessing the limitations of this application in 
terms of identifying a long-term solution to global problem debt.  
Part II begins by asking if debt arbitration is helpful, given the present trade regime. Here, 
the focus is on the links between trade and debt, and more precisely, on cross-conditionality 
and the history behind the institutionalization of world trade and how the task of regulating 
commodity prices has been left unaddressed. Further, the attention is on how falling terms 
of trade have led to accumulated debts for poor countries and how, in the present order, free 
trade holds a dominant position in the global order.  The present regime is placed against 
Keynes‘s proposal for an International Trade Organization, and the thesis examines the free 
market ideology, inquiring about the relationship between current free trade and the debt 
build-up.  
In the regime of official development aid, debt relief constitutes a central – and relatively 
growing – element in aid budgets. The goals of development aid were never intended to 
address structural imbalances in the economic system. Rather, development aid is based on 
the notion of a combination of national self-interest and giving with a return on 
investments. But pouring money into debt relief with modest investments and increasing 
debts does little to improve the situation in a lasting way. The thesis thus next inquires into 
the place of development aid in relation to Keynes‘s Global Plan and Pogge‘s negative 
duties. The present ways of renewed debt-relief schemes contradicts economic reasoning, 
and in this chapter, it is argued that in part, development aid has become a tool to counter 
this irrationality. The links between aid and debt are complicated, and the thesis seeks to 
establish if the effects of arbitration on aid can be helpful. First, the emergence of 
development thinking is traced. Next, the international justice aspect of development aid is 
addressed and third, global arbitration is linked to aid.  
This brings us to the final chapter of this thesis, a chapter that looks at the organization of 
international lending. Given the current regime, could debt arbitration better balance the 
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rights of the creditors and borrowers? Much of today‘s problem debt is owed to the 
international financial institutions, the same institutions that administer the international 
debt schemes. In case of sovereign default, the lack of a coordinated mechanism proves 
expensive to the creditors and debtors alike. This deficiency also contradicts economic 
reason. Whether it is about internal or external debt, the core purpose becomes that the 
crisis before us emerges as one where problem debt seems eternal. Instead, in today‘s 
global finance, discussions about a global lender of last resort and global bankruptcy 
mechanisms necessarily surface. In response, the thesis proposes placing the interests of the 
market before those of the creditor. First, it looks at what the absence of a global lender of 
last resort brings with it. Next, it assesses the interests of the lender, the borrower and the 
market. And third, it builds upon and concludes with a discussion of the initiative of setting 
up an international restructuring mechanism according to ‗Chapter 9‘. 
Finally, the conclusion outlines the possible contours that a debt arbitration mechanism 
might take. It also highlights the limitations of the proposal of global arbitration of debt, 
and points to further work. Is global arbitration of international debt viable? The argument 
of this thesis is that ‗yes, it is viable, but with qualifications‘.  
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PART I:  
 
The economic, political, and  
legal dimensions of problem debts of  
poor countries 
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2.  
THE ECONOMIC QUESTION:  
 
Is the current system economically 
viable?  
 
 
It was in the early 1980s that the debt burdens of poor countries spilled over into a debt 
crisis. This situation persists into the present and hence, the economic core of this thesis. 
That particular debt crisis first emerged in 1981 when Poland defaulted on its loans, which 
was considered a major shock on the world‘s financial markets.18 The following year, 
Mexico declared itself unable to honor its debt obligations. This event attracted much 
international attention and is generally considered the beginning of what is today referred to 
as the poor countries‘ debt crisis of the early 1980s. At the time, the aggregated debt burden 
of poor countries constituted some USD 600 billion (World Bank 2008). The roots to this 
crisis go back to the 1970s, when the level of external debt for what constitutes today the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries equaled the total exports and a quarter of their Gross 
Domestic Product (World Bank 2008). By the late 1980s, their debts equaled the GDP and 
a good five times their exports. At most, by the mid 1990s, the level of indebtedness among 
the HIPC countries topped 152 per cent of GDP (1994) and 663 per cent of exports (1993) 
(World Bank 2008). Fifteen years on, external debt ratios have fallen. The average external 
debts to GDP ratio of HIPCs have dropped to 45 per cent and the ratio over exports to 150 
per cent (World Bank 2008). Specifically for Sub-Saharan Africa, through HIPC, external 
debt to Gross Domestic Income ratios fell from more than 80 per cent in the mid-1990s to 
                                                 
18
 Here, default stands for a(ny) failure to meet a(ny) financial obligation, or when the debtor has not met his 
legal obligations as stated in the loan contract. 
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less than 30 per cent today (World Bank 2009: figure 1m).
19
 This does not mean however, 
that problem debt of poor countries has been done away with, or that the current solutions 
are sustainable. Rather, the emerging figure is less linear and more complex than these 
observations may indicate. To begin with, a counter observation is found in absolute figures 
where poor countries‘ external debts constitute almost five times as much as what they 
were in 1982, or nearly USD 3 000 billion (World Bank/Global Development Finance 
2007a: online data bank). In this context, a quick look at Africa reveals that between 1970 
and 2002, the continent received some USD 540 billion in loans – and paid back some USD 
550 billion in principal and interest (UNCTAD 2004a: 9-10). In spite of this, Africa 
remained with a debt stock of USD 295 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa received USD 294 
billion, and paid USD 268 billion – but remained with a debt stock of some USD 210 
billion. Discounting interest and interest on arrears, further payments of outstanding debt 
would represent a reverse transfer of resources. What is more, even though some countries 
have reduced their external debts through HIPC, the level of internal debt may be on the 
rise.  
Such observations inspire careful thought regarding the vulnerability of poor indebted 
countries. One way of examining such thoughts is by exploring the composition of both 
debtors and debts. As for the composition of debtors, two recent trends are significant. 
Rising commodity prices of the early 2000s benefited exporters, especially in Latin 
America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2009). In contrast, the shock 
spike in prices has been costly for food and fuel importers. In this vein, current account 
balances of most oil-importing low- and middle-income economies worsened (World Bank 
2009: figure 1p). As for the composition of debts, two further trends stand out. Partly as a 
result of the previous point, private non-guaranteed debt of low- and middle income 
economies rose, from 24 per cent of total debt in 2000 to 37 per cent in 2007 (World Bank 
2009). But then again, and relating to the general observation of vulnerability of poor 
countries, in countries with declining external debt, this has to be balanced by further 
increasing internal, or domestic, debt. Alternatively, concerning these compositions in 
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 The national GDI stands for the total value produced within a country. The GNI comprises the GDI 
together with the income received from and payments made to other countries (such as dividends and 
interests). 
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general, a short-term decline in debt, or immediate decrease in lending, may result in a 
compensatory greater need for aid. This aid may not materialize fully or even partially, and 
eventually, this temporary decline leads to increased borrowing.  
Another school of thought relates to the chronic state of indebtedness of poor countries. 
One explanation is found in the pattern of countries with trade deficits financing their 
current account by increased borrowing abroad. This theory of debt as a structural problem 
is supported by the very close correlation between external terms of trade shocks and debt-
servicing problems as observed by Nissanke and Ferrarini (2004). This also echoes the 
theory of economic structures and deficit zones. In this context, some evidence for the 
polarization of deficits and surpluses is found in the observation that between 2005 and 
2007, the five largest surplus economies in the world accounted for 71 per cent of total 
current account surpluses, and the five largest deficit economies account for 79 per cent of 
the total current account deficits (World Bank 2009: table 1e). With the emergence of the 
debt crisis and the recognition of problem debt, a storm of discussions ensued, peaking in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Yet, taking a fresh look at that discussion, what shadows 
not only the relevance of the trends, what they are relative to and even the disputes 
regarding the methodology of acquiring them, is the fact that the indebtedness of poor 
countries remains severe. The severity of the situation is not helped by the close 
connections between high levels of indebtedness and poverty. From a global perspective, 
the logic of maintaining the debt claims does not hold, at least if contrasted against the goal 
of poverty alleviation, the main aim of not only the Bretton Woods institutions, but also of 
the OECD donors. In this chapter, though, the focus is on the economic reasoning that 
allows debt claims on over-indebted nations to be maintained and that, ultimately, informs 
the principles of debt relief programmes. In this context, it is of quintessential importance 
to note that there is no body or standardized universally agreed mechanism that indebted 
countries could turn to. The aim here is to show that since the current ways in which debt is 
dealt with are neither operating according to economic reasoning nor are they just, the 
system is not economically viable or justifiable; and also, that by stretching into the 
political and the legal spheres, problem debt is an issue that reaches well beyond 
economics. But the first question, that should preface the latter, is if debt relief and debt 
cancellations are economically viable.  
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Building on this, addressing the question of whether debt relief and debt cancellations are 
economically viable is best done by addressing three sub-questions. Firstly, this chapters 
begins by asking where the debt build-ups come from. This is done by placing the 
economic order into a historical context and contrasting it to John Maynard Keynes‘s 
proposal for a mechanism striving at global equilibrium. By tracing the thinking behind 
debt relief, the chapter continues by looking into reactionary debt related policies. 
Secondly, the economics of debt relief is looked into by asking if the policies are 
economically sustainable. In this context, economic reason can be looked at both from the 
debtor‘s side (has debt relief brought about space for national economic sovereignty?) and 
from the creditors‘ side (is the established pattern of pouring funds into debt relief paying 
off in some way?).
20
 Thirdly, ways of dealing with sovereign debt crises are compared. The 
chapter concludes by arguing for international debt arbitration as a coordinated forum for 
more efficient and more just dealings with problem debt. 
2.1 The history behind problem debt 
Often, economists‘ analysis of sovereign indebtedness is placed in the present situation, 
with emphases on inter-temporal borrowing and lending models (Easterly 2002), theories of 
the financial markets (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), the effects of debt on growth (see part II of 
Addison et al. 2004b), or poverty effects of debt relief (see part III of Addison et al. 
2004b). With increasing frequency, these contributions either start from or conclude with 
the concept of ‗debt sustainability‘, a concept that is, however, set aside for a moment. For 
now, it is of importance to note that less often is the build-up of problem debt put in a 
historical perspective relating it to the creation of and the principles behind the Bretton 
Woods institutions. The significant impact these principles have had in creating problem 
debt justifies a reflection on the history behind problem debt.  
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 The economic analysis of debt relief comes with two further qualifications. First, in situations where debt 
burdens have not decreased sufficiently, it may of course be that this figure would be even higher had the 
country not received any debt relief at all. Second, debt accumulates from many areas, such as in situations of 
decreased domestic economic growth rate, in situations where debtors‘ lending profiles suffer, if funding 
becomes more expensive or as a result of accumulation of interest on debts. Sudden shocks in one area – or 
several simultaneous areas – are not necessarily matched with corresponding increase in debt relief. 
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By situating the onset of problem debt as a result of the crisis in the early 1980s, the fact 
that the international economic order was set in place much earlier, becomes blurred. The 
date is unhelpful in tracing the genealogy of how international debts are administered, a 
process where the policies have gone from creditors declaring war on the indebted nation 
(up until the early 1900s) to creditors pushing problem debt under its current heading of 
development aid (in the 1980s). Specifically, the date distracts attention from the system 
put in place in the 1940s, an order that included the creation of the international financial 
institutions, or the structures of the world economy.  
The international financial institutions were designed in the planning and creation process 
of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, with the objective of securing international financial 
stability and facilitating world economic growth. In a broad sense, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, comprising the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank group, are 
based on the thinking of Keynes, the UK negotiator in defining the Bretton Woods 
agreements. But Keynes was not the sole institutional architect at the table and the 
negotiated outcome resulting in the economic order as we know it today is a compromise 
between the UK and US negotiation parties, personified in Keynes on the UK side and 
Harry Dexter White representing the US.
21
   
Essentially, on almost every point where Keynes was overruled by the Americans, he was 
later proved correct (see for instance DeLong 2000). Among other issues, Keynes predicted 
that eventually, the adopted system would lead to a slippery slope of deficit for certain 
groups of countries. With this particular prediction in mind, the next section looks at what 
Keynes proposed and what the negotiations actually resulted in from the point of view of 
problem debt.  
Keynes’s Global Plan and the role of debt 
Keynes saw that involuntary unemployment is equal to a waste of resources (Toye 2006: 
984; see Keynes 1936). What was not produced today would never be produced at all, and 
Keynes thinking was prompted by a desire to prevent this waste of resources and realize 
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 For accounts of the positions, negotiations and compromises in establishing the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
see for instance Boughton (2002); or George and Sabelli (1994: chapter 1) for an expanded, yet more critical, 
explanation. 
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potential output.
22
 In a similar vein, Keynes‘s vision for international economics was based 
on his long-standing opposition to deflation as a method of economic adjustment (Toye 
2006: 990).  Keynes developed this vision in three memoranda on an International Clearing 
Union, on Commodity Buffer Stocks and Plans for Relief and Reconstruction, all written in 
1942.
23
 
Keynes argued for the creation of a relatively open multilateral system of trade and 
payments. This system is aimed at reconciling openness and trade expansion with stable, 
but adjustable, exchange-rate capital controls alongside commitments of national 
governments to full employment and economic political stabilization. The theory supports 
work towards a common aim for symmetry in global economics. The idea is to manage a 
system of international trade and payments with strong incentives for nations to avoid both 
substantial trade deficits as well as trade surpluses. Importantly, for Keynes, the broad 
purpose and method of these proposals overrode the technical details: ―The principal object 
can be explained in a single sentence: to provide that money earned by selling goods to one 
country can be spent on purchasing the products of any other country. In jargon, a system 
of multilateral clearing.‖ (Keynes 1943: §528)  
To put the theory into practice, Keynes suggested a global plan consisting of two 
international institutions, the first being an International Clearing Union authorized to 
impose measures for correcting imbalances between surplus and deficit countries.
24
 In 
short, the role of the Union would have been to regulate trade between nations.
25
 The key 
twist is that in addition to taxing deficits, the Union would have taxed also credit reserves 
of nations. Concerning balance of payments imbalances, Keynes recommended that both 
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 It is of course often emphasized that at the time, the prime driving force of Keynes was that the aftermath of 
World War II must not be a repetition of the unemployment and inflation that Britain, Germany, and the USA, 
too, suffered from in the post-war period.  
23
 To these three memoranda one could add the Beveridge Report of the same year, in 1942, since Keynes 
reportedly contributed significantly to this document. 
24
 The International Clearing Union replaced Keynes‘s earlier proposal of an International Currency Union.  
25
 Keynes did not claim that the idea for an International Clearing Union was purely his own invention, but 
rather, that it was a compilation of ideas of others. For an account on the roots of the proposal as they 
emerged from Schacht and Funck, see Iwamoto (1997: 179). 
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debtors and creditors should adjust their policies. Countries with payment surpluses should 
increase their imports from deficit countries, and by doing so they would create foreign 
trade equilibrium. Thus, Keynes was sensitive to the problem that placing too much of the 
burden on the deficit country would be deflationary, or bring about a process of a general 
reduction of price levels. This is because he saw that falling prices increase debt burdens. 
Investors hoard their currency rather than invest it, a process which in turn affects future 
economic growth adversely. 
The Union would have been overseen by another institution, an International Clearing Bank 
managing not only an international, but a universal currency, the bancor.
26
 In fact, the 
International Clearing Bank would have been a world central bank, where countries would 
become debtors and creditors towards the bank rather than to each other. Contemporary 
ideas of a world central bank and a global lender of last resort are best considered alongside 
elaborations regarding international bankruptcy proceedings, and are returned to in that 
context in chapter 7.  
But for now, and as noted, Keynes was only one of several negotiators in the setting up of 
the Bretton Woods system. The United States, being concerned about inflationary pressures 
in the postwar economy – in addition to being a likely creditor nation – negotiated a more 
modest plan.
27
 Where Keynes had proposed a much larger Fund, functioning as a global 
lender of last resort, a weaker version was set up as the IMF. On the one hand, its weakness 
derives from its limited capacity for correcting imbalances and in the only modest 
obligations for creditor nations to contribute to a relief fund. On the other hand, even if the 
resources lasted further than assumed, an important conundrum lies in the inconsistent and 
inefficient ways of making use of these resources (Roubini and Setser 2004: 336). Either 
way, essentially, the IMF was given an economic mandate and political ideology that 
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 For current interpretations on Keynes‘s proposal for an International Clearing Union see for instance 
Costabile (2007: 16); Peden (2006: 112); and Raffer and Singer (2001: 2, 4). 
27
 A related explanation is found in Nagel (2005: 136), who explains that in the absence of global justice, 
prosperous nations have reason to want more governance on a world scale, but they do not want the increased 
obligations or demands for legitimacy that may follow. They do not want to increase the range of those to 
whom they are obliged as they are toward their own citizens, and this reflects the convictions of their citizens, 
not just their governments.  
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stressed controlling inflation and introducing austerity plans over striving for global 
balances. In contrast to the proposal by Keynes, the system is such that in times of 
economic crises, deficit countries are driven towards tightening fiscal spending. But 
centrally, Keynes‘s proposal that debtors and creditors would both be equally responsible 
for deficits and excesses in their balance of payments was also not picked up upon, rather, 
the adopted terms of agreement set out that debts are the responsibility of the debtor 
alone.
28
 In short, Keynes‘s proposal would have encouraged a common strive for global 
economic balance, whereas the present system fosters an environment where debtors have 
few alternatives but to head into a debt trap.
29
 
The breeding ground for what has turned into problem debt of poor countries was thus 
cemented in the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944. From a global perspective, 
mechanisms of exchange and falling terms of trade, or relative prices of a country‘s export 
to import, set different courses for economic development in countries in deficit vis-à-vis 
countries showing a surplus. As will be seen below, this fertile soil for debt accumulation 
was further nourished by a number of exogenous shocks, overall inexperience in general, 
sudden unilateral policy shifts by the creditors and imprudence by the borrowers. For 
instance, had non-oil primary commodity prices been maintained and stabilized between 
1950-73, the rise in oil prices, which constituted one of the central factors behind the build-
up of debt, would not have contributed to the balance of payment crisis and the subsequent 
debt crises in poor countries (Raffer and Singer 2001: 5-6). Before analyzing the efficiency, 
here seen as the economic reasoning behind which debt relief has been implemented so far, 
an examination of these pivotal incremental shifts as they unfolded chronologically is in 
                                                 
28
 This was also the main point of ideological difference between White and Keynes. This is in contrast to 
many of the other parts of their proposals, where their positions can be seen as differences in degrees. As 
Keynes (1943: §535) said and wrote: ―Most critics, in my judgment, have overstated the differences between 
the two plans, plans which are born of the same climate of opinion and which have identical purpose.‖ 
29
 Stiglitz (2002b: 12-3) is strong in his criticism of the IMF. He says that founded on the belief that markets 
often work badly, the IMF now champions market supremacy with ideological enthusiasm. And, founded on 
the belief that there is a need for international pressure on countries to have more expansionary economic 
policies, today, the IMF typically provides funds only if countries engage in policies like cutting deficits or 
cutting taxes, actions that lead to a contraction of the economy. Keynes would roll in his grave were he to see 
what has happened to his child, Stiglitz concludes.  
41 
 
order. This process can be broken into ten partially overlapping phases, here roughly 
divided into periods of Keynesianism and post-Keynesianism. 
Problem debt sets root  
With the economic structures of the mid-1940s in place, the subsequent half a century saw 
a number of other events leading up to the onset of over-indebtedness among poor 
countries.
30
 As for the borrowers, one could generalize and say that they have largely been 
poor, oil-importing states that often have complex economies and extensive official 
development aid programmes (Lipson 1981: 611). Usually, accounts of debt accumulation 
describe the collapse of the gold standard system and two oil crises (in 1973-4 and 1979-
80) as a significant juncture. In addition, in the period between the 1970s and the early 
2000s, mounting loans followed from falling terms of trade led to spiraling debt. 
Subsequently, borrowing increased due to the higher costs of energy and manufactured 
imports. These events were accompanied with hiking interest rates, and accordingly, the 
absolute debt figures increased rapidly. The full story is however, somewhat more 
complicated than this brief synopsis indicates. A closer look at the historical and 
chronological specificities behind the debt build-up and its changing composition covering 
both the borrowers‘ and the lenders‘ perspectives reveal a number of additional and 
complex processes and mechanisms.  
For one, the abandonment of exchange rate pegging and general deregulation created a new 
environment for lending. Under the Bretton Woods agreements, countries fixed their 
exchange rates to the US dollar. In turn, the US pegged its dollar to gold, which, in practice, 
meant that indirectly, every currency fixed to the dollar also held a fixed value to the gold.
31
 
In 1971, this system broke down as US President Richard Nixon withdrew from the 
agreement when, in hindsight, the US found itself in a situation of financial duress due to 
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 For accounts on the unfolding of these events, see for instance Lipson (1981); Corbridge (1993: Part I); 
George and Sabelli (1994); and Raffer and Singer (2001: especially chapter 11).   
31
 The USD was pegged to gold at the rate of USD35 per ounce. By the early 1960s, gold was exchanged at a 
higher price, showing that investors knew that the dollar was overvalued. To reflect these events against 
Keynes‘s Global Plan, Keynes was not supportive of a gold standard in the first place, an issue I will return to 
in Chapter 7. 
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the prolonged nature of the Vietnam War. This ‗Nixon shock‘, also sometimes called the 
‗Volcker shock‘, stood for the rupture of the US dollar from gold, and was accompanied 
with a move to floating exchange rates ultimately leading to a sudden and subsequent rise 
in interest rates unilaterally by the US on its outstanding loans.
32
 This move was part of a 
more general deregulation of international economic affairs (Corbridge 1993: 31), a policy 
that was to accelerate and become more intense during the following decades, and to which 
I will return below, and then again in Chapter 7. Consequently, benefiting from less 
regulation and subsequently lower costs, much of the debt was accumulated in the offshore 
markets (Lipson 1981: 604, see also Balin 2008: 2).
33
 The move represented a shift from 
multilateralism to unilateralism.  
Also in the 1970s, flows of official development aid stagnated as the available aid was 
redirected toward poorer recipients. This led to an even higher dependency on the 
Euromarkets for the financing of balances of payment. (Lipson 1982: 612)
34
 The 
subsequent mixture of commercial financing and slow adjustment also had other global 
ramifications. According to Lipson (1981: 613), the single most important impact is on the 
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 Naomi Klein refers to this as ―the Volcker Shock that ballooned the developing world‘s debt in the 
eighties‖ (2007: 257). Paul Volcker was the chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987 and who 
allowed interest rates to reach 21 per cent, leading to a surge in domestic bankruptcies and mortgage defaults. 
It had disastrous consequences for foreign nations‘ finances – particularly those in the developing world, as 
Naomi Klein refers to. 
33
 Low transaction costs are interesting not only to creditors. Debtors look for cheaper balance-of-payments 
financing. (Lipson 1981: 604) 
34
 Eurodollars are deposits denominated in USD at banks outside the US, which means that they are not under 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve. Consequently, such deposits are not subject to the same regulation as 
similar deposits within the US, allowing for higher margins. The ―Euro‖ prefix of Euromarkets, or 
Eurodollars, comes from the fact that the market for these offshore currencies is based in London. 
Consequently, there is nothing particularly ―European‖ about Eurodollar deposits; a US dollar-denominated 
deposit in Caracas or Tokyo would likewise be deemed Eurodollar deposits. As for the roots of the 
Euromarket, first, domestic regulations stimulated their development as a less costly source of funds. Second, 
as the market developed, monetary authorities in the US generally avoided actions that might have stunted its 
growth. If the US was concerned with its capital account, the British were concerned with London‘s role as an 
international financial center. The US welcomed the Euromarket‘s development in the City. In this way, state 
action and inaction shaped the institutional context of credit flows. (Lipson 1981: 605, 607) 
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distribution of the balances of trade, or the current accounts. At the time, creditors were 
guided by the misconception that there was not going to be any shifting of current account 
problems onto others. Instead, surpluses by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries were made available to countries needing to top up their deficits, a fact that 
soothed potential confrontation by the deficit nations towards those in surplus.
35
 
Petrodollar recycling describes the need of oil-rich countries to lend money to their oil-
poor customers (Snow 2010: 411). This remarkable transfer of global wealth was carried 
out by the Eurobanks, not by the central banks, thus extracting a price, as it accommodated 
not only the collective deficit but also the OPEC surplus. This shift, also based on the 
increased consumption of oil as a result of the increased demand for energy globally, led to 
the transformation of countries into states of vulnerability previously only familiar to 
companies (Snow 2010: 406). In this way, the recycling of petrodollars was the first step in 
the creation of global financial markets (Snow 2010: 409). Today, one of the characteristics 
of the financial markets is that the value of financial movements exceeds, by far, the traded 
value of goods, a matter returned to in chapters 5 and 7. 
Parallel to these developments on the lending front, the composition of lenders, their 
geography and the loans themselves interweave in a dynamic way. A trend of general 
growth in sovereign lending since the 1970s is observed by Bulow (2002: 45) who credits 
this development to the fact that lending contracts started moving jurisdiction over 
sovereign commercial transactions to first world courts. A closer look at this trend reveals 
additional complexities. At first, creditors were seeking to expand both their portfolios and 
the number of partners. As often referred to, and in response to the high oil prices during 
the first oil crisis of the early 1970s, and the surplus of Eurodollars, the major commercial 
banks, operating in virtually unregulated Euromarkets, embarked on profitable lending. 
Soon, the Euromarkets assumed a central role in mediating international capital flows and 
financing world trade, and in the process, private banks became major creditors of 
sovereign states (Lipson 1981: 605). Simultaneously, international banking had developed 
syndication mechanisms for mobilizing large sums from multiple banks for lending 
predominantly to poor country governments (Herman et al. 2010; Garay Salamanca 2010). 
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 OPEC is often categorized as a cartel. Unlike other cartels, however, OPEC is composed of nation states 
as opposed to businesses.  
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This process was enforced by a breach of a key bank regulatory decision from 1979, a 
violation that came to have a bearing on the crisis. With this decision, the Office of the 
Controller of the Currency issued a new interpretation of a statute that sets limits on the 
amount of loans a bank could make to a single borrower, which stipulated that by law, a 
national bank was not permitted to make loans to a single borrower in excess of ten per cent 
of the bank‘s capital and surplus (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1997: 203).36 In 
reality, however, during the 1970‘s and early 1980‘s, some of the largest US banks had 
loaned more than ten per cent of their capital to various government agencies and 
government-related corporations of poor countries, here defined as the least developed 
countries, such as Mexico and Brazil.
37
 As a consequence of the subsequent defaults on 
these loans, and the perceived danger to the banking system, the main creditor countries 
along with the IMF oversaw the effective cartelization of the international banking sector. 
Here, and given the gravity of the situation, policymakers stressed the importance of 
systemic interest over individual bank interests, ultimately leading to the establishment of 
the London Club. Compounding these dubious lending policies, the IMF rapidly increased 
and encouraged further lending to indebted nations, something I will return to in Chapter 7. 
However, along with the debt crisis of the early 1980s, as commercial banks withdrew from 
the South, multilateral funds poured in. Similar to this shift in lenders from commercial 
banks to international financial institutions, the 1990s brought with it another shift. This 
time the risk was directed away from international financial institutions towards 
institutional investors and the public at large. The shift occurred because of changes in 
regulation regarding equities making private investment more attractive in general. 
Financial flows from new sources, bonds, and foreign direct investments as well as 
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 The OCC was created by the US Congress and is the chartering and primary regulatory authority for all 
national banks, a category that includes all money center banks and almost all large US banking 
organizations. Contemporary international banking regulation within the frames of the Bank for International 
Settlements is discussed in Chapter 7.  
37
 Title 12 US Code, section 84, established ten per cent of capital as a limit of total loans to a single borrower 
for all national banks. These limits held until passage of the Garn.St Germain Act of 1982, which expanded 
the limit to 15 per cent of capital, and if certain collateral conditions were satisfied, this limit could increase to 
25 per cent, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997). 
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portfolio investments flooded into some southern countries, allowing for voluntary 
repayments to commercial banks and easy servicing of multilateral debts. These changes 
eventually led to the second Mexican crisis, for without such changes, that crisis would 
never have happened. (Raffer and Singer 2001: 179) In addition to this structural balancing 
that shifted the risk from the USA to other countries, it also brought with it a new 
geography. Until this point, the USA had been more exposed to poor countries than other 
lenders (Raffer and Singer 2001: 169). 
At this stage, it is useful to link back to the cascading of the Eurodollars in the financial 
markets already for it being a perceived common starting place for explaining the history of 
the debt problem. However, the balance of payments deficits run by the US government 
may have been even more important than the Eurodollar traffic. This is due to the fact that 
the inflation induced by these US deficits was also responsible in part for the growing pool 
of dollars available for on-lending by the commercial banks pre- and post-1973 (Corbridge 
1993: 31). The second oil crisis in the late 1970s was followed by a monetarist approach 
(Corbridge 1993: 3), or a focus on the supply of money in the economy as the prime 
instigator of inflation. This shift was a result of a more general trend of turning away from 
Keynesianism and the goal of employment, toward a focus on battling inflation.
38
 The 
world‘s financial system was also about to be globalized and in the process, or perhaps as 
part of this process, it was to be thoroughly deregulated. 
Towards global deregulation 
But before that, we must look at how economic development in poor countries was stunted 
as a consequence of the oil-crises and the requirements attached to structural adjustment 
policies. The oil crises in the 1970s stifled industrial lift-off in poor countries whilst at the 
same time, leading to inflation. In turn, this led to slower economic development than what 
might otherwise have been the case. This unpromising situation was further exacerbated 
following the introduction of demands regarding changes in national policy, or so-called 
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 Stiglitz (2008: 1-2) argues that in fact, the financial crisis emerging in 2008 with central banks focussing on 
inflation,targeting raising interest rates when inflation increases, allowed the financial system to undertake 
risks that put the whole economy in jeopardy. He goes on to argue that central banks have a broader 
responsibility of ensuring the stability of a country‘s economy as opposed to mere price stabilization.  
46 
 
conditionality programmes, and as a result of the bartering for political loyalty during the 
Cold War. Perhaps these programmes of the Bretton Woods institutions actually 
contributed importantly to debt accumulation. In the 1970-80s, from Latin America, the 
programmes spread to Africa and other poor nations and regions. An apparent reason for 
the creditors to push Structural Adjustment Programmes, SAPs, was their interest in 
securing returns and reimbursements on their investments. IMF policies and stabilization 
loans were conditional on deflationary, or austerity policies, where governments curb their 
spending to reimburse creditors. The focusing of economic output on direct export and 
resource extraction culminated in a shift towards a drastic reduction of public welfare 
spending, thus providing an attractive investment climate to international investors. As part 
of the global deregulation policies, this was further promoted through increasing investment 
flows by replacing foreign direct investments with the opening up of stock markets. In 
general, the rights of the foreign investor were enhanced vis-à-vis national laws. Such 
reductions in national investments can have considerable and long-lasting socio-economic 
effects. In many ways, structural adjustment led to a fundamental reorientation of Southern 
economies. Soon structural adjustment policies became the prerequisite for borrowing and 
for receiving development aid, the consequences of which I discuss further in chapters 3 
and 6. The structural adjustment requirements are also seen as one of the main contributors 
behind the move toward official loans, especially in Africa (Addison et al. 2004a: 3, 5). 
Next, and as will soon be returned to, the debt spiral was thrown a loop following the 
recommendations of the illiquidity theory of the 1970s and 1980s, suggesting that rather 
than being insolvency crises, the debt crisis constituted only a temporary situation of 
payment difficulties due to short-term lack of liquid means. Consequently, countries 
finding themselves in a payment crisis were encouraged to take on new loans to service 
their old debts. Yet, against the backdrop of the oil crises and the simultaneous depreciation 
of the US dollar in the 1970s, indebted nations saw their export earnings fall as a 
consequence of the general fall in commodity prices. This negative curve of commodity 
prices was not to point upward until the early 2000s.  
Underlying many of these events, but worth singling out as it is not oft-referred to, is the 
post-1945 shift in the responsibility of sovereign lending transforming the shared risk 
between debtors and creditors to a risk that is borne by the debtors alone. It is easy to point 
the finger at the oil-exporting OPEC countries for flooding the financial system with 
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liquidity by sending sudden cash down the financial system.
39
 Raffer (2007a: 129) takes a 
longer-term view and notes that not only were sovereign debtors treated more generously 
before the Bretton Woods institutions became debt managers, but the 1970s brought with it 
a thorough change in lending practices where commercial banks picked up on signals by 
their governments that they would be protected from credit risk. The 1970s also saw the 
Euro market overturn traditional patterns of external finance as private creditors far 
outpaced official grants and loans (Lipson 1981: 611). The mistaken belief in riskless 
lending influenced creditors‘ behavior in destructive ways, causing massive misallocation 
of funds.
40
  
On balance, at times heedless and carefree lending by the international financial institutions 
and private lenders was accompanied with equally reckless borrowing on behalf of poor 
and indebted nations.
41
 In response, calls for repudiation of debt − perhaps with a particular 
focus on odious debts − have increased and today it forms one of the cores of civil society 
work on debt. The populace of the countries previously led by dictators active on the 
borrowing front does not accept that they should assume responsibility for repaying loans 
they never benefited from (Transparency International 2004). Back in the 1980s, with the 
thawing of the Cold War, Soviet assistance had dissolved and structural adjustment had 
become the dominant economic plan for many of the world‘s nations. Struggling under 
heavy burdens of debt, and unable to collectively alter unfavorable terms of trade, many 
poor countries governments had little choice but to assume a new role as economic policy 
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 Also Lipson (1981: 610) warns against over-simplifying financial flows to borrowing nations to petrodollar 
recycling only. The sources of these funds have varied and commercial lending to poor countries is complex. 
Twice, the banking system has funnelled credit from petroleum producers to consumers (petrodollar 
recycling). But at other times, surplus creditors supplied much of the market‘s funding providing credit for 
their own industrial exports. Importantly, key financial innovations have led to broadened lender 
participation, in turn leading to sovereign borrowing on an important scale. The issue of international 
borrowing and lending is further investigated in chapter 7.  
40
 The role of credit export agencies is related to this point. Export credits and their implications are analyzed 
in Chapter 5, so here, suffice it to just mention that they have a role  in disturbing the important issue of credit 
risk. 
41
 For further elaboration on the responsibility for reckless lending and borrowing, questions of repudiation 
and the concept of odious debt, see chapter 4 on the legal question.  
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negotiators instead of legislators. This was not helped by the fact that neither lenders nor 
borrowers were prepared to manage new possibilities of extensive borrowing which 
resulted from the picking up of high capital mobility (Sachs 1995: 1).  
At this juncture, poor countries‘ debt has been placed within the framework of its 
international context, and filled in the emerging contours with the various events, 
incremental insights and consequent moves by the creditors. This chapter now moves 
towards an analysis of the policies of debt relief by contrasting these to economic 
reasoning. 
2.2 The economic policies of debt relief 
Since the 1980s in particular, but stretching back to the setting up of the Paris Club,
42
 and 
dealing with the rescheduling of official bilateral debt in low-income countries since the 
1950s, the world has seen various and varying approaches to debt relief.
43
 The exact 
amounts channeled to poor countries in debt relief is not easily accessible, but one estimate 
amounts to USD 100 billion between 1989 and 2003 (Depetris Chauvin and Kraay 2005). 
Yet, the debt restructurings almost never provide enough relief for a ‗fresh start‘ of the 
debtor economy (Herman et al. 2010c: 489). Characteristically, debt relief can be seen as a 
series of waves where governments and donors reluctantly, yet repeatedly, widen their 
understanding of what their policies stand for and aim at. In tandem, and with each new 
insight, the relief agendas are re-drafted. 
The most common form of debt relief, or at least its most prominent form, is managed by 
the international financial institutions through various partly intertwined programmes 
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 Whereas the Paris Club deals informally with public debt, the London Club deals as informally with private 
debts. The Paris Club was born in 1956, as a consequence of lending governments‘ need for a mechanism to 
deal with debt difficulties of sovereign borrowers (Cosío-Pascal 2010). In the early days after World War II, 
the international bond market was moribund and the international banking sector was recovering. This meant 
that most international credits, particularly for poor countries, were inter-official loans. For a detailed tracing 
of debt relief for Ethiopia, and how the policies of the Paris Club have recently changed, see Martin (2010). 
For how the Paris Club forms one of the pillars under the HIPC programme, see Cosío-Pascal (2010). 
43
 For a short and critical overview of debt relief prior to the HIPC initiative, see Mandel (2006: 37). See 
Easterly (2002: 124-5) for debt relief between 1967 and the HIPCs.  
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chronologically running from SAPs, originating in the conditionalities that the Bretton 
Woods institutions attached to their loans in the 1950s, to the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative, set up in 2005 to top up debt relief for countries graduating from the HIPC 
programme. The roots of SAPs are partly due to the IMF becoming selective in its loaning 
as a consequence of its limited resources. But more importantly, conditions were attached 
to loans as part of the political polarization games of the Cold War. Especially since the 
1970s, SAPs served as a central policy instrument in acquiring and maintaining strategic 
friendships. In the 1990s, due to strong criticism and the particularly adamant voice of civil 
society, SAPs were replaced with the HIPC Programme. Only briefly appeased, civil 
society soon objected to the HIPC scheme, asserting that it provided too little debt relief too 
slow, and soon an enhanced HIPC initiative, this time with the aim of providing yet 
―deeper, broader and faster‖ debt relief was conceived. In the early 2000s, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers were added to the palette of debt related instruments. PRSPs 
provide the operational basis for Fund and Bank concessional lending and for debt relief 
under the HIPC initiative (IMF 2008a).
44
 The introduction of PRSPs was the result of 
recognition by the IMF and the World Bank of the importance of promoting ―ownership‖ in 
development as well as the need for a greater focus on poverty reduction (ibid.). In 2005, 
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was set up, in a way to top-up debt relief for countries 
graduating from the HIPC initiative. The MDRI differs from previous debt relief initiatives 
in that it is the first initiative where multilateral institutions are no longer preferred 
creditors. According to the IMF (2008b), the MDRI goes further by providing full debt 
relief so as to free up additional resources to help these countries reach the Millennium 
Development Goals (IMF 2008b). Here, though, a warning is attached to this combination 
of initiatives. This warning relates to a risk that donors do not maintain, or cease to actively 
increase, the level of development aid. Keeping that in mind, but leaving it aside until 
chapter 6, it is now time to explore how debt relief came to exist in its current format, and 
the international and national considerations it has sparked in its nearly 60 years of history.   
Tracing the thinking about debt relief  
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 In 2009, the HIPC countries form a group of 40 countries, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, as potentially 
eligible to receive debt relief. The HIPC initiative itself will be discussed later. 
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To date, debt rescheduling, debt restructuring and debt relief have been dealt with by 
various informal groups of creditors. The immediate aims of the groups have been to 
salvage the creditors‘ assets by deterring default, reconstructing debt if they see it 
necessary, ensuring timely repayment, while maintaining the larger ambition of limiting the 
impact of debt crises on bank assets worldwide (Lipson 1981: 614). Since the civil society 
mobilizations of the 1990s, debt relief programmes have been designed around the 
identification of moral imperatives, or to ―fighting poverty‖, thus in keeping with 
development targets. But most importantly, the thinking of debt has gone through a number 
of shifts of mental models reflected in continuous changes in structure, design and 
motivation behind debt relief. It is in line with this observation that this thesis prepares 
ground for a potential consequent shift, one including arbitration of international debts. 
Leading up to the justifications for that, a look back at the previous shifts paves the way.   
Most of the research on problem debt in the 1980s came out of economics departments of 
universities in the USA and the temporal focus was the acute short-term. In addition, the 
bulk of this research was driven by an interest in protecting the creditors‘ claims, and in 
contrast to national financial laws, the rights of the debtor were not addressed (with the 
exception of Raffer 1990). Although important in many aspects, much of this literature is 
based on the experiences from the Latin American debt crisis (arisen from problems in the 
servicing of commercial debts) and as it is dusted off today, it may not be automatically 
transferable to current HIPC countries (where the debt problem is largely composed of 
official debt) (Addison et al. 2004a: 13; UNCTAD 2004: 3). Looking back though, it was 
only in 1996, and with the HIPC scheme that the first comprehensive approach to problem 
debt of poor countries was actually coordinated (UNCTAD 2004: 3). 
Remaining in the 1980s, but transferring our discussion to the policy front, the focus is 
turned to what is often referred to as the Baker and the Brady plans, which constitute two 
important milestones in the debt debate. The Baker Plan (1986-8), named after US 
Secretary James Baker, echoed the call for a centralized solution, but was based on the 
rationale that the debt crisis of poor countries was a short-term liquidity problem. Under the 
Plan, the indebted countries were encouraged to take on new loans to cover the re-payment 
of the outstanding debts, as mentioned before. Perhaps part of the reason behind this 
thinking was that writing off old loans could have choked new lending (as suggested by 
Cline 1995: 208), and thus cut off poor countries‘ access to new credits. Perhaps another 
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part of the reason was that creditors were primarily concerned with protecting their claims. 
Or perhaps the situation was new as such and a comprehensive understanding of poor 
countries‘ sovereign debt was yet to mature. In either case, under the Baker Plan, recipients 
of new loans were to strengthen the process of fiscal adjustment and to undertake structural 
policy reform regarding import liberalization, the liberalization of treatment of foreign 
investments and privatization of state firms (Cline 1995: 209). The Baker Plan also 
proposed strengthening international institutions, and ultimately, shifting the structural 
adjustment process of debtor countries from debt repayment to debt increase (Suter and 
Stamm 1991: 672). But austerity failed to resolve the debt crisis in part since it was a short-
term response to an emergency rather than a long-term strategy for economic development 
(Roodman 2006: 16). Instead and in hindsight, the Baker Plan mainly led to a 
reorganization in the structure of debts (Raffer and Singer 2001: 169).  
The understanding that the debt crisis was a mere shortage of liquidity changed with the 
Brady Plan of 1989, named after US Secretary of Treasury Nicholas Brady, which was the 
first initiative that approved debt cancellation instead of the previously adopted debt 
restructurings. The perception that problem debt was a matter of insolvency rather than 
illiquidity was an important change of emphasize both for policy makers as well as for civil 
society. But as the Initiative did not establish a more general framework or statutory 
approach for subsequent dealings with sovereign debt, it did not provide a helpful precedent 
for the future (Garay Salamanca 2010). Yet, while it was of limited financial importance, 
the Brady initiative irrevocably opened the door for debt reductions (Raffer and Singer 
2001: 172).
45
 Perhaps most importantly, since the net amount of debt reduction was 
minimal, with the Brady Initiative, the way was paved for a series of crises in the decades 
to come (Garay Salamanca 2010). 
Essentially, the international consequences of financial crises reminded creditors of also 
their vulnerability to financial meltdowns of debt burdened areas. Susan George was the 
first to articulate how problem debt is not simply a problem for the indebted countries, but 
rather, how problematic sovereign debts manifest an international problem. In her book the 
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 Understandably, as governments and the international financial institutions insisted on full payment, banks 
were reluctant to accept reductions in debt repayment and service. Banks wanted equal treatment of all 
creditors. (Raffer and Singer 2001: 171) 
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Debt Boomerang, George (1992) predicted how the debt problem, if its growth continued, 
would bring with it consequences also for the North. Among other things, she lists that 
problem debt will lead to deforestation (a country‘s debt burden correlates with both the 
pace and the extent of its tropical forest destruction) which in turn harms bio-diversity and 
future food sources. She also predicted accelerated drug trafficking, since a number of 
people in deeply indebted countries are dependent on drug dollars for survival and 
thousands of people displaced by the IMF‘s economic austerity programmes cannot find a 
livelihood in the legal economy.  
A final, but hardly less important factor contributing centrally to the understanding of and 
discussions on sovereign debt are the highly visible, vast, and persistent civil society 
mobilizations on this issue. Over time, civil society mobilizations around debt may be the 
single most significant motor driving the official reactive debt policy agenda.
46
 Returning 
in chapter 3 to civil society involvement regarding debt, here, the significance lies in 
acknowledging these mobilizations, the awareness they raised and their impact on debt 
relief policies.  
Having looked at the motivations behind debt relief policies, this text now turns towards 
looking at outcomes, or lessons learned, from debt relief schemes. This is done by grouping 
these considerations into two groups, international and national aspects.  
Five international considerations regarding debt relief schemes47 
First, debt relief has not led to sufficiently decreased debt burdens (Mandel 2006: 7, 8; 
UNCTAD 2009).
48
 Recalling the figures from the beginning of this chapter, the debt ratio 
of poor countries is still high, be that measured in terms of GDP or exports. There is little 
disagreement that this high level of indebtedness poses a serious threat to the economies of 
the poor countries. The obvious observation that debt burdens are not decreasing enough 
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 This does not mean that critics of the agenda would not have a lot to say about the actual implemented 
policies.  
47
 This section and the next develop further the arguments in Sehm Patomaki (2009: 91-2). 
48
 UNCTAD (2009) is based on an analysis of the situations in Argentina, Bolivia, Kenya, Republic of Korea 
and Uganda. 
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leads to a number of questions. Perhaps most remarkably, particularly from the perspective 
of the international financial institutions, this has meant that the institutions keep throwing 
good money after bad with exponentially diminishing hope – or few realistic aspirations – 
of ever receiving payments for the original credits. Why does such strikingly irrational 
economic behavior continue? Underlying this strategy has been the belief by the IMF and 
the World Bank that it is important to keep borrowers on a short leash, and by doing so, 
restore their capacity to make payments quickly (Suter and Stamm 1991: 661). From the 
perspective of Southern countries, their debt burden is mounting and this is resulting in 
serious repercussions. The debt burden, it is said, forms only one part of the mechanisms by 
which the North extracts wealth from the South. We hear calls for the North to compensate 
the South for exploitation dating back to the beginning of the capitalist system.
49
 Leaving 
that discussion aside here, it is at least worth noting that North-South relations do not enjoy 
a healthy symmetry. Since debt relief so far has not lifted debt burdens in a sustainable 
manner, this in itself casts a shadow of a doubt over the economic viability of the present 
treatment of problem debt. It seems not only reasonable, but also fair to assume that there is 
a need for exploring other alternatives.  
The second point relates to the effect of debt relief. On the one hand, there seems to be 
surprisingly little independent research and rigorous analysis of the effects of debt in low-
income countries – as opposed to middle-income countries (Addison et al. 2004a: 3-4; see 
also Theunissen and Akkerman 2004: 7, 10; and Martin 2004). Instead, there is a question 
about whether debt relief stimulates economic growth and how growth is linked to policy 
goals of poverty reduction. This question comes along with how debt relief affects donor-
recipient relationships in development cooperation (Addison et al. 2004a: 3-4). But on the 
other hand, the literature that does exist does not find debt relief efficient, be that in terms 
of public spending, investments, growth, or institution building in the recipient countries 
(Depetris Chauvin and Kraay 2005; Presbitero 2009). More specifically, debt relief does 
not improve the distribution of wealth in a poor country, or, in the language of economics, 
it is never Pareto improving, and therefore, it cannot affect the long-run level of investment 
(Aguiar et al. 2009). This conclusion gains support through simulation exercises estimating 
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  Calls that are often based on a Marxist view of capitalist exploitation by the rich, see Corbridge (1993: 
203), for instance. See also the collection by Alternatives Sud (2002). 
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Tanzania and Zambia gaining 0.2 per cent in GDP in economic growth from debt relief and 
econometric modeling of Tanzania reaching the same 0.2 per cent (Bigsten, Levin and 
Persson 2004; Hansen 2004). Rather, the mechanism seems to be that debt relief correlates 
with increasing domestic debts, in turn undermining the effects of positive achievements in 
reducing external debt service (Easterly 2002: 128; Presbitero 2009). A truly 
comprehensive debt sustainability analysis of poor countries has to factor in domestic debt, 
not only since it constitutes a large portion of the total public debt in poor countries, but in 
the particular case of the HIPCs, it has the potential of impacting negatively on their overall 
debt sustainability (Beaugrand et al. 2002; Fedelino and Kudina 2003). Panizza (2010) 
specifically compares external debt with domestic debt and immediately underlines that the 
definition of domestic debt is of central importance, as this has consequences for how it 
would be regarded in the treatment of debts and to the risk it poses to fiscal sustainability. 
Domestic debt can be divided into local currency loans (at home or abroad), to local 
investors (in domestic or foreign currency) or governed by local law (again, either in 
domestic or foreign currency). In terms of restructuring debts, Panizza separates between 
loans under the governing law as the most central ones, while from an economic 
sustainability perspective, the currency of the obligations is paramount. This separation of 
legal hosts prepares the ground for what will be discussed in chapter 4 eventually leading 
the discussion to separating odious debts from unsustainable economic debs. The inability 
to reconcile debt relief with economic reason further justifies the case of here seeing 
efficiency in its minimalist way of economic reason. 
A third concern is that debt relief programmes and cancellations are ad hoc measures. The 
lack of a coordinated, established and respected institution for debt restructuring is an 
obstacle to the fair and standardized treatment of debtors. Both debtors and creditors are 
treated differently, both with respect to each other but also within groups.
50
 The ad 
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 For instance, when the Baker and Brady Plans of the 1980s represented swift reactions to the threat posed 
to the Western banking system by the magnitude of debts owed by Latin American borrowers, the options 
provided in reaction to African indebted nations has been in stark contrast (Cheru 2006: 43). As for the 
creditors, since the international financial institutions insist on being treated as preferred creditors, this means 
that ultimately, private banks are expected to bear a larger share of debt. In this capacity, however, the IMF 
and the World Bank have maintained debtor discipline by binding debt rescheduling agreements to previous 
conclusions of standby agreements of the IMF (Suter and Stamm 1991: 661). 
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hoc‘ness of dealing with sovereign restructurings also makes debtors subject to 
relationships driven by political dependency and potential nearsighted policy preferences 
by the creditors.  
A fourth set of problems relating to debt relief proposals is the idea that large sums should 
be injected to creditors as compensation for lost credits (such as in the case of writing down 
the debts of Iraq in 2004, proposals by the G8 to grant debt relief, and proposals of selling 
the IMF gold reserves to compensate creditors for losses from debt reductions). Most 
credits owed by indebted poor countries have small prospects of ever being repaid. If the 
international financial institutions were handed large sums in compensation for loans (that 
they will never get paid back anyway), it is possible that they would use this money to do 
what their terms of agreement binds them to do: direct it into new loans in the future 
(Raffer and Singer 2001: 185-6). There are no indications that the ways in which new loans 
will be made will deviate from the way in which previous and presently disputed ones have 
been made. Instead, an overall decrease in the debt burden would actually allow the 
international financial institutions to collect better from a debtor, when part of its burden is 
lifted.  
As an fifth point, debt relief processes do not at any point allow for the questioning of the 
accuracy and accountability of the policies practiced by the international financial 
institutions (see more on the financial accountability of the international financial 
institutions in Raffer 2004b, also Stiglitz 2002b; and chapter 4 of this thesis). Civil society 
voices have ardently protested against this matter, especially Southern social movements. 
For instance, in contrast to mostly middle-income countries in Latin America where the 
debt is largely composed of private debts, and as I already mentioned, the debts of the 
African countries are predominantly official loans (Birdsall et al. 2004: 61).
51
 In other 
words, these same disputed types of official loans made and administered by the 
international financial institutions. It follows then that lending policies should be revisited 
since future lending is an important policy instrument. In this context, an indication of the 
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 One reason for the composition of official loans in Africa is that African countries do not have sufficiently 
reasonable credit ratings to issue sovereign bonds. Only following the 2006 debt relief programmes have 
Ghana and Gabon had sovereign bond issued, both very well-marked by the international capital markets. The 
stability of good credit ratings is uncertain in the future.  
56 
 
recognition of poor performance in the past is the abandonment of the terminology of 
―structural adjustment‖, as witnessed in the late 1980s. As policies of the Bretton Woods 
change, one can either assume that past policies were wrong or inadequate, or alternatively, 
that the old ones were correct and the new ones will prove wrong (Raffer and Singer 2001: 
174). In her book on the debt issue, Noreena Hertz cites Sonny Callahan, a conservative 
congressman from Alabama saying that ―debt cancellation would be money down a 
rathole‖ (Hertz 2004: 15). Callahan believes that additional monies would only encourage 
the World Bank and others to continue to make bad loans, leaving poor countries having to 
borrow and getting into debt all over again. It is often also pointed out that cancelling debts 
would tarnish the credibility of the system – or at least the credibility of the borrower – and 
could thus jeopardize future lending. Callahan‘s comments summarize most of the 
arguments put forward on the creditor‘s side. In a way, these arguments reflect the 
structural order underlying the world‘s financial and economic systems, and perhaps also 
recognize a lack of political will to mend this bias. 
Five national considerations regarding debt relief schemes 
Shifting down to the national level, but maintaining the count, a sixth point relating to 
considerations regarding debt relief is that of the connection between debt relief and its 
implications on overall available resources of the indebted country. Debt relief is often 
announced in blocks of injections into a resource-starved country. Rajan (2005: 1-2) 
explains this matter with the help of a hypothetical example of a country owing USD 100 
million, but earning only USD 50 million in foreign exchange. Clearly, the country is 
unable to make the repayments from its own resources. In this situation, an emerging 
contradiction is that debt relief of the full USD 50 million without accompanied additional 
funding appears less attractive than additional lending, which could provide liquid means 
for the day-to-day business of the nation. This additionality can come as foreign aid or 
through veins of private capital. This creates a situation where  additionality (creditors lend 
additionally but do not forgive debts) is preferable to a f extensive debt relief, which would 
result in the cutting off of links to further or future lending or development assistance.   
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Generally, debt relief is initiated and controlled by creditors.
52
 A seventh point raises 
doubts concerning the inherent justice, or lack thereof, in the current system of dealing with 
the situation. Further, and as will be seen in chapters 3 and 4, creditor dominance in turn 
risks conflicting with the furthering of general preferences of the borrower. Nor does it 
resonate with the principles of rule of law, where in this context, the rights of the debtor 
would be addressed, a matter revisited in the next chapters on political and legal questions 
of debt arbitration.
53
 Consequently, new loans could be accompanied with yet tighter 
conditionalities (Acosta and Ugarteche 2007: 7). Stated differently, ultimately, debt relief 
can serve as a political tool to reformulate conditionalities now tied to a loan. In a similar 
manner, the rolling over of loans, or loans replaced by new loans, takes place in such a way 
as to expunge the original taint of odiousness, or aspects regarding the legality of the loan 
in the first place  Hanlon 2006a: 221).  
An eighth consideration is related to debt relief being granted only following the 
implementation of certain policy measures required by the creditors, described as 
conditionalities. Hanlon describes HIPC as  
―conditional on poor countries jumping through a number of hoops relating to 
macroeconomic stability and openness of the economy having the World Bank approved 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers […] it is basically a charitable exercise in which the 
debt of the ‗deserving poor‘ is reduced but not totally cancelled‖ (2006a: 223).  
External involvement in national political decision-making is problematic. It endangers the 
national democratization process where voters have elected their political decision-makers. 
External interests do not necessarily equal nationally developed democratic preferences.
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Furthermore, official creditors have repeatedly attached conditions to debt relief not 
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 I am thinking of the Clubs of Rome and London, the Baker Plan, Venice Terms, the Brady Plan, Toronto 
Terms, the HIPCs, the PRSP, the MDRI, but the actual complete list is of course longer.  
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 Easterly deliberates on incentives for donors and recipients and categorises these as ―the heedless giving to 
the hopeless‖ (2002: 115). 
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 In fact, some suggest that PRSPs are merely repackaged SAPs. To be more exact, the key macro-economic 
policy conditionalities remain intact and the policy prescription has not been adjusted to suit the overall goals 
of poverty reduction. (Gould 2005: especially 3) 
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necessary connected to economic necessities (Raffer 2007b: 246). Or worse, these 
conditions may even have compounded the already drawn-out debt crisis of poor countries. 
This statement is made in light of the observation that since the 1980s, many poor countries 
are in worse condition than when they started implementing structural adjustment 
programmes as mandated by the rich nations through the IMF and the World Bank (Stiglitz 
2002a; Cheru 2006: 35).
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Narrowing the discussion to the HIPC initiatives alone raises a multitude of questions, 
summarized as a ninth point, starting with how a country became indebted in the first place. 
Was it because of bad policy and external shocks or because of more fundamental structural 
issues of political economy? In either case, the HIPC initiative is unlikely to provide a 
definitive solution to problem debt (Fedelino and Kudina 2003; Addison et al. 2004a: 20, 
see also 11; Cheru 2006: 51; and Theunissen and Akkerman 2004 for a thorough analysis 
of the successes and failures of the HIPC programme). Perhaps above all, even the HIPCs, 
although accepting the idea of a ―fresh start‖ as the goal of debt relief, it did not sufficiently 
lower the debt burden for the selected countries until eleven years on, with the MDRI in 
2005 (Cosío-Pascal 2010). And even then, the initiative was carried out only as a one-time 
operation for the included countries. Among other things, this means that the mechanisms 
for dealing with imbalances between surplus and deficit countries are still absent, and 
deficit zones quickly risk building up new debts. It also casts a shadow of doubt regarding 
the ultimate motivations behind debt relief. Despite various modalities of persuasion by 
policymakers that the systemic interest took primacy over individual bank interest, logical 
analysis suggests the contrary (Garany Salamanca 2010). Worse still, a situation of 
complete debt cancellation would lead to a rupture in control by the creditors over the 
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 Reporting of tricks a country can resort to in order to improve their short run conditions, appearing to meet 
the conditionality for the loan, Easterly (2002: 112-5) explains how in fact they are merely postponing the 
problems and eating into their future economic prosperity. Examples include countries in adjustment 
programmes pumping oil out of the reserves faster than during periods without adjustment programmes. More 
revenue today cost less available oil revenue sale in the future. Countries can also get advance payments of 
taxes to meet IMF deficit targets. And governments can help themselves to subsidies from their pension 
funds. Stiglitz (2002b) argues that the Western nations have seriously mismanaged the processes of 
privatization, liberalization and stabilisation in the poor world. By following the advice of the rich, many poor 
countries are now actually worse off than they were before, he writes.  
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debtors (Northover 2010: 305-6). Interestingly then, debt relief granted within the HIPC 
scheme accounts for more than half of the total sums in debt relief as tallied since 1989 
(Depetris Chauvin and Kraay 2005). Yet, building on the above, the initiative‘s targets 
appear too ad hoc and the criteria for debt relief appear to be too narrow. In fact, the official 
discourse on debt relief resembles that of the centrally planned economies from the past: 
targets are set, growth assumptions are made and little allowance is made for new shocks. 
This sits uncomfortably in a debt-burdened poor world with commodity price fluctuations, 
environmental stress and social unease. Not to mention human rights and the increased 
unrest this link might provoke.  
Focussing the discussion on the concept of debt sustainability, a term that has popped up a 
few times already, doubles as a tenth point and as a conclusion for considerations regarding 
debt relief. Perhaps first, as any economist would confirm, the absolute value of debts as 
such is not central in this discussion. Rather, debts have to be relative to something, for 
instance the GDP. Since debt relief has been provided, the IMF and the World Bank has 
calculated the indebted country‘s need for debt forgiveness according to various criteria.56 
The initial step is to calculate the net present value of debt. Following from this, the 
indebted country‘s debt sustainability is assessed.57 This is usually measured in terms of 
how well debt can be serviced out of export earnings. This measurement, however, does not 
address the issue of the effects of the debt on growth or poverty reduction, which is 
paramount in assessing development (Addisson et al. 2004a: 8). This approach assesses a 
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 The level of debt forgiveness has been raised in two steps: London terms in 1991, standing for a 50 per cent 
debt reduction, and the Naples terms in 1994, signifying a two-thirds debt reduction (Addison et al. 2004a: 5). 
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 Debt sustainability is a modernized concept that comes from an earlier tradition of work on debt 
management where the focus was on country risk and on the likelihood and consequences of debt default 
(Cornford 2009: 1). With debt management the perspective was the creditors‘ whereas debt sustainability 
invites an interpretation that also takes into consideration the preferences of the debtors. For a thorough 
analysis of the many and partially conflicting theoretical and practical underpinnings of debt sustainability see 
the compilation by UNCTAD (2009). Essentially, and for present purposes, it is enough to say that the 
concept of debt sustainability is far from universally agreed and the concept merits further attention. 
60 
 
debtor country‘s ability to service its financial obligations,58 but it says little about the 
consequences for human development (see Northover 2010). For instance, what level of 
debt is sustainable for countries where the vast majority of the population lives under a 
dollar a day?
59
 Also civil society expresses reservations regarding the concept of debt 
sustainability. Eurodad (no date a) states that the concept is flawed both on theoretical and 
practical grounds, and on a results-oriented level. Instead, Eurodad, along with its network 
members, advocates a concept taking into account the resources the poor countries need to 
promote the eradication of poverty. Along similar lines, and picking up on the initial 
proposal by Raffer (1990; Raffer and Singer 2001: 109, 189, 194),
60
 the New Economics 
Foundation (NEF) supports the replacement of debt sustainability with a human rights 
approach, which protects a minimal standard of living for the people (Mandel 2006: 12).
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In addition to factoring domestic debt into any debt sustainability assessment framework, 
the assessment must also include the average coupon on the debt, the amount of debt 
becoming due in the near future, the amount denominated in foreign currency, the country‘s 
ability to deliver the political and economic adjustments it needs, and the political support 
for the effort (Roubini and Setser 2004: 20). The principles of a fresh start, mentioned 
above in connection to the HIPC programmes, and equitable treatment should be 
understood in terms of human development (Herman et al. 2010c: 492). This means that 
debt restructuring should not only aim at facilitating an economic recovery but at 
guaranteeing especially that the burdens of adjustment do not severely and adversely 
impact the disadvantaged in society (Herman et al. 2010c: 492). The NEF goes on to argue 
that according to the UN charter, governments have an obligation to provide a minimal 
standard of living for their people, and that this obligation should come before any financial 
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 Stephen Mandel equals the term ―debt sustainability‖ with ―debt repayability‖, since it relies ―solely on the 
capacity of a country to service its debts in terms of export earnings and (to a lesser extent) government 
revenue without regard to the demands on these resources‖ (2006: 5). 
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 UNCTAD devotes its publication (2004) to the concept of debt sustainability with a focus on Africa.  
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 Raffer has made an attempt at refining the measurement of debt indicators, or indicators of debt servicing. 
He suggests a principle of basing the index on the debt overhang, or debt due, rather than on payments made, 
see Raffer and Singer (2001: 176-7). 
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 A human rights approach could be concretized into the right to food, the right to education, and the right to 
health (Cheru 2006: 42). 
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obligations to creditors. The North, argues the NEF, has a moral responsibility to support 
this. To this ends, Stiglitz (2002b: 200, 201) sees that the IMF‘s focus on balance of 
payments‘ deficits is another example of problems of coherence plaguing not only IMF‘s 
remedies but also its diagnosis. The IMF‘s way of handling bankruptcy represents still 
another arena where the Fund‘s approach is plagued with intellectual inconsistencies, he 
adds.
62
 A related issue regarding sustainable debt concerns the way debt relief is focused on 
the current accounts of poor countries (Sachs 1995, Stiglitz 2010c). With the 1940s as a 
backdrop, today‘s economies use finance as the overwhelming capital mover, in contrast to 
trade, meaning that the balance of payments of countries look different today and have to 
be treated differently. By looking at questions regarding the mechanism by which to 
determine debt sustainability, this discussion also reflects back at the international concerns 
listed above. It also raises the questions regarding who decides when a debt is sustainable, 
and how this should be dealt with. Given the fundamental nature of the emerging questions, 
let me next turn towards how sovereign dealt has been and is being dealt with.  
2.3 Dealing with sovereign debt 
In any financial system, borrowing is a way to make larger-scale investments and debt 
makes it possible to spread the costs over time. A loan is one of many financial 
instruments. Also, no one expects a nation to be able to repay its sovereign debts 
immediately. Nor is sovereign debt a negative thing unto itself. The trouble begins when a 
country does not have the means to repay according to schedule. As demonstrated, an initial 
reaction could be to borrow from elsewhere in order to repay what is due today. But in such 
cases where the problem is not due to mere temporary disturbance in cash-flow, but rather 
to a situation with deeper roots, the indebted are forced to consider alternative routes. The 
exact nature of the situation may not be easily determined, and regardless the outcome, it is 
bound to be contested. Therefore, the most obvious assessment of the root cause of problem 
debt in poor countries is that at the time of default, the expenditure of these countries 
exceeds their revenues.  
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recommendations would be implemented fully and swiftly by the creditors. This initiative was not supported 
by the donor community.   
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Quite reasonably, the preferred course of action is to prevent debt crises from occurring in 
the first place. This is echoed for instance by UNCTAD, calling for a responsible 
multilateral effort to redress global imbalances, rather than increase pressure on developing 
countries (2006b). A truly global financial system would call for a global regulator and a 
global lender of last resort. Both the mechanism of global regulator and global lender of last 
resort are closely linked to some coordinated mechanism for dealing with insolvent 
countries. This leads to the final part of this chapter and to the considerations involved in 
debt restructuring. Putting aside the theoretical dimensions of global regulation and lending 
until chapter 7, it is at this stage worth noting that there is a gap to plug in the international 
financial architecture. At present, the only mechanisms available to defaulting countries are 
ad hoc efforts to restructure debts. The underlying assumption is that the international 
community will bail out private creditors. These processes are problematic not only since 
the IMF may not have sufficient funds at its disposal, but also because of the mixed signals 
conveyed to lenders. But above all, the mechanisms address the symptoms rather than the 
root causes of indebtedness. 
There is a strong case for a collective forum making the sovereign debt restructuring 
process more coordinated, systematic, orderly, predictable, and rapid. In short, an orderly 
process with minimal delays. Or put differently, the speed of intervention must not be 
confounded by a doubtfulness of the durability of the settlements reached (Suter and 
Stamm 1991: 664). Another goal is to provide a fresh start, taking note of the 
considerations above. Additional criteria for debt restructuring in efficient ways involve 
two aspects: the capability to take action and to respond quickly to a looming crisis on the 
one hand and the durability of the crisis solution on the other (Suter and Stamm 1991: 652). 
Given this, the next section looks at the challenges that the proposal for international debt 
arbitration raises and tries to answer how it would relate to the overall mechanisms 
available in situations of problem debt. Both issues are examined; what new concerns 
would arise and how these could be met, but first, attention is drawn to how sovereign 
restructuring is dealt with de facto and list the main considerations arising from today‘s 
frameworks.  
Sovereign debt restructurings 
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Since the 1800s, six wide-spread periods of disturbances in debt-servicing can be singled 
out. Major international lending crises occurred from the late 1820s to the early 1840s (in 
1820s, all but one of the newly-independent Latin American states defaulted on their 
foreign debts Eichengreen [1991: 150]), from the mid-the 1870s (again Latin American 
countries defaulted) to the early 1890s (with the panic of the 1890s, or the Baring-crisis but 
stretching out to Egypt and Turkey along with a Greek default in 1890s),
63
 from the early 
1930s to the late 1940s (Argentina being the only Latin American country that did not 
default in the 1930s), in the 1980s mainly regarding Latin American countries, from the late 
1990s to mid 2000s, and from 2010 (see Eichengreen 1991; Suter and Stamm 1991; 
Roodman 2006; Damill et al. 2010: 181: Herman et al. 2010b and not to forget Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009). From the pile of overall experiences that these crises have produced, 
four main observations may be deduced.  
The first observation relates to coordination among creditors. Prior to the Bretton Woods 
institutions, and until the debt crisis of the 1930s, the foreign governmental bond was the 
principal financial instrument of official external borrowing. In the post war era, and with 
the establishment of the Bretton Woods, foreign bonds were replaced by loans and credits 
by official bodies of creditor countries. So-called creditor clubs, often constituted by a 
fairly small number of creditors, exerted strong, quick and far-reaching influence on debtor 
countries, often these also represented interests contrary to that of the debtor country. 
Official lending was confined to the few richest core countries including official 
development agencies, international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
and private commercial banks. (Suter and Stamm 1991: 646)
64
 The subsequent drop in the 
number of creditors along with the appointment of the Bretton Woods institutions as debt 
managers, represented a watershed moment regarding attitudes and policies towards 
international lending, in two pivotal ways. On the one hand, prior to the creation of the 
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 Colombia defaulted in 1873, and following the Baring crisis during early 1890s, Argentina defaulted in 
1891, followed by Uruguay the same year and Santa Domingo in 1892, 1897 and 1899; Venezuela in 1892 
and 1898; Guatemala in 1894, 1898; Ecuador in 1894, Costa Rica in 1895 and El Salvador in 1897. (Suter and 
Stamm 1991: 646, 651) 
64
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institutions, risk was allowed to play its role also in sovereign lending and creditors were 
aware of the risks. Economic mechanisms prevailed and debtor protection was accepted. At 
times, war-ships were sent out to collect debts, but vast sums of money were lost. 
Eventually, following negotiations, claims were reduced. In some way, sovereign loans 
may be seen as the junk bonds of the past.
65
 (Raffer 2007a: 129) On the other hand, over 
the past decades, there has been a shift of responsibilities onto debtors, and there has been a 
concerted effort to eliminate lender responsibility (Raffer 2007a: 128). As a consequence of 
creditor collaboration, before World War II, debt crises manifested themselves in outright 
defaults on foreign governmental bonds, but from the 1950s onwards, defaults have been 
forestalled by the arrangements of multilateral debt rescheduling agreements (Suter and 
Stamm 1991: 646).  
The division of sovereign debt into private and official leads us to the second observation, 
which is that while practices of treating problem debt owed to private as opposed to public 
creditors have varied, the crises of the 1980s departed from the historical pattern in one 
important aspect. This time, the major creditors were banks, not bond investors (Roodman 
2006: 16). However, as a result of the way in which debts were rescheduled following the 
crises in 1982, sovereign debt is returning to bond financing
66
. This trend was strengthened 
as a result of the IMF policy shift of replacing bail-outs with bail-ins of private creditors 
between 1997-2004, following from the crises of East Asia, Russia and Argentina (Herman 
et al 2010b: 5).  
Third, previous debt crises resulting in unilateral default have usually ended in some form 
of forgiveness (Sachs 1989b: 23: Spiegel 2010). Usually, a compromise is reached where 
the debtor serves some, but not all, of its due debt. The norm, rather than the exception, is a 
partial write-down of the debt.
67
 However, market-based mechanisms, or orderly 
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 Among other examples, Raffer (2007a: 129) mentions the US railways nearly routinely going bankrupt, 
leaving foreign creditors with worthless papers and the US with the infrastructure. 
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 Accordingly, some suggest the global economy faces much the same problem as London bond markets did 
in the 19th century (Miller 2002). The early 2000s saw a wave of early reimbursements of IMF loans, leading 
not only to the questioning of the role of the IMF but also to a debate about the new lenders on the scene. 
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 Suter and Stamm (1991: 672) reaches the same conclusion by detecting a certain temporal sequence of four 
stages in debt crisis. First, debtors usually tried to mobilize new loans (debt increase). Second, if this proved 
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restructurings, have not been effective at adequately reducing debt – rather, they have been 
about reorganizing the debt (Spiegel 2010). Fourth, problem sovereign debt is no longer 
uniquely the concern of poor countries. Large debts in advanced economies have made also 
these counties more vulnerable to international economic trends. By mid-2011, Iceland, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal have had to rely on external financial support. 
With these observations in mind, in practice, once additional funding, or guarantees, is 
exhausted, countries in financial trouble can either restructure their debts orderly or 
disorderly. As has been emphasized, there is also a difference between situations regarding 
the composition of debts, whether the debts are predominately private or public. In 
situations of default, countries can follow one of three routes (Porzecanski 2006: 279-80).
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Porzecanski titles these routes the negotiated route, the unilateral exchange offer and the 
unilateral demand. The negotiated, cooperative, and orderly route is when governments sit 
down to design a debt-restructuring deal with a representative committee of either 
bondholders or commercial banks, depending on which group holds the majority of the 
claims on the sovereign. This route was followed by a dozen countries beginning with 
Argentina in the early 1980s to Vietnam in the late 1990s, all of which negotiated with the 
London Club. Among these, the Argentinean default in 2001 was the largest default in 
history (for an analysis, see Damill et al. 2010). Other private creditors are then informed of 
the decision and their compliance is presumed. Those unwilling to participate would be 
stigmatized and isolated from future dealings. Renegotiations usually take place before 
debtors formally declare default (Suter and Stamm 1991: 660).  
The unilateral exchange route is when governments engage one or several commercial or 
investment banks to consult privately with a critical mass of lenders or investors about the 
potential shape of an acceptable settlement. The settlement is then presented to all creditors 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. These exchange offers are accompanied by bondholder exit 
                                                                                                                                                    
impossible, they were forced to take some adjustment measures (debt repayment) or to suspend debt service 
payments (debt repudiation). The settlements eventually negotiated between the debtor and the creditor after a 
period of default usually contained some debt relief, such as reduction in interest rates or outstanding debts 
(debt release) and elements of debt repayment.  
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 Porzecanski also mentions the fourth option of beheading creditors as followed by various French Kings in 
the 1500s and 1600s (see also Reinhart et al. 2003: 8). 
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consents encouraging the participation of as many investors as possible by leaving non-
participants in a disadvantaged position. One example of such a disadvantaged position 
would be less liquid securities. This approach has gained in popularity and has been used 
by Pakistan (1999), Ecuador (2000), Ukraine (2000), and Uruguay (2003).
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The unilateral demand route is when a government proposes restructuring on the basis of 
what it feels it can pay going forward, regardless the fact that this may not be in harmony 
with what the market can bear. This would translate into a form of repudiation, seen for 
instance in Ecuador defaulting on two bond issues in late 2008 and early 2009, and based 
on political judgments of the ‗illegitimacy‘ of the loans rather than because of illiquidity 
(Herman et al. 2010b: 3). In contrast to Porzecanski‘s cautious attitude to this less-explored 
approach, Stiglitz (2002b: 202) lists Russia and South Korea as successful and encouraging 
examples of this route.
70
 In 1998, Russia experienced a massive default, but was able to 
resume borrowing from the market in 2001 and capital has continued flowing back into the 
country (for a closer analysis, see Gorbunov 2010). Similarly, capital flows to South Korea 
picked up even though the nation effectively forced a restructuring of its debt, giving 
foreign creditors a choice of rolling over loans or not being repaid. Repudiation was the 
most common strategy before World War II (Suter and Stamm 1991: 670). 
Regardless the chosen route, a by-product has been that big bailouts allowed countries to 
maintain briefly over-valued exchange rates, which in turn allowed the rich in these 
countries to get their money out at more favorable terms than they might have done 
otherwise. These bailouts also allowed Western banks that engaged in imprudent lending to 
be repaid. Meanwhile, as overvalued exchange rates – even if maintained for only a short 
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the cases of Ukraine and Ecuador, see for instance García-Hamilton et al. (2005: 124-6). 
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concludes that the lessons are not encouraging since the absence of a negotiated solution risks leading to 
international financial isolation and also to prompt litigation. Litigation can of course, he writes, be successful 
in eventually securing payment in full. 
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period – further depress the economy, the country is left with the burden of repaying 
billions of dollars in IMF loans. (Stiglitz 2002a)
71
 
Interestingly, if applying the concept of world leadership, and describing the actor structure 
within the richest core countries doubling as the core of the creditors on debt crisis 
management, Suter and Stamm (1991) detect a positive correlation between a centralized 
hegemonic power and efficient debt restructuring from the perspective of the creditor. 
During the nineteenth century British supremacy, speedy debt restructuring prevailed. 
Between the turn of the century and World War II, the structure became multi-centric and 
the focus was on crisis management. During the postwar period, the US first gained 
hegemony, but from the 1970 onwards it begun to deteriorate. Reasons for this may be the 
hegemonic power‘s interest in maintaining stability, and its potential of acting as a lender 
of last resort. The rising competition between creditors pronounces both their political 
influence on debtors as complicates the identification of the necessary financial means from 
the debtor‘s perspective. The debtor may benefit from debt restructuring during a phase 
where a new hegemonic power is emerging and in doing so, trying to integrate debtor 
countries into its power system at the expense of the old hegemonic power.
72
  
Generally, in the past, multilateral rescheduling was concluded within just one year, 
whereas agreements between bond-holders and debtor countries concerning the settlement 
of bonds could be reached only after six to fourteen years. Debt reschedulings usually 
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 Nowhere was the problem more evident than in the 1998 Russian bailout, where only after the ―failure‖ – 
after the devaluation of the rouble – did growth resume. The billions lent to Russia quickly wound up in the 
Swiss and Cyprus bank accounts of Russia‘s oligarchs. All of this was evident at the time the money was lent 
in July 1998, but it is Russia‘s people who today must pay for the mistakes of the IMF. (Stiglitz 2002a) 
72
 For a historical look at the efficacy of crisis management between the 1800s and the early 1980s, see Suter 
and Stamm 1991, who, among other matters, analyse the duration of default, the durability of settlements and 
the amount of debt relief. One pattern they detect is that on average, after a debt settlement, twenty-one years 
elapse before the same country defaults once again or negotiates a resecheduling arrangement (Suter and 
Stamm 1991: 655). Another is that defaults lasted more than nine years on average (Suter and Stamm 1991: 
657). Further, reschedulings do not equal debt settlements, one example being that out of the forty-eight 
countries that had to reschedule their debt between 1976-86, thirty-eight of them met more than once with 
their creditors.  
68 
 
provide only provisional settlement, hinting at the existence of trade-offs between speed of 
intervention and durability of solutions. Further, debtor countries obtained more favourable 
terms for debt settlements for defaulted foreign bonds than for multilateral reschedulings. 
(Suter and Stamm 1991: 667-8)  
But in short, the system relies on concessions made by debt holders, with much of the 
negotiation taking place between with representatives of the IMF, the bondholders and the 
hard-pressed debtor country (Rasmussen 2004: 1159). It may also be that relative to the 
UN, the World Bank and the IMF, the real forces in setting the rules for the global financial 
system are the Basel institutions and the Financial Stability Board. I will address these in 
chapter 7, but for now, the importance is to observe that already the variations in the way 
indebted countries have been met make a strong case for a more orderly, more predictable, 
and more rapid sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. This includes a strong case for 
addressing the collective action problems and for taking reasonable steps to address holdout 
litigation. (Roubini and Setser 2003: 2) Simultaneously, it is of importance to realize the 
limitations to what likely can be achieved. Any useful debt restructuring mechanism, even 
if it fulfilled every possible criterion, must be accompanied with corresponding adjustments 
in aid and trade, and other neighboring fields.
73
 
To summarize, the settlement of problem debts is usually quick but rather ad hoc. Second, 
creditors do not exert direct influence on debtors, but rather, indirect pressure is applied by 
international organizations, notably by the IMF. Third, there has not been debt forgiveness 
on a large scale. (see Suter and Stamm 1991: 667) 
Considerations regarding sovereign debt restructurings 
These considerations can be grouped as relating to matters of definition, speed, 
embarrassment, practicalities and general uncertainty. Regarding definitions, lifting the lid 
of the pot on sovereign debt, sovereign debt can further be divided into subgroups or 
categories. A first group includes debt owed to the international financial institutions, or 
multilateral debts to official creditors, as is the case of many of the African borrowers. A 
second set is composed of bilateral loans to governmental creditors. A third category is 
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 As a general point of observation, people do ethics of aid and trade but leave aside the economy of the 
ethics. In this thesis I attempt at seeing how merging these perspectives might hold.   
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commercial loans to banks. Finally, a fourth group is composed of private loans to bond 
holders, such as pension investors. Within these categories, a further classification of 
claims is dependent on the seniority of claims (bonds) or their respective date of issue.
74
 
Alongside these divisions and classifications, increasingly, domestic debt is replacing 
external debt. Situations of defaults on domestic debt cannot be ignored; the 
aforementioned Russian experience from 1998 provides an important lesson (Gorbunov 
2010). These situations are of particular, topical interest since the trend of proportional 
domestic debt is on the rise.  
Obviously, the issuers of these various categories of loans, and the receivers of these, 
represent differing views regarding sovereign debt restructuring in general as well as 
regarding the analysis of underlying problems. Before pin-pointing these differences, In 
terms of speed, it is central to note the insistent calls for making sovereign debt 
restructurings more rapid (Boorman 2003: 6; Raffer and Singer 2001: 172; Roubini and 
Setser 2003: 2; among others). Smooth and rapid proceedings could both prevent further 
debt build-up for the debtor while securing more returns for the creditor. Since creditors are 
many, and since they are not necessarily in contact with each other, the alarm would need 
to be set by the debtor. This is also because a nation has, of course, immense resources to 
draw from, since it can always raise its taxation. The moral threshold beyond which the 
taxation, saving in social expenditures or selling of national resources, becomes 
unacceptable is for the government of the indebted to decide. Therefore, in a sense, the 
insolvency of a nation is always a political decision. Default and the associated 
uncertainties regarding creditor-debtor relations often lead to widespread economic chaos. 
Domestically, it leads to social upheavals. Economically, the admission that a sovereign 
cannot pay can itself trigger other types of runs (Roubini and Setser 2003: 4). Proposals for 
strengthening arrangements for debt restructuring are intended to increase the likelihood 
that early agreement – preferably before default occurs – can be reached on a restructuring 
that can restore viability. Neither debtors nor their creditors should bear unnecessarily large 
costs in these crises situations. (Boorman 2003: 8) 
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 Bulow (2002: 230, 238) provides a discussion about seniority and sets the parameters by 
confirming/sustantiating the general belief that the IMF claims comes first, the World Bank second, followed 
by other multilaterals and bilateral. But, seniority can also simply refer to the due date of debts, the borrower 
makes payments until it has no more money and defaults, leaving the remaining creditors with nothing.  
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Intuitively, the first question could then be to ask why countries hesitate to approach their 
creditors. Naturally, no one wants to admit the reality of their problems − especially not the 
minister in charge of the country‘s financial affairs and policies. Matters of embarrassment 
constitute another group of concerns. There is also a real concern regarding future access to 
credit markets. (Boorman 2003: 6-8; see also Easterly 2002: 117) Or, then, perhaps political 
incentives prevent sovereign debtors from calling time.
75
 Short-term political aims along 
with personal goals may provide reasons for over-borrowing, even at high ex post 
restructuring costs, as identified by Bolton (2003: 61-2). Therefore, it is debatable whether 
sovereign debtors would pick up an ex ante efficient level of debt renegotiation that 
optimally trades off ex ante costs of borrowing and ex post costs of financial distress. But in 
addition to, or perhaps even apart from, reasons of perceived humiliation and short-term 
political agendas, the fact remains that there is no mechanism to reasonably assure the 
country that there will be an orderly, predictable and transparent process to reach a 
negotiated settlement with creditors to restructure the debtor‘s debt in line with the 
prospective capacity of the country to service its debt (Boorman 2003: 6-8).
76
 This lack of 
rules also explains the substantial risk aversion found in emerging economy debt markets 
(Spiegel 2010). Eichengreen and Lindert (1991: 5) conclude that even when default did not 
taint or alter creditworthiness for an individual debtor country, it did bring about heavy 
collective costs for the overall group of debtors. They attribute this to the fact that private 
lenders did not discriminate in the shutoff of credit after the crisis broke, in the same 
manner that they did during the previous lending boom. In other words, the argument is not 
that default was without implications for the operation of the market, but rather that the 
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 Instead, Easterly (2002: 117) argues that, surprisingly enough, the indebted country sits in the driver‘s seat 
during the negotiations over disbursement of loans. This, he explains, is due to three factors. First, the 
borrower assumes that the creditor will disburse the loans regardless of whether the borrower meets the 
condition since secondly, the lenders‘ aid budgets depend on the lenders‘ new lending. Thirdly, the borrower 
can always threaten not to service old debts unless they get new loans.  Here, one could add a fourth 
dimension related to personal pride. The lending portfolio manager, who obviously is not keen to place his 
professional assessments in bad light, is also keen to expand on his portfolio and has every incentive to 
maintain – or preferably increase – his lending.  
76
 Partly based on these considerations, Bolton and Skeel (2004: 786-7, see also 788-93) suggest that from the 
perspective of both the creditor and the debtor, involuntary bankruptcy could make more sense than is 
generally thought.  
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effects were largely external to the defaulting countries (Eichengreen 1991: 161).
77
 During 
the crisis of the 1930s the spread of damage to creditworthiness from defaulters to debtors 
was especially prevalent (Eichengreen and Lindert 1991). For instance, Brazil, the 
defaulter, had no more trouble borrowing than Argentina, the faithful reimburser (Cardoso 
and Dornbush 1991). Argentina was further unrewarded for faithful payments in contrast to 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Peru (Jorgensen and Sachs 1991). Put into a general 
perspective, as lending picked up after World War II, there was little discernible difference 
in the capital-market access of countries that had pursued different policies toward their 
external debts (Eichengreen 1991: 161). The short-term effect on credit access for the 
defaulting nation is supported by Gorbunov (2010) who concludes that following Russia‘s 
default in 1998, Russian sovereign debt was upgraded to investment grade within five years 
of the default.  
Turning to the practicalities of debt restructuring, in the absence of an orderly process, the 
international community is put in a position of deciding whether to continue to support the 
country‘s policies. In the face of unsustainable debt burdens, continued IMF lending would 
not provide the universal cure.
78
 Increasing the burden of debt that benefits from the Fund‘s 
preferred creditor status may only increase the magnitude of the debt adjustment that must 
eventually be borne by private sector creditors and bilateral official creditors in situations 
where there is no underlying improvement in the country‘s capacity to service its debt. 
(Boorman 2003: 6) On the other hand, the transferral of burden laid on the private sector 
has brought with it a shift in power from the IMF to other creditors. The IMF has in fact 
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 Accordingly, defaulting countries could have paid a price through loss of capital-market access. Economic, 
and often empirical, ―theoretical models of international lending in the presence of default are built on the 
assumption that default blemishes the borrower's reputation and destroys its ability to borrow, while countries 
that maintain debt service enjoy continued access to international capital markets. This assumption can be 
reconciled with the historical evidence only with difficulty. Countries that faithfully serviced their debts in the 
1930s did not enjoy superior credit market access subsequently. In fact, virtually no one was able to obtain 
significant amounts of new portfolio capital abroad in the 1930s or in the decades following World War II.‖ 
(Eichengreen 1991: 161) 
78
 Bulow (2002: 252) analyzes that in the Mexican (1995) and Argentinean (2001) crises it would have been 
better had countries had to restructure a year earlier and had they lacked the ability to borrow the money that 
helped them postpone and exacerbate their problems.  
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conditioned its own lending on the willingness of the private sector to lend. If creditors are 
unwilling to carry losses in the case of default, the borrowing county is unable to secure 
further loans from anyone else. The creditors suddenly have enormous leverage in relation 
to the official lenders. (Stiglitz 2002b: 204) In case private lenders refuse to take on losses, 
a defaulting country is not able to reach a renegotiated debt structure. But in turn, private 
lenders lack a defined outline of how different creditor groups will be treated in case of 
sovereign debt restructuring.
79
 Uncertainty heads the final group of concerns. They also 
remember previous situations where the private sector de facto is assumed to bail out the 
official creditors. Official creditors, Raffer (2007b: 236) explains, largely pushed aside the 
most essential economic principles and the rule of law in sovereign lending after 1970. 
They established a framework violating human rights, destabilizing credit markets, and 
inflicting damage on the poor in particular, but also on private creditors. The equation of an 
obvious need for writing off debt, where the official creditors insist on them being treated 
as preferred creditors promises only negative outcomes for the private creditor. In the 
literature, this is referred to as a bail-in strategy which has replaced bail-out strategy, 
representing changes in IMF policies. The bail-in policy meant that prior to the IMF bailing 
out a country with loans, the IMF insisted on an extensive participation by the private 
sector lenders. This operation includes and assumes a ―haircut‖ for the private lenders, or a 
write-down of parts of their debts.
80
 In addition, as a lender of last resort, a role that the 
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 Regarding private debts and their restructurings in isolation from official debts, one can divide these into 
two groups, cooperative and non-cooperative, or unilateral, defaults. Among the cooperative defaults, Spiegel 
(2010) has looked at these situations and found that most of the restructurings were considered successful in 
terms of being relatively quick and orderly. However, few of these actually reduced the countries‘ debt 
burdens. On the other hand, these restructurings can be seen as successful in terms of rolling over debts. If 
looking at the unilateral defaults, where Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001 are the most typically referred 
to the cases, creditor losses could be significant. However, and importantly, also here, Spiegel (2010) reports 
that the debt in itself was not reduced significantly. A fact that, in turn, means that despite temporary ease 
with its creditors, the underlying financial problem debt of the debtor country has not been eased. Although 
neither Argentina nor Russia is at the focus of this thesis, the point here is to draw attention to general and 
relevant problems with debt restructuring processes.  
80
 Stiglitz provides an account on how this strategy proved ―both problematic in conception and flawed in 
implementation‖ (2002b: 203-5). Damill et al. (2010) explains the particular haircut of the Argentinean 
default in 2001, concluding that one would be hard pressed to say that the treatment of Argentina‘s debt was 
either efficient or timely. This is since all Argentina‘s multilateral creditors were repaid in full, and on time, 
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IMF has often played, may make bondholders reluctant to agree on restructuring 
negotiations (Rasmussen 2004: 1160). Similarly, Rasmussen continues, a country in 
distress may overstate its fiscal woes, hoping for an infusion of fresh funds. In sum, though, 
any possible infusion of new money will tend to move both bondholders and sovereign 
debtors away from the negotiation table.   
These concerns, perhaps crowned by a general uncertainty surrounding the restructured 
process, boil down to a hold-out problem, in the literature standing for the inclination for 
any single creditor not to agree to a restructuring under the expectation that other creditors 
will take the necessary reductions in their rights to payment. The hope is thus that the 
―hold-out‖ will receive payment according to the bonds‘ original terms. But the hold-out 
problem is relevant not only from the angle of the creditor, but also for the indebted nation, 
that, when faced with debt-servicing difficulties clings to, among other issues, the hope of 
acquiring more loans. Emerging market issuers have had to pay a premium to bondholders 
to overcome the high risk they associate with emerging market debt. As the excess return 
for investors takes place at the expense of developing countries in distress, Spiegel (2010) 
joins the call for clearer rules in the game of sovereign bankruptcy.  
Arbitrating international debt? 
To address the shortcomings of the present debt restructuring system, two main sets of 
proposals have been put forth. One is about Collective Action Clauses, an initiative that 
also represents the ideology underpinning a range of Codes and Principles. The underlying 
aim of this group of initiatives is that they aim at either reducing the risk of accumulation of 
problem debts, or at sorting out possible ways of dealing with these. These proposals, 
however, do not aim at eliminating the risk of sovereign bankruptcy. Another group of 
proposals centre around declaring insolvency for the sovereign indebted country, a way of 
dealing with problem debt that would have effects on the roots of the world‘s financial 
system.  
The idea of CACs, or ―the contractual approach‖, is about allowing changes in the payment 
system terms of all bonds provided that a specified number of the bondholders voted in 
                                                                                                                                                    
the losses were borne by private creditors, including thousands of small households investors in Europe who 
took risks they probably did not understand.  
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favor of the change.
81
 The aspiration is that the clauses would eliminate the threat of 
opportunistic holdouts in order to facilitate restructurings. In effect, this is an attempted 
response to the line of argument that criticizes the lack of formal priorities in sovereign 
debt.
82
 In practice, CACs have gained support in the absence of support for other debt 
restructuring initiatives (see for instance Miller and Thomas 2006).  
But already from within this debate, the CACs are not seen as providing a sufficiently 
comprehensive restructuring of poor countries debt. Further, non-bond debt is not 
addressed and it leaves the indebted country with too much remaining debt (Bolton and 
Skeel 2004: 772-5). Some commentators also reject CACs on the grounds that they 
undermine the absolute priority of repayment and do not address the sovereign nation‘s 
need for new financing (Bolton and Skeel 2004: 772-5).
83
 In addition, CACs would not 
address global benefits, such as global rather than ad hoc restructuring and access to 
interim financing, in the way sovereign bankruptcy would (Bulow 2002: 251). Actually, the 
absence of a priority structure, or CACs, revolves around an argument for a different kind 
of reform of the sovereign restructuring process. This reform is linked to, but is not 
necessarily about, a bankruptcy regime (Roubini and Setser 2004: 332). Finally, CACs is 
made by the creditors and for the creditors and leaves out a role for the indebted country. 
The second set of proposals deals with bankruptcy measures for indebted nations, borrowed 
from bankruptcy procedures from the corporate world. In his The Wealth of Nations, Adam 
Smith is the first to have mentioned bankruptcy procedures for nations:  
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same 
manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and 
avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the 
debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor (Smith 2009: Chapter III).    
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 CACs were proposed by US Under-Secretary of Treasury James Taylor (2002). See also Tamura (2002). 
Collective action terms are familiar from UK-based debt contracts. For a thorough look at CACs, with a focus 
on the Argentinean case of 2002, see Miller and Thomas (2006) 
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 See for instance Gelpern (2004), Bolton and Skeel (2004) and Zettelmeyer (2003). 
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 For more on the discussion on formal priorities in sovereign debt, and specifically for criticisms of the lack 
thereof, see for instance Gelpern (2004) and Zettelmeyer (2003). 
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It would take another 200 years before the bankruptcy of nations became a topic of 
discussion. In the 1980s, the idea was picked up suggesting paralleling national insolvency 
to corporate bankruptcy procedures.
 84
 At the time, the principle put on the table for these 
emerging discussions was that of ‗Chapter 11‘ of Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, a 
code permitting the reorganization of any business under bankruptcy laws of the US.  
But corporate dynamics cannot capture all of the relevant dynamics surrounding debt 
restructuring (Rasmussen 2004: 1161). Rasmussen sees a firm as an investment vehicle 
where the state, in contrast, aims at well-being for its citizens. The ‗Chapter 11‘ approach 
was criticized on the grounds of failing to address the questions of sovereignty and the fact 
that a government‘s assets cannot be seized. Therefore, this business approach is not 
applicable to sovereign countries. At this point, Raffer (1990) proposed the 
internationalization of the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ of the same code and title.85 ‗Chapter 9‘ 
is a procedure for solving the insolvency of a governing body, a so-called municipality, 
without violating or undermining its governmental power. Under ‗Chapter 9‘, 
municipalities are not liquidated, but their debts are re-organized. It takes into account the 
protection of governmental powers for the debtor, protects those affected by debts and is 
thus applicable to sovereigns. Raffer (1990) adds that ‗Chapter 9‘ combines a general 
framework with the flexibility necessary to deal fairly with individual debtors. In practice, 
when a municipality files a petition this translates into an automatic stay of enforcement of 
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 For an overview of these proposals, earlier ones and ideas related to other initiatives, see Rogoff and 
Zettelmeyer (2002). 
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 The Title 11 of the US code, or the ―US Bankruptcy Code‖, is divided into nine Chapters, addressing 
bankruptcy of individuals, corporations and municipalities:  
Chapter 1. General Provisions;  
Chapter 3. Case Administration;  
Chapter 5. Creditors, Debtor and the Estate;  
Chapter 7. Liquidation;  
Chapter 9. Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality;  
Chapter 11. Reorganization Business;  
Chapter 12. Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income;  
Chapter 13. Adjustment of Debts of Individuals with Regular Annual Income, and 
Chapter 15. Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases  
(Legal Information Institute 2008b) 
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claims against the debtor.
86
 Famously, in 1994, ‗Chapter 9‘ was used by Orange County, 
California, to adjust its debts.
87
 The main interest of this thesis is not ‗Chapter 9‘ itself, but 
rather the principals behind it. This thesis is about taking those principles and procedures of 
the national level and rethinking them in the context of international political economy. 
‗Chapter 9‘ provides a general framework with the necessary flexibility of dealing fairly 
with individual debtors, and bringing the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ to international settings 
would only require minor changes, with one exception, Raffer concludes (1990:02, 304). 
This exception regards the court, and more precisely, replacing the national court with a 
neutral court of arbitration. In an international context, the principles behind the automatic 
stay of ‗Chapter 9‘would mean that the indebted government would benefit from the 
protection of a time-out to negotiate a plan with its creditors and its people. Raffer proposes 
that the model could be taken from the agreement with Germany (the Federal Republic of 
Germany, FRG) of 1953. And in doing so, it is noteworthy, that neither in the case of 
Germany, where half of its debts were reduced, nor in the subsequent similar situation in 
Indonesia of 1969, were the countries put under the supervision of the IMF or the World 
Bank. Instead, he says, and relying on usual practice in international law, the arbitrators 
should be nominated by both parties, so that creditors and debtors nominate the same 
number of persons. The members, in turn, nominate a chairperson to reach an uneven 
number of the members of the panel. The political and legal features of internationalizing 
the principles behind ‗Chapter 9‘ receive separate treatment in the subsequent chapters. For 
now, it is useful to compare the economic basis of other proposals commenting on the 
‗Chapter 9‘ initiative.   
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 Raffer‘s proposal has since been supported for instance by Erlassjahr (2001), Stiglitz (2002a, see also 
2010a), Round (2003), Palley (2003) and Soederberg (2005). Neither Stiglitz nor Soederberg refer to Raffer 
directly. Soederberg supports Raffer‘s initial model as later promoted by Ann Pettifor. Also UNCTAD (1998) 
has called for a similar independent panel to be set up, assessing the economic sustainability of the debts of 
African countries, in particular.  
87
 On 6 December 1994, Orange County declared itself bankrupt. The treasurer of the county, Robert Citron, 
had lost USD 1.7 billion in speculative operations on the New York stock exchange. Orange county owed 
USD 7.6 billion to the federal government and public agencies (municipalities, districts and special districts). 
Citron had borrowed USD 2 for each dollar deposited. He had borrowed short to invest in diverse exotic 
products linked to interest rates. 
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Connecting Raffer‘s proposal to that of CACs and the discussion on seniority of claims, in 
an international ‗Chapter 9‘, a symmetrical treatment of all creditors is a central point.88 It is 
a matter of fairness to debtors as to other creditors. Debt reduction must be uniform; the 
same percentage must be deducted from all debts.
89
 (Raffer and Singer 2001: 195) This 
eliminates the discussions on formal priorities in sovereign debt, and equalizes dealings 
with private debt to that of or public debt. Although in conflict with much of the discussion 
on debt restructuring, an international version of the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ fulfills the 
criteria of being not only viable and fair but also economically efficient and thus provides a 
solution to the problems arising from seniority claims. This conflict appears as a result of 
much of the research on restructuring being focused on immediate aid instead of promoting 
a longer-term solution.  
Finally, taking a step beyond CACs and landing in a space in-between the principles of 
‗Chapter 9‘ and ‗Chapter 11‘, the SDRM, as drawn up by the IMF, proposes establishing a 
treaty obligation by amending the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Debts would be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis. Comparing the SDRM to the CACs, Krueger (2002) asserts 
that even if creditors are bound by collective action terms regarding individual bonds, 
sovereign debtors typically owe debts to different types of creditors, and any one of these 
classes could form a holdout. Bulow (2002: 251), in turn, sees that even though the SDRM 
proposal makes strides towards eliminating the holdout problem, it still leaves space for 
enormous creditor infighting regarding the seniority of the claims. He also sees that the 
SDRM would leave much sovereign debt under the jurisdiction of a first world legal 
structure, and the possibility that debts could be dealt with in different courts opens up the 
possibility of uncoordinated ruling (ibid: 251). While it is true that the SDRM could bring 
some improvements in terms of coherence in bond restructuring, most importantly, Raffer 
(2003: 2; see also 2006) summarizes that the SDRM builds partially on arbitration by the 
IMF exempting multilateral institutions while acting evasively towards Paris Club 
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 Also Lipson (1981: 620) supports the equal treatment of all creditors, be they private or public and 
regardless the priorities attached to their loans. This statutory approach clearly offers a more elegant solution 
to the hold-out problem than CACs, write Roubini and Setser (2004: 333). 
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 Yet, Raffer sees that CACs could be helpful in organizing the process of registering creditors and their 
nominated arbitrators who immediately divide on the recognition of claims. (Raffer 2006: 248). 
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members.
90
 The fundamental principle in a ‗Chapter 9‘ arrangement of including all 
creditors as equals would thus not be fulfilled. But even if all creditors were brought in 
under some equal heading, the situation where one of them – the IMF – would rule in its 
own case sounds indeed odd.
91
  
In conclusion, the sheer mass of concerns regarding debt relief is important. Even when 
moral and legal aspects are left aside, already from an economic point of view these 
concerns prompt an examination of the underlying fundamentals of and motivations behind 
debt relief, and dealings with debt in general. So far, this analysis supports the viability of 
implementing international principles reflecting those of ‗Chapter 9‘. This brings us to a 
new set of questions relating to whether an international debt arbitration mechanism is 
viable from a political and legal point of view? This question opens the doors to the two 
following chapters of the argument of this thesis. 
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 Some of the main features of the SDRM include that a supermajority of creditors could vote to accept new 
terms under a restructuring agreement, while a minority creditors would be prevented from blocking such 
agreements, that negotiations should be based on good faith, and that there would be transparency 
requirements and sharing of information by the debtor and finally, that a dispute resolution forum would be 
created. The proposals were abandoned in 2004 following objections by a number of creditor governments 
and private financiers. Proposals were also criticised by NGOs for, among other reasons, the exclusion of IMF 
debts from the process of orderly restructuring. For further information, see IMF (2003) and Setser (2010).  
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 In an extended comparative analysis specifically on the SDRM and a ‗Chapter 9‘-type arbitration, Round 
(2003) lists nine specifics. In addition to the four observations high-lighted for discussion in this thesis 
regarding the SDRM being biased toward creditors and exempting the World Bank and the IMF from the 
restructuring process, as well as its failure to engage the public on whose behalf the debt was contracted, 
Round notes five linked concerns. One, the SDRM requires all participant countries to adhere to dubious 
IMF-imposed structural adjustment. Two, it effectively concedes to the IMF the role of determining what 
level of debt will be deemed sustainable. Three, it effectively requires the surrendering of democratic 
decision-making by the debtor. Four, it fails to recognize the question of illegitimate debts. Five, it provides 
no provision to protect domestic budgetary resources and seeks to re-legitimize and finally, it seeks to expand 
the influence of the IMF in global economic governance.  
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3.  
 
THE POLITICAL QUESTION: 
 
Is global arbitration of international 
debts defensible given the political 
system of sovereign nation-states?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The global financial architecture was established at Bretton Woods in 1944. Four years 
later, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These two institutional 
parallel paradigms form a tension between protecting the advantageous positions of the rich 
nations on the one hand and equal rights for every individual on the other. Whereas the 
Bretton Woods institutions have been criticized for reflecting the powers of the winners of 
World War II, the Declaration, which arose in a similar way directly from the experience of 
the war, represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are 
inherently entitled. This expression is an important threshold as it brings with it the 
recognition that all humans are equal in terms of the cardinal moral laws, and it applies 
regardless wealth, nationality, race or gender.  
As a rule though, today, human rights and human dignity are not prioritized over repayment 
of debt.
92
 This also holds globally, where law and institutions have been subordinated to the 
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stipulating that states have the right and the duty to articulate national development policies to implement the 
fundamental rights and the texts of the UN indicating that every country has the sovereign right to freely 
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neoliberal economic ideology (Supiot 2010). Yet, problem debt is closely tied to poverty 
and resource deprivation in poor countries. The extent and severity of existing deprivations 
in the poor world, contrasted with the vastly higher standard of living among the rich, 
suggest caution against thoughtless approval of the conduct, policies, and global institutions 
of the rich countries (Pogge 2008b: 6). The postwar informal arrangements governing 
international debt not only helps increase the power of credit to serve as an effective form 
of social discipline, but the policies are also profoundly contradictory (Soederberg 2005: 
927). Although in a less deprived context, similar social disciplines by lenders in the Euro 
zone are equally effective. The power of credit is particularly important to note, when in no 
market-based economic system can the overindebted be forced to starve to service their 
debts, a principle that is not applied to international lending or sovereign nations (Raffer 
and Singer 2004: 244). What is more, international economics accepts without reservation 
that sovereign debt operates in a space independent from political philosophy or legal 
theory (Lienau 2008a: 65). 
Against these observations, one must question whether the absence of political economists 
and scientists in these discussions holds? And what the reasons for their absence might be 
might be? Providing a pragmatic response, Hahnel (2005: especially 18) argues that in the 
twentieth century, increasing confusion, and even opportunism, among critics of capitalism 
about economic injustice formed one of the substantial contributions to the failure of 
advancing the cause of equitable cooperation. This failure, he predicts, will not morph into 
success unless the understanding of economic justice and commitment to fighting for 
economic justice is deepened.  
The observations that pertain to poor indebted countries reveal the interplay between the 
servicing of debt as driven by the global financial institutions on the one hand, and the 
violation of human rights as stated in the Declaration on the other and raise intriguing 
theoretical and policy issues. Two stand out. One, given the global nature of both 
paradigms, together with the warning by Hahnel about a general confusion regarding 
matters of economic justice, an identification of an appropriate approach to global justice 
seems to be in order. To make path for impartial agreement between these issues, this 
                                                                                                                                                    
dispose of its natural resources for its development. Of course, the full International Bill of Human Rights, 
adding the two covenants to the Declaration entered into force in 1976 only. 
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approach would have to allow for open impartiality, and for addressing appropriate 
institutional arrangements. Two, given the political system of sovereign nations, is a global 
reorganization scheme, or mechanism, defensible?  
This discussion is inevitable limited and necessarily perspective-bound. This is perhaps 
seen most clearly in the fact that in discussing justice, the focus is on the institutionalism, 
rather than on actual societies or behaviors of people and their interactions. This means that 
the argument subscribes to an arrangement-focused view of justice (to borrow from Sen 
2010: 10). Instead of contributing to the thinking of justice per se, something others have 
done so brilliantly, this thesis serves a theoretical purpose of lifting problem debt into a 
frame of global justice. It does so by generating a discussion on the ways and inconsistent 
conduct in which sovereign debt is being dealt with, an approach that doubles as giving this 
article a policy purpose. As a backdrop it is of essence to recapture what emerged from 
chapter 2, that despite numerous debt relief programmes and various debt cancellation 
initiatives, the poor world remains heavily indebted.  
The argument is structured in three parts. This chapter begins by placing problem debt in a 
global justice framework since that will help locate the particular approach towards global 
justice that this thesis strives to present in the subsequent part. This discussion provides a 
practical political and moral justification for acting on negative duties, by which the rich 
nations and peoples have a duty to lift the current burdens of injustices, such as debt, 
weighting on the poor. Rather than focusing on debt relief or development aid for charitable 
reasons, the rich should change the present economic structures which prevent the poor 
from prospering.  Universal human rights are placed in relation to problem debt, and a 
particular focus is given to economic and social rights. Human rights provide a minimal 
ethical and practical framework for debt restructuring. Following this, sovereignty in 
sovereign debt and in relation to global regimes are looked at and it is argued that currently, 
due to the international web of forums, the sovereignty of the political institution of nation 
state is in fact sub-organized to global governance. Conditionality is of primary concern as 
they shrink the policy space of the debtor, and consequently the programmes have spurred 
hundreds of upheavals and wide civil society debates around the world.
93
 This fact propels 
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belonging to the EU, for instance, have voluntarily given up much of their political independence. Those 
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me to further investigate the range of factors underpinning the ambitions of civil society‘s 
far and wide engagement with problem debt. Consequently, and finally, the political 
dimensions and politics of arbitrating international debt are brought up and this chapter 
argues that international debt arbitration is a viable option that would increase the 
sovereignty of nation states, while simultaneously, it would be opening a path towards the 
further promotion of global justice. This chapter shows that the creditors‘ political 
motivations have proven quintessential behind successful debt relief initiatives, and 
following this, it inquires into actual cases of political processes of restructuring debt, and 
the support for and implications of these in introducing international debt arbitration. 
3.1 The global justice dimension of problem debt 
What is critical here is that concepts and theories of global justice are still in their early 
stages of development (Nagel 2005: 113-7). The nation-state is the primary locus of 
political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice.
94
 But the concept of justice can be used in 
evaluating many quite different things, from criminal law to the market economy. As 
Thomas Nagel (2005: 113-7) writes, what creates the link between justice and sovereignty 
is something common to a wide range of conceptions of justice. This common denominator 
is that they all depend on the coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot 
be achieved without legal re-enforcement by a monopoly of force. Separate individuals 
have no motive, or opportunity, to conform to, or contradict, patterns or institutions on their 
own. The only way to provide this assurance is through some form of law with centralized 
authority to determine the rules, and a centralized monopoly of power to enforce them.
95
 
Today, there is a complete absence of any comparable standards of fairness or equality of 
opportunity from the practices that govern our relations with individuals in other societies, 
                                                                                                                                                    
within the Euro-zone have also given up their financial independence. Simultaneously, numerous 
international treaties tie the hands of newly elected governments far into the future. 
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 For the formation of the state, the nation and their role in contemporary globalization, see for instance 
James (2006; chapters 9, 10 and 11). 
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 This stands in contrast to Adam Smith‘s visible hand of liberal economics, or the notion that markets are 
self-regulating. Further, the idea that participants in the market place are rewarded according to their 
contributions is problematic as this, as discussed, misguidedly assumes free and fair participation in the 
economy. For this reason alone, the invisible hand is problematic as a concept of justice.  
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he adds. What is more, in setting such standards, mere collaboration and conventions which 
make cooperation possible is not enough, but rather, what is needed is something more 
which would make equal consideration of all concerned under the rule of a collective 
authority possible (Nagel 2005). This then brings the question of what exactly this 
collective authority would look like. And what would be the process of getting us from here 
to there? What is needed is a convincing justification and implementable practical first step 
for putting the process in motion, a call that motivates the proposal of a universal 
mechanism to deal with problem debt as such a first step. 
Keynes‘s plan demonstrated one type of collective authority, as explained in chapter 2. 
Keynes‘s thinking about deficit and surplus zones is central for the understanding of 
international debt as a matter of consequence of imbalances in balances of payment. It also 
motivates the appropriateness in approaching problem debt from the perspective of global 
justice, or injustice, rather.   
In the absence of a collective authority, one practical approach for setting the wheels of 
action in motion is to appeal to the negative duties by the rich towards the poor. According 
to this approach, the rich have a duty, as opposed to a reference to voluntary action in the 
form of charity, to lift the current burdens of injustices pressing on the shoulders of the 
poor. Problem debt of poor countries is here seen as one of these burdens. For the purposes 
of looking into the viability of arbitration of international debts, all that is needed is a 
pragmatic and minimal approach to global justice. In meeting these needs, the framework 
of negative duties emerges as useful, minimal and practical. In discussing negative duties, 
this thesis builds upon the framework as argued for by Thomas Pogge, preliminarily 
because of its institutional focus.
96
 Given the market-based system, it is appropriate to 
interpret ethics and human rights in a minimalist sense. Already for moral reasons of 
existing world poverty, global justice and its possible forms are seen not only as a central 
component of the solution to problem debt, but as a most pressing world political issue. The 
peoples concerned – both in debtor as in creditor nations – must have a say regarding what 
principles of justice should be followed. With this importance spelled out, it is now time to 
discuss different ways of conceiving global justice. Following that, Pogge‘s approach of 
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negative duties is explained and then, negative duties are tied to the protection of human 
rights in indebted nations.   
But before taking a closer look at Pogge‘s framework, a justification of the approach is in 
order. First, and in brief, clearly, any path regarding global justice must address the issue of 
institutions, either as they exist currently or in their future forms. This discussion is 
postponed to the next chapter. For now, this thesis works toward setting a minimal 
condition of ethical and institutional legitimacy. For present purposes, a pragmatic and 
minimal approach to global justice is needed. In meeting these needs, Pogge‘s framework is 
useful, minimal and practical. For institutional change, and given the market-based system, 
it is appropriate to interpret ethics and human rights in a minimalist sense. This requires 
accepting the world as it stands with its nation-state, civil society, and existing global 
forums. The minimal condition will then serve as a basis for pushing the question of 
institutionalization farther. The approach remains conceptual, as practical considerations 
are dealt with in the next chapter discussing the legal dimensions of international debt 
arbitration. Another part of the approach is based on the argument that human rights are a 
necessary condition for global democracy, or global democratization, an argument that will 
however not be further addressed here (but see for instance Goodhart 2008 for a 
clarification).   
Second, already for moral reasons of existing world poverty, the task of reducing global 
injustices are seen not only as a central component of the solution to problem debt, but as a 
most pressing world political issue. Given this, the peoples concerned – both in debtor as in 
creditor nations – must have a say regarding what principles of justice should be followed.  
About global justice  
The alternative ways of perceiving the collective authority that was just mentioned above 
calls for a broad approach to global justice. Here, global justice is seen as an ethical issue 
addressing global inequality. In doing so, three main ways of perceiving global justice are 
identified, and the focus is specifically maintained on institutional arrangements.
97
 These 
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of justice was technical. He argued that the Bretton Woods institutions should be neutral in their politics and 
that their tasks should be confined to the technical. Perhaps the main concern with this approach is that since 
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ways draw on three partially competing theoretical frames: One, Kantianism that builds on 
social contract theory in combination with transcendental institutional investigations. Two, 
liberal egalitarianism stands for appropriate procedures and equal participation in these. 
And three, utilitarianism focuses on social relations rather than institutions (for discussions 
on these frames specifically in relation to global justice, see for instance Sen 2010; 
Papaioannou et al. 2009).  
In practice, a first practical-political way of perceiving global justice is to see a just world 
as the outcome of a web of internally just nations. Here, this is referred to as the nation-
state approach.
98
 In this approach, by putting its citizens into a national institutional 
relation, which they do not have with the rest of humanity, the precise existence of 
sovereign states is what gives the value of justice in its application. Since this institutional 
relation does not stretch across borders, those who take the political view will not find the 
absence of global justice a cause for distress (Nagel 2005: 121). The nation-state approach 
is of course perhaps most well-represented by John Rawls, who, in his well-known 
―original position‖ as laid out is his A Theory of Justice (1971), offers justice as fairness. 
Identifying a weakness of the utilitarian doctrine as a basis for the institutions of 
constitutional democracy, Rawls (1971: vii-viii, and 1987: 416) works out a conception of 
justice that provides a reasonably systematic alternative to utilitarianism. He explains the 
objectives of justice as fairness as both a convincing account of basic rights and liberties 
and the prioritization of them, as well as an understanding of democratic equality. Central 
to Rawls‘s thinking is distributive justice, which is concerned with the fairness of allocation 
of goods in a society. The hypothetical thought-experiment of the original position (1971: 
17-22) is based on the idea that conceptions of justice are to be ranked by their acceptability 
to the persons whom it touches. The experiment refers to ascertaining which principles 
would be rational to adopt in any given situation. Thus, Rawls connects the theory of 
justice with the theory of rational choice. Importantly, in applying the original position, 
                                                                                                                                                    
matters need to be dealt with in some way, the fact that this way is never the subject of debate allows for 
subjective, ad hoc, and not necessarily coordinated or public ways of dealing with affairs. This particular 
example, or course, is based on the assumption that global mechanisms working toward global balance are in 
place. 
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 Nagel (2005) calls this the political approach. 
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Rawls sees that one can do so simply by arguing for principles of justice in accordance with 
the given restrictions.
99
 Rawls‘s principle is designed to regulate the basic structure of 
separate nation-states only, and is not designed to regulate either the personal conduct of 
individuals living in a just society, the governance of private associations, or the 
international relations between societies (Nagel 2005: 123). In addition to this, Rawls‘ 
concept of justice does not allow for a plurality of reasons for justice, or put differently, his 
principles allow for only one set of principles of justice to rule (Sen 2010: 11). As for the 
international aspect, and for my argument, Rawls‘s principle does not seem to allow for a 
collective, coordinated or dynamic approach to justice, for instance in terms of addressing 
already set structures pertaining to the economic order, such as problem debt. To clarify 
further, and as pointed out by Pogge (Blom 2003), Rawls‘s theory disregards the action 
taken by rich countries which has contributed to the persistence of global poverty. Rawls‘s 
theory is based on the concept that poverty is home-grown. And Rawls‘s justice as fairness 
uses the device of the original position, and a social contact based on that, among the 
citizens of a given political community (Sen 2010: 123). This means that no outsider is 
involved in, or party to, such a contractarian procedure (ibid). Thus, Rawls‘s justice 
represents a closed form of impartiality (Sen 2010: chapter 6).  
An alternative to the nation-state approach is to see global justice as executed by a 
supranational entity, a world authority of some kind, perhaps a world government, and is 
often called the cosmopolitan view, led by Thomas Hobbes, and later followed by 
Immanuel Kant, and others.
100
 Hobbes argues that cosmopolitan justice could be realized in 
a federal system, and would be analogous to the requirement that within a state, the 
institutions of private property should be arranged so that societal injustice is not their 
indirect consequence (Nagel 2005: 120). Hobbes anchored his thinking in social contract 
theories and argued that people ought to submit themselves to an absolute political 
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frame.  
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authority against which rebellion would not be tolerated. The enforcement and performance 
of debt contracts is problematic in a Hobbesian sense. This is because today, there is no 
overarching global sovereignty, no sure enforcement of claims, be those judicial or other 
kinds, and there is no common or shared power. Rather, it is the character, or kind, of 
international political structures that prompt debt servicing practices so far, also in cases 
when sovereign nations have found it onerous, and the lack of an overarching authority 
constitutes a matter that needs to be explored (Lipson 1981: 606; Stigliz 2010a). 
A third option falls in-between these categories. This option would translate into a kind of 
transnational way of organizing politics, with possible plural centers of power.
101
 On the 
one hand, this approach is rooted in popular support for global justice in general and 
universal human rights in particular. On the other hand, it is supported by movements 
within transnational civil society, or popular sovereignty, often in connection to discussions 
on global democratization. This type of cosmopolitan democracy is best defined as an effort 
―to globalise democracy while, at the same time, democratizing globalization‖ (Archibugi 
2004: 438; see also Archibugi and Held 1995). The transnational approach is the one that 
fits best with Adam Smith‘s ―impartial spectator‖, the process of involving an impartial 
assessment perhaps, but not necessarily, belonging to the focal group (Sen 2010: 123). In 
his view, impartial views may come from far or from within a community, or nation, or 
culture; Smith argues that there is room and need for both (Sen 2010: 123). Thus, Smith‘s 
justice represents an open form of impartiality (Sen 2010: chapter 6). 
Given the political system of nation states, this last form stands out as the most far-reaching 
in terms of it being the farthest from practice. With the rise of a transnational civil society, 
a development that escalated in the late 1990s not only with the debt movements around 
Jubilee 2000, but also with other campaigns such as the mobilizations against the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the late 1990s, this third option suddenly 
presented itself in more concrete terms. But admittedly, the leap from civil society 
mobilizations to the reorganization of sovereign power(s) is not only giant, it is also neither 
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different competing centres of power ruling in similar cases but with different outcomes.  
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easy nor practically evident.
102
 But a high degree of hypotheticality does not mean that it is 
a less promising scenario. Here, this thesis will not dig deeper into the principles of the 
cosmopolitan or transnational ideas, since the detailed visions of future political 
organization are not of immediate concern.
103
 Further developing these ideas and theories 
of global justice would need to entail a historical approach, or a practical analysis in terms 
of how they have come about, or then, a focusing on their internal relations. Alternatively, 
approaching global justice hierarchically as from the above would open up to an analysis of 
the relationships between the participants and their nations. It would also encompass 
discussions on the design of power. However, any of these approaches would necessarily 
broaden the approach further. Therefore, the discussion stops being helpful for the current 
practical and proactive purposes, and at this point, the discussions are left aside regarding 
normative theories for global governance and institutional goals or normative approaches to 
other possible contours of the shape of the future global order. Instead, this discussion 
serves as backdrop and inspiration, while noting that clearly, we are already engaged in 
some kind of institutional relationships – legal or economic – with people all over the world 
(Nagel 2005: 137).
104
 In fact, the term globalization is increasingly used in the most varying 
contexts.
105
 Importantly, for now, the absence of a sovereign authority over participating 
states makes it impossible for these institutions to pursue global justice, let alone make 
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 For a similar approach but concerning sovereign debt in particular, and using the framework of odious 
debt, popular sovereignty and the rule of law as starting points, see Lienau (2008a). 
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 Perhaps the main difference between the two latter ones is that whereas the cosmopolitan approach brings 
with it an assumed world government of some kind, the transnational democracy approach is visualized 
around the concept that the power would not be centralized, but dispersed. The nation-state approach is the 
politically least imaginative one.  
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 At the top of Nagel‘s list of areas of focus are: the rights of sovereign states to sell or confer legal title to 
the exploitation of their natural resources internationally, their right to borrow internationally and to create 
obligations of repayment on successor governments, the rights of commercial enterprises in one country to 
establish or acquire subsidiaries in other countries, and to profit from such investments, international 
extensions of antitrust laws, regulation of financial markets to permit the orderly international flow of capital, 
the laws of patent and copyright, the rules of international trade and so on.   
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 Interestingly, political parties provide an important exception to this prevailing trend. Hardly anyone is 
talking about global political parties. (Sehm Patomäki and Ulvila 2007: 1) 
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them an appropriate avenue for claims of justice – socioeconomic justice is not attached to 
economic activities (Nagel 2005: 137-8). This discussion will soon be returned to. But 
before that, this thesis turns to distinguishing between charity and justice. Without this 
separation, it would be difficult to continue my discussion with its practical purposes.
106
 
Against this, the more specific distinction now discussed is that of positive duties, negative 
duties and most importantly, the difference between these two.  
Negative duties 
Within the context of duties, one can make the significant moral distinction between the 
positive duty to help and the negative duty not to harm. For instance, Peter Singer (1972; 
2008) develops a preference utilitarian view, and asserts that the rich, or better-off, should 
help the poor by making personal sacrifices. Singer says that anyone able to help the poor 
should donate part of their income toward poverty relief and similar initiatives.
107
 Another 
route, co-captained by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, presents a capability approach, 
which asserts that the appropriate ―space‖ is that of the substantive freedoms, or 
capabilities, to choose a life one has reason to live (Sen 1999: 74). These functional 
capabilities can be seen in contrast to either utility or access to resources. From this, it 
follows that poverty is seen as capability deprivation. As a remedy, Sen emphasizes social 
reforms in poor countries.
108
 A third track is drawn by Thomas Pogge who champions 
structural reforms, not only in order to channel money to the global poor, but to lift burdens 
that the North currently imposes on poor countries for their own benefit (Berges 2007: 2). 
According to Pogge (Berges 2007: 1), the principal moral differences between these 
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 The driving interest behind Singer‘s argument is the psychological mechanism which makes it possible for 
people to relate and respond to helping those who we see are in need. Simultaneously, we do not acknowledge 
that a large number of people whom we cannot see are in need – so this does not trigger a corresponding 
response from us. In a moral sense, there should be no difference between these observations and yet, in 
practice, the level of response is radically different.  
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 Sen leaves the pragmatic political guide aside. Today, despite globalization being a popular and common 
term, there is no ―global policy‖, which would require some kind of a global state. National policy is made by 
governments in turn formed by representatives of political parties. To exemplify, in his book (1999), Sen does 
not mention the words ―political party‖, and economizes on the use of ―civil society‖. 
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different directions are that he emphasizes negative duties while Singer focuses on positive 
duties and Sen and Nussbaum do not highlight the distinction.
109
 While these moral 
differences complement each other well, this thesis chooses to rely on the ethical frames 
provided by Pogge (2008a) as the negative duties he discusses involve structural reforms of 
the world systems. And because dealing with international debt constitutes a practical way 
of fulfilling negative duties. 
On their own, positive duties are important, necessary and useful – but insufficient. They 
are insufficient both economically and morally. They are economically insufficient because 
a system based on hand-outs creates a dependency on hand-outs instead of laying the 
foundations of a more sustainable arrangement. Morally they are insufficient because they 
place the donor in a superior position to the receiver. In focusing on negative duties, Pogge 
does not deny positive duties, but rather, he sets them aside. Pogge refers to the case of 
slavery in order to illustrate negative duties (see for instance 2008b; or 2007). Today, it is 
judged that slaves were harmed by the institutional order imposed upon them because this 
order denied them freedom of movement, free choice of occupation, freedom from assault, 
rape, and torture and access to basic education, health care, and political participation. In 
making this judgment, harm and benefit are juxtaposed against a moralized subjective 
baseline, defined in terms of a just regime feasible at that time. An institutional order harms 
people when its design can be shown to be unjust by reference to a feasible alternative 
design. In order to extend this understanding of harm to global institutional arrangements, 
we need a barometer of what makes such arrangements just or unjust. From a different 
angle, Pogge settles on some characteristics that such a design must not possess on pains of 
being unjust. Pogge employs basic human rights as the internationally recognized minimal 
standard of our age, and argues that any institutional design is unjust when it foreseeably 
produces an avoidable human rights deficit. Human rights thus furnish a necessary, but not 
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 Obviously, the analyses are based on the judgements of why poverty exists. Is it just bad luck to having 
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The remedies, in turn, are results of differing points of view regarding what is realistic. Singer (1972; 2008), 
for instance, sees that helping the poor by donating money through charity is a realistic way of ―doing good‖, 
whereas working for changes in the economic structures are more utopistic.  
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sufficient, condition of social justice. The fact that some institutional design realizes human 
rights insofar as is reasonably possible may not guarantee that it is just.
110
   
Essentially, Pogge argues that the rich should contribute to efforts toward institutional 
reform or toward protecting the victims of present institutional injustice. Focusing on 
negative duties alone, Pogge limits such compensatory duties to the amount of harm one is 
responsible for by active cooperation with an unjust institutional order. Compensatory 
obligations are strictly limited in range (to persons subject to an institutional order one 
cooperates with), in subject matter (to the avoidance of human rights deficits) and in 
demandingness (to compensate for one‘s share of that part of the human rights deficit that 
foreseeably is reasonably avoidable through a feasible alternative institutional design). 
From a legal point of view, the amount of harm one is responsible for in terms of 
international lending can be contested in the claim that some sovereign debt is so called 
odious debt, where debts have been taken on by the leadership of a nation that has not used 
the debts for the benefit of the population.
111
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 Further, Pogge (2008b: 25-6) defines a notion of harm according to six principles:  
1. The rich are harming the global poor only if their conduct sets back their most basic interests, this 
standard of social justice is sensitive only to human rights deficits.  
2. The focus is exclusively on human rights deficits that are causally traceable to social institutions.  
3. Moral responsibility for such a human rights deficit is assigned only to those actively cooperating in 
designing, or in the imposing of, the relevant social institutions, and only to them is he ascribing 
compensatory obligations to do their share toward reforming social institutions or toward protecting 
its victims. 
4. Our active cooperation is harming the global poor only if it is foreseeable that this order gives rise to 
substantial human rights deficits. 
5. It is required that these human rights deficits be reasonably avoidable in the sense that a feasible 
alternative design of the relevant institutional order would not produce comparable human rights 
deficits or other ills of comparable magnitude.  
6. This avoidability must be knowable, we must be able to be confident that the alternative institutional 
design would do much better in giving participants secure access to their human rights.  
111
 Returning to legal perspectives of lending and odious debt in the next chapter, the point here is merely to 
lay the foundation by way of contextualizing the discussion.  
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Following from here, Pogge discusses three consequent insights: First, the national and 
social factors we most frequently like to blame for the persistence of severe poverty, bad 
governments and corruption in the less developed countries, are not wholly native 
ingredients of a lesser culture, however defined, but rather sustained by core features of our 
present global order. Second, the international privileges benefit the rich and poor country 
elites and autocrats at the expense of the poor populations of less rich countries. This shows 
how thinking about global justice must not be limited only to the confines of international 
relations. Third, we must stop thinking about world poverty in terms of helping the poor. 
The poor need help only because of the injustices the rich have been inflicting upon them.  
In line with Raffer and Singer (2001: 12), Pogge argues that by sidelining problem debt as a 
consequence of internal problems in poor countries, one turns a blind eye to external 
factors. Pogge (2008b: 17) explains that disputes about national and local factors draw 
attention away from foreign and global influences on the evolution of poverty. This 
manipulation of focus may be conscious, he hints. Heavy concentration by development 
economics on national development trajectories encourages the view, widespread in the 
affluent countries, that world poverty today can be fully explained in terms of national and 
local factors.  
Pogge (Blom 2003) sees that the rich are involved in a colossal crime against humanity by 
upholding the present global economic order. Poverty is a very grave moral responsibility, 
far greater than any other responsibility the rich of the world have today. Given this, Pogge 
argues that the people of the rich countries have a responsibility to realize the magnitude of 
the suffering caused by the global economic order as maintained by the rich countries. Yet, 
this does not mean that we need to draw the dubious utopian conclusion that global 
interdependence must be undone by isolating states or groups of states from one another. 
Rather, it means that we must be concerned with how the rules structuring international 
interactions affect the incidence of poverty. The rich countries, thanks to their vastly 
superior military and economic strengths, control these rules and therefore share 
responsibility for their foreseeable effects. (Pogge 2008b: 206) This responsibility includes 
the effects of dealing with international debt. 
Human rights and legitimacy 
93 
 
If we perceive negative duties as a justification for action by the rich at one end, at the 
other, we see the International Bill of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights calls for the right for ―everyone to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.‖ 
(UN 1948: Article 25) Three articles down, the same declaration states that ―[e]veryone is 
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms are forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized‖ (UN 1948: Article 28).112  
These calls echo the basis for Raffer‘s (Raffer and Singer 2001: 194) assessment of 
sustainable debt where he calls for debt relief schemes to protect these minimum standards 
of living for the indebted populations. Parallel to this, Cheru (2006: 42) proposes debt 
discussions that take a human rights approach, pivoting around the right to food, the right to 
education, and the right to health for the indebted. Not to forget that according to the UN 
charter, governments have an obligation to provide a minimal standard of living for their 
people, and that this obligation should come before any financial obligations to creditors. 
Accordingly, one can argue that the North has a moral responsibility to support the 
fulfillment of these obligations (see for instance Mandel 2006: 12), as also brought up  in 
chapter 2.  In addition to current circumstances, an ethical approach to problem debt should 
take into account not only the differing economic circumstances of the parties, but also the 
origins of the problem of indebtedness (Stiglitz 2006: 165). 
As has been argued, the emphasis in the discussions on debt should be on structural 
reforms, not for reasons of charity, but rather, to lift burdens that the rich currently impose 
on the poor for the benefit of the rich. Voluntary charity should be replaced by a collective 
authority and the initiators should be the rich countries. Here, human rights provide a 
minimal ethical and practical framework for debt restructuring. As for the internal 
coherence of human rights, Sen (1999: 10-1) explains the empirical connection between 
different kinds of rights.
113
 He sees that political freedoms (in the form of free speech and 
elections) help promote economic security. In turn, social opportunities (in the form of 
education and health facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in the 
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 As for the origins of human rights, their sources can be traced to the teachings of Jesus and in classical 
Greek philosophy, and are later consolidated in the European Enlightment.  
113
 In addition to ―rights‖, Sen also uses the terms ―freedoms‖, and ―opportunities‖. 
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form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to generate 
personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. Freedoms of different 
kinds, he proposes, can strengthen one another. And on similar terms, no one particular 
right is more important than the other. Pogge (Blom 2003) continues from here by warning 
against making the mistake of associating civil and political rights with the obligation not 
to harm, and social and economic rights with the obligation to benefit. In this way, the way 
in which the operations of economic institutions are organized predictably make it 
impossible for many to meet their basic social and economic needs, those who impose these 
institutions are actually harming people rather than merely failing to help them. Most 
severe poverty in the world today, Pogge writes, is due to poor people being harmed in this 
way.   
Using the platform of human rights as a reference in dealing with problem debt merges two 
interesting and highly important streams of discussion. On the one hand, there is a 
philosophical stream dating back to Cicero‘s On Duties. It is from this stream that the 
particular line of ethical thinking about negative duties has been picked up by Pogge 
(2008a). On the other hand, as will be discussed in the next chapter, there is a chronological 
and practical development of attitudes towards debts, starting from religious traditions via 
the throwing of the indebted in prison, into so called debtor‘s prisons, to today‘s insolvency 
courts protecting the rights of the indebted in national legislation. It is the lifting of this 
intersection of discussions regarding duties and debt into the international sphere, and 
connecting it to the discussions about global justice that has justified the argument of this 
chapter.   
But human rights are not without their critics. Human rights have been met with 
skepticism, perhaps based on the suspicion that there is something simpleminded or 
arrogant about the concept. One group of concerns is what Sen (1999: 227-31) calls the 
legitimacy critique.
114
 Common to this line of critique is an insistence that rights must be 
seen in post-institutional terms as instruments, rather than as a prior ethical entitlement. 
According to Sen, this militates in a fundamental way against the basic idea of universal 
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 In contrast, Sen lists the case for basic freedoms, and the associated formulations, describing it in terms of 
rights as resting on. i. their intrinsic importance; ii. their consequential role in providing political incentives 
for economic security; iii. their constructive role in the genesis of values and priorities. (Sen 1999: 246) 
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human rights. Human rights are best seen as a set of ethical claims, which must not be 
identified with legislated legal rights. Instead, the freedoms associated with particular rights 
may be the appropriate focal point for debate, not human rights themselves. What is to be 
judged is the plausibility of human rights as a system of ethical reasoning and as the basis 
of political demands. Sen entitles a second group of concerns the ―coherence critique‖, a 
view questioning how we can talk about rights without specifying whose duty it is to 
guarantee the fulfillment of these rights.
115
 But here, human rights are seen as rights shared 
by all – irrespective of citizenship – the benefits of which everyone should enjoy. While it 
is not the specific duty of any given individual to make sure that every person has his or her 
rights fulfilled, the claims can be generally addressed to all those who are in a position to 
help. The claims are addressed generally to anyone who can assist, even though no 
particular person or agency may be charged to bring about the fulfillment of the rights 
involved. Or, in the language of negative duties, the claims are addressed to all those who 
are in the position of having caused, or contributed to the causation of burdens on those 
unable to benefit from human rights. According to this reasoning, included amongst the 
duties of the rich is the duty to lift debt burdens of poor countries, for their populations to 
properly benefit from human rights. As Pogge states, where poverty is caused by others, it 
should be considered a human rights violation. Having laid this ground, it is of significance 
to now focus on the meaning of sovereignty for nations in situations of problem debt, and 
building on this, to pay some attention to the actual motivations behind debt relief.   
3.2 Sovereignty and the global order 
As the world stands, the political system is based on sovereign nation-states. Yet, in a way, 
the current informal international net of forums, groups and organizations already serve as a 
transnational, or global, regime. What is more, and particularly with regards to the 
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 In addition to the legitimacy and coherence critiques, Sen (1999: 231-46, especially 244) also circles a 
cultural critique placing human rights in the domain of social ethics where the required universality does in 
effect not exist in the world. Sen responds to this not by arguing against the unique importance of each 
culture, but rather to plead in favour of the need for some sophistication in understanding cross-cultural 
influences as well as our basic capability to enjoy products of other cultures and other lands. Sen encourages 
us not to loose our ability to understand one another or our enjoyment of cultural products of different 
countries in the passionate advocacy of conservation and purity. 
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specificities of international dealings with debt, this debt regime has largely fallen into the 
laps of the IMF and commercial banks (Lipson 1981: 608, 630). Out of these two groups, 
the private lenders seem to have their hands on the steering wheel. But regardless the 
division of labor between these two, what is of importance is that these two non-state actors 
have played the central role in developing rules and procedures related to problem debt. 
Consequently, they now comprise a coherent and distinctive, yet unofficial regime for 
negotiating poor countries‘ debt. In a way, balance-of-payments financing has been 
privatized, Lipson continues. The close interdependence of international banks, their 
capacity to coordinate, and the IMF‘s permanent institutional framework virtually assure 
collective action in cases of impending default. Thus, as he concludes, there is an effective 
structure for the supervision of sovereign debt – a structure that is currently built not on 
state power but on private sanctions and multi-lateral oversight. 
On balance, there is little guidance as to what it means to be sovereign if you are 
overindebted.
116
 Lienau‘s (2008a: 109) interpretation that the attention paid to human rights 
and popular sovereignty has put pressure on earlier frameworks underlines the argument of 
this article, that problem debt is not only an economic issue, but should be placed in 
political economy, and in a justice framework. It is here that the earlier note that 
socioeconomic justice is not attached to economic activities is picked up. With this, the 
normative discussion is postponed towards the end of this chapter, and for now, it is time to 
shift the attention to the significance of sovereignty in overindebted countries in particular, 
and to the extent to which existing global networks affect national sovereignty. As nodes in 
these networks, a number of global forums set and maintain a large set of rules that at times 
overlap and at times conflict. There are also gaps in the areas which these rules cover. In 
this system, the tension between the social and financial risks becomes prominent and 
important. On the whole, as part of the activities of this network, the granting of loans has 
provided a lucrative business in which most of the risks are borne by the debtor state or, 
more specifically, its society (Soederberg 2005: 930). As for poor countries, conditionality 
is a primary cause of concern. Civil society mobilizations around problem debt have been 
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 But see Purdy and Fielding (2007) for a historical overview of the powers and duties of sovereign nation-
states. Operating in a setting of private law arrangements, Purdy and Fielding lead the discussion to ultimately 
call for introducing private-law concepts to articulate limited powers of the state.   
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vast and vigorous. Following the conceptual deliberations on the relationship between 
sovereignty and global regimes, the discussion in this chapter moves onto firmer, more 
concrete, grounds by looking at the two closely intertwined issues of conditionality and 
civil society mobilizations.  
National interest versus global regimes 
According to current understandings of political organization, the planet is divided into 
sovereign countries ruled by governments composed in a number of variations. Alongside 
and among nation-states there are several crisscrossing and partly overlapping networks 
and institutions promoting global governance. In fact, it would not be completely untrue to 
say that the world has actual forms of global structure. These structures may not be 
representative (the seats in these networks are dominated by the richer countries),
117
 let 
alone democratic (those affected by its decisions do not necessarily have a say). Leaving 
the discussion aside regarding the functionality, the adherence to democratic principles or a 
normative assessment of these forums, this thesis contends that as a consequence of the 
decision-making taking place within these networks, national policy space is shrinking. For 
instance, in practice, agreements signed at the WTO, the EU and numerous other 
organizations, provide a framework within which the nation-state then operates.
118
 In 
addition, these agreements tie the hands of future elected officials.
119
 
The political, economic and legal pressure exerted by creditors on debtor governments has, 
according to the UN Secretary-General led to the erosion of national sovereignty and 
domestic control and shifted the initiative in formulating economic policies form national 
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 Yet, close to 90 per cent of the world‘s population live in poor countries. 
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 According to Raffer and Singer (2001: Chapter 6) among the most influential actor in these nets seems to 
be the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Another informal but perhaps even more 
influential group is made up of the finance ministers of rich countries who meet in various committees and 
meetings. 
119
 On a national level, this may be one of the factors denting the belief in democracy among voters who do 
not see the expected policy changes they voted for, partly as a result of decisions which reach far into the 
future. The trend is that democratic participation is on the decrease, if measured against, for instance, voting 
turnouts. This is a global phenomenon.  
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authorities to international sources (Jochnick 2006: 134). Remarkably, this question has not 
sparked an interest among political scientists with the exception of Lienau (2008a) who 
stands out in this regard. She explains that the issue of sovereignty is notoriously slippery 
and is not easily unpacked for proper examination. In particular, Lienau emphasizes the 
willingness of international economics to accept without hesitation the category of 
sovereign debt as disconnected and isolated from political philosophy or legal theory 
(Lienau 2008a: 65). She concludes that although the strictly statist conceptions of 
sovereignty, standing for the practice of  centralized government control over economic 
policy and planning, has become a dominant theme of the twentieth century, the current 
attention paid to human rights and popular sovereignty has put pressure on re-interpreting 
this framework. As inspiration for further research, Lienau proposes that given the current 
complex relationship between international law and local state autonomy, a more cautious 
rule of law conception of sovereignty may offer a useful third way.
120
 This route may 
extend beyond the arena of sovereign debt. (Lienau 2008a: 110-1) Introducing a rule of law 
conception in this way could bring with it implications for global justice. Importantly, 
recognizing that the traditional model of international organizations based on treaties 
between sovereign states has been transcended, Nagel (2005: 139-40) points out that global 
or regional networks do not bear responsibility for the social justice of the combined 
citizenry of all states involved. If this responsibility existed, it would have to be exercised 
collectively by the representatives of the member states. The members of the networks rely 
on the enforcement of these agreements by the individual sovereign states, not by a 
supranational force responsible to all.  
Justice cannot be reduced to the pursuit of common aims by unequal parties whose self-
interest is seemingly diluted by charity. Justice, or at least the political conception of it, 
requires a collectively imposed social framework, enacted on behalf of all those governed 
by it. Further, the framework must aspire to command their acceptance of its authority even 
when they disagree with the substance of the decision. Put differently, justice applies only 
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 From a different perspective, James develops a counter-position for making decisions ―about political 
ethical-directions on the basis of an understanding about the different forms of community and polity, rather 
than on the basis of ideologically-driven prejudice about the essential virtues of savage globalization‖ (2006: 
8-9). The different approaches of Lienau and James overlap in their interest in the maintaining of the diverse, 
their respect for the local and in their caution against the blindness of blanket and ideology-driven policies. 
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to a form of organization that claims political legitimacy and the right to impose decisions 
by force, and not by voluntary association, or contract, among independent parties 
concerned to advance their common interests. There is a difference between voluntary 
association, however strongly motivated, and coercively imposed collective authority. 
(Nagel 2005: 140) This translates into the fact that donating money for development, as 
mentioned before, based solely on goodwill and sprung from guilt, could never work 
towards justice. By contrast, Keynes‘s Global Plan would have fulfilled the criteria of such 
a theoretical collectively imposed authority.  
Institutions that make complex economic interaction possible do not act in the name of all 
individuals concerned, and are sustained by those individuals only through the agency of 
their respective governments or branches of government. This begs the question, what is 
the characteristic in virtue of which they create obligations of justice and presumptions in 
favor of equal consideration for all those individuals? Something more might be needed. 
(Nagel 2005: 142-3) 
Surely, there are reasons for resisting the expansion of democracy to an international 
level.
121
 Rich countries face the problem of how to create a global order with a legitimacy 
of its own without being the kind of legitimacy that undermines the strict limits on their 
responsibilities (Nagel 2005: 143).
122
 Poor countries have their own reasons for resisting 
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 In this context, I like to refer to the case of the UN Security Council and the discussions on expanding its 
permanent membership. When the Security Council was set up in 1946, it represented more than half of the 
world‘s population (India was then part of the Great Britain and China‘s population had yet to explode, at the 
time counting for 400 million). Today, the Security Council (excluding China) represents 12 per cent of the 
world‘s population. In these discussions, one could ask according to what right Europe has two seats on the 
council (Great Britain and France) when other parts of the world has none (Africa or Latin America, for 
instance)? The question gains further merit if we couple it with the fact that declining populations in Europe is 
balanced with increasing population figures for many other parts of the world.  
122
 Raffer (2004a: 9) observes that the idea of equal treatment seems to be the main obstacle to progression 
toward a ‗Chapter 9‘ model type solution to the sovereign debt problem. Public creditors are not keen to treat 
poor countries as other types of debtors where it is beyond discussion and doubt that exclusively independent 
entities have decision power.  
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what might translate into international pressure on them.
123
 Already the vague wording of 
―expanding democracy internationally‖ raises questions regarding the type of democracy 
and other associated conditions that are assumed. 
124
 This is especially since the experience 
of international institutions is not favorable to poor countries in terms of participation, 
representation or decision-making mechanisms. In fact, poor countries feel used, abused 
and politically overridden by rich nations.
125
 Certainly, the relationship between the poor 
and the rich is unhealthy. Finally, one could of course say that democratic governance 
beyond the nation-state is not possible given the absence of relevant forums.
126
 This 
resonates with the legitimacy critique of human rights as addressed earlier. Is international 
democracy possible only in another, future system of political organization? Of course, 
democracy as a prior ethical entitlement does not fulfill Nagel‘s criteria of a coercively 
imposed collective authority. But this does not mean that principles of international 
democracy cannot be followed while waiting for democratic principles to be adopted 
internationally. Also, it does not mean that targeted, sector specific or particular efforts are 
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 For instance, the currently dominant neoliberal policies rest on the steadfast belief that political and social 
problems in the indebted countries should be solved primarily through market-based mechanisms as opposed 
to state intervention. This justification is based partly on the assumption that debt is a consequence of 
misguided macroeconomic policies on the part of debtor nations as opposed to banks over-lending. In part, 
this is based on the belief that market participants are inherently more rational than government. (Soederberg 
2005: 938) For the indebted nation this translates into blame for past performance and a solution inviting 
private creditors to the steering wheel. 
124
 Talk about ―democracy‖ raises questions regarding what model of democracy is being promoted. Perhaps 
talking about ―democratization‖ instead, here signalling an open-ended process with revisable rules, might be 
less overwhelming. 
125
 In designing international debt relief, it is essential that the programmes allow for debtor countries to 
exercise their political will in designing these programmes. On a related note, it is further argued that PRSPs 
have failed in their goals of creating national ownership and just participation and decision making 
mechanisms for civil society. For example, Whitfield (2010) concludes that in Ghana, PRSP documents 
produced by the government had little impact on implementing policy actions for instance by way of 
rebuilding the public administration to support any long-term poverty reduction strategy. Rather, the function 
of the documents was to secure debt relief and the continuation of foreign aid from official donors.  
126
 Put differently, ―[e]verything has been globalized except our consent. Democracy alone has been confined 
to the nation-state. It stands at the national border, suitcase in hand, without a passport.‖ (Monbiot 2003: 1) 
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discouraged. For present purposes, democracy should be approached in the minimalistic 
way of fairness.  
Yet, some nations do not want to operate internationally. They threaten to resign from 
international forums, and may decide that they want to go bankrupt. They consider 
repudiating their debts, or at least they change their debt structures so that their loans are 
not tied to conditionalities. The political price associated with the withdrawing from loan 
agreements is generally seen as entailing a range of costs such as the breaking of trust and 
financial burden of raising the price for future lending. However, in the case of 
international lending, debts considered odious or loans whose repayments are considered 
the cause of human rights violations raise doubt and blur these concepts of economics and 
law.
127
 In practice, though, examples of countries actually shutting the door to international 
participation are scarce. For example, in April 2007, on separate occasions, the heads of 
state Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela announced that their 
respective countries would withdraw from the IMF and the World Bank. The presidents 
then launched the Banco del Sur, or the Bank of the South, in an attempt at creating a 
regional alternative to the IMF. However, as of today, both countries remain members of 
both the IMF and the World Bank. One reason might have been that Venezuela, for 
instance, was forced to back down because a withdrawal would have triggered default 
clauses in the country‘s sovereign bonds.128 
These reflections lead to questioning the reasoning behind creditors wanting to maintain 
poor countries in the international credit system, if the indebted already now find it hard to 
honor their financial obligations. The capitalist response might be that the lucrative 
business of lending to high risk premiums is a normal way of doing business. The Marxist 
response might be that it is a consequence of capital accumulation based on predation, 
fraud and violence taking on a stronger role (Soederberg 2005: 931). Be it either of these, 
or something in-between, the argument carried throughout this thesis is that in addition to 
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 For a discussion on sovereigns exiting treaties in general, as in beyond debt contracts, see Helfer (2005).  
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 This resembles the unilateral demand, discussed as one route countries in trouble can choose, see chapter 
2.  
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being economically unsound, the present ways in which debt is dealt with are politically 
unjust.
129
  
Initially, debtor countries were assumed to be keen to service their debts, as a failure on 
their part would risk their future access to international credit markets. This assumption 
dates back to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) who wrote that while creditors are unable to 
impose sanctions on defaulting countries, they can hinder the access of the debtor to 
international creditor markets. This has since proven partially misleading. Raffer (1990) has 
since looked into examples of successful situations similar to debt arbitration that have 
taken place post World War II; most notably the London Accord with Germany and the 
Indonesian solution of 1969. In the case of Germany in 1953 Hermann Abs, a German 
banker, had the de facto authority of an arbiter, since creditors were willing to follow his 
views. Raffer concludes that the German experience suggests that debt arbitration would 
not disrupt international lending to the country involved in an arbitration process. Another 
example is Indonesia where the same Hermann Abs de facto was given the authority of an 
arbiter. In sum, as put by Stiglitz (2010: 48), markets are forward-looking.
130
  
Given these observations, that nation-states de facto find themselves in a tightening 
international web of institutions, where decisions are made influencing the sovereignty of 
nations, the real question becomes, is the jump to international debt arbitration too high? 
Naturally, this would depend on the form the arbitration takes. Referring to ‗Chapter 9‘ of 
Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, as introduced in the previous chapters, and relying on 
Raffer‘s comparison of section 904 of ‗Chapter 9‘ to the concept of sovereignty, his 
conclusion is that ―sovereignty does not contain anything more than what §904 protects‖ 
(Raffer 2010: 89), it says:  
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 Raffer does not camouflage the bad or the ugly: ―Official creditors have inflicted damage on debtors, 
flouted contractual rights and obligations, and even ignored human rights, gaining politically and financially 
from their behavior and using these catastrophes to exert leverages with debtor countries. Obviously, pacta 
non servanda (contracts must not be honored) when it comes to the rights of developing countries, an 
asymmetry destroying the foundations of markets and the rule of law. Eventually, official creditor behavior 
has also increased the losses of the private sector.‖ (2007b: 240)  
130
 For a detailed explanation of the incentives of the debtor, especially in the case of Argentinean crisis of 
2002, see for instance Miller and Thomas (2006).  
103 
 
notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides, the 
court may not, by any stay, or decree, in the case or otherwise, infer with: 
1. any of the political and governmental powers of the debtor 
2. any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or 
3. the debtor‘s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.  
(Legal Information Institute 2008a)  
In fact, the mentioning of ‗Chapter 9‘ as solving a problem unique to public borrowers, that 
of intrusion into the debtor‘s governmental powers from outside, is the first feature Raffer 
addresses in his initial presentation of the proposal (Raffer 1990: 302). In addition to this 
argument, there are three further reasons for dismissing the anxiety that national 
sovereignty would be threatened under a panel of global debt arbitration. Firstly, dealings 
with debt up until today cannot be seen as either economically reasonable or just, as shown 
in the previous chapter. This is because nearly 30 years of debt relief have not decreased 
debts of poor countries to a sustainable level. Novel initiatives are worth exploring. 
Secondly, it is also because of the conditionalities that are attached to debt relief.  Poor 
countries are left with shrinking national space, or autonomy, in which to articulate national 
economic policies. Consequently, this should tempt debtors and creditors alike to identify 
new ways of dealing with debt – arbitrating debts being one such novelty stapled to the 
broader goal of both economic efficiency and justice. Thirdly, at the surface, an 
international arbitration as suggested in a ‗Chapter 9‘ inspired panel, may be seen as 
chipping away at national sovereignty in terms of an international entity overruling national 
authorities regarding what debt and how much of it should be repaid. However, the criteria 
for the panel are in accordance with sovereignty which means that strictly speaking, 
international debt arbitration could strengthen national sovereignty rather than diminish 
it.
131
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 But is it operational from a rich creditor nation‘s point of view? In case a debt is ruled not payable, this 
translates into the taxpayers of the creditor country absorbing the costs of it. This same line of thinking goes 
in general for debt relief, too. In this way, one could argue that also the rich countries‘ citizens are the victims 
here.  
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In addition, this brings about that international lending policies are not merely the 
considerations of national sovereigns. They are international legal matters, affecting every 
country.  
Conditionality 
When a private person – or a corporation – wants to make a purchase, the seller – or the 
credit card company – confirms the available credit of the consumer or the credit card. In 
the case of states, the discussion about conditionality or the question about what can be 
asked by the lender prior to making its resources available to the borrower, is more 
complicated. Some think that no questions should be asked at all. Keynes was one of them. 
Returning to the era of setting up the Bretton Woods institutions, Keynes wrote that most 
creditors, the credit card company — be that Visa, Master Card, or American Express — 
will check whether the purchase comes within my allowed credit, and whether I am 
currently meeting my minimum monthly payment. Keynes thought that the same should 
apply to countries drawing on the Fund, that is, purchasing dollars or other convertible 
currencies with their own currencies. He wrote, ―if countries are to be given sufficient 
confidence, they must be able to rely in all normal circumstances on drawing a substantial 
part of their quota without policing or facing unforeseen obstacles.‖ (Letter from Lord 
Keynes to Prof Jacob Viner (Oct 1, 1943), quoted in Horsefield and de Vries et al 1969, 
quoted in Lowenfield 2002) In contrast, the US‘s position was that, ―discretion on the part 
of the Fund was essential if the Fund‘s resources were to be conserved for the purposes for 
which the Fund was established and if the Fund were to be influential in promoting what it 
considers to be appropriate financial policies. (Gardner 1980: 113, quoted in Lowenfield 
2002)‖132 
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 See Lowenfeld (2002) for an interpretation on the practical consequences this has led to. Initially, it was 
understood that the Bretton Woods institutions were concerned with international relations—political, 
economic, and social. Matters ―essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state‖ were not the concern 
of the international organizations or the international community. In particular, the IMF was to focus on 
member states‘ balance of payments, exchange rates, and exchange controls, but not on their domestic 
policies or priorities. Gradually, it became clear that the border between domestic and international policies 
could not be enforced. As the IMF moved to a regime of conditionality for the use of its resources, and 
thereafter to performance targets and deadlines, domestic policies of states became the subject of ever more 
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Both views could be supported by the text of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF as they 
emerged from the Bretton Woods conference.
133
 This is because conditionality as such did 
not exist in the original IMF Articles of Agreement (Raffer and Singer 2001: 51). In 
practice, though, conditionality has come to play an important role in the relations and 
operations between the World Banks and the IMF.
134
 Conditionality, the condition that debt 
relief is granted only following the implementation of certain policy measures required by 
the creditors, is one of the main causes of concern regarding debt relief.
 135
 Not only is 
conditionality problematic from a democratic point of view (the preferences of national 
voters are over-ridden), but the conditions of debt relief extend beyond economic 
necessities. In particular, these conditions extend well into the field of the politics of 
                                                                                                                                                    
detailed examination. Not only national budgets, taxes, and the money supply, but subsidies, wage policies, 
competition law, corporate governance, even accounting practices and regulatory reform became subject to 
scrutiny, negotiation and commitment. Lowenfeld does not condemn this erosion of sovereignty, but points 
out that neither the member states nor the IMF have come up with a new theory to reflect the new reality, or 
reached agreement on where a new boundary may be set between national and international concerns. 
133
 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. 
Article V(3) provides: ―A member shall be entitled to buy the currency of another member . . . [if it] 
represents that [the currency] is presently needed for making in that currency payments which are consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement.‖ Such a statement seemed to support Keynes. But according to Article 
V(5), the Fund could limit or deny access to the Fund‘s resources if it was ―of the opinion that the member is 
using the resources . . . in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund . . . .‖ 
134
 Seventy-seven per cent of all reschedulings concluded by the end of 1986 were accompanied by IMF 
adjustment programmes (Suter and Stamm 1991: 664). 
135
 Raffer and Singer (2001: 53) provide a chronology of the policies. In the early days of structural 
adjustment, the World Bank and the IMF insisted on devaluations by the debtor. Later on, for instance in Asia 
or Brazil, they insisted on defending fixed exchange rates. This change occurred in line with a change of 
capital movements. In the 1980s, debts were in US dollars or to a lesser extent in other Northern currencies. 
Devaluating the debtor‘s currency increased the debt burden in national currency without changing debt 
stocks in US dollars. The short-term placements which dominated during the late 1990s were often in the 
debtor‘s currency. This being the case, speculators would have to take losses if the old formula was still 
applied. Keeping the peg fixed allows them to leave the country without, or at least with reduced, losses. In 
addition, the Bretton Woods Institutions justified shockingly high interest rates by claiming that they would 
keep volatile capital in the country plus, that it would attract new flows. But in practice, these signals were 
interpreted as a clear signs of distress, ultimately resulting mainly in huge costs for domestic firms. 
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debts.
136
 In fact, Gould explores emerging forms of post-colonial stateness at a pivotal 
instance of the ways external and internal political processes intersect, the example being 
the ―‘poverty reduction consensus‘ – a campaign of the self-styled ‗international donor 
community‘ to transform relationships between creditor agencies and debtor governments 
of the South‖ (2005: 1). 137 What were, he continues, until recently, uneasy modes of 
bondage based on harshly imposed borrowing conditions are now portrayed as 
―partnerships‖ based on mutuality and trust. 138 
For debtors, conditionality appears as if from the above. It certainly appears from outside of 
the sphere of democracy.
139
 In some immediate and superficial way, Keynes‘s neutral and 
technical vision is actualized since neither the policies, nor staff of the international finance 
institutions achieve their position through election. However, from a wider political vantage 
                                                 
136
 Rodrik (1996: 16-7) writes that in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s, the whole complex of 
import-substitution policies were held responsible for a crisis, which in reality was a crisis of overspending 
exacerbated by the fickleness of international capital markets. It became commonplace to see the debt crisis as 
the consequence of inward-oriented policies. This paved intellectual ground for wholesale reform of 
prevailing policies in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Orthodox economists whispering in the ears of policy 
makers got their chance to wipe the state clean and mount a frontal attack on its entire range of policies. 
Eventually, this produced dramatic results, especially in Latin America, he writes.  
137
 Gould (2005: 2) looks into the formulation of PRSP-papers, and how a new form of ―processual‖ 
conditionality has been built into the ―partnership‖ concept. Completing the PRSP-process signals the client 
state‘s readiness to enter into a partnership with the Bretton Woods institutions and in return, recipient 
governments are required to commit themselves to a multi-tethered programme of state reform.  
138
 But initially intended economic conditionality does not only extend into political conditioning on a 
bilateral level between the lender and borrower. The space of economics is bleeding into the political sphere 
also in other ways. Originally, the division of labour between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions was 
that as the UN should deal with political matters, and the Bretton Woods institutions with economic matters. 
However, alongside their economic focus, and since the mid-1990s, the World Bank and the IMF have 
gradually introduced political vocabulary into their policies. Terms regarding political processes, such as 
―democratization‖, are today found in most policy papers produced by the IMF and the World Bank. But the 
entering of the economics into the politics is not reciprocal. The UN has not gained economic ground. 
139
 For a summary of discussions around conditionality and development within political economy, and how a 
theoretical form of conditionality could benefit both donors and recipients, but in practice does not, see 
Kanbur (2006: 1573-4). 
107 
 
point, as protectors and promoters of their majority holders, they are very much political.
140
 
This insight is perhaps the single largest engine driving vast civil society mobilizations for 
lifting debt burdens from poor countries.
141
 But this discontent is not limited to the 
application of conditionalities. Rather, the discontent is directed against the broader 
economic system with strong dependency relations between the poor and the rich and the 
limited policy space this results in for the poor. Beneath their seemingly neutral, 
quantifiable and objective meaning, financial risks are historically specific social constructs 
used to discipline indebted poor countries through the material threat of withholding 
desperately needed funds to impoverished states of the South (Soederberg 2005: 940). 
Simultaneously, the issue is not as simple as this may suggest. Fuelled by the recent debates 
regarding odious debt, conditionalities have been discussed regarding loans taken by – or in 
some instances encouraged toward – dictators in the name of the populations.142 This 
discussion is fuelled by the observation that autocracies tend to borrow at a higher rate and 
invest at a lower rate in general, if compared to democracies (Oatley 2010). In cases where 
the government of a poor country is perceived weak, there are concerns as to the capacity 
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 The US has a de facto veto power in the Bretton Woods institutions. 
141
 By way of examples, and apart from the justification of conditionalities, Kanbur (2006: 1575) shows the 
complexity of why conditionality does not work, ranging from the complex composition of representatives of 
different sectors dependent on the inflow into the country, to the overall dependence on the release of 
minimum resources to various pre-negotiated uses. 
142
 For instance, a stream of work related to pre-emptive lending policies (for instance Khalfan et al. 2003; 
Kremer and Jayachandran 2002; Jayachandran and Kremer and 2006; and Shafter 2008) is based on Pogge‘s 
Advancing Democracy (2008a) where he proposes an entity to oversee the level of democracy in a country 
seeking to borrow. Based on this democracy rating, lenders would then make their decision to lend or not. 
But, and in addition to other  concerns this proposal raises, the fact that an external entity would have such 
absolute power over a country‘s borrowings is in stark contrast to democracy as understood that those 
influenced by the decision would have a say in the decision-making process. Three further points of critique 
are found in King (2007: 659-60). First, such an international institution ruling over odious regimes is likely 
to designate very few regimes as odious. The institution is likely to be take years to establish, and even then, 
states would presumably mainly act in their own self-interests and never on the basis of impartial assessments. 
Second, declaring a regime rather than a set of actions odious represents a ―nuclear‖ type of option unlikely to 
be deployed until the regime reaches pariah status. Third, and ironically, the term ―due diligence‖ could be 
highly misleading in this instance. The model in itself would eliminate the need for diligence at all since 
according to the logic of the model, a creditor can confidently lend to a not so designated regime.  
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of the government to make adequate use of the loan or the debt relief.
143
 In these instances, 
conditionalities are proposed as a guide. This, of course, contradicts Keynes‘s thinking 
regarding giving the borrowing country confidence to run its own matters. It also 
contradicts the equal treatment of countries, since the lender – in this context the rich 
lending nation – is given some authority over the borrower – the poorer counterpart.  
Civil society’s involvement 
Since the 1970s, civil society has been calling for the cancellation of debts. But a quarter of 
a century after the debt crisis occurred, the system for dealing with debt remains 
unchanged. During this same period, and in absolute terms, the actual debt burden of poor 
countries has grown around three times, the total debt of poor countries amounts to around 
USD 2,851 billion
144
 (World Bank 2007a: online data bank). In pure interest, the amounts 
paid to international financial institutions, private, and public creditors is many times what 
was owed in 1980, just before the debt crises broke.  
                                                 
143
 The model of Kremer and Jayachandran (2002) proposes a legal procedure for an institution declaring 
governments ―odious debt prone‖ ex-ante, meaning before loans are granted, whereas the adapted Due 
Diligence Model (Shafter 2008) transports the procedure into a political context. These proposals raise 
questions about democracy (who decides over whom?) and, on the type of democratic models the (selected or 
elected?) representatives of this forum would prefer – be it based on legal or political imperatives. But 
importantly, this family of proposals seems to neglect the role of the population of the loan-seeking country, a 
fact that stands in stark contrast to discussions on democratization. For instance, Kremer and Jayachandran 
assign the population of the borrowing country ―the role of a passive player‖ (2002: 10), and Shafter proposes 
solely exterior entities, such as an international organisation and its diplomatic political appointees to prepare 
the declaration. Already because of the disrespect for the nationals of borrowing countries, this proposal does 
not fit well into civil society‘s claims and suggestions on how to solve the debt problem. In addition, it is not 
entirely clear whose interests the model(s) promote – those needing to borrow or those seeking investment 
opportunities. In fact, some of the problems echo those of the current debt relief programmes (a potential 
conditionality trap for borrowers while the accountability of past policies is left undealt with). 
144
 The absolute sum of any debt is irrelevant. Rather, the amount must be put in relation to the income. In this 
case, poor country debt is looked at either in relation to exports or in relation to GDP. Another useful 
relationship to explore would be to relate the debt burden, or debt servicing to annual budgetary spending. For 
a critical assessment of calculating debt sustainability in connection to debt relief, please turn back to chapter 
2.  
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In 1980, the debts of the poor countries amounted to USD 600 billion. Championing their 
case using statistics where the amounts paid in debt servicing exceed those of the debt, civil 
society organizations and social movements in particular claim that the debt of poor 
countries is a  political, as opposed to an economic, problem (see for instance Call of Social 
Movements 2002: § 13). Since the 1980s, the South has transferred many times this amount 
back to Northern creditors in interest and principal, and social movements demand 
unconditional cancellation of debt and the reparation of historical, social, and ecological 
debts. Morally, the argument is persuasive in spite of its economic dubiousness.
145
 The 
hypothesis that cases where debts have been reduced – for instance most recently in Iraq 
following the new regime in 2004 – have been politically motivated as opposed to having 
been argued for on economic grounds, further strengthens civil society‘s arguments.146 
Supporting this, it can be argued that in the 1980s, global debt administration became 
increasingly political (Teivainen 2002: 43-4). This analysis is based on the fact that the 
crisis management of the repayment problems in the 1980s in Latin America was brought 
under the control of public actors. This is also where the international mobilization has its 
roots: in national opposition movements to economic austerity measures as a required by 
the international financial institutions. 
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 However, from an economist‘s angle, and as pointed out by Raffer (2007b: 231), stopping repayments by 
claiming that the principal has been repaid is patently invalid. Raffer uses the example of car rental. A 
prolonged rental quickly builds up a fee corresponding to a large share of the actual price of the car. But this 
does not mean that the person who rents the car can claim ownership of the car, nor is he or she backed by 
rights of refusing to pay the rental fees. But, Raffer points out that instead, what could be legally convincing 
regarding poor countries‘ debts is the argument of usury, which would justify appropriate reductions in debt 
service. As seen in the next chapter (chapter 4), usury constitutes a viable ethical and moral considertion 
stemming from religious traditions.  
146
 It is important to note however, that in the case of Iraq in the early 2000s, a number of factors played vital 
roles in the process. One of them is the security aspect, where Iraq was perceived as a security risk to western 
countries and a destabilization force in the Middle East (Damle 2007: 147). While an analysis of this 
perception is not explored here, let it suffice to say that the correlation between reality and the perception 
marketed to western countries might not be linear.  
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Over the years, social movements and non-governmental organizations have persistently 
campaigned for a solution to problem debt.
147
 The debt campaign may have been the largest 
single-issue campaign world-wide mobilizing millions of people throughout the years (see 
Reyes Tagle and Sehm Patomäki 2007: 1).
148
 First in line were the massive civil society 
mobilizations in the 1990s culminating in the G7/8 shadow meeting in Birmingham in May 
1998, a phenomenon repeated in Gleneagles at the G7/8 meeting in 2005. The 
mobilizations at the G7/8 shadow meeting in Birmingham in 1998 were among the largest 
single-issue mobilizations to date. Reportedly, the Jubilee 2000 campaign of the 1990s for 
cancelling Third World debt attracted as many as 24 million signatures worldwide (Millet 
and Toussaint 2004: 164).
149
 According to estimates by the New York Times, some 160 
million people have at some point been involved in some kind of work on problem debt. 
This high number is at least partly due to the media attention the campaign got thanks to its 
unusual mix of figureheads, or more specifically, the joined forces of the Dalai Lama, the 
Pope and Jeffrey Sachs.  
In addition to shadowing G7/8 meetings, civil society remains highly vocal regarding the 
debt issue at the World Social Forum-meetings and opening marches. The debt issue is 
prominent among the thousands of events within the World Social Forum process. Among 
the many media-attracting participants in these movements, the Church and trade unions 
became pivotal actors grounding the action.
150
 In the 1980s, the emphasis of the movement, 
or movement of movements, was mainly on criticism of the structural adjustment 
programmes. In the 1990s, the movements gathered under the common Jubilee-umbrella, 
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 For an analysis of the debt campaign as a case study in how to get political attention, see Busby (2007); 
and for a stronger focus on the movement, or movement of movements, see Reyes Tagle and Sehm Patomäki 
(2007). 
148
 This is based on, for instance, the number of events organised around debt within the World Social Forum 
process, the largest self-organised civil society mobilisation to date. This observation is further strengthened 
by the relatively vast numbers of mobilisations over time, divided into several separate mass events, as 
referred to in this text.  
149
 As the signatures are not filed in any one place, and therefore are not easily verifiable, the reports of the 
total number vary. The estimates range from 17 to 24 million. See supra footnote Chapter 3. 
150
 For an account on the involvement of the church, in particular the Catholic church, in debt work and the 
Jubilee campaign see Donnelly (2007). Hertz (2004) presents the campaign from the perspective of Bono.  
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only to then fragment into the next decade. In the 2000s, an early emphasis on ecological 
debt has given way to discussions about odious debt coupled with a revived discussion on 
the future roles of the international financial institutions.  
The movements and organizations working towards lifting the debt burdens of poor 
countries form part of global civil society, or the global justice movement. The rise of this 
internationally, and very much electronically, linked network of civil society actors can be 
seen as forming in parallel with, or counter to, the rise of neoliberalism as initiated by 
Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US. Thatcher‘s claims that there is 
no alternative, and that there is no such a thing as society, represent the mirror images of 
the core of what civil society stands for.
151
 Rather, civil society articulates how society 
itself is breaking down as a consequence of severe austerity measures and national savings. 
The uniting slogans of the debt movements in connection to the G7/8 meetings have been 
to ―Break the Chains of Debt‖, as called for in Birmingham in 1998, and ―Make Poverty 
History‖, as proposed in Gleneagles in 2005. Naturally, within these masses of people, 
views differ regarding how to deal with problem debt. The earlier distinction between a 
voluntary association and coercively imposed collective authority forms perhaps the most 
important divider. Where some groups would contend with ―enough‖ debt relief, others 
demand a new set of just rules to the system. In some cases, when civil society‘s demands 
were acknowledged, some felt that the mission was accomplished and turned to other 
issues. But despite high expectations, loud applauds and even louder rhetoric, the expected 
outcome of the debt movement never eventuated (Hertz 2004: 135; George 2004: 193). 
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 Problem debt adds to a multitude of challenges under the wider heading of human security. From this 
wider angle, the occurrence of various and simultaneous crises, such as the global economic crisis, the food 
crisis, the threat of climate change, increasing conflicts at local levels, and other situations, form serious 
threats to the welfare of communities and individuals (James 2009: 6-7). The human security aspect is 
perhaps most directly present in nations emerging from conflict, for instance in Africa, where the challenges 
of (re)creating the state and financial system are important. In many of these situations, problem debt forms 
an important additional challenge. For an analysis of the creation of a ―development state‖ in conflict, or post-
conflict, indebted countries, see Addison and Ndikumana (2001) and for debt relief and civil war, see Addison 
and Murshed (2003). For the linkages between debt and poverty and its influence on world peace, see 
Veerkamp (2007). In addition to debt, the economic focus of civil society has been in particular on the 
connected issues of trade and aid. 
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Although politically successful in terms of generating public consciousness and debate 
about problem debt, the campaign had less success regarding policy change (see Busby 
2007; and Reyes Tagle and Sehm Patomäki 2007). One explanation may be found in the 
complex presentation of the debt relief programmes presented in reaction to the noise by 
the movements. Many are the civil society participants who have thought – time and again 
– problem debt to be fixed.  
But this movement of movements is also politically divided. One of its wings is represented 
by Jubilee South, an offspring of the Jubilee movement of the late 1990s. Their vision 
seems to be that lifting the debt burden would allow for a strong national state, a traditional 
leftist view. In this vision, there is little space for any international order, regardless its 
form or shape. This vision resembles that of Walden Bello (2005), who talks for de-
globalization, arguing for the dismantling of the international organizations. Bello argues 
that international financial organizations, along with globalization itself, are in a crisis from 
which there is no exit strategy. Some groups are less revolutionary and more reactionary. 
And surprisingly many shy away from both practical dimensions of how debts should be 
written down in practice, and what kind of an economic system they would prefer in the 
future. Interestingly, across the board, civil society documents and discussion events 
seldom address normative dimensions, or how international lending should be organized in 
the future. While it would not be fair to say that many avoid the normative as such, it is true 
that practical, comprehensive, thought-through reforms or transformations are not 
competing for attention.  
Within this strong but splintered movement, some civil society organizations, despite 
perhaps small in numbers, support the initiative of setting up a Fair and Transparent 
Arbitration Mechanism, a renamed reflection of the model based on the mentioned 
‗Chapter 9‘. By avoiding the terms ―insolvency‖, the groups try to tempt aboard those who 
passionately reject the idea of a country declaring bankruptcy, which they perceive as 
humiliating. Another reason for their suspicion is that any new mechanism could merely 
reflect current and unjust power positions. Or perhaps even re-enforce them.  
3.3 The political viability of arbitrating international debts 
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Globally, there are a number of ways in which greater international authority would be 
desirable. Instead of the present voluntary contributions, resources for official development 
aid and emergency relief could be more effectively obtained by a systematic assessment or 
some form of tax. Both the protection of human rights and the provision of basic 
humanitarian aid would be easier if regimes found to be responsible for the oppression or 
the destitution of their own subjects in these respects were regarded as having forfeited 
their sovereign rights against outside interference. (Nagel 2005: 144)  
There is a great difference between agreements or consensus among separate states 
committed to the advancement of their own interests and a binding procedure based on 
some kind of collective authority, charged with securing the common good. Is some form 
of legitimacy possible for the global or international case that does not depend on 
supranational sovereignty or democracy – let alone distributive justice? This form should 
be embodied in institutions that are less cumbersome and feeble than those depending for 
their creation and functioning on unanimous voluntary acceptance by sovereign states. 
(Nagel 2005: 145) In what follows, it is set forth that debt reductions are politically 
motivated, according to the preferences of the creditors, not by the debtors.   
Political initiatives dealing with debt 
Is some form of legitimacy possible for the global or international case that does not 
depend on supranational sovereignty or democracy – let alone distributive justice? This 
form should be embodied in institutions that are less cumbersome and feeble than those 
depending for their creation and functioning on unanimous voluntary acceptance by 
sovereign states. (Nagel 2005: 145) To date, the various debt relief programmes and other 
initiatives put forward have been initiated and controlled by creditors. Looking at matters 
this way, arbitrating international debts could bring justice and rule of law into the present 
procedures. The current domination of creditors sits uncomfortably with the rule of law, 
standing for principles of the equal possibility of participation and influence by all 
parties.
152
 Consequently, it is of interest to look at the creditors‘ motivations behind debt 
relief initiatives.  
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 One of the few proposals from the debtors was the idea of a Club of Debtors initiated by Cuba in 1982. 
This idea fell through because of the launch of new negotiation processes shortly thereafter dashing false hope 
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In contrast to the failure of debt relief programmes to decrease debts in a sustainable way, 
the ad hoc initiatives that have been politically motivated have been more successful in 
decreasing debt burdens. Examples of the writing off of debt for political reasons post 
World War II include Germany in 1953, Indonesia in 1969, Poland in 1980, Egypt in 1991, 
and most recently Iraq in 2004. By contrast, the ad hoc market solutions, or so called 
orderly solutions, have not led to efficient resolutions of debt crises (Spiegel 2010: 140). 
While it is true that ordered restructurings have in general resulted in creditors recovering 
higher percentages of their investment than in disorderly situations, nevertheless, it is 
important to note that in most of these situations, the debt levels of the indebted nation have 
not been reduced, as for instance seen in the sovereign debt distress situations of the 
Dominican Republic in 2004-5, Uruguay in 2003, Moldova in 2001-2, Pakistan 1999 and 
Ukraine 1998-2000 (Spiegel 2010). Reorganization of debt has meant just that, a 
reorganization of the composition of lenders, maturity and size of the investments.  
To exemplify, at the end of World War II, the Allied powers gave West Germany a 
historically unprecedented post-war debt settlement (Kairos 2003: 3). Instead of demanding 
reparations, as they had after World War I, Britain, France and the United States decided to 
give West Germany a generous settlement in order to revive its economy. In the years 
leading up to the debt reduction, Germany had a debt service ratio of four per cent (Raffer 
2010: 4). In February 1953, the Allies signed the historic London Debt Accord with 
Germany that cancelled about half of a USD 7.5 billion debt (worth about USD 45 billion 
today) and rescheduled the rest over a long term at fixed interest rates. Moreover, Germany 
was only required to devote a maximum of three per cent of its export earnings to servicing 
debts and was even allowed to suspend debt service if it acquired a trade deficit. (Kairos 
2003: 3) In contrast, the debt service ratio of HIPC countries is 15 per cent (since Cologne) 
(Raffer and Singer 2001: 245). Under the HIPC initiative low-income countries must spend 
an average of 8.6 per cent of their export earnings on debt service and are not allowed to 
suspend payments even at the expense of paying for essential imports. In effect, the case of 
Germany in 1953 is seen in light of the realization that the Versailles treaty, following the 
                                                                                                                                                    
of forthcoming positive changes (Hernandez Pedraza 2002: 32). It does not help that the articles of the Paris 
Club (the group of sovereign creditors to which a country must go to negotiate debt rescheduling) explicitly 
deny borrowing countries the right to negotiate in groups (Hertz 2004: 40). 
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World War I, had led to the rise of Hitler, and a repetition of this scenario was ardently not 
desired: the risk that Nazism would re-emerge had to be reduced (Hernández Pedraza 2002: 
32). Most importantly, disagreements between Germany and its creditors were to be settled 
by arbitration, not by creditor decisions (Raffer and Singer 2001: 245).  
In 1969, Suharto‘s new Indonesian regime received a debt reduction very similar to the 
German case – the debts of both countries were halved. As Indonesia was substantially 
indebted to Communist governments, this demand was also of great political importance 
(Raffer 2001b: 31). In addition, the handling of a second Indonesian crisis in the 1970s 
proves a previous point; commercial lending continued as if on autopilot despite economic 
indicators flashing red. Commercial banks operated under the assumption that sovereign 
lending was riskless, and this point was consolidated when the US eventually decided to 
bail out US banks at the onset of the so-called Pertamina crisis, named after the Indonesian 
national oil company (Raffer and Singer 2001: 161-2).    
In 1980, during the peak of the Cold War, Polish debts of an astounding USD 20 billion 
were halved.
153
 This move was motivated by hopes of suffocating socialism in Eastern 
Europe (Hernández Pedraza 2002: 32). In the early 1980s, the West‘s sympathy for Poland 
continued in plentiful abundance, as long as the Polish government treated the opposition in 
a manner politically acceptable to Westerners, and reschedulings and additional credits 
were arranged (Rachwald 1990: 117-9). 
In 1991, the debts of Egypt were reduced as a gesture of appreciation for political support. 
The US forgave half of Egypt‘s military debts because the country sided with the West in 
the first Gulf war (Raffer and Singer 2001: 91; NY Times 1991). A most recent example of 
politically motivated one-off debt reductions is the case of Iraq, when 80 per cent of its 
debts were reduced following the set up of the new regime in 2004.
154
 The justification was 
that the new regime should not be responsible for repaying debts accumulated during the 
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 For a brief profile on Poland‘s political situation from a Western point of view, see for instance US 
Department of State (2009). 
154
 For the technical process, stages of debt relief and shares of the various creditors, see Weiss (2008). 
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previous ruler. Also in this case, the debt cancellation was driven by the US authorities.
155
 
In practice, this leads to an application of the concept of odious debt, although the US has 
not employed the word ―odious‖ to describe this debt. Although both cases of Iraq and 
Egypt present examples of debt forgiven on political grounds, the cases differ in terms of 
both the history behind their accumulation and with regard to the process of the writing 
down of the debts.
156
 
If the creditors have been pro-active in protecting their own assets, debtors have been re-
active. Indebted poor countries have mainly reacted to proposals and programmes presented 
by the creditors. Indebted countries have aimed at getting the most favorable terms possible 
within the frames provided by the creditors. The closest that poor countries have come to 
setting up a common front, as in a representative body, is the plan of the previously 
mentioned, and later abandoned, idea of a Club of Debtors. But even here, the vision of the 
Club did not stretch far beyond setting up a common forum for joint action and negotiation 
in creating pressures on the creditors. Ultimately, the Club was not envisaged to devise its 
own proactive strategies. (Hernández Pedraza 2002: 32-3) 
The political background to these debt reductions has, stroke by stroke, painted an image of 
unrestricted creditor domination, and thus enforced the argument of the importance of the 
rich countries to lift these burdens off the shoulders of poor countries. Debt reductions deal 
with individual treatment of debtors on a case-to-case basis as opposed to uniform 
solutions. A practical consequence of these proceedings is that this domination denies 
debtors the basic human right of debtor protection. It need not necessary be this way. 
Debtor protection is an issue of equity and human rights for all humans. At present, 
insolvency protection for the last unprotected type of debtors is justified by rule of law as 
well as by the concept of debtor protection granted to anyone except people in poor 
countries (Raffer and Singer 2001: 245). Or put differently, the insertion of debtor 
protection is on the list of negative duties that must be addressed by the rich nations. 
The debt of the North and the debt of the South 
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 In 1991, the Iraq defaulted on its debt to the US. This means that from an economic point of view, the US 
was in a situation where it wrote off the debts which were not serviced anyways (Weiss 2008: 5) 
156
 See chapter 4 for a comparison of the legal issues involved.  
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Until now, this thesis has been concerned with problem debt of poor countries, analyzed as 
if from the outside. Turning the coin and looking at problem debt from the standpoint of 
poor countries, the debt burden is linked to the mechanisms by which the North extracts 
wealth from the South, as first mentioned in chapter 1.  
From the South, we hear radical calls for the North to compensate the South for 
exploitation dating back to the beginning of the capitalist system: ―it was mercantile at first, 
when it was responsible for the extermination of entire populations, slavery and the pillage 
of wealth. Then it was industrial capitalism that established the colonialist era at the cost of 
numerous wars. The current mechanisms of unequal exchange pursue the same ends‖ 
(Alternatives Sud 2002: 249). Soederberg (2005: 928) shows how informal arrangements of 
international debt assist in creating conditions for capital accumulation by masking the 
relations of power and exploitation underpinning it. She says that the informal nature of the 
international debt architecture helps increase the power of credit to serve as an effective 
form of social discipline. These current mechanisms have also been referred to as means of 
re-colonizing the South (Tandon 2001; see also Raffer and Singer 2001: 54), ―not only 
should the cancellation of the debt of the South be fought for, but also compensation from 
the North, above all through a total revision of economic relationships between North and 
South‖ (Alternatives Sud 2002: 249). Some see this compensation, or the debt of the North 
to the South, as composed of ecological debt, as the repayment of debt has caused 
misappropriation of natural resources extending back to the colonial period (see also Simms 
2006). Others point to a democracy debt where the lack of respect for human rights has 
weakened the relations between the government and the people and in some cases 
facilitated dictatorships. This lack of commitment to the satisfaction of social needs has led 
to violence, internal conflicts and sufferings. Yet, perhaps most frequently, one stumbles 
across references to the violation of human rights and how conditionality programmes have 
violated cultural, economic and social rights, the right to development and the right to a 
healthy environment. (Reyes Tagle and Sehm Patomäki 2007: 6-11) 
The issue of finger-pointing is blurred further by the cases where the loans were politically, 
rather than economically, motivated, or never intended to reach the population in the first 
place, but was instead used for personal consumption. Who should be paying for these 
loans? The people in whose names loan agreements were wrongfully signed, or the 
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taxpayers of the rich nations? This complication merges with the discourse on odious debt, 
a matter addressed in the next chapter.   
Unsurprisingly, the standpoints differ as regards to who owes whom.
157
 Looking past 
culpabilities, there is a need for a new relationship between the richer and the poorer 
countries because the present relationship is thoroughly unhealthy. In describing the role of 
the UN in the twenty-first century, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested a 
―debt arbitration process to balance the interests of creditors and sovereign debtors and 
introduce greater discipline into their relations‖ (Annan 2000: 38). In fact, echoing the calls 
for a revision of economic relationships between the North and the South, and to mend 
North-South relations and to create a basis for healthier relations, Yash Tandon and others 
have proposed setting up a North-South truth commission (see the conclusions of Rikkilä 
and Sehm Patomäki 2002). Appointing an independent entity to decide over wrongs and 
rights resembles this initiative. Forsberg and Teivainen examine specifically the history and 
functions of truth commissions and conclude their research by saying, ―debt arbitration 
could indeed constitute themes under which truth-commission-like consideration on 
forgiveness and reconciliation could play a role (2004: 28)‖. The promise of reconciliation 
through a fair North-South truth commission process is attractive in its potential as a trust-
builder between nations and regions. Yet, they point out, given the current relations of 
power, it is not surprising that some of the radical social movements express doubts about 
the proposal of such a commission arbitrating problem debt. Forsberg and Teivainen also 
echo the concerns raised by Raffer and Erlasslahr (2001) stating that it would not be 
advisable to launch an arbitration process from within the UN due to current power-play. In 
its present form, though, the proposal is shrouded in vagueness, avoiding fundamental 
questions, such as what the commission should discuss and how its decisions should or 
could be implemented. 
Public debates, civil society upheavals and concerns regarding justice all relate to the public 
sphere. On the one hand, the public sphere as such can be analyzed. Prominently, Jürgen 
Habermas sees the concept of public sphere both as an idea and an ideology in itself, and as 
a place where subjects participate as equals in rational discussion in pursuit of truth and the 
common good (see Finlayson 2005: esp. 12-3). On the other hand, the political activities 
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 See for instance Millet and Toussaint‘s book Who owes Who? (2004) structured around this very question.  
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both within and emerging from the space can be analyzed. Perhaps of interest here is 
Hannah Arendt‘s thinking when she argues that (political) action can never be predicted 
(for a discussion, see Arendt 1963: chapter 3). Here, her statement is stretched to reflect 
that the outcome of such action is equally unpredictable.
158
 Political activities risk resulting 
in unanticipated outcomes. Therefore, the guide of this thesis, the combination of efficiency 
and justice, must be carefully and constantly recollected of. Therefore, and returning to 
pragmatics, solving problem debt issues must not only deal with the present short-term 
situation. Rather, the solution must allow for the introduction of a mechanism solving 
perceived injustices in the past, and it must be accompanied by arrangements promoting 
fairness, justice and sound economics in the future.  
Towards arbitrating global debt on the path to global justice 
As established so far, in order for it to gain legitimacy and the peoples‘ support, any future 
arrangement must be set up according to democratic mechanisms regarding participation 
and decision-making, relying on democratic principles and abiding by rule of law; all whilst 
taking into account future generations and possibly past ones, too. It is equally clear that 
arbitrating international debt is only one part of several transformations required for 
introducing democratization into the world economy. Regarding debt arbitration, the 
present obstacle seems to be not so much a matter of getting the rich creditors on board and 
committed to the process, but rather the setting up of fair rules.
159
 The two main issues of 
disagreement that make a resolution of bankruptcy both important and difficult are on the 
values of assets and on the consequences of action. (Stiglitz 2010: 48) Morals, ethics, or 
even the most appropriate arguments for justice may not be enough. Also in this context, 
acquiring power is easier than giving it up. In supportive terms, Nagel (2005: 145-7) notes 
that when thinking about the future, it is important to accept that political power is rarely 
created as a result of demands for legitimacy. There is little reason to think that things will 
be different in the future. The historical developments of conceptions of justice and 
legitimacy for the nation-state indicate that sovereignty usually precedes legitimacy. First, 
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 The predictability of political action is pondered upon in chapter 6 about development aid and 
interventions, so at this stage, I have contended with the introduction of the ideas. 
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 See chapter 1. 
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there is a concentration of power. Then, gradually, a demand for the consideration of the 
interests of the governed starts to grow, and this demand includes giving the governed a 
greater voice in the exercise of power. This demand may be reformist, revolutionary or a 
demand for reform made credible by the threat of revolution, but here it is the existence of 
concentrated sovereign power that prompts the demand, and makes legitimacy an issue. 
War may result in the destruction of sovereign power, leading to reconfigurations of 
sovereignty in response to claims of legitimacy, but even in this case the conquerors 
exercising the power become the target of those claims. While it is conceivable in theory 
that political authority is created in response to antecedent demand for legitimacy, Nagel 
sees it unlikely to happen in practice. Rather, what is more probable, is the increase and 
deployment of power in the interests of those holding it, followed by a gradual growth of 
pressure to make its exercise more just and to free its organization from the historical 
legacy of the balance of forces that went into its creation. Nagel sees unjust and illegitimate 
regimes as necessary precursors of the progress toward legitimacy and democracy. This is 
because they create the centralized power that can then be contested – and perhaps turned 
in another direction without being destroyed. For this reason, Nagel sees that the most 
likely path toward some form of global justice is through the creation of patently unjust and 
illegitimate global structures of power that are tolerable only to the interests of the most 
powerful current nation-states. Only in that way will institutions come into being that are 
worth taking over in the service of more democratic purposes, and only in that way will 
there be something concrete for the demand for legitimacy to go to work on. Nagel 
concludes that the path from anarchy to justice must go through injustice. The global scope 
of justice will expand only through developments that first increase the injustice of the 
world by introducing effective but illegitimate institutions to which the standard of justice 
apply, standards by which one hopes they will eventually be transformed.   
But the practices of these intergovernmental organizations do not change in response to 
arguments, they need to be changed politically (Berger 2007: 6). Be the vision one for a 
strong nation-state, for a cosmopolitan world view or some new form of transnationalism, 
and be the vision that of the activist illusion or the analytical cynicism, whichever, at this 
moment, this thesis contends to arguing for introducing international debt arbitration as one 
means of introducing rule of law, bringing with it a promise of global justice and global 
democratization. This is because of the definition of democracy as power authorized and 
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controlled by the people over whom it is exercised, and in such a way as to give these 
persons roughly equal political influence (Pogge 2008a: 249). It is also because a minimal 
definition of democracy is fairness. The application of rule of law would in effect give 
franchise to debtors. Appropriately and sustainably decreasing debts could not only foster 
sound national economic policies in poor countries, but the consequent loosening of 
dependency ties could also open up possibilities for structural changes in the global 
economy. To the extent that the industrialized countries have prevented debtor nations from 
earning their way out of debt, they must take some responsibility themselves for poor 
countries‘ inability to repay loans (Cheru 2006: 38). Sovereign debt restructuring according 
to an international edition of the basic concepts of ‗Chapter 9‘ would only replicate what 
states agree is fair on a national level. An international debt arbitration mechanism could 
indeed alter economic structures – possibly opening the path for additional transformations. 
Central to the argument of this thesis is that under the umbrella of internationalizing the 
principles that inform ‗Chapter 9‘ – be that under the FTAP heading or some other – many 
proposals regarding debt lifting could be accommodated, and as Raffer suggests. Placing 
the concept into a framework might become institutional form, in the sense that it would 
erase the risk of uncoordinated multiple forums submitting inconsistent decisions. The 
model could be implemented as an orderly framework to determine which part of their 
debts insolvent debtors can or should actually pay while the sovereignty of their country 
remains respected. All creditors would be equally treated. The arbiter‘s work list could 
include determining the economic sustainability of the debtor (a disputed and vague 
concept), the assessment (and consequent repudiation) of odious debts (as discussed in the 
next chapter), and (s)he would be drafting a repayment plan together with the nationals. 
Abiding by the rule of law allows for the rights of the debtors to be heard. The creditors‘ 
claims would be compensated according to the debtor‘s ability to service its debt stock. In 
the case of odious debts and the proposals for an arbitration panel or tribunal, once a debt is 
ruled odious it should not be paid. This could, for instance, be the case for loans 
deliberately made to dictators – although rolled over perhaps many times since.,  
Problem debt provides serious challenges for both national as well as international 
democratization.
160
 To meet these, the indebted poor countries must look beyond their 
                                                 
160
 Even the most perfect local democracy – however defined – cannot function according to its potential if 
the international frames within which it functions, are not democratic. In turn, a perfect international 
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diverse spatial and temporally limited stability problems and unite in the attack on the root 
causes of their vulnerability to the economic structures. Eventually, introducing fair and 
efficient debt arbitration could in turn open the door for further adjustments in the world 
order. 
International debt arbitration emerges not only as a viable political idea supported by 
practical economic reason, but also as defensible and justifiable in a capitalist world system 
where global forums eat away at sovereignty while providing little democratization. After 
abolishing the undue discrimination of poor countries and bona fide creditors, reinstalled 
economic mechanisms would again be allowed to play their useful and welcomed role 
(Raffer 2007b: 247). But given the lack of space for collective political imagination it is 
unlikely that principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ will be to be taken up with great ease. Nevertheless, 
and as will be addressed in Part II, it is of significance to look at how the ramification of 
arbitration of international debt set up according to the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ would 
work its way out in relation to trade, development aid and perhaps above all the dilemma of 
short-term conflicts of interest in the current system of international lending and borrowing. 
In this chapter, a minimal condition of ethical and institutional legitimacy has been set, and 
democracy has been defined as fairness. This thin concept allows for respect for the 
autonomy of diverse cultures and histories. It is also modest. And at the same time, the set 
condition is not exhaustive. The requirements of the universal criterion should be 
understood as pre-eminent within any other more ambitious national criterion.
161
  
In conclusion, the argument of this chapter has been that international debt arbitration 
would provide one way, or a first step, of introducing rule of law into this global regime, 
thus paving a pathway to a process of global justice, and global democratization.
162
 The 
                                                                                                                                                    
democracy (again, however defined), is not enough as such. In order for persons to lead democratic lives, 
their local surroundings must be democratic.   
161
 Here, I have used Pogge‘s four desiderata for shaping social institutions (Pogge 2008b: 42). 
162
 Or even, and perhaps less ambitiously, international debt arbitration could be a helpful step on the 
currently dominant path of ideology where everything is commodified, in a setting where regulatory 
frameworks on a national level are gradually being dismantled in the context of globalization (for an analysis 
of the economic crisis of 2008 in the context of the market being the supreme regulatory authority, see Supiot 
2010: 153). 
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political dimensions of international problem debt provide a foundation for determining the 
legal instruments by which to decide what is just and fair, and what debts, or share of debts, 
are to be repaid. This thesis has consciously shied away from discussions regarding the 
determination of regimes or governments as ―odious‖, or the political principles 
underpinning these regimes.
163
 Rather, the analysis has concentrated on the debts 
themselves. In the next chapter, it will be argued that debts should be dealt with on 
economic grounds (against criteria that has determined the basic economic rights of the 
indebted), or, on legal grounds; either against claims of odious debt or, in any case, 
according to legal principles of protecting the rights of the indebted.  
Debt arbitration cannot be considered in isolation from the surrounding system of global 
governance. In the previous chapter, it became clear that the roots of problem debt stretch 
down to the asymmetrical construction of the world economic order, promoting the power 
positions and motivations of the leading nations at the time, rather than according to a logic 
promoting global economic justice. On these grounds, the thesis has set forth that problem 
debt cannot be considered a purely economic issue. This argument is strengthened by the 
policies that problem debt has been met with, policies contradicting economic reasoning. 
From an economic and political point of view, arbitrating international debt mirroring the 
fundaments of ‗Chapter 9‘ of Title 11 of the US insolvency code would establish the 
principles for an economically efficient and just model. This takes us next to examining the 
legal perspectives of arbitrating international sovereign debt.  
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4.  
THE LEGAL QUESTION:  
 
Can global arbitration be 
institutionalized and what form might 
this take?164  
 
 
 
 
Debt constitutes an essential component of economics, be that in the economy of an 
individual or a household, a corporation, or of a sovereign nation-state. Acquiring debt is a 
way of securing funding for investments in order to generate future profit. Following this 
the natural assumption is that those who run up debt are responsible for repaying it (pacta 
sunt servanda). Yet, in the case of default, the idea of modern insolvency legislation and 
debt restructuring proceedings no longer rests on the liquidation or elimination of insolvent 
entities. Instead, the aim is to remodel the financial structure of debtors who are 
experiencing financial distress in order to facilitate rehabilitation and the continuation of 
their business. The debtors‘ rights are protected. This is justified from a human rights‘ 
angle as a means of protecting the basic economic and social rights of the indebted. From a 
moral vantage point, the indebted is provided with new incentives instead of being 
condemned to him or her suffering demoralized in prison. From the economists‘ angle, 
such a remodeling allows for the indebted to generate profits in the future. This profit 
benefits society as a whole through increased consumption and taxes and by potentially, or 
at least ideally, creating new workplaces.  
                                                 
164
 Sections of this chapter were published as ―Towards global equity: disentangling odious debt from 
sovereign economic insolvency‖, Global Society (in print). 
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With regards to sovereign debt however, the system is more complicated. Legally, the 
government of a state enters loan agreements on behalf of its population. In the case of 
default, the insolvent state cannot be liquidated, and the resources are not necessarily easily 
seized. Rather, the central legal tension is between creditor rights and human rights. Absent 
an international commonly negotiated framework, the administration of international debt 
operates in a legal vacuum. Not only is the debt regime poorly institutionalized and ill-
equipped to cope with larger dilemmas (Lipson 1981: 630), but, what is equally 
disconcerting is that international debt forgiveness or relief is based on arbitrariness as in 
there being no right to it, nor are there any universal rules: it is granted to some countries, 
but not others, for some types of debt, but not others (Raffer 2007b: 247).  Dealing with 
debt resembles an opt-in process. This has led to incremental processes, institutions and 
negotiations, both unofficial and official. Simultaneously, and perhaps most importantly, ad 
hoc‘ness leads to slow institutionalization.  
This matter is not helped by the streams of literature paralleling rather than intersecting the 
different aspects of sovereign debt. On the one hand, it is important to separate between 
commercial and official lending, and private and public debt. However, despite being 
different in nature, the common denominator of these discussions is ―insolvency‖.  On the 
other hand, it is of equal importance to separate between bankruptcy proceedings and 
mechanisms dealing with so-called odious debts as they operate under different 
jurisdictions. The concepts have little to do with each other, and the terms should not be 
confused. An insolvent country should not refer to its economic woes when claiming its 
debts odious. Similarly, the odiousness of a debt is independent of the borrower‘s economic 
situation, and consequently, odious debt should not be argued for on grounds of its 
economic sustainability. Nevertheless, this does not mean that insolvency and odiousness 
of debt could not be dealt with under similar arrangements, or pursued simultaneously. 
Rather, the viability lies in not confusing the arguments. 
The argument set out two chapters ago suggested that sovereign insolvency proceedings are 
coherent with reasons for economic efficiency in terms of economic reasoning. This 
chapter now takes the discussion further by shifting the focus to the responsibilities of 
lending and burdens of payment of the debts. Legally, international arbitration would have 
to take place through a fair and institutional arrangement based on well-researched and 
viable economic, political and legal dimensions. In discussing the just and legitimate path 
126 
 
forward in the governance of debt, questions of institutions arise, stretching far beyond the 
aforementioned social institutions. The previous discussion emerged in the context of 
minimal conditions for ethical and institutional legitimacy coupled with the contours for an 
institutional framework for a legal mechanism arbitrating sovereign debt. At the moment, 
the frames appear as if in backlight. It is time to now deepen the discussion, and in doing 
so, the contours are filled in. However this chapter moves beyond the mere shape and form 
of the frames, as it works towards a legal institutional and international framework for 
sovereign debt restructuring, and in this process of design, the individual components are 
first untangled, only to then being assigned appropriate places in the frame.  
This chapter is written around the pivotal point of arguing for an institutional frame for 
arbitration of international debt. Debt can be seen as questionable in two ways, either by its 
repayment subsequently threatening the economic and social human rights among the 
population in the indebted country, or by the legality of the debt itself. To arrive at this 
argument, first, the thinking of debt in religious traditions and in economics is traced, 
leading up to modern day bankruptcy proceedings. This leads to a comparison between the 
responsibilities of lenders and debtors in national law to those of international practice, in 
particular regarding the application of rule of law internationally and as a prerequisite for 
global justice and democracy. Next, the focus is shifted to the parallel track of odious debt, 
where the search for conceptual clarity requires an analysis of the debates. In order to 
clarify the somewhat haphazard messy debates, the political and societal dimensions of law 
are examined. The attempt is not to examine questions pertaining to the determination of 
the odiousness of particular debts, but rather, the discussion pertains to the potential of the 
concept and its application. Finally, the question of institutionalization is addressed. What 
can this mean in the context of international debt arbitration and what do the proposals 
regarding economic insolvency and odious debt bring with them? From the many 
insolvency proposals currently on the table, if looking at them through a legal lens, a few 
observations emerge. Here, theories of institutions provide a guide for transporting the 
principles of arbitration debt internationally and toward the comprehensive solution this 
thesis seeks. 
4.1 Transporting national legal principles to the international level 
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The underlying aim of this section is twofold. The first aim is to highlight milestones in 
how the thinking regarding debt has evolved at a national level. The second goal is to 
compare these developments with international practice. What lessons can we learn from 
the history of attitudes regarding debt? Are there national laws applicable to sovereign 
debt? Can global debt arbitration promote international rule of law? 
Following a selection of chronological historical references, which are linked to legal 
thinking regarding debt, the scope is narrowed to a look at the responsibility of the lender 
and the borrower in international loaning. This is followed by a closer look at what a debt 
arbitration mechanism for sovereign nation-states might look like, and what its relationship 
to odious debt could be. Returning to the discussions regarding odious debt in the next 
section, first, the relation between economic bankruptcy and odious debt will be briefly 
elaborated.  
Tracing the legal thinking on debt 
Looking back in time, the roots of attitudes towards debts and debt forgiveness can be 
traced to religious sources. These sources justify the non-payment of debt in cases where 
the livelihood or survival of the debtor is placed in jeopardy. In Judea, during 440-330 
before the Common Era, the year of Jubilee, which took place periodically every 50 years, 
is a particular time for the remission of sins and universal pardon. During this year, debts 
are forgiven, and slaves and prisoners freed. The year of Jubilee also allowed not only for 
slaves to be released, but also for compensation of the services that the Hebrew slave 
performed. This evolution constitutes a significant departure from old ways of thinking as 
previously, the liberation of slaves in ancient economies was an act of trade or grace, not of 
law or justice. Indebtedness was a central problem for ancient societies and indebtedness 
led almost always to the enslavement of the debtors. This presented an important economic 
problem. It was clear that the needy must receive assistance. Simultaneously, the needy 
were obligated to repay, often could not, and lost everything. But, through the periodical 
debt release they were made whole again. Regardless the reasoning and justification behind 
the writing down of the debts, it is of importance to note that the accountability of the 
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accumulation of the debts was not addressed (as also raised by Herman 2007: 798).
165
 
Instead, the main incentive was to create a fresh start for the indebted. Predictably though, 
the procedure of the writing down of debt, in turn, decreased the willingness to lend. To 
address this issue, lenders required payment and a surplus as a form of interest. As interests 
rose to up to 50 per cent, debt servicing became an illusion. This forms the basis behind 
many religious traditions condemning interest, or at least disproportionally high interest 
rates. (Veerkamp 2007: 171-4) Partly in recognition of this rationale, although mainly in 
line with political ideologies, civil society voices claim that poor countries‘ debt burdens of 
today are a result of usury and should therefore not be paid.
166
 This argument remains at the 
core of civil society mobilizations around debt, and was one of the main inspirational forces 
behind the civil society Jubilee debt campaign of the late 1990s, as addressed in the 
previous chapter (see also Reyes Tagle and Sehm Patomäki 2007; Herman 2007: 781-3; 
and Busby 2007). But even if religious sources do support debt forgiveness, the difference 
between a covenant and a contract cannot be ignored. Where a covenant can best be 
described as a solemn promise, or an expression of will, a contract is a binding legal 
agreement. This means that a covenant can be restricted to a promise with dubious or no 
legal backing. A contract, on the other hand, is enforceable in a court of law. Religious 
references evolve around moral codes, but do not necessarily bring about enforcement or 
legislative action.
167
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 Herman summarizes three standpoints. The justification for the write-downs could have been preventing 
society the rich in society from becoming too rich or the poor from becoming too poor (as suggested by 
Veerkampf 2007). Alternatively, it could have been an impulse of solidarity to alleviate the suffering of the 
poor (as suggested by Donnelly 2007: 192-3). Trebat (2007) refers to the more recent case of the Argentinean 
default in 2001/2 and concludes that from a theologian perspective, debt relief came following the reaching of 
a perceived limit on how much punishment the Argentinean population should be expected to sustain. 
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 ―The external debt of the countries of the South has been repaid several times over. Illegitimate, unjust and 
fraudulent, debt functions as an instrument of domination, depriving people of their fundamental human rights 
with the sole aim of increasing international usury. We demand unconditional cancellation of debt and the 
reparation of historical, social and ecological debts. The countries demanding repayment of debt have 
engaged in exploitation of the natural resources and knowledge of South.‖ (Call of Social Movements 2002: 
§13) 
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 In fact, in modern history, the examples of moral appeals based on religious principles driving political 
change are few. One example may be the civil rights movement in the US. Others may be the struggle against 
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But what, then, is the history of the present thinking behind legal principles, or doctrines, 
regarding debt? Four specific lines of thinking are worth tracing. The first one relates to the 
national context and is about the principle of debtor protection and how this has developed 
from debtor punishment. Looking at the recent history of debtor protection, we must begin 
in the UK. Here, the tradition of incarcerating debtors was abolished in 1869 with the 
Debtor‘s Act. Up until this time, indebted persons were held in debtor‘s prisons. The person 
was expected to remain in custody until the repayment of his or her debts. For obviously 
reasons, this practice proved futile as the incarcerated person had limited opportunity of 
earning money to service their debt. The idea of incarcerating the over-indebted is starkly 
contrasted to more contemporary legal principles, such as the doctrines of Forza Major and 
that of Rebus Sic Stantibus, both establishing grounds for debtor protection in the event of 
overbearing, unforeseen or radically changed circumstances. What is of importance in the 
context of the argument at hand is that on an individual and corporate level as well as in 
national settings, the insolvent indebted is not legally punished, nor politically controlled. 
The point here is that since international lending lacks mechanisms of international law, it 
is tempting and perhaps even intuitive to compare it to laws on lending in national contexts.  
Second, and as noted, contemporary legislation also provides strategies for dealing with 
insolvent municipalities, corporations or individuals. Although practices of dealing with 
insolvency differ according to jurisdiction, many are rooted in the US bankruptcy code.
168
 
In particular, international lending has been compared to national lending where the 
                                                                                                                                                    
apartheid in South Africa and the anti-debt movement. (Donnelly 2007: 189) Here, one could of course 
counter this claim by drawing attention to the importance of the particular changes against the low number of 
changes.  
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 In fact, most countries‘ insolvency laws are based on the US Bankruptcy Code, see Schwarcz (2000: 119). 
Karlsson-Tuula (2007) highlights some differences in the direction of these laws. Then again, in designing an 
optimal insolvency law, one must take note of the purpose, function and direction of the law. By purpose 
(ratio legis), one means how the legislation fulfills the objectives of the law. By function, she means the task 
the legislation is supposed to fulfill (this branches also into the political and societal dimensions of law, as 
brought up in a moment). By direction she means if the legislation is pro-debtor or pro-creditor. The question 
of the direction of the law is relevant in order to establish the future need for reform in the area of the law. For 
instance, Karlsson-Tuula concludes that in contrast to the US bankruptcy law, the Swedish law is pro-creditor.  
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borrowing party can declare itself bankrupt and thus unable to repay its loans.
169
 In the US, 
as bankruptcy for corporations and individuals first surfaced in the early 1800s, 
municipalities were not given the same opportunities for reorganization (MuniNetGuide 
2008). Yet, when municipalities found themselves unable to meet their debt obligations, 
lawsuits ensued (MuniNetGuide 2008). Initially, the only remedy when a municipality was 
unable to pay its creditors was for the creditors to pursue an action of mandamus, or 
compelling the municipality to raise taxes (PLRI no date: 2).
170
 During the Great 
Depression, this approach proved hopeless so in 1934 the US Bankruptcy Act was amended 
to extend to municipalities, under ‗Chapter 9‘ of Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. In 
comparison to corporate bankruptcy procedures, municipal bankruptcy filings are rare. 
Since 1937, there have been less than 600 files for bankruptcy by municipalities, a number 
that pales in comparison to the good 23 000 business filings during 12 months in 2006-7 
alone (MuniNetGuide 2008).
171
 In an absolute sense, though, 600 municipal bankruptcies 
mean that bankruptcy filings are by no means exceptional. 
Thirdly, while creditor dominance remains vital in international lending, the form of this 
control has changed shape. Earlier explicit gun boat diplomacy has turned into subtle 
economic control. Up until World War I, defaulting nation-states were occupied by the 
military force of the creditor.
172
 In the period 1870-1913, the use of ―super-sanctions‖, or 
direct military pressure and imposition of foreign political or financial control were a 
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 For sovereign debt analogies based on national bankruptcy proceedings, see for instance Rogoff and 
Zettelmeyer (2002); Bulow (2002); Bolton and Skeel (2004) and the series of contributions by Raffer 
(compiled in 2010). For additional economic angles, see for instance Kreuger (2002); Acosta and Ugarteche 
(2007). For voices from civil society, see Afrodad (2001); and Erlassjahr (2001), among others. 
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 Mandamus is ―Latin for ‗we command‘. A writ of mandamus is a court order that requires another court, 
government official, public body, corporation or individual to perform a certain act. For example, after a 
hearing, a court might issue a writ of mandamus forcing a public school to admit certain students on the 
grounds that the school illegally discriminated against them when it denied them admission. A writ of 
mandamus is the opposite of an order to cease and desist, or stop doing something. Also called a ‗writ of 
mandate‘.‖ (Nolo Glossary 2008) 
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 For the oft-referred to case of Orange Country in California declaring bankruptcy in 1994, see chapter 2. 
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 For a historical overview placed in the frames of the contemporary discussions on odious debt, see King 
(2007: 617-20)  
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commonly used enforcement mechanism (Mitchener and Weidenmier 2005). With the 
creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, this tradition of gun boat diplomacy was broken 
and replaced with more subtle, or less straight-forward, methods. Soederberg (2005: 929) 
points out that what remained unchanged, however, were the underlying relations of power 
in the international credit system.
173
 The new arrangement differed from the earlier one in 
that now, sovereign states are not directly constrained by other nations. Instead, sanctions 
and incentives are managed by private-sector and official multilateral lenders. She explains 
that the disciplinary features of this postwar international credit system are twofold. First, 
in exchange for IMF loans, countries are to implement stabilization programmes, and 
second, the repayment incentive is motivated by the debtor country‘s attempt to uphold its 
creditworthiness. Regarding the debts of sovereign nation-states, it is fair to say that 
military warfare has been replaced by economic power-play. As King concludes (2007a: 
620), at all times in the history of sovereign debt, there has been a set of overpowering 
incentives and threats associated with payment of sovereign debt to creditors in a position 
to punish defaulting sovereigns. Put differently, although dealings with sovereign debt have 
become less violent in a direct sense, the dealings still lack the characteristics of debtor 
protection. This stands in particular contrast to national legislations, where the debtor‘s 
rights are protected, and thus ties back to the above point.  
Fourth, during the same time as ―super-sanctions‖ prevailed also the precedent for what 
was to become ―odious debt‖ was set. The legal precedent to odious debt, as it is often 
referred to, dates back to more than a century ago, to 1898 when the US captured Cuba 
from Spain.
174
 Or, if placed in a different context, it takes place about 30 years following 
the abolishment of the Debtor‘s Act in the UK. At the time, the US referred to Cuba‘s debts 
as ―odious‖, and justified the non-repayment of these debts on the grounds that the 
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 Another trend, still prevailing, is that the repayment of debts is expedient, explained by the fact that 
countries are keen to protect their creditworthiness. (King 2007: 616-7) The threat of lesser or low 
creditworthiness is perceived as frightening since the alternative is unknown, yet feared to be costly in many 
senses.  
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 Perhaps the most detailed and well researched history leading up to the birth of the concept of odious debt, 
including a comparison of the conclusions of three main contributors, the contemporaries Sack and 
Feilchenfield along with the subsequent work by Bedjaoui, see King (2007: 621-9) 
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repayments would have oppressed the Cuban people.
175
 Around a quarter of a century later, 
in 1923, the concept re-emerged in Costa Rica. In this case, and what is of particular 
interest for the purpose of this thesis, is that the process was triggered by an act of 
Parliament and the decision was taken by an arbiter. The arbiter, US Chief Justice and 
former US president William Howard Taft, upheld the right of Costa Rica to repudiate 
debts granted by the Royal Bank of Canada to the dictator in the name of Costa Rica (UN 
2006)
176
. This case is of interest since it could create an avenue to allow for the cancellation 
of odious debts by international agreement.
177
 A few years on, Sack (1927), arguing for 
Mexican debt repudiation from the Spanish Emperor Maximillian‘s regime, defined odious 
debts as debts that have incurred by dictatorial regimes for their own benefit (absence of 
consent), and against the interest of the population of a state (absent of benefit), without its 
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 The debts derived from resourcing armed conflict in response to restlessness in Cuba, in turn resulted in 
difficulties in the export market of sugar. In the subsequent peace negotiations, the Spanish asserted a 
principle of international law, stating that state obligations belong to a land and its people, not its regime. To 
this, the Americans replied that the claim is inapplicable to the Cuban debt, both legally and morally, since its 
burden was imposed on the Cuban people without their consent, by military force and was one of the principal 
wrongs that inspired the struggle for Cuban independence. In addition, much of the loans were designed to 
crush attempts by the Cubans to revolt against Spanish domination, and were expended in a manner contrary 
to Cuba‘s interest. The Americans concluded that these debts could not only not be considered Cuban debts, 
but that furthermore. they could not be considered binding on a successor state. As for the lenders, the 
Americans argued that the creditors took a chance of investment, or a credit risk. The US never acknowledged 
liability for the Cuban debt, nor did the holders of the debt collect fully on their claims. (Adams 1991: 163-4)  
176
 Most contributions to the discourse on odious debt start from this case, and no contribution fails to refer to 
it. For probably the most detailed analysis of the Tinoco case, see Lienau (2008a). The case is named after 
Frederico Tinoco Granados, whose government had initially signed on to the line of credit from the Royal 
Bank of Canada and in the name of Costa Rica. 
177
 In international jurisprudence, and in the twentieth-century, a sharp legal and historical distinction exists 
between state and government succession. State succession involves a break in territorial sovereignty, where 
government succession comes with an overwhelming presumption about continuity in obligations. (see for 
instance Gelpern 2007) This means that states – not governments – are assumed the responsible entities in 
repaying debts. This assumption that debts are to be honored, and in spite of the absence of a rule confirming 
this fact, serves as a common starting point. In doing so, the assumption simultaneously blinkers much of the 
argument.   
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consent and in full awareness of the creditor (credit awareness).
178
 In his Treatise, Sack 
synthesized various strands of the argument around at the time (Ludington and Gulati 
2008).
179
 Following a good half a century in hibernation, Patricia Adams (1991) brought 
the concept of odious debts into the daylight. As we will soon see, the consequent waking 
up came with an energetic and enthusiastic shake, today pulling the concept into the most 
different directions.  
In a fundamental sense, it is important to recall that the issue of creating formalized new 
institutional legal procedures cannot be disjunctive to, or separated from, the social and 
political setting within which they operate, a matter I return to in the next section. Naturally 
there is a difference between a country‘s reluctance to pay and its inability to pay. Let us 
examine these issues closer.  
The responsibilities and the rights of the lenders and the borrowers 
Before looking closer at debtor protection and how it appears today, it is important to 
analyse the responsibility of lenders. Entering the discussion on international lending from 
the point of view of lenders‘ responsibilities, Hanlon (2006a: 214-5) explains that laws 
around domestic lending have developed rapidly in the twentieth century largely by 
significantly increasing the responsibility of the lender to act in good faith. 
Correspondingly, the UK Consumer Credit Act 1974 ―reverses the normal burden of proof: 
if a debtor alleges that a credit bargain is extortionate, the burden of proof lies on the 
creditor to prove that the bargain is not extortionate (Harding 1995, cited in Hanlon 2006: 
214-5). Within the framework of creating a basis for international law, some analogies have 
been drawn upon to explain corporate lending policies. Parallels can be drawn in the 
corporate world, where a corporation is not liable for contracts entered into by its senior 
officers without proper authority (Hanlon 2006a: 217-8; Kremer and Jayachandran 2002: 
1). Hanlon parallels the lack of liability of corporations to that of dictators taking loans 
                                                 
178
 For a biography of Sack, see Ludington and Gulati (2008). 
179
 Alongside Sack, Feilchenfeld‘s work on Public Debts and State Succession (1931) is considered central in 
setting the roots for the concept of odious debt (King 2007: 621-9; Ludington and Gulati 2008: 27, 33). 
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without proper consent of the people of their representatives.
180
 In addition to comparing 
international lending to national lending and business law, Khalfan adds the aspect of treaty 
law and international treaty law on corruption, specifically the UN Convention against 
Corruption. The UN Convention ―provides a basis for the principle that governments and 
those parties that engage in corruption are engaging in unlawful behavior, and therefore 
cannot benefit from such conduct‖ (cited in Khalfan 2006: 2). Corruption can be closely 
linked to the concept of odious debt, and will soon be examined in greater depth. But 
briefly, these comparisons mirror those on an individual level – no person is expected to 
pay off what someone else has wrongfully borrowed in their name. These observations 
place international dealings with debt strikingly at odds with national procedures and 
principles. What is more, they also draw attention to the responsibility of the lenders, which 
has opened the floor to further the discussion regarding debt of poor countries. Certainly, 
from this perspective, a shadow of doubt is cast on the responsibility of the lender of 
international loans. The responsibility of the lender is of central importance in discussions 
regarding odious debt, to which will be returned later. 
Now, it is time to return to debtor protection. Debtor protection has emerged in much 
legislation except the international one. Basically, with this, a fundamental conflict has 
materialized, which is that of a collision between two fundamental legal principles (Raffer 
and Singer 2001: 244-5). On the one hand, there is a conflict between the rights of the 
creditors to collect their repayments versus economic human rights of no one having to 
starve themselves to be able to pay. On the other, there is a conflict of rule of law, that no 
one must be the judge in one‘s own case.    
As for the first part of this conflict which concerns the rights of the creditors, there is much 
debate about whether the poorest countries should be liable for debt. There is little doubt 
regarding the legitimacy of such liability in terms of international or contractual law, but 
the many counter arguments have to do with the fairness, efficiency, morality and 
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 Buchheit et al. (2007) and Grey (2007) problematize this argument, by asserting that appealing to 
corporate responsibility ―throws the conversation into deep moral waters‖. By this they mean that threats of 
liability arising from foreign investment may push investors aside.  
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practicality of the system currently in place.
181
 This leads beyond technicalities into the 
fundaments of legal principles, justice and the political choices that motivate them. For one, 
it adds credibility to the implementation of a system or a mechanism introducing fair 
principles internationally. And further, referring to rule of law ties back to the 
responsibilities of the lender, where the lender rules over what debts are repayable in 
situations of default. The case for equal positions in debt renegotiations for both creditors 
and debtors can be strengthened further. No fair (or civilized national) judicial system in a 
market economy allows the same parties to act as prosecutor, defender and judge. One 
could add that only courts under Martial Law, such as the ones held in Guantánamo under 
the jurisdiction of the US, operate under unfair juridical systems involving physical 
persons. Incidentally, this system is the subject of ardent criticism from human rights 
groups. In market-based economies, insolvency laws are applicable to practically all 
debtors except poor countries; therefore, indebted poor countries should demand a neutral 
institution assuring fair resolutions (Raffer 2001b: 14; see also 2003: 2). Consequently, in 
the case of a country being unable to repay its debts, it too could declare itself insolvent. In 
line with internationalized principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ of Title 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, 
as introduced earlier, an insolvent country applying for bankruptcy procedures could then 
apply for debtor‘s protection. In the case of sovereign default, arbitration of international 
debts encapsulates the attractive features of not only protecting the sovereignty of the 
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 Here, recent calls from UNICEF exemplify further: ―[t]he divide between the industrialized countries and 
developing regions, particularly the least developed countries, is perhaps greater on maternal mortality than 
on almost any other issue. This claim is borne out by the numbers: Based on 2005 data, the average lifetime 
risk of a woman in a least developed country dying from complications related to pregnancy or childbirth is 
more than 300 times greater than for a woman living in an industrialized country. No other mortality rate is so 
unequal. Furthermore, millions of women who survive childbirth suffer from pregnancy-related injuries, 
infections, diseases and disabilities, often with lifelong consequences.[…].The health divide in neonatal 
mortality is also marked; a child born in a least developed country is almost 14 times more likely to die during 
the first 28 days of life than a child born in an industrialized country.[…] As with child mortality, the burden 
of death for mothers and newborns is disproportionately heavy in the continents of Africa and Asia, which 
together account for 95 per cent of maternal deaths and around 90 per cent of newborn deaths. Disparities 
across social groups within countries also remain high, especially in relation to poverty. Demographic and 
Health Surveys conducted between 1995 and 2002 show that within regions, neonatal mortality is 20-50 per 
cent higher for the poorest 20 per cent of households than for the richest quintile. Similar inequities exist for 
maternal mortality.‖ (UNICEF 2009: 2-3) 
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insolvent country, but also of placing the creditor and debtor in equal legal positions. This 
also lays the foundation for treating problem debt according to statutory law rather than 
through contractual approaches, a matter that will be returned to soon. 
The proposal for a neutral institution assuring fair resolutions regarding the repayments of 
an indebted country provides a framework that would also likely encourage deliberations 
regarding odious debt. But while the logic supporting odious debt is firm, in the sense that 
there seems to be no disagreement regarding the need to cancel debt that can be proved 
odious, proposals for arbitration around insolvency proceedings has not led to similar 
uniform support. While debtor‘s protection adheres to the criteria of social and economic 
rights, the proposal nevertheless meets opposition on at least three accounts. The first is an 
assumption about restricted future access to international lending, an assumption 
questioned in the previous chapter.  
Second, not everyone feels comfortable with debt arbitration, despite its promises of 
introducing rule of law. This unease is largely due to arbitration being seen as a function of 
declaring oneself, that is, the country in question, bankrupt, or insolvent. Insolvency is 
perceived as humiliating. Acosta and Ugarteche say that corporations go bankrupt, not 
countries, ―a state is not a company doing business, but something quite different: a 
sovereign entity for the purpose of remaining in existence‖ (2007: 3-4). Organizations that 
do not warm to debt arbitration (Jubilee South, for instance), tend to speak for debt 
cancellation – full stop.182 Proponents of debt arbitration counter the demands for 
immediate debt cancellation by noting that cancellation must happen as a result of some 
form of process and by some kind of mechanism. Raffer (2001c: 372) tightens the 
argument by stating that demanding the cancellation of unpayable debts means demanding 
an independent entity be empowered to decide. At present, of course, there is no such 
responsible independent entity at the global level. Herman (2008: 35) analyses that strictly 
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 Repudiation was touched upon in chapter 2. Repudiation carries high political and economic costs, and 
individual countries repudiating debt without the support of a fair objective assessment by a third party risks 
shooting the borrower in the foot. Calls for repudiation are also often connected to overall dissatisfaction with 
economic organisation and seen as a protest against a wide range of issues, not necessarily linked to problem 
debt. In connection to repudiation, this distrust is often linked to political preferences, notably sympathising 
with Marxism and criticism of the system. In essence, however, objective assessment (the rightfulness to 
repudiate) cannot be carried out unilaterally (by the borrower). 
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speaking then, international bankruptcy is an inapplicable model, an opinion which bridges 
to a second line of criticism.
183
  
Due to the partiality of national courts, whether located in a creditor or a debtor country, 
they cannot be guaranteed the establishment of a neutral court of arbitration to allow 
absolutely fair and equitable international bankruptcy proceedings, devoid of overreaching, 
however subtle.
184
 According to this third group of critics, there is no mechanism by which 
arbitration matters can be addressed. This echoes the legitimacy critique of human rights, 
insisting that rights must be seen in post-institutional terms as instruments, rather than as a 
prior entitlement (Sen 1999: 227-31). A conceivable way out, then, would be to open the 
floor to designing new institutional arrangements. 
Debt arbitration as a means to introduce international rule of law 
So far, the rule of law has been defined as no one presiding in judgment of ones own case. 
The rule of law is an ancient ideal, deliberated upon by Aristotle and Plato. The formal, or 
narrow, definition of rule of law serves as a baseline for more advanced definitions, and is 
the principle that no one is above the law.
185
 Modern interpretations of the rule of law are 
based in the Declaration of Delhi, a declaration from the Delhi Congress of 1957. The 
Declaration gave rise to three important elements in the concept of the rule of law:  
1. that the individual is possessed of certain rights and freedoms and that he is entitled to 
protection of these rights and freedoms by the State;  
2. that there is an absolute need for an independent judiciary and bar as well as for effective 
machinery for the protection of  fundamental rights and freedoms;  
3. that the establishment of social, economic and cultural conditions would permit men to 
live in dignity and to fulfill their legitimate aspirations.  
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 Herman concludes on a more optimistic note by saying that the question remains whether arrangements 
that share some of its features would improve on the present process for solving debt crisis.  
184
 Next to the issue of humiliation, this bias is among the main hurdles for civil society groups to continue 
thinking about debt arbitration.  
185
 The partly overlapping sister concept Rechtsstaat stands for the rule of law state and is thus not appropriate 
in this international context. 
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(International Commission of Jurists 1957) 
186
 
Tamanaha (2007) sees the first function of the rule of law as being to impose legal 
restraints on government officials. This function is followed by two further constraints; to 
require compliance with existing law and to impose legal limits on law-making power. In 
terms of compliance with existing law, Tamanaha considers enforcement a fundamental 
problem, where the solution lies in the institutional separation of government powers – the 
governing power cannot hold itself accountable. With regards to imposing legal limits on 
law-making power, or the erecting of limitations on the law-making power of government, 
these restrictions rank above ordinary law-making, he explains. Examples include human 
rights limits, which are superior to and impose restraints upon routine law-making.  
This basic definition is useful for present purposes in that it explains the national context of 
rule of law.
187
 It also obviates the lack of enforcement mechanisms on the international 
level. International rule of law would place matters related to sovereign debt under equal 
rule, meaning subjecting borrowers and lenders to the same standards and procedures.  
Also more substantive definitions to the role of law are of interest. More advanced 
definitions refer to fundamental rights, and criteria of justice. If benchmarked against 
human rights, in particular economic and social rights, and placed in a sovereign debt 
context, theoretically, the rule of law can be used to justify repudiation of sovereign debts, 
or at least to question the legitimacy of the debts (for this argument, see Jochnick 2006). 
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 Among other things, the Declaration of Delhi did not, however, suggest that the rule of law requires 
legislative power to be subject to judicial review, a feature added later by some, for instance by Raz (1991: 
18). 
187
 This is not to say that the concept of rule of law itself is not debatable. For instance, turning towards 
critical legal studies (see also later in this chapter), the rule of law can be seen as one of the central points of 
criticism. Boiling down to three points, Altman lists that first, critical legal studies see that rule of law is not 
possible in social situations where a liberal idea of individual freedom reigns, and second, rule of law is about 
contradictions (in what sense), making contradictory rulings possible and third, critical legal studies sees the 
rule of law as a mechanism to disempower human beings or as a constraint on the exercise of social and 
political power. The rule of law requires that social rules are capable of exercising constraint over a 
population of individuals. It also requires that the mass of rules that constitute the law have some kind of 
objective structure. The structure of legal doctrine just like its content is a matter of what most people in the 
relevant population conventionally think or do. (Altman 1990: 9-16, 181-2) 
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However, repudiation is more complicated than this suggests, a matter I address throughout 
this thesis as I argue for the importance of relying on the assessment of a neutral and 
objective body, rather than a country ruling in its own case. 
It is with this in mind that the fact that debt relief programmes have been named and 
framed by the creditors alone becomes interesting.
188
 Creditor-controlled initiatives sit 
uncomfortably with principles of the rule of law. These principles advocate the equal 
possibility of participation and influence by all parties while presuming that there are no 
asymmetric dependency relations between countries or groups of countries.  
At this stage, it is useful to recall that already Adam Smith listed trust and law and order as 
conditions for exchange in a market-based society, and that the faith in contracts must be 
supported by law (Smith 1776/2009: chapter III; see also Goldsmith 1995: 635). This 
presupposes the existence of a mechanism for assessing transactions made either in an 
unlawful way, or in a sphere outside of the law. To follow Smith‘s logic, a framework of 
public institutions that can referee various and numerous contract disputes is a prerequisite 
for market based allocation of goods and services (Smith 1790/1976: 340 in Goldsmith 
1995: 638). 
As Herman (2008: 35) points out, present arrangements are actually slightly more balanced 
than the case of private corporate bankruptcy proceedings, where creditors hold almost all 
power over the disposition of the bankruptcy enterprise.
189
 But here, two issues are worth 
noting. First, the distinction between ―the public‖ and ―the private‖ constitute the principle 
for excluding business from political decision-making – the principle being that political 
decision-making should not as a business. Simultaneously, this provides a strong case for 
treating international debt as a political matter which should be discussed in terms of the 
equal participation of those concerned by the action. Lienau‘s (2008a: 109-10) conclusion 
is that the consideration of human rights and popular sovereignty – in contrast to statist 
conceptions – merits a new interpretation of sovereignty. This opens up the possibility of 
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 To substantiate,  following the debt crisis of the early 1980s,  the unequal negotiation proceedings are 
evident in the separation of borrowers whom are to be dealt with on a case-by–case basis, however facing a 
conglomerate of lenders is explained in Garay Salamanca (2010: 117-8). 
189
 Raffer (2006: 257) puts this in no uncertain terms by stating that the IMF‘s unfair treatment of other 
creditors is contradictory to the rule of law. 
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presenting an intermediate or ―rule of law understanding‖ of sovereignty, an option offering 
a way understanding sovereignty between either a popular consent or statist control.
190
 
Second, as the direction of the bankruptcy law differs in nations, it cannot be automatically 
assumed that bankruptcy law by definition leans in one way or another (recalling the 
research of direction in bankruptcy codes, see supra footnote 166; Karlsson-Tuula 2007).  
Usually, in the literature, odious debt is not linked to the rule of law, thus by linking odious 
debt to a reinterpreted rule of law concept of sovereignty, Lienau (2008a) presents an 
exception, and her findings resonate well with international debt arbitration inspired by 
‗Chapter 9‘. In reference to popular sovereignty and a call to respect human rights, Lienau 
proposes an approach to odious debt that challenges the current frameworks of international 
law and our perception of the concept of sovereignty. This approach is based on the 
interpretation of rule of law as applied by US Chief Justice Taft‘s ruling in the Tinoco 
arbitration, the case used as the departure point for most contributions on odious debt. 
Lienau presents the ruling as an intermediate option, or a rule of law concept of sovereignty 
which offers a third way between a strict understanding of sovereignty as either popular 
consent on the one hand and statist control on the other. Of particular importance is 
Lienau‘s argument that Taft identifies sovereign statehood through its internal rule of law, 
rather than through control by force of democratic institutions.
191
 For the purposes of this 
thesis, this argument can be applied also in a normative sense supporting the arbitration of 
debt on the grounds of economic sustainability.
192
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 Of course, this possibility is not universally interpreted as such. For a reaction to criticism of the usefulness 
of the Tinoco case, and other matters, see Lienau (2008b). From another angle, discussions on sovereignty 
and human rights also link to the thinking of global democracy and human rights. There is little consideration 
of the conceptual relationship between democracy and human rights and almost no attention to 
institutionalization (Goodhart 2008: 399). 
191
 Lienau addresses debt reduction solely on the grounds of odious debt. She does not address debt reduction 
in terms of economic sustainability, or in relation to other economic reasons. 
192
 To the point, Raffer (2007b: 245) sees it mandatory to abolish the discrimination by OECD countries 
against poor countries and their inhabitants. Opposing bringing in the rule of law may carry the risk of being 
accused of accepting or defending the equivalent to apartheid, he predicts. Economically, he adds, equal 
treatment of all debtors would abolish the market imperfection that has resulted in huge damages, the 
misallocation of resources, and human misery.   
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Weaving together the threads from this section, arbitrating international debt not only 
provides a way of replicating nationally accepted legal codes internationally but it would 
also serve as a forum for addressing responsibilities in international loaning, while 
simultaneously heralding in the promise of introducing international rule of law. Rule of 
law is here seen as a prerequisite for democracy. Introducing rule of law opens the door to a 
discussion on democratization models, a discussion that does however, fall outside the 
scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that all contemporary versions of the democratic ideal 
share a minimal core: the government must not fall permanently hostage to a faction, 
however broadly the term faction may be defined, so as to include stable collective 
categories such as segments of society (Unger 1983: 27). Placing the minimum core at the 
centre of an international setting would support removing international loaning from the 
dominance of the lenders.  
4.2 About odious debt  
Until now, odious debt has been referred to in a categorical sense only. A closer look at the 
concept, the debates and the practical-political relevance of it is appropriate. The revived 
interest in odious debt is credited to Adams (1991), who placed the concept in an 
environmental framework. The concept itself, its credibility, validity, status and normative 
application has spurred a whole range of contributions. The discussion is active also in a 
contemporary setting; the most recent cases where odious debt was discussed – although 
not applied – were those of cancelling the debts of Iraq and when Norway wrote off some 
its credits (Raffer 2007b, esp. 228-31; see also Foreign Ministry of Norway 2006; and 
Gelpern 2005).  
In conjunction with the term ―odious‖, there are debts that have been labeled ―illegitimate‖, 
―corrupt‖, ―criminal‖ or ―illegal‖. However, there is no agreed universal definition of these 
partially overlapping concepts. In contrast, the application has been confusing and at times 
contradictory.
193
 Perceptions, morality and blunt definitions are not helpful in legal studies. 
On the contrary, instead of sharpening the contours, the discussions lead into blended and at 
times impractical practical-political conclusions. This is not to say that the discourse is not 
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 For attempts at clarifying the discussions, see Hanlon (2006); Raffer (2007b); and EURODAD (2008a: 2); 
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interesting, or useful. On the contrary, odious debt carries the potential of updating 
international praxis to the level of national standards.  
The lack of precise, contemporary, conceptual clarity regarding odious debt has inspired 
many to ready their pens regarding the legal status of the doctrine in international law. A 
closer look shows three general directions in the discussion. In addition to the definition of, 
applicability of, and contemporary relevance of the concept, there are disagreements on the 
qualifications of the concept as a doctrine and its usefulness. And third, and perhaps 
naturally, given the headings of the two previous groups, proposals for the practical 
application of the concept differs. The next section is structured according to this grouping. 
Mostly, the discussion remains on the technical level of identifying an appropriate host of 
jurisdiction. What is still missing is a profound discussion about the societal values and 
priorities of the legal principles when dealing with odious debt – and sovereign economic 
overindebtedness.  
Reviving the concept 
Adams‘s (1991) important revival of the concept, partly consisting of Sack‘s original 
French text translated into English, inspired a flurry of papers inquiring into the concept.
194
 
Today, the stream seems to have turned into a flood, importantly fed by the process of 
granting debt relief for Iraq, a process which initially flashed the term odious regarding 
debts signed by Saddam Hussein. At first, discussions about odious debt were hosted by 
civil society, and still today, the cancellation of odious debts remains a high priority on the 
agendas of civil society mobilizations around debt (Reyes Tagle and Sehm Patomäki 2007). 
Now civil society is joined not only by academics by also by the international community, 
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 Khalfan et al. (2003) explain that Adams‘s book does not ―purport to be a declaration of the state of law 
but rather a description of dictators‘ debts that conforms to Sack‘s doctrine‖. Consequently, they conclude 
that the book does not appear to add weight to the doctrine‘s legal status as such. In reaction, it is only fair to 
bring forward that, based on the title and scope of Adams‘s book, her prime goal was to highlight the 
environmental legacy of loose lending, and not to add to or enter a specific legal discussion.  
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as both UNCTAD (Howse 2007) and the World Bank (2007b) have contributed to the 
discussions.
195
  
Since their starting points and political orientations differ, the contributions create 
ideological clashes and technical contradictions. Whilst these shall be addressed later, the 
fact remains that as part of the accumulation of debt in poor countries, heedless and 
adventurous lending went hand-in-hand with rash borrowing. The list of dictators of poor 
countries who engaged in carefree borrowing in the name of the populations is long. Adams 
relied on past cases of cancellation of debts, and proposes that the ―odious debts are well 
established in international law; through this doctrine […] lenders would collect on their 
debts — not from the people of the Third World but from the […] Mobutus who would be 
liable‖ (Adams 2005; see also 1991). It is claimed that dictators such as Baby Doc in Haiti, 
Zaire‘s Mobutu, Pinochet in Chile, Somoza in Nicaragua and Suharto in Indonesia used 
loans for private consumption rather than investment (see Millet and Toussaint 2004: 23-6; 
Raffer 2010: 231-2) . During the political arm-twisting of the Cold War, loyalty ranked 
over lending policy assessment, proper due-diligence and yield calculations.
196
 Public 
power was driven by private purpose in furthering national geopolitical interests (Pérez Jr. 
and Weissman 2007). There are many examples that illustrate that creditors were well 
aware of the actual, intended use of the credits.
197
 In some documented cases, it is evident 
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 For conference papers on odious debt see North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation, vol .32, no. 4, Summer 2007;  70 Law and Contemporary Problems 3 (Summer 2007) and 4 
(Autumn 2007); see also 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 4 (Summer 2004). The paper of the World 
Bank – itself a main creditor to poor countries – is produced largely in reaction to the ―rising chorus of 
demands‖ (World Bank 2007b: 2) from civil society for cancelling debts on the grounds that they are odious. 
The paper argues that instead of looking back in time, the focus should be on amending lending practices for 
the future. In its response to the paper, EURODAD (2008a) picks up on its lack of reference to a proper 
definition of odious debt and criticises it for having dismissed academic work on the subject. 
196
 For an explanation of the particular link between odious debt and foreign assistance, see Gelpern (2007: 
90-7). 
197
 For background documents on the numerous examples of the granting of loans for calculated and dubious 
purposes, including early warnings for the future misuse of funds or warnings of payment difficulties 
regarding the debt stock – prior to the topping up of the debts, see Hanlon (2006: 215-8); Hertz (2004: 54); 
Millet and Toussaint (2004: especially 21-6); Raffer and Singer (2001); Acosta and Ugarteche (2007: 10). For 
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that some of the loans were acquired with scant intention of them ever reaching the 
population who today serve as debtors of those same loans. Rather, politically motivated 
hand-outs for the personal use of self-pronounced rulers were camouflaged as ―loans‖ in 
the names of the people. Oft-cited favourites are the building of the Bataan nuclear power 
station on seismic ground in the Philippines (completed in 1984) with its total costs 
mounting to USD 2.3 billion, which today still constitutes the largest single debt of the 
Philippines, and the debts taken on by the Argentinean dictatorship (1976-83) which 
seldom trickled down to the Argentine population.
198
 
Returning to the argument regarding lenders‘ responsibilities, Hanlon (2006a), inspired by 
Sack‘s initial work and Adams‘s consequent contribution, develops further the argument 
that lenders, not borrowers, are responsible for irresponsible lending partly based on one of 
the three definitions of ―odious debt‖ as articulated by Sack, which regards debt where it is 
used to oppress the population.
199
 Digging deeper into the motives of the creditors, Hanlon 
(2006a: 212) casts a shadow of doubt on the role of lenders by stating that the burden of 
responsibility for illegitimate loans lies on the lenders, not on the borrowers.
200
 He puts 
forward the case that debt cancellation should be dependent on the prior action of the 
lender, not on the present conditions or actions of the borrower. For instance, in the late 
1970s, five of the top seven recipients of World Bank aid were military, presidential-
military, or military-controlled regimes: Indonesia, Brazil, South Korea, Turkey, and the 
Philippines (Bello 2009). This is further evidenced in the current situation where, out of the 
total sum of debts of poor countries, nearly a third can be attributed to dictators in 23 
                                                                                                                                                    
more polemic accounts on what drives the creditors‘ interests and policies, see Hiatt (2007) and Perkins 
(2005), for instance.  
198
 For details on the Philippine case, see for instance D‘Amato and Engel (1988). 
199
 ―If that could be established, it is to the creditors, in their turn, to prove that, in spite of its ‗odious‘ 
purpose of the loan, and their knowledge thereof, all or part of its proceeds was in fact employed in a way that 
benefited the state‖ (translation by author and emphasis added) (Sack 1927: 30). 
200
 Hardly coincidently, critics of the doctrine of odious debt have tended not to focus on the issue of creditor 
awareness (King 2007: 632-3). 
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countries.
201
 This echoes the claims of especially Southern civil society organizations and 
movements, who have called not only for cancellation of debts but also for compensation 
from the North. In support of this, the Norwegian decision of 2006 (Foreign Ministry of 
Norway 2006) to cancel its loans to five countries revived an interest in the role and 
responsibility of the lenders.  
Accountability constitutes a corner stone in the discussions on problem debt, and was 
earlier discussed under the heading of the responsibility of the lenders.
202
 The trend of 
countries reimbursing the IMF ahead of schedule in the early 2000s in particular, as 
discussed earlier, has led to a transformation of debts. This transformation has once again 
brought focus to the question of accountability in situations where external multilateral 
sovereign debts are being turned into bonds, or where the lenders are private or new 
sovereign states. If old debt is replaced by new debt, does it matter if the original debt 
might have been odious? According to Hanlon (2006a: 221) loans are rolled over or 
replaced in ways that attempt to wash away the original taint of odiousness. Hanlon admits 
that this trick makes it complicated to distinguish legitimate loans from illegitimate ones. 
Khalfan (2006: 2) calls this question a grey area, but concludes tentatively that the debt 
would remain odious and the initial creditor could be sued for the loss. However, the issue 
of accountability reaches still further. In the instance that responsibility for past lending 
performance makes its way onto the agenda, this would also call to account the record of 
practice of the international financial institutions, as brought up in chapter 2 (for an 
analysis, see Raffer 2004b).
203
 This is important, since any useful global arbitration 
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 Out of the total sum of debts of poor countries of USD 2,851 billion (World Bank 2007a: online data bank) 
nearly a third, or more than USD 735 billion can be attributed to dictators in 23 different countries (for a 
breakdown of these countries and dictators, see Hanlon 2006: 217). 
202
 Accountability is also discussed in the broader context of international financial organizations in general, 
for a background to  the key concept of participation in decision-making, albeit representing a less radical 
approach than I have argued for, see Germain (2004).  
203
 One of the findings of Cappelen et al. (2007) is that the amount of debt relief is statistically related to the 
amount of accumulated debt, but not to the degree of poverty in the country. Herman (2007: 797) comments 
on this finding by writing that if poverty was a responsibility factor, creditors should have forgiven relatively 
more debt in poorer countries. Instead, the conclusion of Cappelen et al.‘s analysis is that policy conforms 
more with the theological argument for a fresh start, as referred to in the previous chapter and earlier in this 
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mechanism must treat all creditors equally, including the Bretton Woods institutions. This 
brings with it the arrangement that the arbiter cannot operate from within or on behalf of 
the international financial institutions, themselves being main creditors. 
To date, the doctrine of odious debt has not been successfully invoked (Cheng 2007). The 
doctrine has had trouble both with practice and opinio juris, or the conviction that a state is 
legally obliged to follow it (Gelpern 2007: 85). However, there are a wide range of cases 
where states refuse to resume responsibility of debts in cases where their legitimacy has 
been questioned. This has been done without necessarily specifically invoking the term, or 
doctrine, of odious debt. Rather, one must note the conclusion reached by Gelpern (2005) 
that debt relief has been granted without reference to the doctrine, and in a more expedient 
way than the doctrine might have allowed for. This does not, however, mean that the 
doctrine could not be evoked in the future, or that in the interim, a suitable framework 
cannot be developed.  
In their writings, between Sack, his contemporaries and their followers, some focused on 
the loans and some on the borrowers, as in dictators and corrupt officials. While a large part 
of the subsequent discussion has remained in these realms, as seen earlier, the 
contemporary debate also addresses the responsibility of lenders, or the international 
financial institutions and creditor states.  
The multiple stands and strands of odious debt 
The many twists in the discourse about odious debt revolve around definitions, jurisdictions 
of applicability, practical functionality and viability, and their relation to sovereign debt. In 
an attempt to categorizing these, the contributions can be divided into two main groups. 
The first group is concerned with the range of oppositions regarding the concept itself, its 
definitions, and legal seat. The second group is concerned with the relationships between 
                                                                                                                                                    
chapter. The aim is to provide countries with a chance to develop in an economically successful way. This, in 
turn, provides me with a gate to Chapters 5 and 6 which discuss trade and debt. My argument is driven by the 
observation that even if a magic wand cleared all debt today, the current mechanisms and organization of the 
world economy would quickly drive the system into a similar situation again. Therefore, mere one-off debt 
cancellation is not sufficient. Rather, debt cancellations must be accompanied with corresponding adjustments 
in aid and trade in order to live up to the promise of having a lasting impact. 
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odious debt and economic matters, or international interests. Let us look at the first group 
here, and embark on the second group under the next heading. 
To start with, Sack‘s work has been scrutinized, criticized, modified, and modernized.204 Of 
course, and as previously pointed out, since writing in 1927, much has changed.
205
 The 
current discussions pick up on different aspects of the definition of odious debt as a legal 
doctrine.
206
 Some support its premise, but reject the doctrine (Buchheit et al. 2007; 
Feibelman 2007a). Others accept the doctrine, but raise doubts with regard to its effects on 
the welfare of the population subject to a dictatorship, by saying that the doctrine as 
presently formulated does not take into account all morally relevant factors (Choi and 
Posner 2007).  
Second, the potential host of the doctrine is a debate in itself. The main groups of 
opposition are private versus public law on the one hand, and domestic versus international 
law on the other. Some present an interpretation of the doctrine of odious debt as a private 
law doctrine (Ben-Shahar and Gulati 2007; Buchheit et al. 2007; Gelpern 2007: 82; Grey 
2007: 138; for private law and state power specifically, see Purdy and Fielding 2007). 
Schafter provides a justification for this by writing that whereas sovereign borrowing as 
such is undoubtedly a public action, the discussion on odious debt in particular is on the 
private act of theft (Shafter 2007: 682-3). Another body of contributions relies on the fact 
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 For an overview of the classic formulation of the doctrine of odious debts, see Khalfan et al. (2002). For an 
attempt to modernise the concept by stretching odious debt into odious finance, see Ochoa (2008a). 
205
 Ludington and Gulati (2008) cast an exposing light on Sack, the person and the lawyer. Given the 
enthusiasm by which Sack‘s writings have been met, placing his work under the magnifying glass is certainly 
welcome. In doing so, their findings resemble a biography. They conclude that Sack‘s work does not measure 
up to the standard promised in civil society‘s references to him. Sack may have been referred to under a 
wrongly translated title, and he may have died in poverty. But Sack himself can hardly be held responsible for 
later generations‘ referencing. To discredit discussions regarding the doctrine, or concept, of odious debt on 
the grounds that Sack did not hold any important official positions challenges the substantive weight of the 
contribution somewhat.  
206
 As for definitions of what legal doctrine actually is: ―Legal doctrine is the currency of the law. In many 
respects, doctrine, or precedent, is the law, at least as it comes from courts.‖ (Tiller and Cross 2006: 517) 
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that principles of agency and contract do not assume that debts are inherited. Rather, 
contractual solutions are usually limited to private-debt obligations.
207
 This means that they 
would not address odious debts owed to other sovereigns or the IMF, for instance (Bolton 
and Skeel 2007: 94). King (2007) divides this literature into two groups. On the one hand, 
there are those who refer to equitable obligations and defenses, or make claims which relate 
to the law on rights abuse and good faith. But, King concludes, the exact status of this, in 
his view, thin doctrine of abuse of rights in international law remains murky. On the other 
hand, King circles in a group examining the relevance of law of agency, which recognizes a 
fiduciary obligation on the part of agents to act for the benefit of their principals.
208
 King 
questions the applicability of this analogy to the debt issue on the grounds that most agency 
law is based primarily on the notion of consent between principal and agent, and that 
consent to be governed is not mandatory requirement in international law. 
A third line of discussion, and related to the previous point, searches for yet other seats for 
odious debt. This stream of discussion is less vivid if compared with the above. Some place 
odious debt as part of customary international law (see Feibelmann 2007b; Stephan 2007). 
Here, Stephan ultimately concludes that unbinding contracts is not the answer. One reason 
for this is that the starting of unbinding contracts could risk spreading to other contracts in 
other areas, such as trade. Others consider that odious debt may be partially covered by 
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 Feibelmann (2007b) proposes a contractual odious debt mechanism, which he sees should have some real 
force to restrain at least some odious transactions, in particular given the unrealistic prospects of the 
alternatives proposed – including setting up some form of bankruptcy mechanism. 
208
 Unsurprisingly, a part of this discussion leads to contract law theory and consequently is problematic in 
terms of the respecting of other contracts, such as commercial ones. This, in turn, leads back to discussions on 
state succession and the responsibility of repaying debts. King (2007: 665) concludes that the decisions of 
various national courts and international tribunals display a marked ambivalence over the existence of the 
doctrine. On the other hand, the scholarly commentary seems divided on most issues. Scholars familiar with 
the international law of state succession appear to find that odious debts are not required to be apportioned 
after succession. Against this, a clear majority of authors presently appear to find that there is little authority 
for the doctrine‘s application in cases of government succession. King closes the gap between state and 
government succession by showing that the difference is arbitrary in this case of odious debt. King (2007) 
shows that the obligation to repay public debts is weak in the case of state succession but well established in 
cases of government succession, albeit with qualifications. For a detailed analysis and comparison of the 
obligations, see King (2007: 609-21). 
149 
 
corruption law.
209
 This brings with it that by extending the doctrine towards corruption, it 
has come to be inherent of the power of Western-oriented universalism. (Backer 2007: 15) 
These three lines of discussion seem to foray into widely different directions.
210
 
Consequently, odious debt emerges as a slippery soap and the chameleontic-like nature of 
the discussions seem confusing. Some guidance towards the road ahead is found in Backer 
(2007: 8-9), who begins by arguing that Sack approached public debt the same way as 
private contracts. But, that Sack was able to construct an exception to the usual private-law 
rule by applying the two ―substance over form‖ presumptions of this approach. First, he 
argued that although state debt, like private debt, was to be treated firstly as a binding 
commitment; he argued further that that commitment that might fail when the public 
character of the debt also failed. Second, a failure of purpose or use sufficient to trigger the 
application of the doctrine, in turn, would have to be based on proof that the debt itself was 
personal rather than public in nature – conferring a private rather than public benefit – or 
that it did not otherwise reflect the will of the population now asked to bear the burden of 
obligation.  
On a more general note, the mere random picking and choosing between oppositions 
appears far too simplistic. In the words of Unger (1983: 15), it is of importance to avoid the 
arbitrary juxtapositions of easy analogy and truncated theorizing. Rather, fragmentation of 
legal regimes affects the self-perception of law. For instance, in citing a corruption case in 
Kenya, where a tribunal of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) determined that an individual businessman could not enforce a contract with the 
Republic of Kenya that he had secured by paying USD 2 million to former president Daniel 
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 For a specific discussion on anti-corruption measures and odious debt, see Ramasastry (2007a), however, 
ultimately proposing transparency and that the borrowed funds remain with the people of the borrowing 
regime.  
210
 It would be easy to confuse the issue further by dwelling on the fact that the IMF reportedly prefer to 
address loan agreements as arrangements, as opposed to agreements. The World Bank refers to credit 
agreements ―governed by public law that includes the conditions at the request of the government applying 
for a loan‖ (Anders 2005: 49). This of course takes the discussions even further away from the mark as it also 
lifts the legal status of the actual loan contract into that which is not defined. It also raises questions regarding 
conditionalities, objectivity and national policy space. The international lending and borrowing system is 
further discussed in chapter 7.  
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arap Moi, Backer lays out that the case included a range of different laws (Backer 2007: 29, 
see also 3, 14-5).
211
 The tribunal determined that the Kenyan state could not be held liable 
for a debt for the personal benefit of the head of state. Particular caution was taken in 
distinguishing between the capacity of the private person and the president Moi. The case 
demonstrates the complexity of municipal law, including constitutional law and 
international law and practice. It also deploys local custom and ultimately, is settled outside 
the judicial system of any state system. (Backer 2007: 29) Providing solid ground in this 
otherwise floating discussion, what others see in the disjunctive, as separate, Backer sees in 
the conjunctive, as simultaneous occurrences, and explains that ―public, private, formal, 
customary, odious, legitimate, and systemic rules originating from stakeholders and the 
institutional system within which each operates will together constitute a protean system of 
defining the increasingly complex rules for determining both the validity of sovereign debt 
and its character as public or private‖ (Backer 2007: 32-3).  
Whilst Backer provides helpful guidance, a pointer towards the final missing pieces of the 
puzzle are found in Solum (2006), who discusses ―welfarism‖ and fairness, terms 
interesting in the context of sovereign debt. In particular, he opposes the idea that private 
law should be guided by welfarism and he is against the exclusion of fairness from 
normative legal theory. Instead, Solum argues for a broad understanding of the idea of 
public reason, by which he means that the practice of legal justification should limit itself to 
values accessible to reasonable citizens. This means that law‘s deliberations should be 
shallow, not deep (Solum 2006: 1455). Solum‘s arguments are rooted in critical legal 
theory, a theory Tushnet (2005) surveys by arguing that law is politics. This argument 
echoes another end of the political spectrum; that of Law and Economics, which, as 
Eastman puts it, is in fact an ―intensely political project‖ (1999: 756).212 To prevent 
misunderstandings, it is important to emphasize that this does not mean disrespecting the 
set of rules, principles and laws, by which a society is governed through enforcement by its 
governmental authorities. Rather, this is about the field that concerns the creation and 
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 The Kenyan case is reported of by Odious Debt Online (2006).  
212
 Law and economics can perhaps best be described as an approach to law via economic methods. In 
response, Eastman (1999: 756) explains that law and economics‘ argument is ideological, and that both genres 
are structured by intractable political contradictions.  
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administration of laws, including also the international system. Introducing a political 
dimension to this legal thinking opens doors for further advancement regarding the creation 
of international legal principles around claims of sovereign odious debt. But first, let us 
dissect these two main streams of political thinking in law.  
Common for critical legal studies and Law and Economics is that both ―represent an attack 
on the dominant law school stance: centrist, ostensibly pragmatic and anti-theoretical, 
process centered, case-law oriented‖ (Kelman 1987: 114). However, approaching law from 
a point of view of welfarism brings about a way of not only opening up the political 
dimension of law, but also combining ethics with economics. The approach prompts us to 
take into consideration claims of existing welfare criteria with regards to choice and utility, 
the Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiencies (Kelman 1987: 142). This is in line with the 
thinking of Law and Economics, which stands for promoting all alterations in social 
arrangements that are efficient so that at least one person is made better off while nobody is 
made worse off (Pareto efficient), as well as those that are potentially efficient, so that 
those that are better off in theory could compensate those that are made worse off (Kaldor-
Hicks) (Kelman 1987: 120).
213
 In response to this, critical legal studies claim that there is 
no politically neutral, coherent way to ascertain the potential Pareto efficiency of a 
decision, be it pertaining to wealth maximization, or whether its benefits outweigh its 
costs.
214
 This ties back to Solum‘s point above, calling for a wide understanding of the idea 
of public reason. 
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 Thus, while every Pareto improvement is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, this does not hold the other way 
around. 
214
 It would suit law and economics to provide a normative neutral arbiter of disputes and a technical answer 
to each case (Kelman 1987: 125). General applicability rules over theoretical completeness. But here, Kelman 
(1987: 130) sees an arbiter as someone deciding over the preferences among the choices, or choosers, or 
utility among those involved, as opposed to an arbiter in the sense of this thesis where an arbiter rules in 
conflicts. The importance here is that the bringing up of an arbiter ruling over choice and utility opens up to a 
discussion about paternalism, a form of analysis that critical legal studies has ―run away from‖ (Kelman 1987: 
138).  
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Rather, the school of critical legal studies has consistently emphasized the presence of 
multiple, contradictory strands within law (Eastman 1999: 757).
215
 On a more precise note, 
Eastman identifies the term ―efficiency‖ as a central concept where, in Law and 
Economics, the term stands for a technical and value-free analysis brought together in a 
normative analysis. In critical legal studies, in contrast, Eastman argues that the efficiency 
discourse as seen from a critical legal theoretical perspective recognizes the social order of 
which law and economics are part of and that it contains within it different models in that in 
turn create serious political tensions and implications for law. (Eastman 1999: 759, 761)
216
 
Fundamentally, but without entering the field of critical legal theory itself, its internal 
discussions or external criticism, this points to Unger‘s (1983) view that law is the 
institutional form of the life of a people and a place where interests meet ideals, and spirit 
struggles with structure. He sees that law cannot be seen in isolation; rather, it is an 
expression of all society and culture. As the single most important example of truncation in 
legal doctrine and legal theory, Unger (1983: 21) mentions the silence over the divergent 
schemes of social life that are manifest in conflicting bodies of rule, policy and principle. If 
comparing notes with insights of earlier chapters, this reasoning further supports viewing 
the legal dimensions of debt also through its political and societal dimensions, and as public 
law. Expanding this point, odious debt does sit on multiple strands.  
Untangling odious debt 
Apart from those searching for a host jurisdiction for odious debt, a second set of 
contributions stretches further. This group links odious debt to various economic, 
international, developmental and other justice considerations. Rasmussen (2004) is not 
alone in pointing to the connection between a nation‘s system of governance and the 
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 From a different angle, Kelman (1987: 118) brings up the role of law, where critical legal studies 
demonstrate that law and society are inseparable. He counters this to law and economics, which, as social 
theory, starts with the supposition that values and desires are the arbitrary assertions of individuals. Rules are 
established without regard to morality. Law and economics is conservative ideology (Kelman 1987: 125).  
216
 For interesting early attempts at connecting theories of participatory democracy and participatory law 
formation, see Ochoa (2008b). Ochoa‘s analysis distinguishes between participatory and representative 
processes but within these processes, she does not, however, separate between the political participation of 
business (one dollar, one vote) and persons (one person, one vote).  
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desirability of restructuring the nation‘s debt when irregularities in the debt servicing occur. 
Grey (2007) places discussions about odious debts in broader debates about general 
transition to democracy and links odious debt to transnational justice. Ginsburg and Ulen 
(2007) see an explicit connection between the problem of odious debt and the related 
processes of economic development and democratization. Consequently, they focus on 
arguments in favor of economic development and the role of democratization in 
development. According to them, the odious debt proposal is best understood as part of the 
broader foreign policy objectives of economic development and democratization.
217
 
Stephan (2007) introduces an institutionalist element to the debate by linking odious debt to 
social welfare. From an epistemological development point of view, Gould (2008) assumes 
that debt relief as implemented through the HIPC programme brought with it an admission 
that aid can be odious. 
On a global level, Backer (2007) shifts the focus of odious debts from the illegitimacy of 
governments to the illegitimacy of the system through which such loans are made and 
enforced generally. The World Bank led anti-corruption programme can be interpreted as it 
effectively having implemented its conception of odious debt as illegitimate obligations 
arising from corruption within its global system of lending (Backer 2007: 44). This 
research is again reflected in Hanlon, who raises reasonable doubt regarding the 
responsibilities of loans, and ultimately proposes a broad definition that covers both odious 
debt and illegitimate loans as lending ―[w]here [l]ender [m]isbehavior [m]akes [l]oans 
[i]llegitimate‖ (2006b: 118). Others imbue the concept with powers to preside, or make a 
judgment, over national political jurisdictions on a more general level, at times stretching 
out into the field of trade. Khalfan (2003) operates along theses lines, and proposes a legal 
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 In further detail, Ginsburg and Ulen (2007) see that the debt problem thus focuses attention not only on the 
justice of having borrowers pay back lenders but also on the agency problem between the citizens of the rich 
world and what they call development institutions. An odious debt doctrine should be seen as an overall 
foreign-policy goal of democratization, they say. The best approach is not to set up an unwieldy new doctrine 
in international law, but simply to provide incentives in the market place to reduce the harm felt by the poor 
countries that repudiate odious debts. In parallel, the Bretton Woods institutions could set up an agency that 
would in essence guarantee debt replacement by selected borrowers, applied especially to odious 
dictatorships. Further, they also detect that the asymmetry between donors and recipients of democracies 
giving and lending money to non-democracies alone gives pause to think about the problem of odious debt.  
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entity declaring a regime odious. Similarly, Kremer and Jayachandran, (2002) pick up on 
where Khalfan leaves off: they first suggest setting up an institution to identify whether 
regimes are odious (2002), and later (2006) develop this concept into trade sanctions – an 
odious regime could not trade.
218
 Pogge (2008a: 259-61) suggests the creation of a 
Democracy Panel under the auspices of the UN, consisting of legal experts monitoring the 
degrees of democracy in countries. The assessment would ultimately serve as a guide for 
lenders whether to lend to a particular country, under the understanding that each 
participating country assumes full responsibility for debt incurred by its government once it 
has been given the go-ahead by the Panel. Stiglitz (2003) mixes economic bankruptcy with 
odious debt and in his proposal, he pairs them in an international bankruptcy court dealing 
with odious debt. Also this court would be set up according to principles devised by the 
UN.
219
 Bolton and Skeel (2007) propose shared responsibility between the UN and the IMF 
in identifying odious regimes (see also Alvarez-Plata and Brück 2008: 493). They do, 
however, separate between a debt overhang on economic grounds and odious debt. By 
examining 12 cases between 1844 and 2006, where odious debt has been discussed, as in 
invoked or rejected, ultimately, Howse sees that this does ―not lead to skepticism 
concerning the legal grounds for a notion of ‘odious debt‘‖ (2007: 1). Yet, the absence of a 
legal forum to settle claims of odious debt poses problems. Consequently, Howse 
                                                 
218
 Choi and Posner (2007) come half-way by proposing that by highlighting the odious debt doctrine they do 
not imply that it is an overall solution to the problem of how to treat dictators, but only interferes with 
lending. They do not, however, dismiss the need to address regimes (in connection to lending). As many 
others, also they  dismiss support for the doctrine on the grounds that if invoked as an instrument of sanction 
connected to future lending, it may harm rather than benefit the population.  
219
 This resembles the categorization by Rasmussen (2007: 255-6), who groups the viewpoints on odious debt 
into three. One group supports generous and responsive debt-relief for distressed countries in need. If this 
were the case, it is likely that not many other tools would be needed. The second group constitutes those who 
separate odious debt from the debt relief context it is usually found in. They say that odious debt is not linked 
to financial distress. The third group Rasmussen identifies traces the link between economic sustainability and 
odious debt by associating it with the nature of the debt, such as the differentiating between the debt having 
been accumulated because of investments or for private consumption. Stiglitz‘s proposal and Rasmussen‘s 
groupings reveal confusion between economic and just thinking on the one hand and odious debt on the other, 
a matter I will address shortly.  
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concludes that the examination of claims of odiousness by a single special transitional 
tribunal charged with all the claims in question may be an attractive solution.
220
 
Stephan (2007) concludes that no satisfactory mechanism exists for instituting an odious 
debt doctrine. First, he says, assigning the authority to an international organization would 
cause severe agency problems. Second, the establishment of the doctrine would not offer a 
global solution to despotic debtor regimes or plotting creditors. In line with Kremer and 
Jayachandran (2002; Jayachandran and Kremer 2006) who propose a Due Diligence model 
for preventing odious regimes from lending and trading, Stephan places odious debt in the 
context of supra-national assessments of national politics. If one retraced their steps and 
stopped at a spot where a doctrine of odious debt was confined to a mere assessment of 
legality of international debts within a framework of odious debts, then the picture becomes 
clearer: Other effects, such as pre-emption of future lending to potential odious regimes, are 
to be treated as what they are, namely side effects, rather than main aims.  
As this brief account shows, arguments related to odious debts are often thrown in with an 
assortment of other issues, such as poverty in general, acute economic insolvency or in 
relation to the political system of the indebted country, past or present.
221
 While it is true 
that problem debt points beyond concerns regarding odious debt, odious debt may not be 
the most useful gatekeeper for entering into these political spheres. Picking up here on the 
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 In the literature, it is often pointed out that judicial decisions on the issue of odious debt are few, if any. 
King (2007: 645) has identified three cases that have dealt with the doctrine in name. The outcome of these 
proceedings has been inconclusive. In addition a number of debts have been assessed as odious, the most 
well-known case being that of Tinoco. For a discussion see King (2007: 645-7). 
221
 Backer (2007: 13-4) lists ―[a]n extension of the applicability of the doctrine of odious debt to all public 
obligations, even those of sitting regimes‖ as one of seven points around which he sees that the modern 
understanding of odious debts revolve. The other points are 1.a consideration of the will of and benefits to 
territorial sovereigns, the people; 2. an emphasis on the lender and borrower due diligence attached to 
contractual contexts; 3. a shift of responsibility to the lender; 4. a greater willingness to excuse a failure to act 
perhaps on the cost of a deepening notion of passivity of the polity; 5. an embrace of the idea that odiousness 
is universal, and not contextual; 6. on the one hand a sharpening of the autonomy between the legal 
personalities of state, government and government officials and on the other hand a simultaneous openness to 
the power of the public and private persons to engage in acts tinged with both public and private 
characteristics.  
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observations regarding the illegitimacy of the system and the calls for supranational 
assessments perhaps regarding the debt burdens in general, and not only from an odious 
point of view, but by using these as a compass, lends further strength to the emergence of 
international arbitration of global debt as a viable option.  
4.3 Institutionalizing arbitration of international debt? 
The debt regime is not only poorly institutionalized and ill-equipped to cope with larger 
dilemmas in which the avoidance of default and the global provision of credit merge, it is 
also built on undemocratic principles of representation and decision-making.
222
 From the 
established grounds of minimal conditions of ethical and institutional legitimacy, the 
question is now taken further. So far, institutional relations have been mentioned as ties of 
interaction between individuals and nations. These relations include agreements and 
contracts. From a sociological – or philosophical – point of view, the totality of the more 
fundamental and pervasive institutions of a social system have been called the institutional 
order or basic structure of the system (Pogge 2008b: 37). Pogge refers to the common 
division of institutional global justice into two domains, the international and the intra-
national. In the international domain, people think in international terms about the rules that 
states ought to obey in their conduct. In the intra-national domain, the question is to what 
extent the rules according to which each state is organized are producing certain harms or 
benefits for the population. This is the analysis Pogge strives to bring to the global level. As 
regards duties across national borders, states should not think only about the way they 
ought to behave in their own interactions with each other, but also consider the framework 
of global rules and what effect this framework has on phenomena such as poverty. (Blom 
2003) This includes the effect the framework has on problem debt. The core of the legal 
and institutional question revolves around what happens regarding mechanisms of debt and 
how they operate. Given these considerations, in devising new institutionalization into the 
financial architecture, a few considerations emerge. 
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 The IMF and the World Bank do not have sufficient resources to offset any major change in the provision 
of private credit. As a result, a flurry of debt problems or, worse, a few major defaults could produce a self-
defeating spiral of credit contraction. In such a risky environment, banks would be reluctant to lend freely in 
turn allowing for still more debt crisis to occur. (Lipson 1981: 630) The financial crisis of 2008 has followed 
this very path.  
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For one, Veerkamp (2007: 178) addresses the realization that in developing an ethical 
approach to the debt problem, one presupposes that all actors share a common set of basic 
values and that they interpret situations in a common way. Also, Veerkamp continues, one 
would presume that if normative priorities were conflicted, the actors would rank them 
similarly. It is easy to get lost among opinions, preferences and idealism. When discussing 
lifting the debt burdens, the argument for human rights as the minimum common basis of 
reference provides an exit from this labyrinth of conflicting interests. 
Also the issue of justice plays an important part in the design process. When we think of 
how social institutions treat persons, we generally have in mind the persons living under 
those institutions, the persons to whom these institutions apply (Pogge 2008b: 37). But in 
thinking about the justice of social institutions, we should not ignore, or exclude in 
advance, the interests of past and future persons or present non-participants. What is more, 
it makes no sense to try to asses the justice of social institutions one by one. Even perfectly 
just, separate institutions may still be more just if redesigned together. (Pogge 2008b: 38-9) 
This serves as a reminder of, and relates back to, the significance of devoting some thought 
to the future system of global governance.  
One of the threads woven throughout this chapter has attempted to connect the diverse 
studies on the essential components for an international institutional framework. Piecing the 
separate parts together to form a bridge to the following chapters, the framework that 
emerges from the previous chapters is well suited to the proposal of setting up international 
arbitration as inspired by ‗Chapter 9‘, and as initially proposed by Raffer (1990). 
Intriguingly, Raffer‘s steady stream of contributions tying together odious debt with 
economic bankruptcy is somewhat ignored, or at least not fully or widely recognized. Let 
us next survey briefly the criticism with which Raffer‘s proposal has been met, and 
compare these alternatives not only against the criteria of economic reasoning and fairness 
but also to each other and against Raffer‘s model. ‗Chapter 9‘ itself is put center-stage in 
chapter 7. 
Filling in the contours of the proposals 
Commenting on the model proposed by Raffer (1990) based on internationalizing the 
principles of ‗Chapter 9‘, three other proposals of debt arbitration processes or mechanisms 
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have also emerged. These are a Fair Transparent Arbitration Process as drawn up by 
Erlassjahr (2001), an International Board of Arbitration for Sovereign Debt by Alberto 
Acosta and Oscar Ugarteche (most recently in 2007), and the Sovereign Debt Restruction 
Mechanism conceptualized by Anne Krueger (2002) of the IMF. Before turning our 
attention to these, it is of interest to digress briefly into the history behind the proposals to 
introduce sovereign bankruptcy mechanisms. In addition to the initial suggestion by Adam 
Smith (as mentioned in chapter 2), a debt restructuring mechanism was suggested also by 
Harry Dexter White in earlier drafts of what came to be the Charter of the Bretton Woods 
Institution and three decades later in connection to the New International Economic Order 
(for the stories and analysis of the processes, negotiations and outcomes see Helleiner 
2008). As we know, neither suggestion was successful, perhaps due to a combination of 
factors. Helleiner separates these into collective action problems, distributional issues and 
private creditors‘ states reluctance, many of them discussed in chapter 2. Let us now turn to 
the more recent proposals, and in doing so, we will simultaneously reflect on how some of 
the discussions are linked to the previous initiatives.  
In order to avoid the use of the sensitive term ―insolvency‖ when discussing arbitration, 
some civil society organizations use the term ―Fair and Transparent Debt Arbitration 
Process‖. Apart from the heading, this proposal differs little from Raffer‘s proposal. 
Erlassjahr proposes that once the debts – or a majority of the debts – of the poor countries 
are arbitrated, the FTAP process could be transformed into a Fair Transparent Debt 
Arbitration Mechanism that could be set up on a permanent basis, for instance within the 
system of the UN. Here, one alternative is with the UN Commission on International Trade 
Law. Due to the power play within the UN, Erlassjahr concludes – thus siding with Raffer 
– that it would not be advisable to launch the process from within the UN, hence echoing 
the concerns of Forsberg and Teivainen regarding a North-South Truth Commission.
223
 
When comparing the code proposed by Acosta and Ugarteche to the model by Raffer, and 
apart from the disagreement – seemingly rhetorical – over whether a country can officially 
declare itself insolvent, it seems that the differences are minor. Acosta and Ugarteche speak 
for an International Board of Arbitration for Sovereign Debt as part of a new financial code. 
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 See the previous chapter on the political question of international debt arbitration, discussing the initiative 
of setting up a truth commission to address the debt problem.  
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Referring to the code, Raffer (2004a), brings in the component of time as a factor that risks 
slowing down the process.  
Raffer (2003: 2, see also Raffer 2006) summarises that the SDRM, as drawn up by the IMF, 
builds partially on arbitration by the IMF that permits the exemption of multilateral 
institutions and is evasive to Paris Club members. The fundamental principle in a ‗Chapter 
9‘ arrangement of including all creditors as equals would thus not be fulfilled. In addition, 
even if all creditors were brought in under some equal heading, the situation where one 
creditor – the IMF – would rule in its own case sounds indeed odd. But most importantly, 
the SDRM is by definition a mechanism for corporate bankruptcy.
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Raffer argues that an international adaptation of the basic principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ would 
require only minor changes, the exception being the aforementioned replacement of a 
national court with a neutral court of arbitration.
225
 This was also the kind of neutral body 
of arbitration that was established by the London Accord, which reduced Germany‘s debt 
burden in 1953. This is because no national court can be considered impartial. As noted, in 
Raffer‘s model, and as is usual practice in international law, each side should nominate the 
same number of persons, who, in turn, elect one further member to achieve an uneven 
number. One of the arbitrators is elected as chairperson by a simple majority, or, if the 
debtor and creditors should wish so, by a qualified majority. In the outcome of the process, 
the creditors are to receive what can be ―reasonably expected‖ from the debtors under given 
circumstances. In the US Code, the living standards of the indebted municipality‘s 
population are protected. The jurisdiction of the court depends on the city‘s volition, 
beyond which it cannot be extended. An international ‗Chapter 9‘ would return the debt 
service obligations again in line with the capacity to pay, which demonstrates the 
appropriateness for sovereign debtors. It could be implemented quickly, as a provisionary 
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 The IMF issued a number of variations and updates to the original proposal of the IMF. Raffer has 
carefully analysed some fundamental points which have remained unchanged. For these along with a 
chronological and analytical analysis of the SDRM proposal, including its amendments, see Raffer (2006).  
225
 Arbitration is an established method for solving legal disputes. Already the Greeks and the Romans are 
known to have applied arbitration to settle disputes. Today, international arbitration is common in commercial 
law (for a detailed analysis, see Dezalay and Garth 1996). In the context of this article, lifting the principle of 
arbitration to an international level also takes it out of the rules of any particular jurisdiction.  
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226
, as it would be a cheap and immediate mechanism in the name of both economic 
efficiency and the protection of human dignity. It would be fair to all concerned, avoiding 
unnecessary costs on debtors or the international community.  
A central feature of the model is that in addition to the protection of sovereignty, 
governmental powers, and public interest, all creditors should be subject to arbitration, and 
all creditors should be considered equal. The inclusion of all parties is important because a 
large proportion of debts are public debts, or credits by international financial institutions. 
The international financial institutions, or other international institutions, cannot be 
considered unbiased or neutral as they are controlled by majorities of creditor States, and 
are creditors in their own right. All claims have to be verified loan-by-loan at the 
beginning, as routinely done in any domestic insolvency. On the one hand, this means that 
multilateral institutions cannot be considered neutral in terms of serving as arbiter in the 
process. On the other hand, by putting the credits of international financial institutions up 
for arbitration, this procedure would mean that past lending policies of the international 
financial institutions would be politicized as well. This indeed is the subject of many civil 
society debt tribunals, held as public events in the South, motivated by a desire to highlight 
the injustice of debt.
227
 The policies of the international financial institutions would thus be 
held accountable. Acknowledging the political difficulties in convincing the Bretton Woods 
institutions to subject themselves to an arbitration process, one way of developing the 
process could be to link it with the creation of other forms of alternative financing for the 
poor countries.
228
 In an indirect way, this may be materializing today with the 
transformations of debts and the new lenders on the international markets, for a discussion 
see chapter 6. 
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 Initially, Raffer proposed the setting up of an arbitration board according to an international treaty ratified 
by all members of the UN, but later he shows a preference for provisionary panels established by the debtor 
and creditors, for practical reasons (Raffer 2004a). 
227
In 1989, Northern and Southern civil society organisations and movements with the support of labour 
movements coordinated an International Debt Tribunal in Lima, Peru. Debt tribunals have since been held in 
1999 in Rio de Janeiro and consequently in connection to the World Social Forum-process. (Reyes Tagle and 
Sehm Patomäki 2007: 22) 
228
 Introducing international taxation aiming at taxing tax-shy multinational corporations, financial 
speculation or environment teasing would of course provide another lane.  
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As such, in order for the odious debt doctrine to be useful it must be anchored in some 
objective and verifiable way. As will be repeated later, Sack proposed an impartial tribunal 
to deal with odious debts. This resonates with other proposals of a third party entity 
deciding over whether a debt is odious or not. In practice, this could be done either ex post 
or ex ante.
229
 The discussion about maintaining the entity‘s independence or attaching it to 
some existing institutionalized process or forum can also be advanced. As with setting up 
debt arbitration, also in this context, the UN system has been suggested.
230
 Too often, 
though, the proposals stop at the threshold of the proposed organization. For instance, 
general proposals that the UN should serve as a host for debt arbitration raise important 
question marks, representing a range of issues which should all be addressed together. 
These include the identification of the exact UN organ, the procedure for the organ to 
address arbitration, the nomination of the staff and executives, the funding of the activity, 
and perhaps above all, the practicalities of enforcement. 
The twists 
In an attempt at connecting the dots so far, one must concede that in the predominant 
literature, the precise relationship between the proposals for restructuring sovereign debt 
and for creating a workable odious debt doctrine has, so far, remained unclear. As seen 
above though, the proposals cannot substitute each other. Following the identification of 
two basic principles, and having previously discussed oppositions to the debate of odious 
debt, a structure will be presented upon which six factors regarding insolvency procedures 
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 An ex ante approach could entail an ex post approach, but it is also possible that it excludes the ex post 
dimension. If so, the approach would leave aside the problem of present debts. But an ex post approach 
excludes an ex ante approach. 
230
 The proposed bodies to be appointed with the task cover most of the existing institutions. While some 
propose the UN Security Council as the forum (Bolton and Skeel 2007), others prefer the Bretton Woods 
institutions (Ginsburg and Ulen 2007). In contrast, and because of the important role the IMF and the World 
Bank play as central lenders, some see that they are not fit to serve as mediators or rulers (Paulus 2005; Raffer 
for instance 2004c; Stiglitz 2003). Instead, the International Court in The Hague has been nominated and for 
ad hoc arrangements, also the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, pursuant to Article III(3) of the 
Convention of 15 April 1994 (Paulus 2005). Others have suggested setting up a new adjudicative body. 
Paulus (2005) supports creating a new body under a UN heading, perhaps with the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development, UNCTAD.  
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are listed (as also in Raffer and Singer 2001: 244-5). The two basic principles upon which 
this list should be based are: 
 insolvency only deals with claims based on a solid and proper legal foundation.  
 in the case of odious debts, no insolvency is needed, as these are nul and void.231  
With these principles in mind, a first set of considerations involve discussion about whether 
a debt arbitration mechanism should involve an automatic stay or not, that is, should there 
be a stay on economic transactions until matters are resolved. The literature covers the full 
spectrum of opinions.
232
 The SDRM proposal allowed for the insolvent debtor country to 
request a stay, but the endorsement of stay would be in the hands of the IMF. Raffer (2006: 
249) argues that regarding creditor majorities, such as the IMF, endorsed legal protection of 
them from the start is clearly unrealistic.  
A second discussion regards the adherence to absolute priority. Bolton and Skeel (2004: 
766-7) represent a dominant point of view found in the literature by seeing the importance 
in adherence to absolute priority of credit agreements whenever possible.
233
 The absolute 
priority rule refers to the general requirement that higher priority creditors be paid in full 
before lower priority creditors receive anything. Sovereign bankruptcy can actually assure 
greater adherence to absolute priority than the status quo.
234
 In contrast, Raffer 
convincingly argues that all creditors must be treated equally. This is important not only for 
the sake of fairness, but also since the international financial institutions are the ones 
responsible for much of the policies by debtors countries which have ultimately lead them 
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 Demands for cancelling apartheid debts, as mentioned earlier, or the debts incurred by the former South 
African regime, are therefore based on the odious debt doctrine (Raffer and Singer 2001: 244-5).  
232
 Bolton and Skeel (2004: 780-6) argue for at least a limited stay, preferably a targeted stay differentiating 
between ordinary litigation and the actual seizure of assets. Alternatively, they suggest, the SDRM could 
include a right of appeal from judgments received by a creditor after the SDRM was underway.  
233
 See also Gelpern (2004); and Zettelmeyer (2003). 
234
 They further provide an analysis saying that by promoting adherence to absolute priority, the SDRM 
could plausibly result in lower costs of borrowing ex ante. 
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into the debt trap they find themselves in today. The debts to the international financial 
institutions should not be prioritized over debt to other official or private lenders (Raffer 
2006: 261).  
Thirdly, the matter of shopping for jurisdiction is contrasted against the idea of a single 
tribunal assigned to deal with the matter. Ultimately, ―jurisdiction shopping‖ is 
incompatible with the rule of law (Supiot 2010: 157). This is since freedom to choose the 
most convenient legal system goes against the notion that everyone should be equally 
subject to the rule of law. It also goes against democracy itself because the scope of 
democracy automatically shrinks in countries where labor, tax and environment legislation 
is subject to global competition. As a remedy to the moral hazard problem which arose in 
the 1970s as a consequence of jurisdiction moving to lending nations, leading to countries 
borrowing as much as they could, Bulow argues that if domestic courts had jurisdictions, 
foreign lenders would basically be in the same boat as domestic creditors. (Bulow 2002: 
245) In contrast, some recommend debtor jurisdiction (Bulow 2002), while others (for 
instance Bolton and Skeel 2004: 816) suggest that giving the sovereign debtor a choice to 
file in any jurisdiction where it has issued debt would reinforce competition among 
bankruptcy courts. This, they see as potentially creating a healthy interjurisdictional 
competition among bankruptcy courts. In contrast, Raffer (1990; 2001a: 8) does not 
support shopping for jurisdiction, as the impartiality of national courts could not be 
guaranteed, nor does Howse (2007), who concludes that odious debt could be raised either 
in multilateral negotiations or then in the context of arbitration or domestic litigation. 
However, he warns for a situation where multiple forums representing diverse debt 
contracts, involve the same debtor state. This may lead to inconsistent decisions. Rather, 
there is a convincing case for supporting his proposal of a single special transitional 
tribunal for this purpose.  
Based on her analyses of the sovereign debt rearrangements in Argentina and Iraq, Gelpern 
concludes that these cases ―suggest that alternative tools to shield countries from creditor 
lawsuits and reduce sovereign debts have helped pre-empt the emergence of new law in the 
areas of sovereign bankruptcy and odious debt. The fact that public and private creditors 
seem to prefer the existing tools weighs heavily against the new norms.‖ (2007: 393) King 
(2007: 648) counters the lack of citations of odious debts in tribunals by saying that neither 
has a tribunal definitely rejected the doctrine. Yet, the lack of application of the concept 
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should not lead to a shelving of the proposals for new mechanisms. Instead, it should 
inspire future work and as part of this, it should not rule out new institutional development.  
What is referred to as the Hotchpot-rule, or the agreement that any amount received 
through litigation is deducted from the sum to which the creditor is finally entitled, also 
ignites discussion. Applying the Hotchpot-rule would, according to Bolton and Skeel 
(2004: 777), diminish litigation risk. In contrast, Raffer suggests (2006: 240-50) that in 
practice, retaining the right to litigation is reduced to a meaningless formality without 
consequences. In turn, he says, it would accumulate additional costs for the creditors 
through the litigation process. This is further supported by the praxis of courts to delay, if 
negotiations are underway between creditors and debtors – which would be the central 
component of an arbitration process.  
Six, can one-size fit all insolvent countries or are designer insolvency models needed? The 
difference in the particular situation of each country‘s economy, and how the debts have 
built up, including the composition of debts – private or public, for instance – raises 
questions regarding the applicability of a blanket model.
235
 Here, the arguments for one 
model applicable to insolvent countries across the board lies firstly in the concept of justice. 
The same rules apply for all. Secondly, as the arbitration panel assesses each debt 
separately, also the particular factors behind the accumulation of debt and the history would 
be taken into consideration.  
With these six considerations in mind, it is useful to shift from the abstract to the concrete. 
Comparing the de facto sovereign bankruptcy situations of Germany in 1953 and Iraq in 
2004, Vagts (2004) first distinguish between the countries‘ situations. Whereas Germany‘s 
debt was accumulated before and not during Hitler‘s regime, Iraq‘s debts were seen to 
mainly derive from the Iraq‘s war with Iran or from Saddam Hussein‘s personal 
consumption. This means that the debt could not be referred to as odious in the case of 
Germany, but indeed so in the case of Iraq. In the German case, the main creditors, the US, 
France and the UK cut their claims and interest payments. Interestingly, the dispute 
resolution arrangement took the form of an international arbitration panel. In contrast, and 
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 Bolton and Skeel (2004: 818-21), among others, discuss this very issue. Bolton and Skeel propose 
specifically tailored provisions around a core concept similar to all.  
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elsewhere, the Iraq debt renegotiations of 2004 are explained to have been ruled upon and 
executed by the US in such a manner so that the losses were carried mainly by European 
lenders.
236
 Returning to Vagts, he lists five requirements for debt resettlements. First, the 
settlement must encompass all of the country‘s external indebtedness as lingering 
substantial uncertainties prevents credit from being restored.
237
 There must be certainty 
regarding what the liabilities amount to. Certain claims could be set aside for later 
resolution. Second, the resulting debt burden must be tolerable both economically and 
politically. Third, a successful settlement can be entered into only by a government debtor 
in control of its own territory and economy and who is internationally respected. Fourth, 
remaining unresolved problems should be dealt with through a dispute resolution 
mechanism. Finally, it is of utmost importance that the solution is workable and here Vagts 
refer to failures with the US ‗Chapter 11‘ ultimately forcing debtors into liquidation. Of 
particular interest in Vagts‘ listing is that certain unresolved problems can be put aside – 
there is a middle ground between all and nothing.  
Bearing debates previously discussed in mind, and similarly paying attention to these 
subsequent requirements for successful rescheduling, one more matter must be addressed. 
This concerns the matter of bail-outs and bail-ins – are the lenders taking a haircut or are 
lost loans being compensated for? Are all lenders treated the same? Are debts forgiven or 
paid off by some other mechanism? Who is paying the price and what effects does this have 
on the economic future of the indebted country? Through these questions, the matter is 
placed on the table, and will be further analyzed in chapter 7.    
At this point, magnifying the map of differences further risks blurring the essentials of my 
argument. Especially since a number of disagreements would evaporate if arbitration was 
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 The writing down of the Iraq debt was orchestrated by the US. However, see Weiss (2008) both for the 
process and for a breakdown of the actual payers of the deal. In sum, the US wrote off debts valued at USD 
360 million, out of the total of USD 25.8 billion to date.  
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 Vagts interprets Iraq‘s high indebtedness prior to the rescheduling process as a threat to peace. Based on 
this, he opens the door to the involvement of the UN Security Council in the matter. One could add that 
despite the official reason for writing down Germany‘s debt being economic, and as has been referred to 
earlier, in Chapter 2, the camouflaged reason may have been to prevent the re-emergence of Nazism.  
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set up according to the fundamentals of ‗Chapter 9‘, as seen above. Therefore, it becomes 
more useful to turn the attention to actual forms and processes of institutionalization.   
Arbitration of international debts can certainly be institutionalized. Initially, the 
institutionalization might best take its shape as a provisionary mechanism. At a later stage, 
it might be considered to incorporate it under the umbrella of the UN. It is also possible that 
the process can be narrow, instead of wide. A few cases, which point the way for future 
examinations by underlining the importance of international rule of law, might be enough. 
Arbitration of international debts comes with the promise of being the most useful 
opportunity for solving problem debt at this time in history.  
Forms of institutionalization 
International lending and consequent debt is poorly institutionalized. Slowly, 
incrementally, and hap-hazardly a non-coherent, contradictory and therefore confusing 
system has emerged. This development begs the question of what the pragmatics are toward 
institutionalization and towards what kind of institutionalization.  
Institutions can be formalized legal entities or they can be informal, for instance in the 
shape of a convention, but still abiding to certain sets of practices and regimes. (James and 
Palan 2007: xv, xvi)
238
 This means that into the term ―institution‖, one can include 
contracts or relationships also apart from perhaps intuitively thought of formally 
institutionalized organizations with proper physical headquarters, such as the UN, the IMF, 
or the WTO. 
In political economy, institutional economics draws the attention to human-made 
institutions and their role in shaping economic behavior. In a way, although not necessarily 
in line with the core of institutional economics, this opens a door to emancipatory politics: 
what is human-made can also be changed by people and according to people‘s needs. But in 
addition to institutional economics, one could choose to discuss institutions by way of 
regime theory (see James and Palan 2007), or rational design, assuming that states use 
international institutions to further their own goals and they design institutions accordingly 
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 See James and Palan (2007) for an introduction to the history, processes, roles and forms of institutions in 
global economic integration.  
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(see Koremenos et al. 2001). Regardless political orientation, institution theory necessarily 
raises central questions regarding membership, enforcement of decisions, funding structure, 
along with rules and processes for revising these, to name a few. Here, instead of focusing 
on the general theoretical approaches to institutional design in a general and top-down way, 
two particular initial issues for setting up a provisionary debt arbitration mechanism are 
membership and enforcement. Why would creditors agree to enter an arbitration process 
and what would guarantee the enforcement of the decisions? 
Leading up to this, and first, it is of importance to reflect upon how Pogge (Berges 2007: 5) 
sees two-fold obligations against the poor. He argues firstly that the rich should organize 
for reforms of their governments‘ policies and negotiating positions in international forums. 
This extends far beyond periodical voting. To change things, the rich must seek to influence 
the political agenda. Second, the rich should work to protect the global poor from part of 
the harm they also cooperate in imposing on them. In both these respects, the rich should do 
as much as possible to compensate for the harm they cause jointly. Whether to focus more 
on reform or on harm prevention, and which efforts exactly to undertake, cannot be 
identified generally, Pogge writes.
239
 But regarding problem debt, and global debt 
arbitration, which fits into both categories of reform and harm prevention, two birds could 
conceivably be killed with one stone. Shifting to a practical level, there are two justifiable 
reasons for creditors to step on board an arbitration process. First, as seen earlier, economic 
reason alone provides compelling motivation for creditors to break an unhealthy pattern. 
Secondly, the fact that the IMF itself has proposed a kind of a bankruptcy procedure, the 
SDRM, can be interpreted as creditors‘ shifting course (see Raffer 2006: 247-8).240 The 
enforcement is linked to the membership so that by agreeing to an arbitration process, the 
participants agree to abide by the outcome. Of course, neither of these justifications 
addresses potential political motivations behind an interest in maintaining the present 
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 On an individual level, Pogge continues, each person in the rich world should consider his or her particular 
situation, endowments, abilities, motivational constraints, activities of like-minded people and so on, and 
should then decide on that basis what effort would make most sense in terms of cost effectiveness (Berges 
2007: 5).  
240
 By proposing the SDRM, the IMF finally ―admitted the long-denied obvious‖ that their programmes, 
alongside those of the World Bank, have failed in restoring sustainability and overcoming problems with 
overindebtedness. (Raffer 2006: 248) 
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system of dealing with debt. In addition, the justifications for a long-term solution do not 
always correspond with short-term action. The remaining obstacle is with the political 
leadership of the indebted nation, because of the risk to their personal career path, and that 
of the international lender, who faces a similar risk in case the default results in a writing 
down of public debt.  
The two identified approaches are on the one hand to appeal for debt reduction on 
economic grounds and in reference to human rights, and on the other hand, we place the 
approach of debt reduction by referring to odiousness of debts. Dealing with these 
approaches merge in the proposals for setting up an international arbitration mechanism. 
This is in line with Sack‘s (1927: 163) suggestion of an institutionalized framework to 
determine the character of sovereign debt as odious or as enforceable. This 
institutionalization should be established at the international level. Sack‘s thinking was that 
formal institutionalization would assure that states would be complicit in any outcome. In 
turn, this would provide both a safeguard against abuse and a basis for the legitimacy of the 
decision. Here, it is important to note that Sack focused on determining the debt, not the 
government or state, as has been proposed by other subsequent commentators.
241
 Sack‘s 
proposal of setting up international arbitration identifying odious debt also sounds well 
with Raffer‘s proposal of mirroring ‗Chapter 9‘ procedures internationally for insolvent 
nations. Also Stephan (2007) is supportive of the idea of addressing odious debt through 
the decisions of formal enforcement authoritative dispute-settlement bodies, whether 
international arbitral organs or domestic courts. As a matter of convention, Stephan sees 
that the second option of domestic courts would involve a decision by such bodies to treat 
the doctrine as part of customary international law. As another route towards addressing the 
odious debt doctrine, Stephan (2007) provides a second option of defining odious debt 
through a treaty or national legislative acts. Contracts, their design, implementation and 
enforcement are at the core of institutional economics, and a treaty is possible and perhaps 
intuitive. Initially, though, a treaty is not necessary (Raffer 2006: 258). The London Accord 
was possible without an OPEC-type institution and the Paris Club functions without a 
treaty (Raffer 2001c: 4). 
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 As specified by Sack (1927: 6), writing that the form of government (or monarchy) or whether it represents 
the whole or part of the population is of no importance for the problem at hand.  
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In practice, as recalled, under ‗Chapter 9‘, both sides nominate an arbiter, along with a third 
neutral person, to form the arbitration panel. Raffer (2006: 257-9) argues that all registering 
creditors nominate arbitrators who immediately decide on the recognition of claims. Next, 
the procedure of verifying claims should begin. Arbitrators would be assigned the task of 
mediating between debtors and creditors.   
In conclusion, in a national context, countries adopt bankruptcy, or insolvency, proceedings 
for both efficiency and equity reasons (Stiglitz 2010a). Therefore, it is reasonable to set the 
same goals for bankruptcy principals on an international level. The issue of setting up this 
institutionalized framework as a provisionary panel or in the shape of a specialized 
institution has been addressed previously. The present institutional framework with its 
political power-play struggles cannot show a credible neutral face to indebted poor 
countries. In order to jump-start the process, a provisionary panel is advisable. Eventually, 
once the process has been put in motion and debts are written off, the situation could be 
reassessed. To this argument, Raffer (2006: 258) adds the dimension of speed. Institutional 
decisions and implementation take time where a provisionary panel could be set up in a 
faster, smoother and in a less expensive fashion.  
Previously, from a political perspective, the path towards global justice was seen to take 
shape through gradual pressure on the power holders. From a legal perspective, and in a 
similarly incremental fashion, the antagonistic view of the relation of law to society need 
not and should not be applied all at once (Unger 1983: 25). Rather, it serves as a regulative 
ideal capable of guiding modest but potentially cumulative changes (Unger 1983: 25). An 
international version of the principles and processes of ‗Chapter 9‘ as an arbiter of 
international debt is not only viable, it is also helpful in constituting a first step towards a 
more fundamental shift towards global democratization and global justice.  
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PART II:  
 
Implications of  
global debt arbitration  
for existing regimes  
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5.  
WORLD TRADE  
Given the current trade regime – is debt 
arbitration useful? 
 
 
Today, the value of financial movements has exceeded the traded value of goods. 
Consequently, these flows must be factored into equations assessing the complete financial 
system.
242
 This is in contrast to the situation in the 1940s, when the present international 
institutions were planned, and when trade was the largest reason for international currency 
movements.
243
 One way of approaching trade and financial regimes is to create a space for 
looking at how, and the conditions under which, world trade, development aid and other 
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 Foreign direct investment and portfolio flows to poor countries reached a net value of USD 403 billion in 
2007. The following year, the same post amounted to USD 71 billion. (IMF 2009c) The biggest explanatory 
factor for this sharp fall is the global financial crisis of 2008, but more significantly, this fall shows the high 
volatility, and therefore, unpredictability, of these flows. By way of relative comparison between the sums of 
trade and financial flows, in 2008 poor countries‘ exports in trade and services reached nearly 180 billion, up 
from a good 40 billion in 2000 (World Trade Organisation 2009b: 5). 
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 In 2008, world trade reached an all time high of nearly USD 20 000 billion which is a considerable 
expansion from 1948 when trade in goods peaked at 59 billion (IMF 2010: 171). This means that in 2008, the 
volume of trade was nearly 20 times that of the volume in the early 1950s (WTO 2009a: 10). For a more 
recent comparison, when world trade in 1990 accounted for a good 16 per cent of global GDP (at 2009 
prices), in 2008, it had reached nearly 25 per cent (Deutsche Bank Research 2010). The global downturn 
triggered by the financial crisis reduced global trade back to levels of 2006, but IMF (2010: 171) predicts that 
the levels of 2008 will be reached again in 2011. However, for now, developments since the crisis have varied 
widely in individual countries and regions. This means that when tackling current economic issues, such as 
how global imbalances materialise, analysing bilateral trade flows will likely be a useful approach (Deutsche 
Bank Research 2010). This also points to another trend, which is that more and more production is being 
traded across national borders. During the latter half of the 20
th
 century, world merchandise trade increased 
almost twentyfold while world merchandise production increased just over six-fold (Dicken 2007: 36). 
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financial transactions between the rich and the poor became institutionalized and what 
consequences have ensued in terms of creating problem debt in poor countries. 
Creating this holistic space provides a useful complement to the frequent attempts at 
addressing the more focussed effects of particular instruments of trade, or finance, or their 
balancing counter-instruments, such as Aid for Trade and a range of capacity building 
initiatives as usually found under development aid. In doing so, we also reduce the risk of 
diverting attention away from attempts at understanding the causal connection between the 
various agendas and actions of the rich countries versus people living in poverty.
244
  
In this space, the real debate is about arguing for arbitration of global debt as a process that 
would eventually contribute to discussions on how poor countries can better pursue their 
own development policies and priorities, or at least widen their policy space. In this general 
and wider process, and as relevant for this chapter about trade, the central questions are 
focussed on the roles of debt and trade in the current economic regime. More specifically, 
the questions address under what conditions, and to what extent, deeper integration into the 
current global economic framework is or is not desirable for poor countries and the 
alternatives they have in strategically selecting their terms of engagement or disengagement 
(for further elaborations in a similar direction, see Tandon 2009). While these central 
questions fall beyond the focus of this thesis, it is important to acknowledge the possibility 
that the outcomes of debt arbitration would likely lead to a situation that allows for a 
reframing and a facilitation of further discussions on these important issues.  
As part of this set approach of looking at the institutionalization of processes of financial 
interaction between the North and the South, and as premises for this chapter, we note that 
the build-up of sovereign debt cannot universally be attributed to any one single factor or 
process (as seen in chapters 1 and 2), but rather, debt builds up through a combination of 
processes and as a result of the variation in emphasis placed upon a number of mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, a determinant factor for the poorest countries is the accumulation of large 
debt burdens following falling terms-of-trade. The most immediate link between trade and 
debt pivots around the fact that around 80 per cent of world trade is financed by some form 
of credit, or in the words of the director of the WTO: ―trade finance is the oil that keeps the 
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 This argument comes in a broader context of global influences on poverty in Pogge (2008b: 17). 
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wheels of global trade running‖ (Lamy 2010).245 Credit for the financing of trade may be 
the strongest link between trade and debt, but, as this chapter will demonstrate, it is not the 
only one.  
As has been noted, a systematic and coherent mechanism for dealing with debt would 
provide more fair and efficient outcomes than approaches designed and implemented in 
isolation and on an ad hoc basis. With this chapter, we enter the second part of this thesis. 
The premise of this part is that global arbitration of debts would provide a holistic approach 
to problem debt, an approach that would affect the regimes of trade, development aid and 
other forms of North-South finance. This is since a large part of these regimes rely on 
borrowing and lending. In doing so, we recall the concerns regarding debt relief and debt 
cancellation as a fresh economic start for the indebted country as the risk of running new 
debt is not addressed (chapters 2 and 4). The aim of this second part is to see if arbitration 
of poor countries‘ problem debts would be useful and helpful for the regimes of trade, aid 
and international funding. Accordingly, the objective is to see if arbitration of international 
debts could be a useful tool to better serve the interests of the poor in an efficient and just 
way.  
Transfers between countries involve trade, aid and financial flows and this chapter begins 
by concentrating on the links between trade and debt, and how arbitration of international 
debts would affect the trade regime. This is done by looking at the structural 
interdependence between debt and trade that has operated as a constraint to development in 
poor countries. The larger picture this chapter hopes to explain is not only how debt relief 
(as discussed in chapter 2) and various capacity-building mechanisms linked to trade 
negotiations are mistakenly placed under development aid (the grand scheme under which 
these fall is addressed in more detail in chapter 6), but more specifically, how problem debt 
must be singled out and separated from this equation. The argument that will be further 
fortified in the next chapter, is that development aid should not be content with the role of 
compensating for unbalanced or unfair structural economic mechanisms, resulting in, for 
instance, systemic deficits in trade balances.  
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 Beyond the identification of the connection between falling terms of trade and accumulated debt, 
surprisingly little has been written about the direct relationship between trade and debt. Two important 
exceptions are Raffer and Singer (2001) and Caliari and Yu (2009). 
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In what follows, first a look is taken at the history of the institutionalization of world trade, 
and the policies adopted in the process. This is done by looking at the characteristics of the 
commodities‘ markets in the liberalized economic order of today and by comparing it not 
only to Keynes‘s proposal for an International Trade Organization but also to negative 
duties, and more concretely against the idealistic proposal for a Global Resource Dividend 
(as promoted by Thomas Pogge). The initiative of an International Trade Organization was 
among the articulated proposals during the time of the creation of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The concept of this organization is based on a mechanism of stabilizing 
commodity markets, a function that neither the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
nor its successor, the WTO, has taken over. Yet, the exports of poor countries are 
dominated by commodities and fluctuations in the price of these can have important effects 
on the exporters‘ economies. Second, this leads me to an analysis of the current regime and 
negative duties of the rich countries towards the poor. Building on this, the links between 
sovereign debt and trade are looked into, both from the perspective of a surplus rich country 
and a poor deficit country. Finally, the usefulness and limits of arbitration of international 
debt in relation to trade is assessed.  
5.1 The institutionalization of world trade 
This discussion about the organization of world trade begins first with a look back at the 
role of and mechanisms envisaged for trade at the Bretton Woods institutions. This 
approach provides a sounding board for an alternative, against which to address the present 
system. A main thread throughout this section is focused on commodity price fluctuations 
and the consequences of this for the creation of problem debt. Second, the principles of the 
WTO may not necessarily reflect the interests of the global poor. Ultimately, though, this 
section is about how the institutionalization and mechanisms of world trade contribute to 
the mounting of problem debt in poor countries.   
The International Trade Organization and the role of commodities 
Today, since poor indebted countries have been encouraged to expand exports, often of the 
same commodities as their neighbors, or other indebted nations, oversupply and collapse of 
prices results (Raffer and Singer 2001: 12-3; Razmi 2009). The picture is complicated by 
the fact that even during peaks, profits may be steered to foreign companies thus bringing 
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little benefit to the poor country itself. Apart from issues that may be raised regarding the 
perceived unfairness of this system, Keynes (1938: 452) identified as early as the 1930s 
that laissez-faire orthodoxy and unregulated competition on an international scale stands in 
the way of effective action in the overall organization of competitive industry, or, in his 
words: ―The ill effect of these truly frightful fluctuations on trade stability is great. But the 
ultimate results of the obstacles which they offer to the holding stocks may be even more 
injurious‖ (Keynes 1938: 451). Keynes came to be a notable advocate of commodity buffer 
stocks. In practice, Keynes suggested the adoption of a world currency unit, the bancor, as 
first mentioned in chapter 2. The bancor would be based on 30 primary commodities, 
among them gold and oil. This currency unit would have brought with it an automatic 
stabilization of the average price of commodities, but without ruling out fluctuations of 
individual commodity prices (Raffer and Singer 2001: 4). The aim was to avoid market 
disturbances in the price of commodities that many poor countries‘ economies were, and 
still are, dependent upon. The underlying reasoning was to prevent a collapse of primary 
commodity prices, a collapse that Keynes saw as being a contributing factor to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Raffer and Singer 2001: 4). The function of commodity price 
stabilization was at the core of Keynes‘s plan for an International Trade Organization, and 
incorporated into his proposed outline for the Bretton Woods institutions; more specifically 
relevant to his proposal for an International Clearing Union. He recommended that 
governments use buffer stocks to smooth out price fluctuations by purchasing commodities 
when prices were thought to be low and selling them when prices were thought to be high. 
This counteraction was to be paired with Keynes‘s proposal of taxing not only deficit 
countries, but also, and perhaps even especially, surplus countries. This was because 
Keynes argued that surpluses lead to weak global aggregate demand, and therefore, it was 
the surplus countries that posed a threat to global prosperity.
246
 This means that countries 
running surpluses exert a negative externality on their trading partners, and Keynes 
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 Mirroring this proposal against current arrangements, the current social and economic consequences 
should be unacceptable (see for instance Stiglitz 2010b). Those countries whose deficits have soared as a 
result of the global recession should not be forced into a death spiral – as Argentina was a decade ago. But 
this risk remains as the current arrangements mean that deficit countries shoulder the consequences of their 
deficit themselves.   
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believed that it was surplus countries, far more than deficit countries, that posed a threat to 
global prosperity. 
Keynes‘s Global Plan included an International Clearing Bank, a Bank which would have 
overseen the universal currency, the bancor, as mentioned above (the Bank will be picked 
up again in chapter 7). The bancor would not only stabilize the average prices of 
commodities, but simultaneously, it would become the international medium of exchange 
and a store of value. The bancor would have a fixed exchange rate with other national 
currencies, and would be used to measure the balance of trade between nations. Every 
exported good would add bancors to a country‘s account, every imported good would 
subtract them. Each nation would then be given large incentives to keep their bancor 
balance within a very close percentage to zero. If a nation had too high a bancor surplus, 
the Union would take a percentage of that surplus and put it into its Reserve Fund. This 
taking of surplus bancors would encourage nations with surpluses to buy other nations‘ 
exports, so they maintain a zero trade sum.
247
 Nations importing more than they export 
would have their currency deflated to encourage other nations to buy their products, while 
making imports more expensive.  
As for the International Trade Organization itself, its mandate would have stretched to 
include also the regulation of international business (to see the proposed charter, see 
Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization 1948). However, the plans for 
an International Trade Organization fell through, and it was to take 50 years until world 
trade was institutionalized. Consequently, following the creation of the Bretton Woods 
institutions (and also after the death of Keynes), claims that the institutional system was 
incomplete were supported, partly because of the lacking commodity market buffers or 
price controls (Toye 2006: 990; see also for instance Raffer and Singer 2001: 197-235). 
Eventually, these claims prompted the birth of the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development, UNCTAD, in 1964. For decades, Keynes‘s idea of commodity buffer stocks 
continued to remain popular, especially with poor countries, and it was integrated into the 
proposal of a New International Economic Order (UN 1974). The last major incarnation of 
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 Countries with surpluses or deficits in their balance of payments would have been be required to adjust 
their exchange rates upwards or downwards respectively by up to five per cent.  
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this particular Keynesian heritage was in the Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues, or the Willy Brandt-commission, in 1980 (Toye 2006: 990). 
Alongside the lack of a functional mechanism for addressing commodities, another 
important note in relation to trade in the international architecture of economic institutions 
is that, due to the separation of the Bretton Woods institutions from the UN system (as seen 
in chapter 2), in conjunction with the plans for an International Trade Organization falling 
through, the Economic and Social Council of the UN, ECOSOC, has been afforded only 
limited possibilities to influence the dynamics of globalization through trade, investments 
or technology.
248
 This means that alongside the activities and administration of 
international lending, trade can also be added to the other ―hard‖ mechanisms of 
international activity that are subordinated to the IMF and the World Bank group, but 
separate from direct influence from the UN.
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As the regulation of prime commodities fell through, and as the terms of trade of these 
commodities fell steeply over decades, from the 1960s-the early 2000s, the prices of the 
prime exports of poor countries collapsed and caused major problems. Up until half way 
into the first decade of the 2000s, falling terms of trade constituted the largest problem for 
poor countries and their trade.
250
 The steep fall grew steeper in the 1980s when Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher withdrew from the regime of commodities. This brought 
with it a larger problem, the refinement and use of commodities, an issue I return to 
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 In contrast to the aim of the WTO (as soon discussed further), established in 1995, to promote free trade, 
the aim of the UN as a whole, established in 1945, is to promote ―higher standards of living, full employment, 
and economic and social progress‖ (UN 1945: § 55). Contrasting the aim of ―full employment‖ against ―free 
trade‖ reveals how Keynes‘s initial goals have been replaced. According to the UN charter, ECOSOC is 
responsible for the coordination of the promotion of global policy in economic questions. However, ECOSOC 
was never given power to realise its full-fledged mandate. This authority is however significant and legitimate 
as it was from the beginning. (World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization 2004: §533) 
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 For a closer look at the power behind and application of ‘hard‘ and ‗soft‘ instruments in general, and 
development tools in particular, see chapter 6. 
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 Martin Khor (2004) lists examples of how, in1980-2000, the price of commodities decreased in general by 
25 per cent. Specific examples include the price of coffee that decreased by 64 per cent and cotton by 47 per 
cent. This alone decreased the export earnings of Sub-Saharan Africa by USD 16 billion, a sum that 
corresponds to about 16 per cent of the GNP of the area.  
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shortly.
251
 Falling commodity prices coupled with accumulated debts make any equation of 
sustainable economics difficult to solve. Two years later, UNCTAD (2006a:11) notes that 
the curve showing the terms of trade of commodities had turned upwards. These trends 
show the price trends for oil and gold, as well as cocoa. Following these observations, 
UNCTAD (2006b) recommended that indebted countries use this money to pay off their 
debts.  
But a closer look at the beneficiaries of the commodity price boom reveal that the real 
winners are the private corporations, and they do not necessarily contribute royalties or 
taxes to the country where they extract the goods (Christian Aid 2007).
252
 Governments in 
poor countries will have to share the benefits of the price boom, and the net income may 
not be as high as assumed.
253
 As Lipson (1981: 613) noted a quarter of a century ago, if 
debts are ever to be reduced, future absorption must be curtailed relative to production. In 
other words, these countries must generate more foreign exchange by higher net exports. 
Alongside these observations, increased exports since 2005 have failed to boost GDP 
growth significantly, with marginal improvements in the debt situation (Nuňez 2009).254 
This explains further what has been already introduced; the argument that current 
arrangements have created a system of systematic deficits, and that the current deficit and 
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 Against this falling curve for many commodities, UNCTAD (Gore 2004) predicted that there will be a new 
debt crisis within the decade, given that interest rates do not rise before that. If the curve showing interest 
rates rise suddenly or sharply, the crises will be deeper, steeper and wider.  
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 To illustrate with the help of a case on the concentration of ownership within the banana industry, see Tax 
Justice Network (2007). 
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 In reaction, we see the governments of Zambia and Bolivia toughening their lines on extractive industry 
contracts, demanding higher revenues from the oil and mining transnationals operating in their countries 
(EURODAD 2008b). Incomes from taxes and royalties are of course central in the public finances of poor 
countries. Voices from civil society remain vocal and consistent in drawing attention to the environmental 
devastations caused by multinational corporations operating outside environmental agreements, as seen in the 
Niger Delta, for instance. Environmental damage can have serious consequences for the living conditions of 
the local population. 
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 This poses a challenge not only where the bulk of the focus on exports is on natural resources, a feature of 
the export baskets of some poor countries, but also for the Mercosur area, despite the exports being more 
diverse (Nuňez 2009). Instead, here, the difficulty is to add value and knowledge to exports as the main 
limitation to growth-boosting potential of exports.  
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with it, problem debt of poor countries, is an at least partial product of falling terms of 
trade. With this, it is time to shift to the actual institutionalization of world trade and the 
consequences this has had on sovereign debts in poor countries.  
The World Trade Organization  
Following the failure of negotiating governments to establish the International Trade 
Organization, a series, or ―rounds‖, of trade negotiations followed. These negotiations took 
place under the umbrella of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, and were 
negotiated during the UN Conference on Trade and Employment. GATT was formed in 
1947 and lasted until 1994. The following year, it was replaced by the World Trade 
Organization. Under the WTO framework, the basics of the original GATT text are still in 
effect.
255
 With the institutionalization of trade, coherence and cohesion between the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the WTO policies became a focus, starting in 1995 with the official 
establishment of the WTO. Conditionality programmes provide the Bretton Woods 
institutions with direct access to national political processes in indebted countries. In 
negotiations, indebted nations inhabit a weak position, since they are dependent on the 
goodwill of the Bretton Woods institutions. Herein lies a risk, if one blithely adheres to 
calls for cohering the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO. The risk is 
that coherence extinguishes possibilities for poor countries to freely form national policies. 
In this way, coherence would provide global governance but without increasing the degree 
of democracy in the decision making.
256
 
Initially, the formalised and institutionalized trade system of the WTO brought with it 
fundamental changes in world trade. For one, the WTO is a promotor of open trade, or free-
trade (WTO no date b). This means a formalized reorientation of global trade policies from 
the post-war era on three main levels. First, while the industries of the rich countries had 
time to develop, partly while being protected from international competition, industry in 
poor countries faced increasing competition from the outside (Raffer and Singer 2001: 56, 
197-235). From this perspective, world trade was operating according to the interests of the 
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 The original GATT text, or GATT 1947, is still in effect under the WTO framework, subject to the 
modifications of GATT 1994 (WTO, no date a). 
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 Coherence, coordination and related caution are discussed further in chapter 6.  
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rich, who, in addition, retained protection from imports from poor countries in the fields of 
textiles, clothing and agriculture. Second, since neither of the formal trade arrangements of 
the GATT, nor its successor, the WTO, were assigned tasks related to the commodities 
markets, they have therefore not filled the vacuum that was created when the plans of 
setting up the International Trade Organization fell through (Raffer and Singer 2001: 5, 9). 
As commodities constitute the main export of the poorest countries, this has contributed 
further to the vulnerability of these countries. Third, the paradigm prevailing since GATT 
emphasizes separation of trade in goods from financial factors (as brought forward by 
Kregel 2009). The paradigm focuses on trade as a way to create efficiency gains via the 
opening of closed markets, thus separated from the accompanying financial processes 
which were key to the 19
th
 century concept of trade as an engine of growth. In the 19
th
 
century, trade was seen as an engine of growth not because of perceived efficiency of open 
versus closed trade, but as a result of foreign capital and labour inflows to the developing 
areas, he continues. These flows created exactly the production and the exports-processes 
that were necessary to allow the repayment of financial obligations. Trade is perceived as 
the cause, not the consequence, of financial flows and gives rise to a theory on the 
adjustment of the balance of payments that relies on income adjustment. Kregel concludes 
that the impact of capital flows on trade cannot be brushed under the carpet.
257
 In other 
words, during GATT, initially trade was confined to a definition of trade of tangible 
commodities. Today, in contrast, the WTO operates on the definition of issues ―related to 
trade‖ rather than trade in a classical sense. Finally, and fourth, the institutionalisation of 
world trade has taken place as part of a complete global reorganisation of world trade 
(Sachs 1999: 7). At the end of World War II, only around 20 per cent of the world 
organised itself on the basis of modern capitalist institutions. Another third were operating 
under extreme socialism. The remainder, involving most of the poor world, with the 
exception of China, chose a path of statist industrialisation characterised as a ―third way‖, 
eventually arriving in economic debacle. This means that what we have seen is a not only a 
collapse of a tripartite system and therefore the emergence for the first time in history of the 
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 As globalisation and capital mobility progress, the relationship becomes even clearer, and can be seen in 
the fact that it is the investment decisions of large multinational corporations that decide which parts of the 
production chain take place in which countries and the trade patterns across them (Kregel 2009). Financial 
flows beyond trade and aid are discussed in chapter 7. 
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global economy, but throughout the world, an essentially capitalist strategy of economic 
development has emerged (Sachs 1999: 7). Centrally, and not only for the sake of the 
argument of this thesis, nations have adopted this essentially capitalist strategy of economic 
development on the basis of sovereign national decisions, thus tying back to chapter 3 
about the actual and current system of global governance.  
In this context, addressing commodity trade in relation to poor countries‘ economic 
development remains a current core concern. Pascal Lamy (2010), as head of the WTO, 
paints a picture showing where trade in commodities suffers from distortions that can be 
traced back to the colonial times and as such are structured in favour of rich countries at the 
cost of developing ones. Today, trade in natural resources represents an important and 
growing share of world trade. In 2008, at the height of commodity prices, this share was 
around 24 per cent of total global merchandise trade in dollar terms. This includes, of 
course, trade in oil and fuels, minerals and food commodities. For poor countries in 
particular, commodities, including cotton, cocoa, and minerals, represent a significant share 
of their exports and in some economies in Africa and the Caribbean this share is as high as 
80 per cent. In addition, Lamy also points out another side to commodities, by noting that 
in the global financial markets, commodities are now recognized as a major asset class, 
making up approximately 15 per cent of banks‘ fixed income revenues.258 Apart from the 
role of commodities as measured in percentages of trade, it is striking how often countries 
with oil or other natural resource wealth have failed to grow more rapidly than other 
countries without such natural wealth, a matter that will be returned to soon.  
Yet, in lifting our gaze to the future, and looking past the aforementioned double standards 
for textiles, clothing and agriculture, the most important issue for poor countries on the 
trade policy agenda is found elsewhere. In the future, worldwide patents emerge as the real 
and increasing future threat to poor countries, in the sense that these risk leaving decisions 
on global priorities in research and production to those with the greatest purchasing power 
at present (May 2002; Rodrik 2004; Khor 2004; Walløe Tvedt 2010; for a discussion and 
overview, see May 2008). World-wide patents and immaterial rights are negotiated within 
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 According to recent research by Citigroup analysts, bank revenues from trading are expected to be 15 per 
cent to 20 per cent down from 2009, with commodities being the only sector with expected growth (Lamy 
2010). 
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the WTO, and under its Agreement on Trade-related Aspects on Intellectual Property 
Rights, TRIPS.
259
 In brief, TRIPS means that most things, from seeds to innovations, can 
be patented and thus a charge can be demanded of those benefiting from their uses. The 
mistake that occurred with the stabilization of prime commodities should be carefully 
avoided. To recall, this earlier mistake with the commodities was that the interests of many 
nations, and thus the basics for their income, was left aside and not taken care of. Instead, 
falling terms-of-trade led countries exporting commodities into deficit.  
The financing of trade 
This chapter stated early on that trade and trade finance cannot be separated. In addition to 
world trade, which operates to a large extent on credit, trade and trade finance are closely 
connected through intra-institutional conditioning, and calls for policy coherence. Also, 
discussions regarding the link between trade growth and income growth cannot be 
dismissed. The matters on this list will be discussed in said order. 
The real debate, mentioned earlier, about debt and trade policy coherence is concentrated 
upon the area in which poor countries can freely pursue their own development policies and 
priorities. This coherence is a balance between conditionality (interference in national 
decision-making) and efficiency (streamlining international efforts). The term coherence 
could mean aiming at doing away with duplicating efforts in for instance development 
policy, and streamlining in general. In the area of trade, close cooperation between the IMF 
and the WTO was planned for already in the establishment of GATT (as initially mentioned 
in chapter 3). In practice, this means that adherence to WTO agreements is being presented 
as a condition for acquiring new loans, or development aid. Such cooperation leads to 
situations of cross-conditionality, and it makes traditional conditionality less obvious. This 
fits in with the idea that conditionality is exercised through indirect pressure on the debtor 
by the international organizations rather than directly and openly by the creditor nations, (as 
we recall from chapter 3 and) as will be further discussed in the next chapter on 
development aid (see also Suter and Stamm 1992: 664). 
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 The TRIPS-system, in turn, has taken over the administration of intellectual property matters from the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, a specialized UN agency. This has meant a shift in host 
from the UN to the WTO. For an account, see for instance May (2008). 
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Cross-conditionality presented in this way, as the borrower‘s access to new loans being 
dependent on signing free-trade agreements, can be used to flag calls for coherence among 
international economic institutions. These calls can be grouped into two, and the balance is 
fine. On the one hand, there are calls for synergizing and facilitating the coordination of 
efforts by international actors. These calls are echoed in the need to avoid duplication of 
various policy efforts, through the means of harmonizing the instruments and policies of the 
international institutional system. On the other hand, another branch of this discussion then 
adds a sensitive dimension, which is that of requirements for policy coherence, bordering 
on conditionalities. Here, the practical part of the problem are addressed, having discussed 
the political dimension earlier (chapter 3) and saving the international aid discussion to the 
next chapter (chapter 6). Whilst the problem is separated out here, this should not be 
confused as a dismissal of the need for a holistic approach dealing with problem debt which 
is needed to bring substantial improvements in the ensuring system and to provide more 
efficient and fair outcomes than approaches devised in isolation. 
The departure point for efforts to generate integrated discussions on trade and finance in a 
more inclusive forum – in comparison to the current Group of 7, or the more recent G-20 – 
traces back to UNCTAD in 1964 (Herman 2009). Such processes have gradually lost 
momentum, and today the exclusive G7 (or G20) is the place where Heads of State meet 
and discuss polices of the institutions they share governance of. However, Herman (2009) 
traces this very failure to implement inclusive and coherence policy as the leverage which 
inspired the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, a process 
launched to combine various economic policies in relation to poor countries economies.
260
 
Moving down the list of issues related to the financing of trade and towards looking closer 
at trade itself, the relationship between trade growth and income growth is not 
straightforward. This relationship is partly built on the size of the gap between the required 
income and the extent to which this is filled with trade income. This creates a need for 
credit, or debt. This relationship is complicated in at least six ways. First, Mayer (2009) 
analyses that while poor countries have increased their share in world manufacturing trade, 
their share in world manufacturing value added has declined. He adds that while this is true 
in the aggregate, it further appears that trade and income are most favorably related in 
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 The Monterrey Declaration has of course since been followed-up by the Doha declaration in 2008. 
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countries that succeeded in upgrading their manufacturing activities towards more 
technology-intensive products. Based on this, he concludes that to improve income 
generation, and debt servicing capacity, integration should be part of a wider outward 
oriented industrialization strategy. With this, he assesses that while deep integration might 
simply boost exports of goods with high import content, strategic integration might make 
trade growth less pronounced, but generates a denser domestic production network, thus 
favouring domestic income generation. This relates to the refinement and use of 
commodities, as mentioned earlier. 
Second, if looking at countries that opted for an export-led growth strategy based on 
manufacturing, as opposed to commodities, as mentioned above, the fact that many 
countries pursue similar export markets and similar products puts them in competition with 
each other (Razmi 2009; Raffer and Singer 2001: 12-3). Thus exports turns into a zero sum 
game where one poor country‘s gains are mirrored in corresponding losses for another poor 
country. Further, exchange rate undervaluation occurs when poor countries‘ export would 
usually affect more strongly other poor countries competing in the same product, as the 
currency composition of external debt would lead to balance sheet effects that worsen the 
position relative to industrialized and rich countries.
261
 
Third, commodity price instability determines the income, and thus the need for loans and 
in this manner, affects debt. In low-income countries, the export structure is heavily 
focused on a few, perhaps even one or two, commodities. This leads to a dynamic whereby 
during booms, excessive revenues lead to optimistic extensive borrowing, and during bust 
years, additional loans are taken to defend past commitments and to complete projects. 
Meanwhile, debt tends to be renegotiated into loans under less favorable conditions, due to 
the increase in risk. (Odedokun 2009) 
Fourth, the link between export growth and debt repayment is questionable. As noted, 
export growth does not always translate into generated income for the country, responsible 
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 As a complement to this, Mauritius is a country that, following the ending of better use of trade 
preferences, is facing negotiations promoting liberalization of non-agricultural market access. In Mauritius, 
the challenges in this new environment are many, among them declining export revenues. Despite the 
measures Mauritius is putting in place, there seems to be a clear sense that these cannot go very far without 
support from the international community‘s policies on aid, debt and trade. (Sookmani 2009). 
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for the repayments. Rather, some of this income may benefit the private sector, and foreign 
owners in this sector. 
Fifth, and related to the above, in donor‘s documents on development policy, ―increasing 
trade‖ is often mentioned as a goal for trade of and with poor countries (for this argument 
see for example official documents by Finland, as in the Prime Minister‘s Office 2004: 13; 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2005). The attention should here be focused on the fact that the 
terms ‖trade‖, or the ‖increasing of trade‖ are not usually analyzed or defined (Khor 2004). 
Yet, everyone knows that ‖trade‖ is made up of two parts, of exports and imports. Each 
country wants to increase their exports and decrease their imports. In practice, this means 
that poor countries aim at balancing their balance of trade while the rich countries at the 
same time operate according to the Washington consensus. One element in the Washington 
Consensus is that under the heading of liberating trade, countries should lower their import 
tariffs. Decreasing import tariffs means cheaper products for the consumers, meaning that 
the consumer pays less. Simultaneously, the importing nation attracts investments and the 
export becomes cheaper. Along similar lines, it is some times stated that technological 
developments increase trade. Trade increases the benefit of relative advantages, of 
efficiency and income, factors that in turn further increase trade. Trade increases 
competition, competition increases the importance of markets and creates a need for 
technological innovations. The expansion of markets and fast e``conomic growth increase 
investments and thus the use of new technology (for this argument, see for instance the 
Prime Minister‘s Office 2004: 13). Yet, confusing development with competitiveness is one 
of the first mentioned warnings Kozul Wright lists (2009: 64). 
Sixth, common advice to developing countries tends to equate the attraction of foreign 
direct investments with improvements in the balance of payment constraints, and the 
plugging of debt gaps. In this context, another warning on the list started above is to not 
confuse linking investment to exports with attracting foreign direct investments (Kozul 
Wright 2009: 65). This is because the effects of investments are not conclusive. On the one 
hand, they may stimulate growth, but on the other hand, they may bring with them 
detrimental effects leading to a higher risk of default (Antoniou 2009). In either case, the 
link between the interaction of the foreign direct investment regime with the capacity of 
governments to appropriately tax the economic activity and to stop capital flight must be 
considered. Given that public revenue is the crucial denominator in talking about debt risk 
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and the debt servicing capacity, the importance of this approach to investments cannot be 
overstated, says Christina Weller (2009). 
At its core, the basic link between trade finance and debt lies in the bulk of the exports of 
poor countries being made up of commodities, and the difficulty these nations have in 
increasing their exports. The statement that Africa is poor because it is not integrated 
sufficiently in world trade does not hold. African countries have high export figures, higher 
than the USA. According to Khor (2004), this cannot mean but that world trade is up-side-
down. Further, the US collects a similar amount to import tariffs on its products from 
Bangladesh as on its products from France (Desai 2004). Building further on these 
established mechanisms, between fluctuations in, or compositions of trade and debt, the 
next section moves towards justifications for just and economically reasonable dealings 
with sovereign debt by thus preparing the ground for how arbitration of global debt fits in.  
5.2 International trade and sovereign debt 
For sovereign debt itself, the characterization of the trade/debt relationship is fundamental. 
The need to generate foreign exchange for payment of external debt is an important 
motivator for the generation of income. While the recent trend of relative growth of 
domestic debt may represent a reduction of vulnerability to external shocks, it nevertheless 
includes a greater reliance on domestic debt (Rau 2009). 
Some key areas of concern that provide ways of approaching trade and debt relate to the 
discussions about power and self-rule of the poor countries. In practice, the discussion can, 
for instance, be analyzed through the definition of debt sustainability, including how to 
better factor trade performance into debt sustainability assessments (see chapter 2), 
according to the degree of self-rule for the indebted nation regarding market access (see 
chapter 3), or along the link between export growth and debt repayments (as discussed 
above). It can also be extended into a number of additional discussions that fall outside the 
present focus, and examples would be the technical dimensions of linking debt and trade in 
balance of payments accounting, the setting and effects of foreign investment rules, and the 
degree of domestic monetary policy on debt and or trade.
262
 At their core, these issues are 
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connected by matters pertaining to power balance, which are now addressed through an 
exploration of and recourse to negative duties. The focus of this section is on the trade 
regime and particular trade instruments and how they affect sovereign debt. The 
background is the negative duties of the rich countries toward the poor. The chapter then 
continues looking at world trade by contrasting a surplus, or rich, country‘s perspective 
against a deficit, or poor, country‘s perspective. This prepares for the final section where 
not only conditions for, but also implications of, and limits to, debt arbitration in relation to 
trade are discussed. What can we say about the efficiency and justice of international trade 
and the role global arbitration of debts would play? 
International trade and negative duties 
Reflecting back at the time leading up to the debt crisis of the 1980s, the mixture of 
increased commercial financing and slow adjustment (as addressed in chapter 2) had had 
other global repercussions. The single most important impact of this shift was on the 
distribution of the balances of trade, or the current accounts, which translated into a 
remarkable transfer of global wealth (Lipson 1981: 613). The leading thought of the 
creditors was that there was not going to be any shifting of current account problems onto 
others. Instead, OPEC surpluses were made available to countries needing to top up on their 
deficits, or economic gaps, a fact that suppressed confrontation by the deficit nations 
towards those in surplus.
263
 In this way, systematic trade deficits in poor countries were, 
perhaps not deliberately, but at least in practice and in hindsight, caused by the policies of 
rich nations.  
In parallel, current double standards in trade mean that poor countries still do not enjoy 
unbridled access to the markets of rich countries, while, at the same time, their markets 
remain restricted by sets of anti-dumping duties, quotas and high subsidies. For the 
purposes of this argument, discussions regarding the desirability of free trade in the first 
place are set aside. Rather, here, the focus is on the effects of these subsidies making poor 
countries‘ products uncompetitive in rich countries‘ markets. In addition, they hamper poor 
countries products in other markets because they allow rich countries to undersell these 
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 This transfer was carried out by the Eurobanks, and not by the central banks, carrying a price because it 
accommodated not only the collective deficit but also the OPEC surplus (Lipson 1981: 613). 
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products everywhere. By upholding a global economic order that grandfathers the rich 
countries rights to impose such protectionist measures into the global trading system, the 
rich countries contribute to the persistence of the world poverty problem. (Pogge 2007: 6) 
This discussion is steered towards a moral-philosophical argument which is thus; because 
the rich countries, through the institutional arrangements they have set up, have caused 
harm on peoples in poor nations, they are obliged to mend this situation, which brings me 
to a discussion on negative duties (as first raised in chapter 3). As this chapter has outlined, 
the trade in commodities is of central importance. In essence, this can be articulated in a 
single question: what entitles a global elite to use up the world‘s natural resources on 
mutually agreeable terms while leaving the global poor empty handed (Pogge 2008c: 208)? 
A sub-question to this overarching question, but of central importance for this thesis, is to 
ask what entitles this same elite, through more indirect ways, to maintain a situation of 
problem debt in the poor world? For present purposes, the point of interest is found in the 
question of the presence and relevance of shared institutions, by which it is shown how 
dramatically the rich affect the circumstances of the global poor through trade. In this 
context, the very survival of the poor often depends crucially on the consumption choices 
of the rich, determining the price of foodstuffs and the opportunities of the poor to find 
work. Here, it is essential to recall that this does not mean that the rich need to draw the 
dubious utopian conclusion that global interdependence must be undone by isolating states 
or groups of states from one another (from chapter 3), and that nor does this mean that there 
would be reason to draw similar conclusions regarding trade (or aid, as discussed in chapter 
6).
264
 Instead, what is of significance is for the rich countries to recognize their superior 
power due to economic and military strength, and therefore, to accept their responsibility in 
shaping these rules (Pogge 2008c: 206).  
Along this vein of negative duties, and tuned particularly towards global trade, the proposal 
of a Global Resources Dividend, GRD, merits attention for its contribution to a holistic way 
of thinking (as envisaged by Pogge 2008c, especially 210-11). This proposal envisions that 
states and their governments shall not have full libertarian property rights with respect to 
the natural resources in their territory, but rather, they would be required to share a small 
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part of the value of any resources they decide to use or sell.
265
 The proceeds from the 
Dividend would go towards ensuring that all human beings can meet their own basic needs, 
or basic human rights, with dignity. Pogge present the Dividend based on the idea that 
those who make more extensive use of our planet‘s resources should compensate those 
who, involuntarily, use very little. He specifies further that the idea does not require that we 
conceive of global resources as the common property of humankind, to be shared equally. 
Instead, his proposal is far more modest by allowing each government control of the natural 
resources in its territory. Modesty is important if the initiative is to gain support. 
Eventually, it is then quite possible that, and once radical inequality has been eradicated, by 
introducing the Global Resource Dividend, quite a small Dividend may, in the context of 
fair and open global market system be sufficient continuously to balance those ordinary 
centrifugal tendencies of markets enough to forestall its reemergence.  
Defenders of capitalist institutions think along conceptions of justice that support rights to 
unilateral appropriation of disproportionate shares of resources while accepting that all 
inhabitants of the earth ultimately have equal claims to these resources. This thinking is 
based on the conception that such rights are justified if all are better off with them than 
anyone would be if appropriation of resources were limited to proportional shares. (see 
Pogge 2008c: 208)
266
 But to counter this line of thinking, in our world today, billions are 
born into a world where all accessible resources are already owned by others. Billions are 
born into circumstances where their educational and employment opportunities are 
restricted to such an extent that regardless of the intensity of their work, they can barely 
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 This payment they must make is called a dividend because it is based on the idea that the global poor own 
an inalienable stake in all limited natural resources. This proposal entails no right to participate in decisions 
about whether, or how, natural resources are to be used and so does not interfere with national control over 
resources. It does, however, entitle its holders to a share of the economic value of the resource in question, if 
the decision is to use it. On a general level, the principles of GRD coincide well with the requirement of 
universal binding, as opposed to commitment, by its members as discussed in chapter 3.  
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 There are of course legal bodies to deal with trade disputes. In addition to the permanent court of 
arbitration as discussed in chapter 4, there is also the UN Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), which was established by the UN General Assembly in 1966, with the aim to promote the 
progressive harmonization of unification of international trade law. UNCITRAL carries out its work at annual 
sessions which are held alternatively in New York and Vienna. 
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earn enough for their survival and certainly cannot secure anything like a proportionate 
share of the world‘s natural resources. (Pogge 2008c: 209) This means that in practice, 
multilateral trading systems seem to override other regimes, such as those of human rights, 
the environment and sustainable development (see chapter 3).  
The surplus country as a trading partner 
The world‘s financial flows, and with them, world trade, operate under a system where the 
USD is its central monetary unit.
267
 In situations of deficits in the balance of trade, a 
traditional exit strategy has been to devaluate, or to write down the value of the national 
currency, or in the case of floating exchange rates, to allow the exchange rate to 
depreciate.
268
 However, globally, the balances of trade are zero, meaning that 
simultaneously, every country cannot have a surplus in their balance of trade. This is why 
UNCTAD, among others, advocate an international agreement on exchange rates that 
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 Explaining the situation of 2010, where an ―optimistic scenario depends to a large extent on a measured 
rebalancing of the economies of the US, with the world largest deficit, and China, with the world's largest 
surplus. In view of the central place occupied by the dollar in the international reserve system, it is recognized 
that international monetary and financial stability depends fundamentally on the spending discipline by the 
US − in line with its income − which would allow for a fundamental and sustained balance-of-payments 
adjustment. However, in order to maintain growth, the US should not simply cut domestic absorption but also 
shift to export-led growth. An orderly US adjustment would also require, inter alia, a shift by China from 
export-led to consumption-led growth and the realignment of the exchange rate of the renminbi against the 
dollar. In this way, prospects for global stability could be expected to improve without sacrificing growth. 
Even if such a rebalancing proceeds smoothly, most developing and emerging economies are caught in a 
dilemma: they are damned if the US adjusts and damned if it does not. On the one hand, 'business as usual' 
would expose them to recurrent currency and financial instability. On the other hand, retrenchment and 
adjustment in the US could cause problems on several fronts. It is likely to lead to tightened, global financial 
conditions with negative effects on several developing and emerging economies that have structural, external 
deficits and are hence dependent on capital inflows to sustain acceptable growth. More important, there is no 
other country that could act as a global locomotive.‖ (Akyüz 2010: 1)  
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 Another central link is defined by the exchange rate, or a balance between the free-floating of the exchange 
rate versus a situation where the indebted countries can manage the rate themselves. Bresser-Pereira (2009: 
especially 87) argues that poor countries are better off managing their exchange rate than letting it float. If it 
floats, he argues that through Dutch disease, the tendency is towards appreciation. Dutch disease is returned to 
soon. 
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rationalizes the discussion on what equilibrium exchange rates are, or (Flassbeck 2009). In 
the absence of the realisation of such a discussion, or practical implementation of relevant 
policy measures, surplus economics are further discussed in chapter 7, so here, the focus is 
on support instruments related to trade that have been developed by surplus countries 
towards those in deficit. The motives behind the creation and maintenance of the 
instruments are often found in moral reasoning, and dressed in a language describing a 
battle, a combat or a fight against poverty. This also helps us to understand the reasoning 
behind placing the instruments in the frame of development aid, and soft aid.  
Over time, rich nations have devised a set of trade-enhancing mechanisms and various 
instruments of trade support. Common to these mechanisms, instruments and programmes 
is that they usually come from the development aid budgets of donor countries. The choice 
has here been to highlight two specific types of trade ―enhancers‖, Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) and export credits. The aim is to show, by way of example, partly the 
burden these instruments place on the poor countries, and partly, how the faulty system 
leads to the accumulation of debt.   
The policies behind the EPAs provide an illustration of the development of trade policy, 
and serve a dual point as it also explains the consolidation of development concerns into 
trade policy. This also provides an entry point into the next chapter on development aid. 
The history of the EPAs has its roots in the Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in 2000 
between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states. Prior to the 
Cotonou Agreement, European − ACP trade relations were facilitated by the Lomé 
Convention, what was primarily a trade and aid agreement known and originally signed in 
1975. The Lomé Convention, which facilitated ACP trade access to Europe in preference to 
goods from other countries, was renewed and renegotiated successively thereafter creating 
four agreements − Lomé I, Lomé II, Lomé III, and Lomé IV. The Cotonou Agreement, 
which is expected to be in effect for 20 years, is the successor to Lomé IV and was created 
to help the ACP deal with challenges that hinder their development, such as poverty, lack 
of economic opportunities and conflict. The Cotonou Agreement is based on development 
cooperation, trade and the political dialogue. While the Lomé Convention and the Cotonou 
Agreement share similar objectives, the Cotonou provides a comprehensive framework to 
address the political, economic, social, cultural and environmental aspects of ACP 
development.  Though the Cotonou Agreement allowed for the continuation of Lomé IV 
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non-reciprocal trade preferences, it also provides for the replacement of those preferences 
by the end of 2007. The EPAs are defined as an instrument of trade partnership required by 
the Cotonou Agreement to replace the trade component of Lomé IV. It is expected that it 
will help ACP countries to reduce poverty and achieve economic growth through 
sustainable trade with Europe. (CRNM 2008; see also Pantin and Hosein 2004) 
Expressly calling itself a ―Partnership Agreement‖, the Treaty signed at Cotonou differs 
conspicuously from the former Lomé treaties, most conspicuously by the fact that – 
declarations apart – the idea of real partnership is now largely absent (Raffer 2001d; Meyn 
2008). A quarter of a century later, the EU has moved decidedly towards the situation it 
initially wanted when signing the Lomé I, but was then unable to force on African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries, Raffer writes. Legally, an ACP country does not need to 
have a reform programme approved by multilateral institutions in order to qualify for a 
grant. But the seal of approval by the Bretton Woods institutions automatically means 
eligibility for Lomé resources. In practise this means submission to Bretton Woods type 
adjustment. (Raffer and Singer 2001: 102-3) The consequences of this adjustment have 
been discussed above. In any event, and ulterior motives aside, the EPAs are failing the test 
of partnership principles (Actionaid et al. 2007). 
The EPAs share the limelight with export credits. The reason for lifting up export credits is 
that the sum of export credits is now at levels of between two and three times the amount of 
aid provided by the World Bank, regional development banks and countries of the rich 
world. Eight per cent of financing for projects and investment in poor countries today 
comes from export credit agencies. In themselves, these agencies stand for the largest 
source of public finance for private sector projects in the world.
269
 (Hertz 2004: 47) EPAs 
are closely linked with the various action plans which state the preparedness for a country, 
or region, to attract investments.  
Export rating agencies insure loans made by the private sector in the rich countries to a 
counterpart in a poor country. If the borrower goes bankrupt, the credit becomes a public 
debt, and the creditor is relieved from business risk. One way to look at export credits is to 
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see them as means for an entrepreneur in a poor country to be given the opportunity of 
business. But there are other important considerations which place export credits in a less 
favorable light. First, the credit risk should be with the creditor, not with the tax payers of 
the borrowing nation. Second, by eliminating the business risk for the creditor, this practice 
drives the creditor towards moral hazard, where the she or he makes business decisions 
without carefully analyzing the project or the borrower‘s situation. Third, credit exports are 
counted as official development aid, a practice that raises eyebrows because, in the first 
instance, and in practice, it supports exports of the rich country, not development in the 
poor country (Raffer and Singer 2001: 73). In short, credit exports ―combine profit with 
charity‖ (Raffer and Singer 2001: 74), while building up the debt of poor countries. In any 
case, export credits are difficult to justify by reference to a free-market ideology, nor are 
they any easer to justify from an official development policy perspective.  
Yet, there is little discussion regarding the role of these mixed credit and development aid 
instruments in opening up new foreign markets and furthering the export interest of the 
donor country. The important discussion is about the links between export credits having 
been, and still being used, to bankroll projects as ―dangerous, dubious and misguided‖, as 
those in Saddam‘s Iraq (Hertz 2004: 48). Or, the discussion is about export credits serving 
not only the interest of the donor, but also that of the oppressive regimes. This can be 
observed within the frames of the Australian EFIC and its Development Import Finance 
Facility-scheme, from 1980-96, where the country to whom the majority of DIFF deals 
were contracted was Indonesia. Here, approximately USD 1.1 billion in direct loans were 
given to the Indonesian Government under General Suharto to support the purchase of 
Australian exports. This is in the context of the emerged claims that General Suharto, his 
friends and family, are estimated to have stolen over $30 billion from the Indonesian 
people, and accumulated billions of dollars in debt − much of which the country is still 
repaying today. One Australian company benefited more than any other. Over half of all 
DIFF funds to Indonesia ($560 million) went to enable the purchase of 2,500 prefabricated 
steel bridges by an Australian construction company. Between 1984 and 1993 the company 
was the beneficiary of approximately one-third of the taxpayer-funded DIFF funds. Of the 
total value of loans extended to Indonesia to support these business deals, less than 50 per 
cent has been repaid. Further, preliminary evidence suggests that some of the bridge 
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building projects may have been used to further the objectives of the Indonesian military in 
East Timor.
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The understanding gained through these examples also holds in the general. Export credits 
echo claims of being apparent bribery, in efforts to woo tyrannical or dictatorial regimes or 
to garner support for environmentally unsound or socially undesirable projects (Hertz 2004: 
48). In a way, export credits legalise corruption (Hertz 2004: 51). This feeds into the 
previous discussion on odious debt (chapter 4). In poor countries, export credits stand for 
the single largest credits while export credit debts account for about a quarter of poor 
countries total long-term debt – in some countries even more (Hertz 2004: 48).271  
Export credits are provided by the donor country, doubling as creditor, with the intention of 
serving geopolitical interests but also to serve the interest of domestic corporations. The 
credits also serve the interest of commercial banks. In case of a credit risk with the 
borrower, the export credit guarantee departments pay off the debt. This means that in a 
way export credits serve as a risk free loan for the commercial bank to the borrower. Export 
credits are subsidizing their domestic exporters. Export credit guarantee also comes armed 
with powerful political backing. If things go wrong, the exporters‘ embassy, ambassador 
and overseas state department are all ready to step in. (Hertz 2004: 49) 
There are five main reasons for why export credits should be met with caution, both by the 
exporter and the importer. First, export credits serving as export subsidisers clash badly 
with parallel calls for free trade. It also distorts the market. This leads to a second set of 
cautions, which is that by distorting the credit risk, subsidies radically reduce the incentives 
for exporters to do their proper credit analysis (credit risk will be returned to in chapter 7). 
Third, export subsidy policies have tended to be very costly for the exporting countries. 
Export credits are public funding and thus paid for through taxation. But they have also 
proved expensive for poor countries since the resources used for export credits could well 
have been used for other purposes. Perhaps even more importantly, the financial burden of 
failed export credit projects falls on the poor, people who have to face the consequences of 
an increase in their debt burden as a result of the importer not paying up. This is important 
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 Gabon, Nigeria, and Algeria all owe more than 50 per cent of their total debt to export credit agencies.  
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also on the level of recalling the large percentage of export credits in the total figures of 
debt. Fourth, rather than benefiting the interests of their host country, export credit backed 
companies often turn out to be only benefiting themselves. (Hertz 2004: 50-1). Fifth, export 
credits serve as an instrument for corporations in the rich countries to outsource their 
activities to poor countries. While corporations in the rich countries cut staff, they shift 
their production to India, Mexico and China. In addition, Ex-Im in the US, for instance, has 
adopted a selective policy regarding its cooperation partners. This means that in 2001, more 
than 60 per cent of Ex-Im‘s loans and guarantees went to just three corporations, and 
almost 90 per cent went to just 10. (Hertz 2004: 50) 
Export credits and partnership agreements are both found under the heading of 
development aid, an area addressed in the next section, and further explored in the next 
chapter. But when discussing development aid it is important to note that the figures must 
be viewed with some caution. First, there is a blurring of the distinction between 
commercial flows and aid (Raffer and Singer 2001: 71). Second, the distinction between 
sums accounted for as debt relief and those accounted for as aid is equally unclear. But 
most importantly, a double monopoly on data production and performance evaluation has 
allowed donors the privilege of self-control (Raffer and Singer 2001: 71).
272
  
The deficit country as a trading partner  
So far, it has been established that in its simplistic form, trade consists of exports and 
imports. Poor countries are often encouraged to increase their trade and to integrate deeper 
into world trade. It is important to bear in mind that although increasing imports in relation 
to exports increases trade overall, it does not necessarily increase the net income. Along a 
similarly simplistic line, and from the perspective of poor countries, trade constitutes of 
trading commodities against manufactured goods.
273
 Cross-conditionality, and links 
between trade and finance are also discussed above. Next, I will add four particular 
dimensions on trade that link specifically to the ballooning of problem debt in poor 
countries. The underlying thought is that global institutions and agreements that are good 
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 Consequently, the structure of global manufacturing constitutes a central issue for investigation in relation 
to problem debt of poor countries. 
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for the rich countries may not be good for the global poor. This case can be made by 
example, and in tune with the title of this chapter, the choice is to relate to the specific 
dimension of trade. First, the double standards in clothing, agriculture and textiles have 
been named, and the Uruguay trade round leading up to the establishment of the WTO 
serves the point of my case. The WTO regime may, or may not, be furthering the interest of 
some, or many of its members. This, however, does not mean that it would not harm the 
global poor while bringing benefits to others. The rich governments could have avoided 
most of those harms without losing their benefits by making the WTO agreement less 
burdensome on poor countries and their population. For instance, they could have agreed 
that tariffs on manufacturing imports faced by poor countries should be no higher than 
those faced by the rich, rather than being four times as high. Or, they could have agreed to 
open their markets to agriculture, textiles and footwear products from the poor countries. 
They could also have agreed to reduce their agricultural subsidies. And they could have left 
access by the world‘s poor to vital generic medicines undisturbed. The rich governments 
did not do this because they sought to maximize their gains from the treaty. But their 
material gains can hardly justify the harm. (Pogge 2008b: 21-22) 
Second, the present argument case can also be seen in relation to Keynes‘s economics, 
where one of the aims was a global economic balance, instead of driving countries towards 
deflatory policies, as the deficit country experiences today. In this chapter, the focus is on 
the effect of trade on the balance of payments. Surplus and deficit in financial flows relates 
closely to this, and will be returned to in chapter 7. 
Third, a further claim, and one combining aspects of both coherence and conditionality as 
discussed above, is seen in the central notion of the reform programmes adopted by a large 
number of poor countries since the 1980s, or since the debt crisis. Such reform programmes 
pivot around the idea that an export-oriented model would allow them to earn foreign 
exchange to attend to growing external debt payments.
274
 This was a consequence of two 
events. First, moves towards conservative administrations in the UK, the US and Germany 
gradually replaced ―import substitutions‖ strategies with market-based routes to 
development (Kanbur 2006: 1567). Second, at this time, those able to finance, or refinance, 
their poor country debts were provided with leverage. Even today, there is a widespread 
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perception that enlarged market access for poor country export products is the most direct 
trade response to solve problem debt in a sustainable way (Caliari and Yu 2009: iii).  
A fourth dimension of the poor country‘s situation that this chapter tries to relay relates to 
the natural resource curse. National natural resource wealth does not necessarily attract 
wealth, as mentioned earlier, a phenomena that continues to attract academic attention, 
especially among economists, who list a range of factors or possibilities in explaining this 
curse.
275
 This is explained so that the inflow of capital changes domestic demand patterns 
in such a way that production shifts towards a sector that is distorted, and this results in the 
social value of national output potentially falling even though total resources have gone up 
(Brecher and Bhagwati 1958; Bhagwati 1982). Among the factors behind the inflow of 
capital are allegedly adverse long-term trends in world commodity prices, and volatility in 
these prices (Frankel 2010). Cyclical Dutch disease also appears on this list.
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Finally, the cooperation between the IMF and the WTO was agreed upon already in the 
establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and provides an example of 
the above.
277
 Today, it is required that the WTO cooperates in an adequate way with the 
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 See for instance Auty (1993; 2001) and Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001). For an excellent summary, see 
Frankel (2010), who adds the crowding-out mechanism, poor institutions in poor countries, unsustainably 
rapid depletion, and civil war to the above list of factors explaining the curse. In this context, the study by 
Calcagano (2009) merits attention. Building on research conducted by UNCTAD, he draws a link between 
foreign direct investments and the natural resource curse and concludes that the structure of foreign 
investments in the particular sector is of importance. Thus, he warns against a mere simplistic general 
approach in measuring increased or decreased terms-of-trade.   
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 Dutch disease stands for a situation when a country receives a large inflow of foreign currency, for 
instance in the form of aid, as disaster aid relief, or from natural resources (oil is an often mentioned favorite 
in this context). Eventually, this leads to a raise of the exchange rate. A higher exchange rate makes their own 
production less competitive internationally and risks leading the nations into economic hardship. This means 
that what began as an additional injection of income results, in the long run, in the country‘s economy being 
in a worse state. The phenomenon of Dutch disease was first observed in the Netherlands in 1634-37 when 
over-reliance on tulip exports diverted resources away from other productive pursuits. The discovery of large 
natural gas reserves in the North Sea in the 1960s provides further evidence for the phenomenon. Dutch 
disease is discussed in the context of development aid in chapter 6. 
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 This was agreed upon in the 1947 GATT Article XV, and picked up in WTO Article III.5 (Kohr 2004). 
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Bretton Woods institutions to make the global economic policy more coherent (Khor in 
Raffer and Singer 2001: 216). Consequently, poor countries fear more pressure in the form 
of cross-conditionality. In practice, this means that loans by the World Bank or drawing 
rights by the IMF can be further conditionalized. The agreement can be made conditional 
on a favorable WTO report about the recipient country having obeyed the demands of the 
WTO in an adequate manner. Such a development further weakens the position of poor 
countries in the WTO. Those poor countries already governed by the Bretton Wood 
institutions in all but name risk losing the last of their negotiation power. (Raffer and 
Singer 2001: 57, 216-7)
278
 To sum up, conditionality, be that economic or political, is 
seldom exercised directly by the creditor countries, but rather, indirectly as pressure 
channeled through the international institutions (Suter and Stamm 1992: 664; see also 
chapter 3 of this thesis). 
5.3 Trade and international debt arbitration  
To explain why bakers, brewers, butchers, and consumers seek trade, nothing more than 
self-interest and trust are needed, as Adam Smith famously put it. People, and nations, seek 
trade because of self-interest. Yet, as already seen, world trade is one of the mechanisms 
behind world poverty. This is since trade financing is one of the reasons countries take on 
new loans, which makes debt the connecting link. The argument here is that the principles 
behind the current regime lead to a need for a range of counter-balancing instruments. 
To mend various economic gaps in the international trade system, and for moral reasons, a 
number of instruments have been developed to assist the poor countries‘ participation in 
world trade. This is because both trade deficits, but also surpluses, affect the trade balance 
between countries. Having addressed the cases of partnership agreements and export credits 
above, the discussion now turns to the dynamics of trade support, or capacity building as 
part of the development agenda. In this section, these mechanisms are analyzed to then 
further a case for separating trade instruments from development aid. In the next chapter 
(chapter 6), the focus is on development aid, which means that the below discussion on 
trade and aid doubles as a second gateway into that discussion. Before that, and in the final 
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 In fact, conditionality has become polarised to the extent that to settle such disputes, Raffer and Singer 
(2001: 248) suggest arbitration.  
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section of this chapter, the focus is on the impacts global arbitration of debt would have on 
trade. 
Trade enhancement mechanisms are attached to aid 
The intensification of the present global trade regime coincides with the perpetuation of 
poverty in the poor countries. For present purposes it is not essential to discuss whether the 
asymmetrical market opening that has taken place since the 1990s is the cause, or whether 
the reasons are found in the market opening for poor countries in the first place (in a world 
where rich countries have had time to build their industries behind protective walls for 
decades). What is essential is to note that in parallel with this increasing poverty, and in an 
effort to counter this increase, various trade support components have been added to the 
box of development aid tools. 
Nevertheless, to set a direction for the remaining discussion, it is enough to note that one of 
the pillars upon which free trade rests is the assumption that it is desirable. This calls for a 
closer analysis. While blanket protectionism has often not worked for countries that have 
tried it, neither has rapid trade liberalization. Forcing a poor country to open itself up to 
imported products that would compete with those produced by some of its own industries, 
industries that are dangerously vulnerable to competition from much stronger counterpart 
industries in other countries, can have disastrous consequences, both socially and 
economically. (Stiglitz 2002b: 17)
279
 
That deficit countries have entered a spiral of debt that is hard to exit has been recognized 
by the rich countries, both in their capacity as lenders, as in their capacity as aid donors. 
Consequently, under the heading of development aid, trade-related enhancement 
mechanisms have been developed. These mechanisms fall under the general umbrella of 
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 The ILO report brings forth that globalization has influenced the public finances. In particular the taxation 
percentage on relatively freely moveable manufacturing elements has decreased. In the world‘s 30 richest 
countries, the average level fell from 37.5 per cent in 1996 to 30.8 per cent in 2003. This is part of a larger 
scheme of attracting foreign investments through tax incentives (for this argument see World Commission on 
Social Dimensions of Globalization 2004: § 193). However, the tax basis constitutes a main income for the 
nation-state. If this basis is narrowed down, it would call for the implementation of complementing tax bases. 
This is one of the reasons behind calls for global taxation.   
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capacity building, and here, one subheading is the Aid for Trade-agenda. Before looking 
closer at Aid for Trade, it is important to be exact about the share of development aid funds 
that go towards these mechanisms. It is also important to note that these mechanisms 
contribute to a wider confusion surrounding the general purpose of development aid. Most 
importantly, from a radical point of view, their mere existence could be interpreted to show 
the asymmetry of the world‘s economic system while this raises probing questions about 
the need to address the causes rather of the effects rather than how they have been 
managed.  
One possible interpretation of the discussion so far is that the lack of policy coherence 
might be considered one of the causes behind financing of trade leading to accumulated 
debt. On the flip side, coherence can be problematic. Here, the discussion stretches into yet 
another direction while noting that problems of coherence plague not only the IMF‘s 
remedies but also its diagnoses. According to Stiglitz (2002b: 200-1), the IMF pays 
attention to deficits in balance of payments without looking deeper into the reasons for this 
deficit. Is the deficit due to a loan taken by a corporation in the indebted country? In a 
worst-case scenario, the company goes bankrupt, but that should not be a concern for the 
country‘s government, or the IMF. Rather, Stiglitz sees that a coherent approach would 
recognize this. It would have also recognized that if some country imports more that it 
exports (it is building up a trade deficit) another country must be exporting more that it 
imports (trade surplus). It is an indisputable law of international accounting that the sum of 
all deficits in the world must add up to the sum of all surpluses, as said. This means that if 
China and Japan insist on having a trade surplus, then some countries must have deficits.
280
 
                                                 
280
 This actualizes again in the 2010 connection to the financial crisis and economic recession of 2008-9, 
when talks about a currency war surfaced. The USA has repeated both in speech and deeds that they are 
intending to emerge from the situation by way of increasing exports, and if need be, even by way of 
depreciation, or the weakening of the US dollar. The Federal Reserve Bank of the USA has spoken for active 
policies of weakening the dollar if the threatening deflatory pressures do not ease otherwise. Simultaneously, 
the central bank of Japan and its ministry of economy have likewise announced their preparedness to weaken 
the exchange rate of the overvalued yen. In Europe, the central bank of Switzerland has dampened the 
strength of their franc. The central bank of England and the UK government have succeeded in maintaining a 
low value of the pound. The leadership of the Eurozone countries prepares ways of weakening the value of 
the euro. These measures ring a familiar tune when compared to the overarching goal of setting up the Bretton 
Woods institutions, which was that the beg-thy-neighbor-policies were to be done away with. An export-led 
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One cannot just inveigh against deficit countries, the surplus countries are equally at fault. 
Having said this, large trade deficits can be a problem. This is because deficits imply that a 
country has to borrow year after year. The country spends more on buying goods from 
abroad than it gets from selling its goods abroad. In the instance that the financers of this 
system pull out, the country finds itself in a trade gap.
281
  
Aid for trade 
The Aid for Trade-initiative fits this gap, as it aims at raising awareness of the need to 
overcome the barriers which constrain the ability of poor countries to benefit from trade 
expansion and poverty reduction (OECD and WTO 2009: 13). While it is worth 
mentioning that there is a difference between raising awareness of such gaps as opposed 
to actually addressing the causes behind such gaps, Aid for Trade in itself is important 
already since it accounts for almost a fourth of the total sum of official development 
aid.
282
 More specifically, launched by the WTO in 2005, Aid for Trade is an on-going 
process of focusing on breaking the barriers of trade of poor countries in both their 
export markets, and internally by addressing such issues as supporting infrastructure 
creation and knowledge creation (WTO no date c).
283
 In practice, this means that Aid for 
Trade stands for a range of trade related technical assistance and capacity building 
                                                                                                                                                    
economic recuperation will be successful only when those competing set out to compete by way of 
devaluating. The successful one is the one who devalues faster than others. The check is picked up by those 
who devalue last. 
281
 These kinds of situations provide the logic behind the granting of development aid, as to fill in ―gaps‖ in 
the economies of poor countries (see chapter 6). 
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 In 2004, excluding debt relief, Aid for Trade accounted for 24 per cent of the total official development 
aid (OECD 2006: 13). 
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The WTO monitors Aid for Trade at three levels: first a global monitoring oversees overall Aid for Trade 
flows, based on work carried out by the OECD, second, the WTO monitors the commitment of individual 
donors to provide additional Aid for Trade and third, the needs of developing countries are monitored for 
additional Aid for Trade and are being presented to, and met by, the international donor community, including 
the development banks (WTO no date d). In practice, in measuring the amount of aid spent on trade, it is not 
evident where to draw the line between amounts spent on assistance focused on improving trade capacity in 
particular and support to promote economic growth in general (OECD 2006: 11-2).  
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measures, ranging from negotiation training to practical export strengthening 
infrastructure.  
As noted before, the WTO (2007) sees one of its aims as helping poor countries and in 
particular the poorest among them, expand their production and in particular their exports 
of goods and services. Contrary to this aim, the WTO sees that some countries are 
succeeding well − but others are not, including a large number of least developed countries 
where trade is failing to make the contribution that it should be making to economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Therefore, such countries running a deficit need to be accompanied 
by Aid for Trade to address another part of the problem that many developing countries and 
least-developed countries confront. That is, insufficient human, institutional and 
infrastructural capacity to participate effectively in international trade and expand the 
quantity and quality of goods and services they can supply to world markets at competitive 
prices. The need to provide additional official development assistance to help correct this 
deficit in trade-capacity was recognized in 2005 by G-8 leaders at the Gleneagles Summit. 
Here, the WTO sees that a comprehensive Aid for Trade-package needs to respond to two 
related concerns. One is the assistance that some WTO members will need to help them 
implement the results of current multilateral trade negotiations, and to cope with certain 
economic adjustment costs that may be incurred. Effective implementation of WTO 
commitments is in the interest of the WTO membership as a whole. The second, broader, 
set of concerns is the insufficiency of trade-related capacity in many WTO members to 
allow them to benefit from the opportunities the multilateral trading system creates to 
increase investment and expand the production of tradable goods and services.
284
 The core 
role of the WTO remains anchored in the functioning of the multilateral trading system, but 
through its coherence mandate its responsibilities and activities are evolving to assist 
developing countries and poor countries to reap greater, practical, trade benefits from their 
market access opportunities. The WTO presents itself as not being a financing agency, nor 
does it have any ambition to become one, but its expertise and advocacy role in the area of 
trade can make it a valuable partner in collaborative efforts to meet trade-related capacity-
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 This covers a wide area − from setting up testing facilities that will help ensure products can meet 
technical, sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations and standards in export markets, through to much larger-
scale projects such as improving transport infrastructure and trade logistics (WTO 2007). 
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building needs, it says. These involve beneficiary countries and their development partners 
that have the necessary financial and technical expertise − the Bretton Woods institutions, 
regional development banks, specialized intergovernmental agencies and bilateral donors. 
The WTO work programme on Aid for Trade aims ―to help developing countries, 
particularly least-developing countries, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related 
infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO 
Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade‖ (WTO 2007). 
This presentation of Aid for Trade touches on and exemplifies much of the discussions 
above. The export-oriented trade agenda is seen to not be met, and to strengthen the agenda, 
the WTO has launched a support system. Two particular concerns arise. First, in their 
report, analysing Aid for Trade for the Commonwealth Secretariat, Stiglitz and Andrew 
Charlton (2006: 30-1) underline the importance of a comprehensive approach that takes 
into account interactions between trade, aid, and boarder development policies and reforms. 
One of the conclusions they reach is that Aid for Trade actually is a recognition of the 
limitations in the governance of existing institutions. But what is more, the Aid for Trade 
agenda reflects the realization that for poor countries, to realize the full benefits of new 
market opportunities, the necessary investments are particularly large, and the capacity of 
the poor countries to reach them is particularly small. 
In this connection, and second, especially if determining ―debt‖ as a specific reform 
mentioned on the list drawn up by Stiglitz and Charlton, two things become especially 
clear. The first is a verification of the complex economic situation of the poor, and the 
equally complex global economic environment. The second is a confirmation of the idea 
that dealing with problem debt is an opportune starting point in exploring and affecting the 
root causes of economic deficits and ultimately, poverty.  
Picking up on the remark about limitations in the governance of existing institutions, an 
analysis of Aid for Trade could benefit from a parallel assessment of fair trade 
programmes. Fair trade is a movement that is organized to guarantee a certain price of 
mainly basic commodities to producers in poor countries. Fair trade has evolved around a 
focus on exports from the poor countries to the rich, covering an increasing range of 
product groups, perhaps most notably chocolate, tea, coffee, flowers, wine and bananas. 
The system deserves merit for its pricing scheme for farmers. The connection between fair 
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trade schemes and Aid for Trade is that both programmes address gaps in income in similar 
ways, but on different levels. Aid for Trade operates largely on a national level, whereas 
fair trade operates on the micro-level, or on the level of the individual farmer or group of 
farmers. Here, two categories of criticism stand out, both categories applicable to both 
schemes. On the one hand, such fair trade measures, or Aid for Trade support, do not affect 
the actual structures of the world trade regime. Therefore, the implications of fair trade are 
by force limited. On the other hand, and this is a line of criticism emerging in particular 
from the right and promoters of free trade, that in practice, fair trade serves as a kind of 
subsidizing system, where farmers get a minimal income for their goods regardless of the 
actual market price. In this case, this would eventually distort the production, or the supply, 
of the good as this would be based on false market signals. Aid for Trade stumbles across 
similar, but smaller, points of criticism.  
Is debt arbitration useful for trade? 
The structure of the current trade regime is associated with mechanisms leading to 
accumulated debt in poor countries. Consequently, the trade regime is complemented with a 
number of programmes and instruments aiming at balancing the effects of the regime. 
Unfortunately, analyses of trade and debt are often made in isolation from each other. 
Authors who connect these issues in an analytical way are few.  
The problem of commodity price instability, as seen here, easily leads to excess lending, 
both during times of booms and bursts. To counter this, poor countries would need to be 
able to prevent export price instability and the mitigation of its consequences along with 
policies and incentives to change management of the boom-bust cycle (Odedokun 2009). 
The clear link between increased debt of low-income countries and their export dependence 
on commodities could be broken by focusing on the vulnerability to external shocks partly 
by guiding aid allocation, and debt sustainability processes would yield better results as it 
more accurately would capture the reality of the target countries (Nissanke 2009). In 
practice, and this is one of the more interesting proposals, a state contingent aid and debt 
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contract that could be implemented to operate as a sort of ex ante debt relief mechanism: a 
contingent credit line would be activated should an exogenous shock materialize (ibid).
285
  
Meanwhile, there is still an imbalance in the WTO rules between the stringency of the rules 
for imports, Lamy (2010) says, and their laxity for exports. Or, that tariffs escalate as 
products undergo a transformation and value is added, an old feature of the colonial rule. 
According to Lamy, this feature would disappear if we were to conclude the Doha Round. 
In other words, Lamy argues for an international trade system that is thoroughly open to all, 
on equal terms, without tariffs or trade barriers. This argument, however, does not take into 
consideration the circumstances of nascent industries in what are now the rich countries. In 
addition, while there is little doubt that a completed Doha round would bring benefits to the 
rich countries, there is doubt that these gains will outweigh the gains to poor countries 
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2006: 4). 
But these initiatives, and in concluding this chapter, ranging from the interesting initiative 
of a contingent credit line or other initiatives, be they part of the development aid regime or 
international trade, along with their effects on sovereign debt, fall outside the present scope 
of interest regarding arbitration of international debts. This scope is narrower. Arbitrating 
international debt in two phases, by first dealing with claims of odious debt, and then with 
claims of economic unsustainability, the poor would set out on a path towards other 
reforms and changes in financial governance and world governance. One such group of 
initiatives relate to the questions regarding the coordination of economic matters. Here, the 
discussion easily moves, to varying degrees, towards the moving of these questions under 
the auspices of the UN and ECOSOC, in particular, according to the UN Charter. In this 
same sweep, the ECOSOC should be given the authority to execute its powers fully. This 
may, or may not, be what is desired in the future. The point here is perhaps best seen in 
contrast to groups of initiatives and their intended effects towards changes in global trade 
on a general level, some mentioned above, among which debt arbitration would rather fall 
under a group of mechanisms relating to global governance. This means that the effects of 
arbitration on trade are indirect rather than direct. In this connection, we must also note that 
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 A similar proposal of activating some sort of stand-by assistance, but in the context of development aid 
rather than trade, is seen in the idea of offering a pre-qualified line of assistance for social protection which 
goes into action automatically when crisis triggers are breached (Kanbur 2010). 
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there are at least three specific limits to how far debt arbitration might reach. First, it would 
not affect trade rules or trade itself directly by, for instance, helping specific exporters or 
specific groups of exports. Second, it would not affect commodity price fluctuations. Third, 
it would not alter the manufacturing system of the world. Nevertheless, global arbitration of 
debt emerges as a useful tool to deal with accumulated problem debt. 
Yet, if the direct effects on trade are few, the indirect effects are several, and these are of 
high significance. For one, arbitration of debt would affect the rules for credit for trade 
financing. Access to trade credit is part of a larger reality, that of global credit. Before 
approaching that in chapter 7, the next chapter walks us through the connections between 
debt and aid. 
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6. 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID  
 
Given the current development aid regime 
– is debt arbitration helpful? 
 
 
The foundations of official development, or development aid, were laid with the 
establishment of the UN and Bretton Woods systems (multilateralism) and Marshall Plan 
(bilateralism).
286
 On these foundations, the nature, direction and intensity of the streams of 
development aid have been determined most prominently by the evolution of geopolitics 
and of development thinking.
287
 Today, official development aid continues to attract 
interest and stir debates. Though the academic contributions are certainly more nuanced, at 
its core it is pre-occupied with the impact and efficiency of aid. In a broad brush stroke, one 
can perhaps say that where the impact of aid is a major concern for social science 
practitioners, such as anthropologists and sociologists, the efficiency of aid is the main 
concern for economists.
288
 In relation to their methodologies, the social science 
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 Development aid, or development cooperation, is also often expressed as development assistance, technical 
assistance, international aid, overseas aid or foreign aid. 
287
 Aid is linked to geopolitics (Headey 2008). For examples of this and a look at the evolvement of the 
economics of development aid, see Kanbur (2006: 1565-6). 
288
 The issue of Journal of Development Studies edited by Hermes and Lensik (2009) provides an updated 
overview of development approaches to date. The economic discussion focuses much on the effects of aid on 
economic growth. For an overview of the macroeconomic discussions, see McGillivray et al. (2006). Another 
option when seeking an , adequate assessments of the efficiency of debt is to separate it  into evaluations on 
macro and micro levels, however  this risks the assessment leading to a micro-macro paradox of diverging 
results for project and country levels. This paradox can be described so that the success of isolated projects 
may be positive but yet, the overall impact is assessed as negative (see Kanbur 2006: 1577). Alternatively, the 
paradox can be applied in the opposite way so that aid at the project-level is more successful than aggregate 
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contributions are usually presented as open-ended narratives whereas the economics 
contributions are often based on assumptions of closed systems. These discussions and the 
differing approaches reflect a broader disagreement regarding what motivates and inspires 
development and even more fundamentally, what development is in the first place.  
But, however important and influential in themselves, disputes about the efficiency and 
effects of development aid, or national, local or other isolated factors in this process, divert 
attention away from foreign and global influences on the propagation of poverty. Moreover, 
this diversion undermines the causal significance of the setting and background that 
development aid was created in. It also draws away from discussions about the causal 
connection between the agendas and actions of the rich countries and how this impacts 
upon people living in poverty.
289
 
Instead, assuming the facts are as alleged by FAO (2009), it is important to note, first, that 
the number of hungry people has increased, rather than decreased, and now exceeds a 
billion.
290
 In noting this, it is tempting to resort to the vast body of criticism of official 
development aid, a body of literature that stretches as far back as the aid programmes 
themselves. Development aid has not only been criticized for not helping the poor in a 
sufficient or suitable way, but at times, the criticism is even that aid may be causing more 
harm than good.
291
 This may or may not be true, but nevertheless, it distracts attention from 
                                                                                                                                                    
projects on the national level (see Picciotto 2006). The paradox is of interest here since it came to the fore in 
the early 1980s with the debt crisis when development economics gave way to a neo-classical resurgence 
(Picciotto 2006: 8). A third way of addressing efficiency is to acknowledge the existence of unintended 
consequences, meaning that development outcomes can be disconnected from donor agency performance (see 
Picciotto 2006: 18) In contrast to economists, anthropologists focus on the effects of aid on social processes 
(see for instance Mosse and Lewis 2005). In any case, the question on whether debt relief increases growth is 
still under debate, see Addison et al. (2004a: 18-19), for instance.  
289
 Recalling from chapter 5, that this argument is derived from its broader context of global influences on 
poverty, see Pogge (2008b: 17). 
290
 Alarmingly, there are more hungry people now than at any time since 1970, the earliest year for which 
comparable statistics is available (FAO 2009).  
291
 For but one example, in the words of Dani Rodrik (2007a) development works, development policy does 
not. 
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the unavoidable fact that development aid was never created to change structures, or the 
economic order, in the first place.
292
 Having said this, the assessment of a need for a 
reorientation, redefinition or even reorganization of development aid falls outside the 
present purpose, so instead, here, the focus is on the impact of arbitration of debt on 
development, here understood as decreasing poverty.  
The link between debt and aid, and this is also related to the efficiency debate of 
development aid, is the assessments of the efficiency of debt relief. This theme has emerged 
since ―development aid‖ as a concept has come to include not only soft aid, as in grants and 
humanitarian assistance, but also hard loans.
293
 Actually, in addition to debt relief, 
development aid has widened to cover a whole range of transactions, including resources 
provided by charities and NGOs, humanitarian and emergency aid, and various forms of 
political and military support. From this observation two particular noteworthy 
observations emerge. A first observation is the dispersed and diverse application of the term 
―development aid‖ itself, which covers a wide range of transactions. This means that 
conclusions regarding efficiency easily become partial, at best. This is because the motives 
behind the various transactions vary to such a high degree, that the assessment of the 
efficiency at large cannot be undertaken in any one way.
294
 The methodology must not be 
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 In fact, this same line of reasoning could be applied to the UN. Against criticism of it being toothless, 
inefficient, bureaucratic, or even irrelevant in current world politics, one could present the case that the UN 
was set up to prevent a third world war, a mission that has arguably been achieved. Be that through the UN 
itself of through other forums where its member states function. And yes, this argument can be weakened by 
the counterfactual proposal that the outcome may have been true in a world without a UN, although this is of 
course impossible to prove.  
293
 Official development assistance is defined as financial flows to countries and territories on the DAC List 
of ODA Recipients (available at OECD no date) and to multilateral development institutions which are: i. 
provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. 
each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of 
at least 25 per cent (OECD 2008). In addition to official development aid, the OECD also holds a category of 
Official Aid, directed mainly at countries in transition. 
294
 For instance, assessing the efficiency of humanitarian aid in a disaster situation must be assessed 
differently from assessments regarding tied aid, standing for commitments by the recipient country to 
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limited to simple linear methods, or aggregate models, but rather, it must allow for country-
specific and situation-sensitive analysis. This opens up to the underlying argument of this 
chapter.  
The second note, and simultaneously reinforcing the above, is that in development policy 
documents, problem debt of poor countries is perceived largely as an ongoing development 
crisis. This is why including dimensions of official development aid into this thesis is 
important. The sub-questions then become if debt relief is to be seen as additionally, as 
complement or as substitute for aid.
295
   
Development aid is intended to balance either development phases of nations or regions, or 
to fill gaps in their economic structures. Debt emphasizes and widens such economic gaps 
(as seen in the previous chapter, falling terms-of-trade is among the tangible links between 
debt and economic gaps
296
). But filling gaps with aid or debt relief will not address the 
causes of the gaps.  It will neither alter the economic structures to prevent further debts 
from being created, nor will it lessen the need for aid in the future. The underlying 
argument being that arbitration of international debts would have helpful implications of 
efficiency and justice for not only the administration but also the use of official 
development aid resources.  
This chapter assesses the extent to which international arbitration of debts of poor countries 
would be helpful for development policy. The point of departure is development aid in 
general; in the separation of hard loans from grants, and debt relief from development aid, 
with the goal that implementing, in the long run, a systematic process of arbitrating 
problem debts of sovereigns, problem debt could arguably be cut off at its roots. Such an 
institutionalized process would decrease the need for debt relief and in turn, free more 
funding for development aid. Even if tables were cleared from odious and economically 
                                                                                                                                                    
purchase products and services from the donor. Assessing the efficiency of loans granted under the heading of 
development aid complicates the picture further.  
295
 Additionality was first brought up in chapter 2.  
296
 The flow of aid, a good USD 100 billion annually, is dwarfed by global trade (for a closer look at world 
trade, including figures, see chapter 5). Yet, as we have seen, falling terms of trade constitute an important 
reason behind the development aid machinery‘s existence.  
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unsustainable debt, meaning that debts would have been dealt with, there would still be a 
long way to go in the optimal restructuring of the world economy. Debt arbitration would, 
nevertheless, provide a first step towards other potential reforms, should these later be seen 
as necessary and appropriate. This first step would help placing aid into the territories and 
ensuring that it be used for what it was initially intended for – grants, and meeting the basic 
needs of the poor.  
This ties back to the discussion about charity (positive duties) versus obligations to correct 
past injustices as started in chapter 3. Inspiration is drawn from Eskelinen‘s (2009) 
observation that quite a few philosophers aligning themselves with the understanding of 
negative duties have not noted, that when speaking of negative duties, it is important to re-
evaluate what the concept of ―development‖ actually stands for.297 Therefore, and instead 
of development, he proposes that it would be useful to talk about a fair distribution of 
power and resources.
298
 It is here, and as part of this call, that the argument for introducing 
arbitration of international debts is seated. By tracing the emergence of development aid, its 
institutionalization and various mechanisms, development theory, and policy, are first 
discussed as part of the global financial mechanisms. Second, development aid as a 
negative duty is discussed and third, building on these discussions, it is assessed whether 
arbitration of debt would be useful, given the current development aid regime. 
6.1 Development thinking emerges 
Keynes‘s global plan formed the core of the proposals in the setting up of the Bretton 
Woods system, a system that rests on four pillars (as introduced in chapter 2 and developed 
in chapter 5). The first pillar was that of global macroeconomic monetary and fiscal 
management, and the second pillar came to be known as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or the World Bank, as discussed in chapter 2. 
The third pillar was the International Trade Organization, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. What is today called official development aid represents the fourth pillar of the 
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 Eskelinen argues that based on the history of development as a linear model, development as we know it 
today may not be what we should strive for.  
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 The concept of power and (re)distribution of resources falls outside my present scope, but have been well 
addressed by Eskelinen (2009), taking a development perspective. 
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envisaged Bretton Woods system, a pillar that was mentioned in chapter 2.
299
 It is now time 
to draw back the curtain and expose the plan for development aid, simultaneously allowing 
for a closer look at how the development system came about to be what it is today. 
Soft aid versus hard loans 
The fourth pillar of Keynes‘s plan rested on many assumptions as they would have emerged 
from the previously discussed pillars. This leg was meant to stand for a soft aid program, a 
program that was to be linked to the UN (Raffer and Singer 2001: 6). The aid program 
would have provided grants or loans on a highly concessional basis, or soft loans. Further, 
aid would not have been limited to fixed-term funding on a project basis. The counterpart 
of this program, a facility for lending, was to be administered through the IBRD, as part of 
the World Bank. In this way, soft lending, at cheap rates and on longer terms, was to 
complement business-lending at market rates. Following a drawn out political dance, in 
1960, the soft aid faculty was finally created in the form of the International Development 
Association, IDA, but, attached to the World Bank rather than to the UN.
300
 Whereas the 
IBRD and IDA now operate under the umbrella of the World Bank, perhaps the main 
difference between these two is that whereas the IBRD raises its funds primarily on the 
world's financial markets, the IDA is funded largely by contributions from the governments 
of its richer member countries. 
One can point to two specific consequences which followed these events (Raffer and Singer 
2001: 7). The first is the fact that the division of financial support is administered through 
the World Bank, whilst food and technical assistance is administered through the UN. The 
second is that this division in itself leads to a widening gap between the UN system and the 
Bretton Woods institutions. The UN was not to be entrusted with ―hard‖ instruments of 
development, including finance and macroeconomic policy making, but rather, this was to 
be administered by the Bretton Woods institutions with its weighted voting system under 
the control of the rich countries. In contrast, the UN was to be entrusted with ―soft‖ 
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 For a more detailed description of these legs, and pillars, see Raffer and Singer (2001: 2-7). 
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 For the story, see Raffer and Singer (2001: 6; 64-6). In the follow-up from these events, the UN became 
the host of two other organisations, the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, and the World 
Food Programme, WFP.  
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instruments, such as food aid, children, women, social policy, technical assistance and the 
environment. The soft financing, as in high concessionality, or the principle of self-
monitoring comparable to Marshall Plan terms for Europe, was not provided for poor 
countries, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s (Raffer and Singer 2001: 65).
301
  
Central to Keynes‘s thinking was his view that involuntary unemployment equaled a waste 
of resources, and output, as brought up in chapter 2 (Toye 2006: 984). This thinking can be 
generalized to include international involuntary unemployment. The ideas and intentions 
behind the creation of the international economic institutions were good, yet they gradually 
evolved over the years to become something very different to what was originally 
envisioned.
302
 The Keynesian orientation of the IMF, which emphasized market failures 
and the role for government in job creation, was replaced by the free market manta of the 
1980s, as part of the Washington Consensus, signaling a radically different approach to 
economic development and stabilization (Stiglitz 2002b: 16)
303
 What was missing was 
addressing particular global mechanisms, such as the specific accumulation of debt. The 
aim of such global mechanisms would be to bear the weight of the overall system also in 
times of hard economic situations. Instead, today, the World Bank group and the IMF 
operate almost perfectly in opposite ways from what Keynes had envisioned. For instance, 
the earlier structural adjustment programmes, or today‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers, PRSP, are not part of the charter of either organization.  
Adding to the deviations, it must be noted that the currently dominating free market 
ideology is built on the assumption of constantly increasing economic growth, a matter 
returned to in chapter 7. In relation to development, this assumption is problematic in two 
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 Yet, from a purely macroeconomic perspective, there was very little research examining the impact of aid 
on growth during this period. Rather, foreign aid was provided under the assumption that it could provide the 
necessary capital to propel poor countries into self-sustained growth. (McGillivray et al. 2006: 1033) The 
Marshall Plan is of course short-hand for the official European Recovery Program during 1947-51. The Plan 
is named after its initiator US Secretary of State George Marshall. 
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 Further, Keynes anticipated two modes of thinking that have subsequently become familiar in development 
economics, the isolation paradox and North-South modelling (Toye 2006: 994).  
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 Stiglitz defines the Washington Consensus as a consensus between the IMF, the World Bank and the US 
Treasury about the ―right‖ policies for developing countries. (2002b: 16) 
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ways. First, in the context of aid, among other things, the sums of aid are dependent on a 
circumstantial parallel in the donor country. This constitutes good reason to consider 
singling out the importance of promoting poor countries‘ investments into trade capacities. 
Against this, the low percentage of aid used for investment, only 1.5 per cent, is surprising 
(see Gore 2004; UNCTAD 2004b). Second, relying on economic growth in itself as a 
solution to poverty can be seen as confusing the ends and means of development, 
something Amartya Sen (1999: 36-37) has warned against. Often, economic growth is used 
as a synonym to development, a matter that has led to this confusion being widespread. 
Instead, Sen speaks of enhanced capabilities and freedom to pursue these, something 
addressed in chapter 3. 
A last conflict is seen in the dominating roles played by creditors and donors in the 
international system.
304
 Consequently, there has been a persistent call for democratic 
participation of donor countries in the multilateral system. At present, these calls are 
recognized under the heading of ―capacity building‖, in the shape of a range of instruments 
of donors‘ support − something returned to in a moment. Meanwhile, the bulk portion of 
development aid funds is channeled through the World Bank, an organization that is 
dominated by the rich donors. For the purposes of the present argument, this paints a 
picture of the structure of aid and the system it operates within.  
Gradually, development theory has branched out into economics and political science. 
Leading up to a discussion of the current usages, models and forms of development aid, it 
is in order to recall the humanitarian motives and ethical considerations that motivated the 
trajectory of development aid as we know it today.  
Development theory and development policy  
The speech in January 1949 by US president Harry S Truman, in connection to the 
inauguration of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, is seen as the founding 
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 Although this division remains, the composition of the camps is changing. The aid industry is becoming 
increasingly fragmented and at the same time, competitive. New donors, and lenders, include China, India, 
Slovenia and Thailand.  
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document of development policy.
305
 ―Development‖ was intended to offer technological 
solutions for social problems however without affecting social structures. The history of 
development, ever since Truman‘s speech, can be seen as a cyclical process where 
development aid organizations reluctantly but repeatedly expanded their understanding of 
what development was required and each time, they extended their agendas according to 
the new insights.  
The first aid programme after the war was the aforementioned Marshall Plan (Raffer and 
Singer 2001: 64). In contrast to the IBRD loans, the Marshall Plan operated almost entirely 
on a grant basis. It played a crucial role in setting a pattern for aid to poor countries later 
on. One example is the institution of counterpart funds, now a common feature associated 
with aid, including food aid (Raffer and Singer 2001: 65). Many guidelines and institutional 
arrangements for the subsequent aid programmes were developed under the Marshall Plan. 
In fact, alongside the setting up of the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions, 
representing a multilateral tendency in development assistance, the second major event in 
shaping development aid was the Marshall plan, which symbolized bilateral assistance 
(Kanbur 2006: 1563). Of course, the objective of both the Marshall Plan and the World 
Bank, was reconstruction of a war-ravaged Europe, not the development of the non-
industrialized world (Kanbur 2006: 1563). Truman‘s speech turned the attention to poor 
countries.  
Since 1949, development policy has developed both in a theoretical and in a practical sense. 
These can be group into both theoretical development of the concept, as well as into 
practical achievements conducted in is name. On the theory side, and in the political 
science departments, we have seen the regular surfacing of theories much resembling 
dominos being knocked down the previous piece. The theory informing development 
thinking can be divided into four distinct phases. It began with the aim of modernizing 
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 Some evidence of international aid can be traced to the classical antiquity. The roots to the modern concept 
discussed here begin in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries as the western powers considered their colonies and other 
poor countries. An example regarding Britain is the Colonial Development Act of 1929 with the aim of 
assisting colonial governments with their economies, however, under the overall aim of promoting British 
exports. Soon, this led to the setting up of the Colonial Development Cooperation. (Kanbur 2006: 1561) 
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undeveloped nations.
306
 This evolved into thinking of dependency relations between the 
rich and the poor where the rich exploit the poor for their own purpose.
307
 In turn, this led 
to the emergence of the world system theory with three groupings of nations, not only the 
rich and poor, but also a third middle group exploiting according to own interests.
308
 Soon, 
the state theory followed, only to point out the close connection between economy and 
politics and to stress the role of the state in the development process.
309
 Common for these 
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 The modernization theory stands for development being the outcome of a process that the rich nations have 
followed, and operates on the belief that development was central in the creation of modern individuals. 
Technology played a mayor part as it was seen as heralding growth. According to this line of thinking, the 
poor countries need support from, and model themselves upon the rich nations in order to learn and to 
advance.   
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 In the 1960s, and as criticism of the modernization theory, the dependency theory evolved, concerned 
largely with the notion of resources flowing from the ―periphery‖ of poor countries to the ―core‖ of rich 
nations. Because of this flow of resources, it is explained that the rich are rich on behalf of the poor. As a 
remedy, poor countries should reduce their interaction with the rich countries. This structuralist theory was 
developed by Hans Singer and Raúl Prebish, and related initially to the Latin American continent, saying that 
the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries relative to the developed countries had deteriorated over time: 
the underdeveloped countries were able to purchase fewer and fewer manufactured goods from the developed 
countries in exchange for a given quantity of their raw materials exports. Together they presented this theory 
under the concept of the Prebish-Singer thesis. (See Raffer and Singer 2001: 32-47) The dependency theory 
nullified the modernization theory by stating that it is impossible for the same process to lead to development 
in exploited countries. The criticism against the dependency theory is that is does not provide a viable 
solution to implement in terms of development. The theory does not acknowledge specificities within the 
periphery or vulnerability within the centre and develops no tools to observe changes within development. 
Other dependency theorists include Samir Amin and Kunibert Raffer.  
308
 As part of the criticism against dependency theory, world system analysis was born. This analysis divided 
the periferia and the centre further into a tri-modal system that consisted of the centre, the semi-periferia and 
the periferia. Exploitation goes from the centre via the semi-periferia to the periferia. The analysis focuses on 
inequality as a separate entity against growth in development and examines a change in the global capitalist 
system. The analysis is suspicious of the state and sees the state as an elite. It also says that one cannot equal 
industrialization and development. This thinking is perhaps most familiar through the work of Immanuel 
Wallerstein, along with Christopher Chase-Dunn and Kunibert Raffer.  
309
 The state theory was born as a result of mistrust in the World System-theory. The state theory builds upon 
the view that economy is intertwined with politics and thus, the launch of development is unique in each 
country. The approach is less confrontational than the previous analyses. Development is a function of the 
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theories is that the pragmatist, as in the policy-maker, or the economist, for that matter, 
finds little in them by way of helpful leads towards plotting a map of transformative 
politics.  
Instead, in parallel, and from an economic perspective, development aid has largely been 
seen as a filler of various gaps in the economies of poor countries (McGillivray et al. 2006: 
1033-37). Problem debt is a major cause of these gaps and an important part of this debt has 
its roots in the current and balance of payment accounts, or trade and international finance 
flows, of the debtors. Common for the various gap models is that usually, the sums are 
calculated on the basis of the willingness of the donors to donate, rather than on the needs 
of the recipients. 
The purpose of the initial focus on gaps was aimed at assessing the rate of economic growth 
by inadequate levels of saving and foreign exchange. Hence, the role of development aid is 
to fill these gaps. From the 1960s onwards, a series of gap models appeared. The first gap 
addressed excess supply of labor and indicated that growth is constrained only by the 
availability and productivity of capital (this is the Harrod-Domar growth model, the most 
well known gap model).
310
 A second gap was identified as a foreign exchange gap, noting 
that poor countries are unlikely to have the export earnings required to import capital goods 
for investment. A third gap was determined to be the capacity, or lack thereof, of poor 
countries to raise revenues to cover a desired level of investment. Thus, gap models assert 
that foreign aid can supplement savings, foreign exchange and domestic revenues. 
However, the condition which foreign aid must meet in order to be considered useful is that 
it be used for investment purposes. These gap mechanisms, however, are set by the donors 
and lenders, and are maintained and fine-tuned by the dominant countries in the 
international financial institutions, or the creditors and aid donors. I will later return to the 
interest of the donor in this process. However, gap theories remain contested. A case in 
point is provided by Kraay and Raddatz (2007) as a search for what they title, in general 
terms, poverty traps. They fail to find empirical evidence for poverty traps as a result of low 
                                                                                                                                                    
stability of the state and internal and external influences. State theorists see that the state should take charge in 
the development process.  
310
 Corbridge (1993: 26) explains the motivations behind official aid as a function of the Harrod-Domar 
model.  
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savings or low technology levels in poor countries. They conclude by questioning the 
relevance of arguments in favour of the scaling up of aid to the poorest countries, premised 
on the existence of such traps, a conclusion I will return to later in this chapter.  
Following the gap-models, the subsequent research has largely been about the impact of 
aid. The 1990s injected new life into economic development research. The World Bank 
(1998) came out with its Assessing Aid report.
311
 The report states that it does help to 
increase growth, but only in countries with sound economic management, or ―good 
governance‖.312 Burnside and Dollar (2004) call for good institutions in the recipient 
country as a condition for aid to have a positive effect on growth. Yet, the definition of 
good reform is to be made by the donors only. This is assumingly translated into good 
governance, a policy instrument implementing policy regimes in recipient countries. In 
addition, this is also consolidating the big step taken by the Bretton Woods institutions into 
the political area of the UN. With this report, the Bretton Woods institutions have started to 
make policy requirements, as opposed to economic ones.
313
  
The past 60 years since the Bretton Woods conference can be called the era of 
development. During this time, the immediate and central goals of policy preferences can 
be divided into three phases. This division takes us from theory to practical achievements. 
First, there was the need to restore and reconstruct Europe following World War II. The 
second phase was characterized by the passage from colonialization to globalization, 
including free trade agreements between rich and poor countries. The third phase was about 
development policies during the cold war, a phase that revolved around the perceived risk 
by the West that poor countries were sliding towards communism. In fact, the cold war may 
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 This report, in turn, draws on Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002). 
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 For an excellent summary of economic research on development, and on which this paragraph draws, see 
McGillivray et al. (2006: 1033-37)  
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 Of course, this picture is more nuanced than this indicates. To name two examples, Jomo KS and Ben Fine 
(2006) distinguish New Development Economics from development economics and Rodrik (2008) separates 
between macro-development economics and micro-development economics. With this, the point is merely to 
address debt relief in development, not the development of economics, or development economics.  
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have been the reason for providing aid (Raffer and Singer 2001: 66).
314
 With the thawing of 
the cold war, streams of development assistance changed. Not only did the by then habitual 
motives for support change, also the nature of the funding changed. This can be seen as 
supported by the view that initially, development funds decreased sharply following the end 
of the Cold War. Along with the consequent changing geopolitics and economics, a new 
phase of development aid was started. One of the changes was the merging of debt relief 
into development aid.  
Against the backdrop of shifting tides in the global political arena, one could also list the 
practical political achievements in concrete terms. The 1960s is often referred to as the first 
development decade. At this time, projects were large and sector and regional planning 
dominated. In the 1970s, the question arose as to whether growth could prevent poverty. 
This question led to a debate about growth hindrances, green values (the UN Environment 
Programme, UNEP, was born), and gender issues. The 1980s was ―the lost decade‖, 
remembered for the Brundtland-report in 1987.
315
 The trend of grand projects turned into a 
preference for small-scale projects. Under the heading of the Washington Consensus, the 
World Bank pushed structural adjustment programs as the IMF started writing formulaic 
recipes for counties. The heavy criticism of market-based approaches in the 1980s and 
1990s led to emphasizing poverty reduction as the ultimate objective, particularly in 
support of specific interventions, paving the ground for the current state of the aid and 
development debate (Kanbur 2006: 1568). In social and cultural terms, this was the decade 
of contradictions. In the 1990s, the concept of ―sustainable development‖ became 
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 The cold war is indeed seen as so central to development aid that aid can be grouped into two distinct 
phases, one looking at development aid during the cold war and another at the policies after the cold war 
(Raffer and Singer 2001; Raffer 2010). 
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 A contributing factor to the ―lost decade of development was the wrong diagnosis of the sovereign debt 
crisis (Garay Salamanca 2010). Beginning with the response to the financial crisis in the 1980s, the 
international financial institutions first treated the crisis as one of liquidity, as opposed to one of insolvency 
(Addison et al. 2004a: 5), and responded to the situation by issuing further loans to finance the paying of 
debts. Consequently, after having pushed active and massive lending towards poor countries, the creditors 
saw the accumulated debt burdens tip over into a debt crisis. Lending turned into crisis management, and 
opened the gates to a flood of research on poor countries and their debts. In hindsight, the failure to correctly 
diagnose the debt crisis meant that adequate solutions were not brought in on time. 
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popular.
316
 Global civil society gained strength and mobilized in particular around the debt 
problem of poor countries.
317
 It is here that problem debt of poor countries was cemented 
into its present place under development aid, rounding off a process that had started in the 
1980s, when debt relief was first issued as a type of aid (Kanbur 2006: 1564). This 
happened with the launching of the HIPC-initiative in 1996, tellingly entitled Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries, which combined high levels of debt with high levels of poverty. 
Moving along the chronology of development policies, the WTO was established and the 
EU expanded further. Free trade agreements were signed with increasing speed and a new 
vocabulary evolved around ―partnership‖, ―ownership‖, ―capacity building‖, and 
―networking‖. The first decade of the 2000s, could be described as the decade when 
globalization tore down walls between nations, but built them up within nations, one 
example being the growing gaps in income within nations.  
Debt relief becomes part of development aid  
Just as lenders started to gradually organize in the period that followed the creation of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, eventually institutionalizing their cooperation with the 
Development Assistance Committee, DAC; of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, OECD, in 1960 (see chapter 2), official donors set up a joint forum and 
established cooperative decision-making processes in development assistance (Suter and 
Stamm 1992: 647). The year 1960 was also the year when the IDA was created, as seen 
above.  
With the foundation of DAC in 1960, official donors set up a joint forum and established 
cooperative decision-making processes in development assistance. Official donors and 
international organizations promoted further cooperation in development aid by forming aid 
consortia, consultative groups and round tables. Commercial banks, largely dependent upon 
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 In the late 1990s, the types of aid moved towards sector support (Hjertholm and White 2000: 81). 
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 The concept and content of ―global civil society‖ requires further scrutiny. Global civil society may not be 
as ―global‖ as assumed (much of the activities are funded by NGOs and donors in the North, creating 
questions regarding dependency strings), see Kaldor et al. (2003). Further, a gradual invasion of the private 
onto the political merits analysis regarding the private versus public nature of civil society (some civil society 
organisations operate on funding from the private sector, thus questioning their political authenticity). 
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each other owing the system of interbank credits, provided the large loans, which sovereign 
borrowers needed jointly in the form of so-called syndicated credits. (Suter and Stamm 
1991: 647) Much like cooperation amongst lenders, the donor community is also made up 
of relatively few dominating actors. Today, the European Union and the United States 
together account for the provision of 80 per cent of the worldwide development assistance 
and 85 per cent of the humanitarian aid. Lenders maintain majority rights in the Bretton 
Woods system, and donors meet in DAC. The largest single aid provider is the World 
Bank.  
If 1960 was an important year defining coordination amongst lenders and donors in the 
process of how and when debt relief would become part of development aid, the 1980s was 
also a transformative decade. First, with the emergence of the debt crisis 1982, problem 
debt was linked to social conditions and deprivation. In the late 1980s, the Bruntland-
commission put this in writing by arguing that debt relief was not only as a precondition, 
but an urgent means, for achieving various social, economic and environmental policy 
objectives in poor countries (WCED 1987; UNICEF 1990).
318
 A series of analysis emerged 
outlining the fact that poor countries, the African continent in particular, actually paid more 
in debt services than they received in development aid. Furthermore, if all creditors 
deducted the costs of HIPC debt relief from their traditional aid budgets for HIPCs, this 
would imply that the HIPCs were paying for the debt relief in terms of reduced traditional 
aid (UNCTAD 2004a: 61). The final costs to the creditors would be zero, as would the net 
benefits to HIPC (UNCTAD 2004a: 61). Hence, an assessment of the allocation of costs of 
bilateral and especially of multilateral creditors is in order (UNCTAD 2004a: 61). This 
relates of course to the question of whether debt relief is additional to aid, which I pick up 
on soon.
319
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 A quarter of a century later, this still holds. Dabla-Norris et al (2004: 18-19) looks into the potential gain 
of social sectors from the resources released by debt relief. They conclude that on average, debt service is 
equivalent to 62-71 per cent of total public spending on education and health in the HIPCs.  
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 The issue of the efficiency, as in economic reasoning behind debt relief itself was analysed in chapter 2, 
and will not be returned to here. Instead, here I focus on the larger heading of development aid, under which 
det relief is placed today. 
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Second, and consequently, the 1980s was also the decade when the development doctrine 
and the aid doctrine melded into one, or where overall country policy was regarded to be 
the key determinant of development and where market oriented policies were regarded to 
be the superior to others (Kanbur 2006: 1567). Third, the 1980s saw structural adjustment 
peak, when transfers were made increasingly in the form of budget support and conditioned 
on policy reform conforming with the Washington Consensus (Kanbur 2006: 1567). Four, 
and still in the 1980s, the Latin American debt crisis was very much a part of the 
development and aid discourse. The same held for Africa. (Kanbur 2006: 1567-8) These 
structural conditions led to wide civil society uprisings, often with protest against debt 
burdens serving as the entrance point. Eventually this came to form a firm leg of what is 
now called global civil society.
320
 
Looking back at these events today, it is worth noting that civil society movements and 
groups have mobilized around the effort to influence the allocation of proceeds from debt 
relief in a way that they have not when it comes to allocations of traditional forms of aid, 
even when aid is transferred in the form of direct budget support. There is little, if any, 
attempt at making donor policy and the aid system proactively open to influence by systems 
of domestic accountability or by a wider group of recipient country stakeholders. The 
donors‘ aid effectiveness agenda stops short of making the aid system itself accountable to 
the poor, let alone of including them.
321
 (Northover 2010) 
Thus these events in the 1980s took place against a backdrop of active coordination 
between lenders and donors, who alternated in these roles. The incremental consolidation of 
common forums for lending and aiding, or for lenders and donors, meant it was only a step 
small to harmonise policies and conditions. The gradual process of attaching debt relief to 
development aid was completed with the HIPC-initiative, and is maintained in the MDRI. 
To qualify for debt relief under the HIPC-initiative and the MDRI, countries must 
demonstrate good economic management and implement sound development plans. This 
inevitably begs the question, what are sound, or good, development plans, something also 
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 For a specific analysis of civil society and problem debt, see chapter 3. 
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 Rather, in Ghana, the PRSP documents provide a rationale for the provision of general budget support. The 
PRSP process did not, however, contribute with sorting out the national decision-making processes, which 
were in disarray. (Whitfield 2010) 
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mentioned earlier as a prerequisite for aid as something similarly reflected in the proposal 
of Assessing Aid. It also opens to a discussion on sums, and the share of overall aid budgets 
allocated to debt relief.  
The short answer is that it is impossible under the current regime to separate sums of debt 
relief from development aid. What can be called the donors‘ benefit is returned to later in 
this chapter. Instead, here, the attention is turned to an important point of view, and suggest, 
aside from discussions on the administration and politics of aid, that the relationship 
between debt relief and aid requires careful investigation. Are they substitutes or 
complements to each other?  
One would agree with the assessment that part of the motivation for financial assistance to 
poor countries is to help the country promote its own development and to help it finance 
social services for its population, where it has insufficient resources to do so otherwise. 
This financial assistance comes either in the form of aid (grants) or debt relief. In the case 
of debt relief, it it motivated on the grounds of it freeing up budgetary resources that would 
otherwise be used to service that debt. Often, debt relief is a one-off permanent provision of 
help to the indebted country. These forms of grants or one off debt relief flows over time. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these forms of assistance. It is also true 
that they are in part at least, substitutes for each other. More debt relief provided by 
governments can and sometimes does reduce the resources available to support other forms 
of aid.
322
  
This idea of partial substitution of debt relief for aid must be considered carefully. 
Presbitero (2009: 532) suggests that in contrast to aid, debt relief does not consist of a 
direct inflow of fresh resources but a decline in debt service payments. This could reduce 
the negative effects of foreign aid leading to exchange rate overvaluation, or the so called 
Dutch disease.
323
 Therefore, and more specifically, the actual effect of debt relief depends 
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 For a discussion, see Boorman (2003: 2). 
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 Dutch disease stands for a situation when a country receives a large inflow of foreign currency, in this 
current context in the form of aid, and the higher exchange rate makes the own production less competitive 
internationally and risks leading the nations into economic difficulties. This occurs, for instance, if important 
amounts of development aid are channelled into a country. Related to the same point, Claessen (2010) asserts 
that replacing external debt with domestic debt, where middle income countries with domestic securities 
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on its being an alternate partial substitute for foreign aid. For instance, to the degree that 
debt relief, or foreign aid, generate a state of aid dependence in debtor countries, it could 
undermine the integrity of national institutions by encouraging corruption or distorting 
political accountability in general.  
A situation where a country is unable to meet its financial repayments becomes 
contradictory when looked at from a development aid point of view. If problem debt is 
written down or cancelled, this does not help the country meet its cash flows requirements 
for the day-to-day business of the nation. This is one of the reasons additional lending, or 
funding, may appear more attractive. This situation, where creditors lend additionally but 
do not forgive debts, is housed alongside discussions on substitutes and complements and 
was mentioned in chapter 2. Just as aid, also additionality may come in the form of loans or 
as development aid. This opens up to two considerations. First, if it comes as aid, it 
provides a vein for conditionality attached to the aid (see later in this chapter). Second, 
even if debt is forgiven, aid is useful to cover the short-term financial liquid needs of the 
debtor. This could mean that debt relief, which does not bring in resources to cover such 
liquid needs, may, in fact, trigger an increased need for aid.  
The relationship between aid and debt relief is also interesting the other way around. 
Without debt relief, for instance, it will be a challenge to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals, MDGs. On its own, aid does not have the potential to have positive 
impacts on both growth and poverty (Dalgaard and Erickson 2009). Instead, achieving the 
MDGs is heavily dependent on substantial debt cancellation and the provision of additional 
                                                                                                                                                    
markets have increasingly floated domestic bond issues in lieu of external borrowing, while even low-income 
countries have covered shortages in revenues (or delayed aid flows) with domestic debt, typically placed with 
banks. Ironically, governments of low income countries have done this to prevent Dutch disease, where 
income of aid flows raises the inflationary potential these surges bring with them. Thus, Claessen concludes 
that increased aid may trigger a swelling of the domestic debt. Ironically, as the international community is 
replacing loans with grants, the policy regarding the management of these inflows is leading to a new build-
up in debt. Claessen argues that one implication of Dutch disease is that there is a need for a new 
macroeconomic policy framework for managing aid inflows (see also Chapter 7). For a discussion in the 
context of international trade, see chapter 5. 
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resources to indebted nations (Pettifor and Greenhill 2002). In contrast, what seem to be in 
motion are parallel processes where governance increases and poverty, too (Gould 2005).  
Aid and debt relief share the notion/stigma that both easily create an aid-dependence in 
debtor countries, a dependence which could undermine the integrity of national institutions 
by weakening and distorting political accountability. In general, debt relief does not 
necessarily provide additional resources to recipient countries − hence the need for 
additionality, as seen earlier. This is particularly noteworthy in situations where debt relief 
concerns debt that was not going to be serviced in any case. Therefore, one conclusion is in 
tune with Gelpern‘s (2007: 103) view that debt relief does not end, but rather perpetuates 
the debtor-creditor relationship and increases creditor control. 
From a broader perspective, though, another conclusion is that the international financial 
architecture actually lacks an institution for international development (Sachs 1999: 15). 
Observations in this vein have led to calls for the setting up of a Global Development 
Organization (see for instance Horton 2002). While an analysis of this claim falls outside 
the present focus of this research, this observation will merely be build upon by 
highlighting the complicated webs that have been created under the heading of 
development aid. Introducing international arbitration of debts brings a promise of 
entangling at least some of these intertwined webs.  
But now, and before looking closer at the characteristics and consequences that shape the 
coherence and conditionality of development aid as a result of debt relief having been 
merged with aid, the discussion about negative duties will be extended (as introduced in 
chapter 3), this time with a specific mirroring against development aid.  
6.2 The international justice aspect of development aid 
Two big issues seriously affect poor countries‘ chances of rising out from under poverty. 
One is the amount of aid they get. The other is the amount of debt they repay.
324
 So far, this 
chapter has justified the separation of loans from grants. At this point, it is of interest to 
analyze what then determines foreign aid? And within this rough grouping, what 
determines debt relief?  
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  On their UK www site, Oxfam (no date) summarises poverty in these three sentences. 
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One main shortcoming of present development cooperation is that aid recipients are denied 
any form of protection common to other cases, national ones, for instance. Put differently, 
damage done by grave negligence has to be compensated in all cases unless in the context 
of development cooperation. (Raffer and Singer 2001: 246). Donors alone determine 
whether political conditionality, such as democracy, transparency, good governance, or 
participation was observed or not.
325
 Further, the opaqueness of these principles opens up 
the possibility of arbitrary decisions (Raffer and Singer 2001: 248). As seen before, Raffer 
(2004b) proposes holding the international financial institutions financially accountable for 
grave negligence. 
Another aspect of development aid is that from the outside, the aid machinery looks much 
like a compensatory mechanism for market failures.
326
 Market failures are addressed further 
in chapter 7, but in examining development aid, they are briefly introduced here. In the 
absence of market imperfections, classical economic models of general equilibrium have 
been used to demonstrate the merits of the market mechanism achieving economic 
efficiency (Sen 1999: 117). In this context, and in examining development aid, it is 
important to take note of the forms of aid. While assessment of specific instruments of aid 
is certainly of relevance, the more general concerns are central to understand. This is 
related, but not identical to, the underlying logic of gap models discussed before, which 
build on gaps between sectors. In a way, the mere existence of development aid could be 
taken as a recognition of market failures on the international level of the aggregate world 
economy.  
Development as a negative duty 
Amongst a broad set of moral approaches to poverty, in chapter 3 the decision to rely on 
frames provided by Pogge (2007; 2008a; and 2008b) was justified as the negative duties he 
discusses involve structural reforms of world systems. The argument has been posited 
                                                 
325
 Tied aid goes back to the 19
th
 century, and has not changed much in current practices (Kanbur 2006: 
1563). 
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 One example of this is technical assistance given in a number of forms. Alternatively, it comes as financial 
assistance under the condition that it be used to purchase the expertise of a donor country (Kanbur 2006: 
1579). Or, it comes as technical assistance to support or countries in their negotiation skills or the like. 
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within the framework of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as versus the Bretton 
Woods arrangements. The argument is that these two institutions are conflicting and that 
this is disadvantageous to poor and indebted nations. In comparison to the past, Pogge 
(2007: 3) argues that today, poverty is fundamentally different in context and causation. 
The persistence of poverty is not foisted on us by natural contingencies of soil, seeds or 
climate. Instead, its persistence is driven by the ways that economic interactions are 
structured. These structures are interlocking national and international institutional 
arrangements.  
More concretely, and in reference to chapter 3, Pogge calls for an end to harming the poor 
by a willingness to uphold a global economic order under which severe poverty exists and 
persists on a massive scale. He sees that it is this violation of a negative duty that should be 
outlawed first and foremost. Doing so would implement Article 28 of the (albeit legally 
non-binding) Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ―Everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realized.‖ Currently, this Article is being violated on a massive scale.  
Underlying the call to no longer cause harm to the poor lies the dimension of recognizing 
the circumstances of the poor today having been significantly shaped by a dramatic period 
of conquest and colonialization, with severe oppression, enslavement, even genocide, 
through which the native institutions and cultures of four continents were destroyed or 
severely traumatized. This is not to say that affluent descendents of those who took part in 
these crimes bear some special restitutive responsibility towards impoverished descendants 
of those who were victims of these crimes. Rather, the thought is that the rich must not 
uphold extreme inequality in social starting positions when the allocation of these positions 
depends upon historical processes in which moral principles and legal rules were massively 
violated. A deeply tarnished moral history should not be allowed to result in radical 
inequality. (Pogge 2008b: 209) 
A qualification concerning the scope of this argument is in order. Some supporters of the 
present distribution pattern claim that even if Africa had not been colonized, the standard of 
living, in Europe and Africa for instance, would roughly be the same anyways. Even if this 
claim were both clear and true, it would still be flawed, because Pogge‘s argument applies 
to persons, not continents. Without colonialization and enslavement, affluence and poverty 
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would still coexist. But these would be persons and populations quite different from those 
now actually living there. This means that starving Africans cannot be told that they would 
nevertheless be starving and the present rich would nevertheless be affluent even if the 
crimes of colonization had never occurred. Without these crimes, there could not be the 
actually existing radical inequality which has resulted in these persons being affluent and 
those being extremely poor. Thus, the existing radical inequality is unjust, and being 
complicit in upholding it violates a negative duty, providing an urgent moral reason for the 
eradication of world poverty. (Pogge 2008b: 210)
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In this regard, Sen (1999: 11) follows a similar direction to Pogge, but takes a less 
confrontational stance and suggests that the empirical connections between the political, 
economic and social rights reinforce the valuational priorities. His freedom-centered 
understanding of economics and of the process of development is very much an agent-
oriented view. With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their 
own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of 
the benefits, or less positive consequences, of development programs. There is indeed a 
strong rationale for reorganizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – and even 
of constructive impatience.   
But this may not be enough. Also general ―good‖ intentions, despite the sincerity with 
which they are employed, at times miss the mark. If anything, this is reason to think harder, 
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 In this connection, but in reply the question of how relevant it is to speak about human rights and 
democracy, when it is widely known that the real threat to the Arab-African world is its economic and social 
divide, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former secretary general of the UN replies: 
―One of the obstacles to democratization and to the protection of human rights is the great suffering of the 
countries of the Third World. Someone who can neither read nor write is not interested in the freedom of the 
press. Someone who has never left their village has little use for a passport to be able to travel. Having said 
that, there is a common denominator of human rights insofar as all human beings are [sic] similar: we all have 
parents and one day, we will all die. Let‘s take the example of an agricultural worker from the South; 
although he has nothing in common with a billionaire from California, the fact that they are both persons, 
ensures that they have the same rights because they are of the same kind. Despite the billionaire‘s wealth, he 
or she will die one day and so will the agricultural worker. The human condition here is the same. The 
language of humanity is that of human rights. One cannot be allowed to help underdeveloped countries if the 
principle that human rights are universal rights is not respected.‖ (UNESCO 2009) 
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rather than less, about world poverty and ways of tackling it (Pogge 2008b: 8). It is also 
reason to push the boundaries and limitations of thinking about global policies and 
institutions. In doing so, a few paths emerge. In this context, however, it is important to 
note that, the at times well-justified questioning of development policies or outcomes, 
cannot conclude that official development aid as such should end, or be drastically cut 
down. In fact, one should ardently oppose such proposals (as highlighted by Kraay and 
Raddatz 2007 earlier). In contrast, and based on the observation that the number of poor 
people is increasing, rather than decreasing, and be that from a perspective of negative or 
positive duties, the outcome should be that development aid must be increased. The issue 
then becomes, in what form that should be. Are voluntary transfers from the rich to the poor 
enough or should universally binding agreements be put in place (as discussed in chapter 
3). 
Logically, at the other end of the spectrum, arguments for the continued and indefinite 
giving of aid have obvious weaknesses. Rawls (1993) argues that whereas aid should be 
given to governments who are unable to protect human rights for economic reasons, the 
purpose of this aid is to ensure that these states are able to maintain appropriate political 
institutions. He also saw that the purpose of aid is not to achieve an eventual state of global 
equality. Instead, he argued that continued indefinite aid would create a moral hazard 
problem where recipient governments would spend irresponsibly knowing that they would 
be bailed out. For this reason of moral hazard, and for the reason of avoiding aid fatigue 
among donors, it is important to steer a certain percentage of aid into investments 
promoting local and national development in the poor countries. Also for the same reasons, 
and to prepare for possible future global transformations, it is important to sort out the 
conceptual issues within the aid system, beyond merely separating soft aid from hard aid. 
Two examples assist in explaining this. First, based on Pettifor‘s account of the Jubilee 
2000 campaign, Gould (2008: 5) argues that the Jubilee 2000 campaign represented the first 
large scale, coordinated effort to politicize aid and demand greater accountability for the 
performance of aid on behalf of the development industry. Gould‘s analysis is that the 
creditor industry responded with great haste to pre-empt the full-scale politicization of 
development aid with the HIPC initiative. And, he notes, that while HIPC wrote off debts, 
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the industry‘s basic financial management practices were left intact.328 Second, another 
stream of discussion links foreign aid to odious debt. Gelpern (2007: 90) ventures into the 
territory of foreign assistance by way of relating odious debt to debt relief. This vein must 
be acknowledged as problematic, both for reasons of regime labeling as well as of blurring 
the focus, where the object becomes the borrowing regime rather than the debt itself (as 
analyzed in chapter 4). Here, it is time to steer the discussion further onto this more tangible 
ground, by picking up Eskelinen‘s (2009) point, that not only must the term ―development‖ 
be clarified, but an analysis of the distribution of power and fairness is also appropriate.  
For moral reasons alone, we should not be satisfied with the aim of lifting debt burdens as a 
question of charity, goodwill or public relations. In addition to reasons of guilt or pity, 
creditors may also implement debt relief as a reaction to more selfish motivations, such as 
measures to prevent a meltdown of the financial markets and to protect the creditors‘ own 
interests. As for the present, with the introduction of partnership and ownership, the 
optimist might detect at least a semantic promise of a striving towards more equitable 
relations. Here, one option would have been to move in the direction of negative duties. 
This has not materialized, and this fact will be used as impetus for an analysis of the 
rationale of the donor.  
The donor’s interest  
From an economist‘s perspective, in a standard neo-classical competitive model with a 
closed system of general equilibrium, the welfare of the donor risks being disturbed by 
making a transfer to a recipient nation. This leads to the incentives behind a system of 
development aid in the first place. The literature supports the assertion that in a system with 
two or more parties, both donors and recipients can be better off when then post-transfer 
equilibrium terms of trade are different, even if there are no distortions. In addition, in an 
interdependent world, negative outcomes in one country quickly spill over to others. This 
would provide rich countries with an incentive of providing development aid simply to 
assure that these negative outcomes do not happen. (For a discussion see Kanbur 2006: 
1570) 
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 Debt relief, including the HIPC initiative, were analysed closer in chapter 2.  
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In practice though, aid also includes loans. Here, and for lending governments, the form of 
the debt, or aid, has both a domestic political function and a foreign-policy function. 
(Gelpern 2007: 99-100). For the donor, when reporting back to its people, it is politically 
easier to provide a poor country with a loan instead of a grant. In looking at the incentives 
motivating donors‘ to grant non-reimbursable aid in particular, Chong and Gradstein (2008) 
conclude that aid generosity is found to be mainly effected by the donor government‘s 
efficiency and less by the recipient one. A direct reason for asking about this efficiency of 
development aid is its relevance for Western taxpayers in the continued provision of aid 
flow.
329
 Discussion about taxation and its role as a resource for development aid also 
awakens discussion about the rule of law (Raffer and Singer 2001: 109). Has income from 
taxation been used by donors in an efficient, law-abiding and appropriate way? An 
examination of global institutions and arrangements could lead to new insights and the 
possible identification of systemic mechanisms causing and maintaining worldwide 
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 Apart from the efficiency argument, official aid is also dependent on the amount that donor nations 
accumulate in tax. Increasingly, donors find themselves under pressure to lower taxation in a bid to strengthen 
their international competitiveness.  On a national level, this is found in the Prime Minister‘s Office of 
Finland (2004: 127) calling for attention to domestic taxation levels as a means to make outsourcing to low-
taxation countries less appealing. On an aggregate international level, in the 30 wealthiest countries, corporate 
taxes went down from 37.5 pro cent in 1996 to 30.8 pro cent in 2003 (World Commission on the Social 
Dimensions of Globalization 2004: §193). In parallel to the taxation per centage for corporations, 
corporations have narrowed their tax base, partly by means of tax evasion. Yet, the fact remains that the main 
source of income for nations is their tax income. If the tax base narrows, nations look for new or 
compensating tax bases. This is one of the inspirations behind talks about global taxation in various forms, 
most recently in connection to the global finance crisis of 2008. Again, in these discussions, it is important to 
separate between three different goals. First, there are taxes or fees potentially implemented as means to 
attract funding for development, or other particular causes. An example is fees on air fares which are intended 
to go towards actions decreasing global warming. Second, there are measures aimed at regulating particular 
activities, for instance financial speculation. For example, taxes on financial speculation. And third, there are 
measures aimed at launching a process towards some form of global democratization under schemes of 
universally agreed binding contracts. An example of this could be a certain form of tax on financial 
speculation. Connecting this discussion to international lending, it is interesting to note that such a pool of 
funds that these measures would attract could potentially be given the function of an international lender. For 
an economic assessment of the donors‘ perspective in determining foreign aid, including a review of previous 
work, see Chong and Gradstein (2008). 
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poverty. It could also lead to new insights and action regarding the active and acute need 
for rich nations to make some fundamental moves towards the eradication of poverty. 
Pointing in similar directions, and addressing aid itself, Raffer and Singer (2001: 74-5) 
argue that aid does not necessary help anyone, except for donors themselves. This is seen, 
for instance, in mechanisms such as the minimum grant element, which makes over-
charging the concessions of an ODA loan, resulting in a combination of profit with charity, 
they write. Fowler (1998: 140) sees this in yet stronger ways, that the use of the term 
partnership by international financial institutions like the World Bank is not premised on 
solidarity but on building relations with non-state actors to improve lending performance, 
the core of its business. This takes us to a further dimension, a dimension found in 
numbers.  
Today, development programs funded by official development assistance are multi-faceted 
and widespread. They cover most aspects of human endeavor and, at least in their 
formulation, are meant to overcome poverty and its consequences. Development aid has 
had lean periods, and the results of development-funded programs have sometimes failed to 
meet their stated goals. Following the end of the Cold War and until the early 2000s, 
official development aid declined gradually. From then onwards however, official aid has 
grown. In fact, in 2008 the net combined aid of major donor nations that form the DAC, as 
mentioned above, exceeded USD 120 billion (OECD 2009). This is the highest amount of 
DAC/OECD assistance ever. Yet, official development aid accounts for a relatively small 
part of the recipient government‘s budget.330 
But what then does development aid transferred in such sums entail? Action Aid (2005) 
questions aid accounting assumptions and lists massive aid delivery inefficiencies 
connected to distorted donor policies on a general level. These include hidden charges and 
costs bringing the true value of aid down to less than half of the sums listed in the official 
statistics released by DAC. Along the same lines, war, repression, human rights violations 
and the destruction of the environment have all been funded by aid donations (Raffer and 
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 In over 70 per cent of recipient countries, aid accounts for less than ten per cent of public expenditures 
(Picciotto 2006: 13). 
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Singer 2001: 64-98). This means that aid, in the sense of real help, has certainly always 
been lower than donors‘ figures have implied.331   
The blending of sums of debt relief into those of development aid has already been referred 
to. Not only are these accounted for together, the varying accounting systems of donors 
differ.
332
 Some guidance is found in Action Aid (2005: 28), a report that concludes that four 
per cent of French development assistance in the year 2003 was made up of debt relief. 
This they call ―phantom aid‖. For one, debt relief, where debt repayments are not made, 
does not create fiscal space or allocation of real resources by donors. This highlights one of 
the underlying themes of this chapter, that separating debt relief from development aid 
could make aid more efficient.  
Looking back in time then, the proposal to set up a UN Fund for Economic Development, 
UNFED, in addition to mirroring Keynes‘s ideas and following the Marshall-plan, would 
also have provided a channel for Europe to fulfill its moral obligation of helping poor 
countries. The system which was eventually adopted leads to a few important issues worth 
discussing from the recipients‘ point of view. 
The recipient’s interest 
From the recipient‘s point of view, the volatility of aid is a general concern (Bulíř et al. 
2008). A specific concern in that the influence of aid has been procyclical and not 
countercyclical, aid has failed to act either as a stabilizing force or as an insurance 
mechanism (Bulíř and Hamann 2008). As a counter measure Bulíř and Hamann (2008) see 
that recipient countries could, among other things, build in cushions of international 
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 Pogge‘s (2008b) initiative arguing for a Global Resource Dividend (as first brought up in Chapter 5), 
which, by avoiding ―any appearance of arrogant generosity […] it merely incorporates into our global 
institutional order the moral claim of the poor to partake in the benefits from the use of the planetary 
resources‖ (Pogge 2008b: 213). In addition, the GRD would also be vastly more efficient than the 
disbursement of conventional official aid. GRD would entail taking a step back from present development aid 
as governed by political consideration. 
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 As said in a policy document by the Australian Agency for International Development, Ausaid, responsible 
for managing Australian Foreign Aid: ―Debt relief is a very good way to provide aid and is recognized by the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD as Official Development Assistance‖ (Ausaid 2007). 
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reserves to draw on in compensation for shortfalls in aid or other sources of budgetary 
revenue. Eifert and Gelb (2008) specify that such buffer stocks would have to be of the 
order of 50-100 per cent of annual aid-financed spending. They also write that further 
research into the reason for the unpredictability of aid is needed.
333
  
The prevailing frameworks of development aid are much too binary to be useful – rather, 
they obscure the substance of the underlying economic and political relationships (see 
Gelpern 2007: 104). In effect, these relationships link closely to the underlying powers in 
the international lending system, or the illegitimacy of the lending system, a discussion that 
emerges in discourse about odious debt (Soederberg 2005; Backer 2007; see also chapter 
4),  
Two points regarding the scope of aid should be carefully examined. The first is that if the 
presently topical terms of ownership and partnership are to be taken seriously, donors have 
to accept that in the future, programmes need to be country-specific. Standard programmes 
and reforms should be replaced with a better fit against the economic, political and social 
conditions prevalent in the recipient country. (Hermes and Lensink 2009: 14) Second, and 
in contrast to trade inflows, aid does not just flow naturally into the recipient country‘s 
economy. Rather, it flows to the government of the country, and is controlled and disposed 
by the rulers. This ruling group may be representing an elite of the population, who may not 
have the interests of the population at large among its first priorities. This point is 
addressed by Stiglitz (2002b), who calls for control of development processes to the 
recipient countries, to ensure that the aid be society-wide. This is in contrast to the present 
system, he says, where aid reaches the elite through ideologically driven standard processes 
employed by the IMF and the World Bank.  
As for technical assistance, the main concern is that the incentives for the system are geared 
towards continuing technical assistance rather than strengthening the local capacity 
building. This means that the form of assistance turns out to be not one that builds local 
capacity to carry on, but that ensures that the need for technical assistance remains 
continuously unsatisfied. (Kanbur 2006: 1579) 
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A related aspect is that through the mechanisms donors adopt to track and monitor aid 
flows, their reporting systems become quite intensive, and intrusive, for the recipient 
country (Kanbur 2006: 1579).
334
 Necessary as it may be for reasons of accounting and 
transparency, the project reporting is nevertheless remarkably time-consuming. The matter 
is complicated by the fact that the differences in reporting systems vary according to the 
donors, and the negotiation of contracts themselves require extensive investment of time. 
This carries the risk that the negotiators find themselves convincing aid agencies of 
maintaining the aid flow turning this aim into a superior driving force in itself, rather than 
listening to the domestic populations and local domestic agenda. Further, fragmented aid 
flows from multiple donors add to the complication. Not only can advice be contradictory, 
and ultimately lead to contradicting sets of conditionalities, but also the supplied technical 
equipment by different donors risks being incompatible. While this inspires calls for 
coherence, the response of creating a donor cartel can be equally problematic. Multiple 
donors versus individual recipients place donors in a dominant position in any negotiation. 
Ultimately, a recipient facing a cartel of donors leads to a situation where donors‘ agendas 
suppress the local one. Apart from problems of a political nature, for example of enforcing 
political processes by way of conditionality (addressed in chapter 3), it can also lead to 
suppressed innovation in the local economy. The question then becomes how to balance 
between the twin extremes of fragmentation and a donors‘ cartel. (Kanbur 2006: 1579-80) 
6.3 Aid and arbitration of international debt 
As a side show to traditional international lending and development aid, we note a set of 
other operations. Large sums of international financial transfers move in the counter 
direction of aid and loans, or from the South to the North. Significant amounts of untaxed 
money exit poor countries, and head for rich countries. This presents two main problems. 
First, tax revenues escape poor countries. Second, placing this against the flows of 
development aid originating from tax payers in the North, one could draw the conclusion 
that some of this money could be substituted by allowing the port to tax the flows directly. 
Clearly, it is a contradiction to support increased development assistance, yet turn a blind 
eye to actions by multinationals and others that undermine the tax base of a developing 
country (Eurodad no date b). 
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236 
 
These reversed financial flows can be divided into two groups (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
2006: 5). First, there is doubt surrounding the activity generating the financial flows in the 
first place, including corruption, tax evasion and criminal activities. Second, a number of 
financial flows are unrecorded, meaning that they escape capital controls in place. 
Unrecorded financial flows are also referred to as illicit financial flows, or funds intended 
to disappear from any record in the country of origin and earnings on the stock of illegal 
flight capital outside of a country that do not normally return to the country of origin. 
On coherence – and conditionality 
Increasingly development cooperation has intensified and been streamlined, most recently 
in the Accra Agenda for Action and the Paris Agenda for Effectiveness. These documents 
aim to increase the coherence of donors‘ development policies as a mechanism to assist in 
eradicating problems with the quality of aid. The processes leading up to and the 
consequences of the cooperation of creditors have been addressed earlier and will be 
returned to later (in chapters 2 and 7). This cooperation of donors leads to similar concerns, 
amongst other things, agendas imposed upon the problem debtors by donors. Perhaps most 
importantly, it builds on reasons for being skeptical towards the possibility, or the 
desirability, of coherence in itself as a policy goal.  Aims at policy coherence translate into 
a preference for one policy line to the exclusion of others, and suffocates potential political 
outcomes in advance. Even more so, coherence can be seen as the promotion of a single 
vision of international development (as concluded by Carbone 2010, looking at aid 
coordination by the EU). This stands in contrast to seeing national policy-making as the 
political process it is.  
A vast literature on aid allocation show how foreign aid mainly responds to political 
incentives (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Recent trends in development policy are increasing 
selectivity of aid allocation in terms of democracy and rule of law (Dollar and Levin 2006). 
Democracy is, above all, pluralism, and the sharing of power between different points of 
view and opinions. In development policy documents, development and democracy are 
inevitably linked. The priority order varies, in some countries where there is extreme 
poverty, development must come first, whereas in authoritarian regimes, democracy should 
come first. Coherence in itself does not bring with it democracy. In contrast, coherence can 
strengthen non-democratic power relationships. This means that the step from coherence to 
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conditionality is small. Conditionality is not only an issue related to debt relief, as 
discussed in chapter 3. In development aid, we can detect a similar pattern. Conditionality 
can be split into two. First, one can ask what the conditions of conditionality are. Second, 
one can ask if the recipient of aid should adhere to these conditions.
335
 These are important 
questions in any discussion concerning conditionality. Regarding the impact of both aid and 
debt relief, it is not difficult to identify research showing that average aid has had little 
impact on growth (for instance Burnside and Dollar 2000: 864).  
Another way of trying to sift through the discussion about conditionality is to turn to direct 
budget support as a way to give aid. In the 1960s, discussions about the potential harm of 
so called ―food aid‖ in poor countries surfaced. The argument being that food aid harms the 
local agricultural production. This ignited a discussion on aid as specific projects versus 
over all budget support for the recipient country (Singer 1965). Direct budget support, 
however, lifts the question of conditionality to a higher level, that of conditioning the broad 
policies of the recipient country, instead of more targeted project specific conditionings. 
Apart from specific instruments of development aid, such as budget support, two distinct 
ways of exploring development should be addressed. 
The clash between soft and hard development? 
One way of redefining development (as called for by Eskelinen (2009) in connection with 
negative duties, or for reasons of understanding approaches more generally), is to look at 
how development is perceived today. This is approached from two practical policy 
perspectives.  
At times, aid can have the exact opposite effect of its intention. For reasons of balance, and 
since economists have so far been relatively more frequently cited than other scientists, the 
choice is here to refer to Elwert and Biershenk (1988), whose work explores the liberation 
struggle in Guinea Bissau in the 1960s and 1970s. There, they argue that, because of the 
intervention of international aid, the central administration was ultimately strengthened and 
disassociated from the grass roots. In other words, the development aid intervention ended 
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conditionality. This highlights a need for an economic analysis of aid contracting. (Azam and Laffont 2003) 
238 
 
up having the exact opposite consequences than what was intended. In addition to causing 
opposite effects, Elwert and Biershenk (1988) posit that interventions are unpredictable. 
This is similar to Hanna Arendt‘s (1963: chapter 3) thinking when she explains that 
(political) action can never be predicted. Here, her statement is stretched further, to reflect 
that the outcome of political action is equally unpredictable. This also recalls Sen‘s work on 
unintended consequences regarding social choice and individual behavior (1999: chapter 
11, especially 254-7), where among other things, he underlines that the unintended 
consequence is unpredictable, and unanticipated. In contrast to Elwert and Bierschenk who 
see unpredictability as a negative, Arendt and Sen see unpredictability, or the unanticipated, 
also as a possibility – it is possible that the unexpected and unintended is positive. In a 
laboratory, of course, discoveries are made also as a consequence of unintended action. 
Importantly, could it be that so-called development interventions are planned according to 
the closed system qualification of ceteris paribus
336
 as often relied upon in economics? In 
terms of development interventions, and placing action in a ceteris paribus framework, the 
unintended is left outside the scope of interest. A related point is found in the approach of 
economics, where risk is divided into two components, risk and uncertainty. Here, the risk 
can be calculated and the uncertain can be estimated according to probability functions. But 
in this equation, there is no space for the unpredictable.  Closed system economic models 
may not be the most appropriate tool for planning and assessing development 
interventions.
337
 Put differently, where economics strive for stable societies, in order to 
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 Ceteris paribus stands for all other being equal and means that one looks at the changes caused by a certain 
factor assuming the other factors remain the same.   
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 One explanation for the scant overlap between different disciplines could be a lack of multidisciplinary 
training. An example is provided in Politics. A very short introduction (Minogue 1995: 55), where economics 
is described as a positive-sum game, where everyone gets richer, and in opposition to a zero-sum game, where 
one person‘s loss is another person‘s gain. In this positive-sum game, the choice is portrayed as being 
between the degrees of riches among the players, but cleaner water, more food and better health care is 
available to all. The problem with this analysis is at least twofold. First, on a global level, the overall 
economic growth is built upon decreases in certain areas compensated by increases elsewhere. This is very 
much a zero-sum game. Second, today there are more poor people on the planet than ever before. While it is 
true that better health care options are available now than before, these services are certainly not automatically 
available to everyone according to their own choice, or even on a basic level.  
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make ceteris paribus predictions, Arendt can be read as political theory proposing the exact 
opposite.
338
  
What is more, Cooper and Packard (1997) discuss the uses and dangers of development as a 
discourse and practice. The development concept can be located at historic junctures, 
understood in relation to intellectual trends, shifts in global economic structures, political 
exigencies and institutional dynamics. The triumph of one model over another is 
questionable. To date, the development framework has excluded many questions quite 
germane to questions of poverty, power and change. And although there are conflicting 
reports regarding the absolute and relative changes in poverty, one can safely say that 
poverty has certainly not been eliminated. Looking beyond the closed framework for 
development interventions, we note that the peoples of the world are facing financial 
instability, food riots due to increasing food prices, and the many consequences of global 
warming. Maybe future challenges will not be about what the rich countries today call 
―development‖ in poor regions, but rather about survival for all. With this in mind, and 
from a donor perspective, and recalling the security aspect, there is certainly merit in 
investing further thought into the setting up of a system addressing collection and 
redistribution of resources on a global level.  
With these concerns over the intent of the idea of development and practice of development 
as intervention at the fore, perhaps it would indeed be useful to rethink the concepts? If so, 
a first obvious issue is to acknowledge the separate roles and dependency relationship 
between donor and receiver, or lender and borrower. In international lending, this 
imbalance could be addressed through some form of international rights based system 
regarding the control of the resources, the formulation of the intentions, in the sense of 
what outcome donors are hoping for, and interventions. Continuing the example of debt 
relief, Hanlon (2006), estimates that up to one third of poor countries‘ debts has been 
granted on suspicious, and potentially odious, grounds. This would make way for moral 
and judicial incentives to establish a debt resolution system that would allow for rights also 
for the indebted. It can be repeated that rule of law, as taken for granted in national 
contexts, could also be implemented in international contexts. Amongst other unexpected 
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 For instance, the well-cited Burnside and Dollar (2002) conclude that aid is only effective in sound policy 
environments.  
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consequences, international rule of law would give way to the potential of open public 
debates including in the rich donor countries.  
The focus of one debate might be the work of, Gunter et al. (2008), who, in looking 
specifically at the relationship between debt relief and development aid, warned against the 
possibility of undesired consequences of new debt relief initiatives. More specifically, 
under certain circumstances, debt relief in its recent shapes of HIPC and MDRI, may have 
some negative implications on future aid allocations for HIPCs or non-HIPCs. In response, 
Gunter et al. highlights the importance of providing aid, recalling the target of 0.7 per cent 
of the gross national income of rich countries also post-HIPC and MDRI.  
A second debate could focus on the goal of rich nations allocating 0.7 per cent of their 
gross national income (GNI) to development aid as an issue unto itself. Despite its 
durability and seeming simplicity, the aid target of 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) no longer makes sense as a benchmark that rich countries should devote to helping 
poor ones. This is the case for three basic reasons: the world has changed radically since the 
target was initially set; the method for arriving at the target is no longer considered 
credible; and the seemingly backward premise of determining the correct size of aid flows 
to poor countries based on the size of rich economies. (Clemens and Moss 2005: 11)
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Meanwhile, extending the timeframe for implementing an orderly debt renegotiating 
mechanism only extends the suffering and economic hardship in poor countries. It serves as 
a central hindrance to the implementation of policies lifting countries out of poverty. It also 
decreases the amount reimbursed to creditors (Raffer 2007: 245). At least, in the short run, 
it might be encouraged that loans include a clause that the loans are subject for international 
arbitration upon signing new credit agreements. 
Arbitration and development aid  
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 As noted in chapter 4, the amount of debt relief is statistically related to the amount of accumulated debt, 
but not to the degree of poverty in the country (Cappelen et al. 2007: 151-66). Similarly, if poverty was a non-
responsibility factor, creditors should have forgiven relatively more debt in poorer countries (Herman 2007: 
797).  
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It is important to recall that underlying the argument of this thesis is a larger point. The 
introduction of an international debt arbitration mechanism is not restricted to dealing with 
past or present debts, but also with future lending and borrowing. Consequently, this would 
affect both the need for development aid operations and the way they are to be dealt with, 
in several ways.  
First, continual mitigation of poverty leads to aid fatigue, aversion and perhaps even 
contempt towards aid (Pogge 2008b: 218). The desire to better improve upon and redefine 
development must be rallied over and over again. Still, no matter how much the persons in 
the donor countries are giving, they could always give just a little bit more to save another 
starved or sick child.   
Second, the inefficiency of conventional development aid is also sustained by the 
competitive situation among the donor governments, who feel morally entitled to decline to 
do more by pointing to their even less generous competitors.
340
 This explanation supports 
the optimistic assumption that the affluent societies would be prepared, in joint reciprocity, 
to commit themselves to more than what they tend to do each on its own. (Pogge 2008b: 
218) 
So far, debt relief has not led to a sufficient decreased in debt burdens (Mandel 2006: 7, 8; 
UNCTAD 2009; see also chapter 2), and that this claim is maintained not only by civil 
society but also by those concluding that lighter debt burdens are an essential partner to 
official development aid. This argument holds also the other way around, so that in the 
present regime, official development constitutes an essential partner to debt relief 
(Ndikumana 2004). Simultaneously, this is a comment on poverty traps, as alluded to 
before. The mere filling of various gaps will not bring lasting change unless the structures 
causing the gaps are redesigned.  
Out of these observations four main conclusions regarding the situating of debt relief within 
development aid can be drawn. First, in the case of poor countries, problem debt is 
complicated and must be seen in the broader context of not only the entire package of 
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 In this context, ―competitors‖ stand for other donor governments both in the sense of them donating money 
with a side wards glance at their neighbor‘s generosity and in the sense of donor governments observing their 
position in the tax competition game, as mentioned earlier.  
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financial assistance the indebted country may be receiving, but also in the context of 
mechanisms of the world economy. 
Second, Bulow (2002: 252-3) proposes separating foreign aid from debt relief, where a 
country‘s borrowing capacity is based on market factors, such as the strength of its own 
property rights system and the attractiveness of investment in the country. By following an 
integrated program of switching the hard loans to aid and switching jurisdiction over all 
future international debt to borrower-country courts, we would probably reduce the 
maximum amount a country could borrow, although this might be partly offset by increases 
in other types of private investment that would no longer be crowded out by debt. Debt 
restructuring would probably surface at lower levels of debt. But in return the process 
might be less painful, because all foreign and domestic creditors could be treated under the 
same system. However, the ultimate goal is not to increase (or to decrease) capital flows 
but to foster trade and encourage efficient investment.
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Third, and more precisely, at least some of the outstanding loans should be turned into 
grants. If considering loans by IDA, for example, and as mentioned, its loans are not raised 
on the financial markets, but rather, constitute of contributions from its member countries. 
Turning these loans into grants would neither cause credit losses for anyone, nor would it 
affect the borrower‘s future access to credit markets. Importantly, one could ask why rich 
governments should be in the business of loaning to poor governments in the first place 
(Bulow 2002: 244). As I have been arguing in this chapter, soft aid and hard loans do not fit 
seamlessly. The messy confusion of concepts is partly due to civil society itself, Pettifor 
(2000: 27) reports that Nigerian civil society organized to challenge OECD countries to 
grant debt relief to support an initiative to roll back malaria. I will return to the separation 
of grants from loans in the next chapter.  
Perhaps most importantly, a fourth conclusion, among many possible others, that can be 
drawn from the development aid so far, is that aid is less about money than it is about ideas 
and institutions (Picciotto 2006: 11). 
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 As also Nissanke and Ferrarini (2004) stress, debt relief must be set in a broader policy context providing 
means or instruments to deal with adverse terms of trade shocks. 
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In conclusion to this chapter on the implications arbitration of international debt would 
have on the aid regime, what appears is that separating out and arbitrating loans from 
development aid, and trade, would provide an isolated and direct, yet far-reaching way to 
deal with what has become a dragged out debt problem in a world of aid dependent 
governments.
342
 As laid out before, loans must be arbitrated in two phases, where first, 
loans claimed to be odious must be dealt with, and then, second, remaining debts must be 
assessed against economic sustainability in terms of satisfying human rights.  
There are two main limitations to this process. For one, arbitration of international debts 
would not have an impact on the counter streams of financial flows. At most, it could serve 
as a bench mark for further thinking about the purposefulness of the circulation of money 
around the planet. Second, global arbitration would not refocus the aid machinery and it 
would not serve as a panacea for lifting each country out of poverty. But global arbitration 
of debt could nevertheless serve as an instrument of introducing global justice and 
hopefully bring about more efficiency of aid resources.  
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 I have noted that conditionality is exercised through indirect pressure on the debtor by the international 
organizations rather than directly and openly by the creditor nations (Suter and Stamm 1992: 664, see also 
chapter 3 of this thesis). The majority holders of these international organizations are the majority aid donors, 
the main lenders and the majority share holders in international organizations. This allows for the possibility 
of cross-conditionality as reflected in both trade (chapter 5) and aid.  
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7.  
INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND 
BORROWING: 
 
What is the current debt regime and 
how could it better balance the rights of 
creditors and debtors?  
 
 
Sovereign debt crises impact significantly on the international financial markets and on the 
world economy.
343
 The absence of an international legal infrastructure complicates the 
principles and processes of dealing with debtor-creditor relations, both in theory and in 
practice. This is of particular importance in a world where international financial flows 
exceed the commercial ones. The financial world has gone from fluctuations in trade to 
fluctuations in capital flows.  
These financial flows between the rich and the poor nations can be divided into five main 
groups. The first group is official development aid. Within this group, loans, as debt relief, 
either may, or may not, be counted as aid. Second, private investments move mainly from 
the rich countries to the poor.
344
 Third, remittances move mainly from emigrate workers in 
the rich countries who send money back home.
345
 Alongside these flows, fourth, we have 
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 For an account of the global crisis of 2008, including a view on the concerns regarding sovereign debts 
also in the rich countries see Ghosh (2010). 
344
 Foreign direct investments mounted to a good USD 620 billion in 2008 but declined to less than USD 430 
billion in 2009 (United Nations 2009c: 81). 
345
 Remittances are a good USD 200 billion annually. The sum of these two streams of funds is at least four 
times higher than aid flows. Under the heading of globalization (a process ultimately resulting in significantly 
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international lending, which in turn, comes in three groups, categorized according to the 
status of the lender. The first one is private lending, where the lender is a private 
corporation. The second group is multilateral lending, where the lender is an international 
organization. The third category is official lending, where the lender is a government. Out 
of these, one could perhaps even say that credit has been the largest source of capital flow 
to poor countries in the past 50 years (Dodd 2002). This could be described as a paradox. 
For instance, if contrasting the flows of development aid from the rich countries to the poor 
ones against those of debt servicing from the poor to the rich, the latter outnumber the 
former by far. This brings us to the fifth point, which is that interestingly, international 
financial transfers also work the other way around, from poor and aid recipient countries in 
the South to rich aid donors in the North, as already mentioned in chapter 6. These reversed 
financial flows can be divided into two groups, legal and illegal flows (Kar and Cartwright-
Smith 2006: 5). Yet, there is doubt regarding the underlying activity generating the 
financial flows in the first place, including corruption, tax evasion and criminal activities. 
In addition, a number of financial flows are unrecorded, meaning that they escape capital 
controls. Unrecorded financial flows are also referred to as illicit financial flows, or funds 
seemingly intended to disappear from any record in the country of origin and earnings on 
the stock of illegal flight capital outside of a country that do not normally return to the 
country of origin. Given the importance of poor countries‘ access to international financial 
flows, in its various shapes and forms, it is now time to look at whether arbitrating 
international debt could better balance the rights of both creditors and borrowers.  
While arbitrating international debt would not change the structures of the economy, by 
way of, for instance, compensating for the absence of the universal monetary unit Keynes 
called for in his Global Plan, it would certainly affect the international lending regime, and 
the rules of the game. It would bring about justice ex post, and create ex ante justice 
concerning international lending in an indirect sense (economically unsound or illegal 
decisions today could be brought up for arbitration tomorrow). Thanks to its cross-cutting 
nature, and in a best case scenario, arbitration would have a pre-emptive effect on illicit 
                                                                                                                                                    
higher financial flows), the role of development aid has been reduced (Picciotto 2006: 20). Importantly, 
though, poor countries as a group continue to provide net financial resources to rich countries. The all-time 
high was reached in 2008, with USD 891 billion. In 2009, the figure was lower, but still important, mounting 
to USD 568 billion (United Nations 2009c: 73). 
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financial flows and ultimately, it would decrease the need for development aid. But, 
because of its limitations, arbitration serves precisely as a first step only on a potential path 
of reforms in and of global governance.  
Today, the lenders are the actors who play the leading roles in the lending market, as 
established in chapter 2. This occurs not only as they operate outside of international law, 
but also as they are in the business of international lending, an activity and context that 
allows for the exploitation of the weaker position of the counterpart, both from an 
economic and legal point of view. The most fundamental questions that arises concerns the 
justifications for arbitrating international debts, the practical steps for setting up this 
mechanism and perhaps above all, what effects the arbitration would have on the nature of 
international lending and financial flows in the global economic system. The purpose of 
this chapter is to address this series of questions.  
This chapter is structured in the following way. First, a global financial and economic 
system calls for a corresponding mirror of national mechanisms of regulation, including 
ideally both a lender of last resort as well as bankruptcy proceedings. Under a purposeful 
system of international lending, the roles of the players, the lenders and borrowers, would 
be defined by rules. Whilst engaging in the activity of lending, the market would provide 
fair opportunities to all its participants. In international finance today, we have neither a 
global lender of last resort, nor do the participants in the market have equal starting 
positions. By comparing today‘s system with Keynes‘s plan as presented in the creation 
process of the Bretton Woods institutions, the concept of a global lender of last resort is 
explored. In this connection, the political thought-process behind the current system and its 
consequences are analyzed. Second, the interest of the individual players, here the creditors 
and the debtors, is contrasted to that of the market. Here, the doctrine of odious debt is 
looked into and its viability when stretched into international law is tested. And third, some 
of the fundamental principles behind classical economics are looked into and positioned 
against the ways in which debt has been dealt with. The challenges the proposal for 
international debt arbitration raises are analysed and it is seen how it would relate to the 
overall mechanisms of the debt problem and its management. 
7.1 In the absence of a global lender of last resort 
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Throughout time, there have been varying attempts at creating financial stability. Among 
several regional and at times competing monetary standards, silver was usually at the core 
(it was also main standard in Europe up until 1821). It was unevenly replaced by the gold 
standard (1821-1946), followed by the most recent Bretton Woods system and the 
international de facto gold standard (1946-71). The influence of the parallel short-lived 
initiative of silver certificates (in the US in 1963-68) is modest. Leading up to today, 
attempts of fixed standards have been replaced with fiat money, or state-issued money 
declared to be legal tender by a government.  
Today, and in the absence of a global currency, whether anchored in a fixed standard or 
not, the US dollar, a domestic unit, has taken on the weight of acting both as global and 
national currency unit. As will be seen, this is neither in the interest of the US or the 
international financial community. Importantly, it has proven detrimental to the poor 
countries as their debt burdens have grown because of fluctuations both in the dollar 
exchange rate and consequently also in the interest rate. Going back to examine the 
planning stage of the Bretton Woods era sheds a light on the questions of how and why we 
are where we are today. Ultimately, though, such an examination serves to broaden the 
basis for my argument of introducing international arbitration of sovereign debts.  
Keynes’s plan 
Keynes‘s Global Plan included an International Clearing Bank to oversee the International 
Clearing Union (as discussed in chapters 2 and 5). The Bank would have managed not only 
the international but also universal currency, the bancor.
 346
 In fact, the International 
Clearing Bank would have been a world central bank, where the countries would become 
debtors and creditors towards the bank rather than to each other.
347
 As Keynes put it, to 
make sure that the quantity of bancor is adequate ―we share it out between the countries of 
the world in equitable amounts; we take what precaution we can against improvidence on 
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 The US proposal also included a universal currency, the unitar, and these names as well as the function of 
the currency are elaborated by Keynes (1943) as largely similar.  
347
 For current interpretations on Keynes‘s proposal for an International Clearing Union and its relevance in 
terms of political viability if introduced today see for instance Costabile (2007: 16); Peden (2006: 112); 
Raffer and Singer (2001: 2, 4) and DeLong (2000). 
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the one hand and hoarding on the other‖ (1943: §532). In fact, the International Clearing 
Bank would have been a world central bank. Its aim would have been to regulate currency 
exchange and to issue a currency of last resort. The central banks of the member countries 
would be eligible to overdraft facilities equalling one-half of the average of the country‘s 
total trade for the previous five years. Moreover, countries could become debtors and 
creditors towards the Bank as a whole, but not towards each other. Consequently, changes 
in exchange rates would not result in international redistributions of wealth. 
Keynes saw that a credit balance of a country left unused for purchasing goods or services 
or for making overseas investments should remain with the Union, but only temporarily 
and until the country chooses to put it to use. This placement of the credit in the Union, 
should not be seen as a burden, but rather as an extra facility allowing the country to spend 
the money at a later stage. The logic is that the creation of international liquidity would 
have been limited to unbalancing transactions. According to Keynes, this point is central as 
this is ―not a Red Cross philanthropic relief scheme, by which the rich countries come to 
rescue the poor‖ (Keynes 1943: §534). Rather, it is a highly necessary business mechanism 
useful to both the creditor and the debtor. Keynes saw the scheme as analogous to an 
individual or national scheme since ―[a] man does not refuse to keep a banking account 
because his deposits will be employed by the banker to make advances to another person, 
provided always that he knows that his deposit is liquid, and that he can spend it himself 
whenever he wants to do so. Nor does he regard himself as a dispenser of charity whenever, 
to suit his own convenience, he refrains from drawing on his own bank balance‖ (Keynes 
1943: §534). 
Juxtaposing reality against Keynes‘s Global Plan (from chapter 2), and having introduced 
here in particular the initiative of a universal currency, it is worth noting that Keynes was 
not supportive of a gold standard in the first place (1943: § 530, 531). Under the former 
gold standard, Keynes points out, gold absorbed by a creditor country was wholly 
withdrawn from circulation.
348
 Instead, he proposed a one-way convertibility of gold. He 
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 Rodrik (2010b) places the gold standard as it came about as a balance between domestic economic 
objectives and external rules and constraints. The classic case is Britain‘s short-lived return to gold in the 
interwar period. The attempt to reconstitute the pre-World War I model of globalization collapsed in 1931, 
when domestic politics forced the British government to choose domestic reflation over the gold standard. 
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argued that central banks should be allowed to pay gold into the International Clearing 
Bank to replenish their accounts, but they would not be allowed to withdraw it. Gold could 
never be paid out to anyone, instead ―[i]f an individual hoards his income, not in the shape 
of gold coins in his pockets or in his safe, but by keeping a bank deposit, this bank deposit 
is not withdrawn from circulation but provides his banker with the means of making loans 
to those who need them‖ (Keynes 1943: § 531). In this way, gold would gradually exit the 
international circulation and member banks‘ reserves. In the logic of the Plan, the gold 
reserves of the entire world economy would eventually converge into the International 
Clearing Bank‘s vaults. Regarding how this mass of gold would then be used, Keynes 
suggested that it should be used to fund international aid. (Costabile 2007: 14)  
At the time, Keynes was seeking to create an economic basis of cooperation for a ―new 
democracy of nations which after this war will come into existence‖ (1943: § 528). It 
reflected the reality of the time when avoiding future wars was the first priority of the 
mapping of a new geography of the world. Today, one would find it difficult to conceive of 
a situation sufficiently compelling to inspire a similar common motivator that would 
traverse national borders and continents. Especially since voluntary agreements and 
conventions do not make binding cooperation possible, but rather, what is needed is equal 
consideration of all concerned under the rule of a collective authority (Nagel 2005), as 
discussed in chapter 3. But now, the universal currency was not set up as part of the global 
fund Keynes suggested. Recapturing from chapter 2, second, Keynes had proposed a much 
larger fund than was realized.  
                                                                                                                                                    
The architects of the Bretton Woods regime kept this lesson in mind when they redesigned the world‘s 
monetary system in 1944. They understood that democratic countries would need the space to conduct 
independent monetary and fiscal policies. So they contemplated only a ―thin‖ globalization, with capital flows 
restricted largely to long-term lending and borrowing. Keynes, who drew up the blueprint along with White, 
viewed capital controls not as a temporary and expedient, but as a permanent, feature of the global economy. 
The Bretton Woods regime collapsed in the 1970‘s as a result of the inability or unwillingness – it is not 
entirely clear which – of leading governments to manage the growing tide of capital flows, as discussed in 
chapter 2. 
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Before continuing by focusing in specifically on the IMF and how it has evolved over time, 
two other notable deviations from Keynes‘s plan are traced. First, while the Bretton Woods 
meeting did not result in a universal currency, more than twenty years later, in 1969, in 
support of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and under the auspices of the 
IMF, its Special Drawing Rights, SDRs, were created. The SDRs are the monetary unit of 
the IMF‘s reserve assets. The aim was to alleviate the shortage of US dollar and gold 
reserves in the expansion of international trade. Rather than being a currency in its own 
right, SDRs are a borrowing unit representing the right to present claims on currencies of 
IMF members.
349
 (IMF 2009a) In practice, the use of SDRs has been scarce.  
Second, as mentioned, under the Bretton Woods regime, the US dollar was pegged against 
gold, which translates into a de facto gold standard for the world‘s currencies. One 
particular consequence of the US dollar breaking free from the Bretton Woods system, in 
addition to others which will be raised soon, was reoccurring inflation on a significant 
scale. In the period 1985-95, a number of indebted poor countries (among them Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru) succumbed to hyperinflationary periods (Sachs 1995). 
Out of these, Bolivia and Nicaragua are among the low- and middle-income countries as 
listed by the World Bank (World Bank 2010). 
Keynes‘s International Clearing Bank would have been a world central bank with the aim 
of serving as regulator of currency exchange and the issuer of currency of last resort. 
Countries would have become creditors and debtors to the bank and not towards each other. 
Instead, what we have is a global system that is the uneven product of several 
interdependent but separate processes of gradual and progressive development. This leads 
us to shifting our focus: looking down at the world as if from the above, and in the absence 
of internal mechanisms as would have been approved by Keynes‘s Plan, a truly global 
financial system would call for a global regulator accompanied with a global lender of last 
resort, reflecting national systems. Both mechanisms are linked to the concept of some 
coordinated mechanisms for dealing with insolvent countries. The guiding thought here 
being that a future international lender of last resort would prevent credit runs, thus saving 
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 The SDR unit constitutes the weighted sum of contributions of the Euro, the yen, the pound sterling and 
the US dollar, four of the major world currencies. Every five years, this value is reevaluated and adjusted, and 
on a daily basis, it is computed in terms of equivalent United States dollars. (IMF 2009a) 
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sovereigns from illiquidity traps. However, where an illiquidity situation is separated from 
an insolvency situation, adequate insolvency procedures for sovereigns are needed. 
Remaining true to my focus on insolvency procedures, when the discussion is next 
extended towards an international lender of last resort, this is done only in terms of it being 
useful in framing my argument for international insolvency procedures. In addition, the 
issue of international lender of last resort is raised as a discussion on the updated role of the 
IMF is proposed. Importantly, and for reasons addressed before, this means that the IMF 
should not be aspiring to the role of debt arbitrator itself (in contrast to Sachs [1995], for 
instance), and these two roles must be kept separate.  
The discussion towards the theory of a global lender of last resort that was paused earlier 
(chapter 2) continues here. Let us here first return to the role of the IMF today and then 
explore its links to the theory of a global lender of last resort. 
The role of the IMF 
The main purposes of the IMF were to monitor the pegged exchange rate system, to extend 
short-term loans to governments in need mostly to assist them in maintaining their pegged 
exchange rates, and to promote currency convertibility and cooperative management of 
monetary relations (IMF 2009b).
350
 Over time, the role of the IMF has been redefined 
repeatedly. Before looking at that, though, one observation is of particular importance. The 
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 According to its Articles of Agreement, the first purpose of the IMF (2009b) is to promote international 
monetary cooperation. The second purpose is to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade, to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income, and to 
promote the development of productive resources as primary objectives of economic policy. Third, the IMF is 
to foster exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements, and to avoid competitive exchange 
depreciation. Fourth, it is also to assist both in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in 
respect to current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which 
hamper the growth of world trade. The fifth purpose is to give confidence to members by making the general 
resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with the 
opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive 
of national or international prosperity. The final, and sixth role for the IMF to play, and in accordance with 
the above, is to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of 
payments of the member states of the IMF. 
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Bretton Woods system is based on the assumption that countries are linked mainly by trade, 
and not by capital movements (as also pointed out by Sachs [1995]). This sit uneasily in 
today‘s financial world, where fiat money has replaced the system of gold backed 
currencies, a shift returned to soon. This assumption also partially explains the confusion 
regarding the current role of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The repeated search for a focus for the mission of the IMF can be found in both external as 
well as in internal factors. Beginning with the external ones, first, following its first 25 
years of operation when the IMF‘s primary responsibility was to monitor the emerging 
adjustable peg exchange rate system, the system crashed in 1971, and the main currencies 
started to float, causing the IMF to re-evaluate its central function (Sachs 1995: 2). When 
the debt crisis of the poor countries broke out in 1982, the IMF quickly took a central 
position in the debt restructuring process.   
Second, this new role coincided with monetarism achieving widespread support as the 
dominating political ideology, as driven by Milton Freedman and his followers. Under the 
heading of monetarism, the focus was on the supply of money in the economy, as opposed 
to the levels of employment in the economy (as Keynes had suggested). Monetarism 
peaked in the 1980s, being at the core in both the US and the UK, personified in Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Stiglitz has argued that by converting to a more monetarist 
approach, the IMF no longer has a valid purpose, as it was designed to provide funds for 
countries to carry out Keynesian reflations, and that the IMF "was not participating in a 
conspiracy, but it was reflecting the interests and ideology of the Western financial 
community‖ (Friedman 2002).351 
Third, with the East Asian, Russian and Argentine crisis from 1997-2005, confidence in the 
IMF was rattled (Herman et al. 2010b: 5). During this period, the focus of the major 
creditor governments, including the IMF, shifted from the bailouts of the mid-1990s to 
―bail-ins‖ (debt restructuring) of private creditors. These arrangements satisfied neither 
lenders, nor debtors. This dissatisfaction was manifested in the case of Argentina when the 
country settled with its bondholders without the IMF (Damill et al. 2010). Consequently, in 
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the early 2000s, another reorientation was required. This time, countries were reimbursing 
the IMF ahead of schedule – among them were Brazil, Venezuela, Turkey and Argentina 
(Schuldt 2006). The process of borrowing countries reimbursing their debts to the IMF 
brought with it four changes: First, and quite rapidly, a number of new lenders in the shape 
of emerging economies entered the scene; China is often mentioned in this context. New 
loans issued by new lenders may have come at higher interest rates, but with less, different 
or no conditionalities. Having said so though, Chinese lend according to a non-interference 
lending policy, meaning that the lending is free of conditions, and also, experience shows 
that loans are written off in a number of years (for a focus on Africa as the borrower, see 
Davies 2007; Dahle Huse and Muyakwa 2008). Second, and on a less immediate time 
scale, overlapping somewhat the previous point, this shift in composition of lenders has 
contributed to the transformation of poor countries‘ external debts into internal debts, partly 
by replacing public debts with private debts. Third, in the long run, fewer dependency 
strings between debtors and the IMF may open doors for new financial initiatives, 
potentially Southern ones. The role of the IMF was again up for debate, not the least 
regarding the organization of future international lending. Four, even poor African 
countries had started to look for untraditional lenders, such as China. In the absence of new 
revenues, in a situation of withering business, the Fund was facing dire cutbacks to ensure 
its own survival.
352
 Later on in this chapter, I will return to the increasing domestic debts 
and what it could mean for the poor borrowing country. 
By the end of this period, the international financial industry had developed a voluntary 
agreement, a code of conduct, which, if adopted, could be interpreted as offering sovereign 
debtors a replacement for the IMF with direct private creditor-debtor discussions when debt 
crises loom (Herman 2010). The role of private aid and private creditors in sovereign 
lending will be addressed later in this chapter. For now, it is sufficient to say that in line 
with the status quo, or the way matters are organized today, this approach would also not 
meet the need for systemic change sought here.  
The march of monetarism and subsequent neoliberal policies were halted following the 
financial crisis of 2007-08, which sparked criticisms of the free market consensus, from not 
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only the left but also the right. In essence, the crisis has led to the dusting off of Keynes‘s 
texts and a renewed interest in Keynes‘s political ideology. This brings us to the internal 
factors driving the search for an appropriate role for the IMF. Since the IMF is much 
smaller than Keynes had envisaged, and since it lacks an automatic mechanism for 
expanding along with world trade, it cannot realistically fill the function of a global lender 
of last resort. If the quota suggested by Keynes were to be implemented today, the IMF 
would need to increase its quota, or membership subscription, manifold − perhaps even 
sevenfold.
353
 Consequently, the Fund came to ration its scarce resources by imposing 
conditions on their use. Monbiot (2003: chapter 5) argues that the mechanisms proposed for 
the Union would have given greater weight in decision-making to the less-developed 
countries, which were then less integrated in international trade than they are now. Also, of 
course, many of these countries did not exist as independent nations in 1944. Yet, in spite 
of this, the IMF has taken on some kind of a role as the international lender of last resort. 
However, this role has been performed on an ad hoc and unpredictable basis. Before 
advancing to an analysis of the practical experience of IMF in this area, let us first look 
back in time to where the concept of lender of last resort emerged from and why. 
A lender of last resort is a lender that extends credit in situations where no other lender will 
do so. The prime purpose of a lender of last resort is to protect depositors, a protection that, 
in turn, prevents widespread bank-runs.
354
 This means that a lender of last resort is the 
preferred port of call in international sovereign lending involving larger sums. Looking 
back, the idea of a lender of last resort was first recognized in the early1800s and further 
developed later that century.
355
 The concept negates against the expectation of a bank run, 
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 In 2002, Boughton (2002: 17) assessed that if the IMF were to be implemented today, the IMF would need 
to quintuple its present quotas.The quota is comparable to a subscription to IMF membership by its Member 
States. The ―membership‖ is available in different categories, and the levels are subject to approval of the 
Executive Board.  
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 Another way of preventing bank runs is to introduce government-granted deposit insurance. Depending on 
the nation, but common for each is that deposit insurance covers the equivalent of relatively small sums. The 
deposit insurance varies among countries, and is not adopted everywhere. Along with the global economic 
crisis of 2009, the EU adopted a deposit insurance of EUR 50 000. 
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 Reportedly, by Henry Thornton in 1802 and later developed and widened by Walter Bagehot in 1873 
(Sachs 1995: 4). 
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or a bank panic, because depositors can maintain confidence that their deposits will be 
honored, without them having to immediately withdraw their deposits. Bagehot (Sachs 
1995: 4) lists three classic characteristics for an effective lender of last resort. First, the 
lender of last resort should lend freely to solvent banks.
356
 Second, it should lend against 
good collateral, and third, it should lend at a penalty interest rate.  
It would take until well into the 20
th
 century before the lender of last resort was adopted. 
One reason behind this was the processes behind the organization of national central banks. 
Another reason was the tension behind the definition of the function of lender of last resort 
and the responsibility of maintaining gold backing until the abandonment of the gold 
standards in 1930. (Sachs 1995: 4) In the context of this thesis, the essential question 
regarding sovereign debt lies in whether a possible global lender of last resort is useful in 
response to sovereign borrowers being hit by bank runs. Moreover, can the closest 
institution at hand, the IMF, take on this feature or not? Sachs argues that the IMF can 
indeed take on this role, basing the need for a global lender of last resort on the existence of 
market failures in the financial markets, amongst which he counts the simultaneous 
multiple equilibrium. The economics of financial markets are returned to in the last section 
of this chapter.  
As criticism of ideas of lender of last resort, one could mention moral hazard (familiar from 
discussions on debt relief programs addressed in chapter 2), or the temptation for lenders to 
take unnecessarily big risks. A lender of last resort provides a kind of safety net protecting 
the lending institution from the consequences of the risk. This is seen as not only distorting 
the assessment of credit risk in an economic system, but also as distorting information by 
blurring the actual economic situation. One can, of course, also turn this around and say 
that the mere existence of a lender of last resort is based on the assumption of the 
possibility of a market failure. An accurately assessed credit risk steers lending partly 
towards less risky investments and in any case away from systematic misuse of capital. 
This would mean that, ideally, credit failures are isolated and would not cause widespread 
bank runs. At this point, the economics of the global financial system are set aside until the 
last section of this chapter. Here, the IMF is returned to, and this starts by recalling its 
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mandate of stabilizing international exchange rates and facilitating development.
357
 One 
cannot ignore two further points of conflict. The first one is that while some countries are 
expected to repay their loans, others are not. This is linked to the non-standardized role as 
lender of last resort. For instance, in the 1995 peso crisis, Mexico received a loan seven 
times its quota – raising questions of the size of loans other countries can expect and most 
importantly, where this money would come from (Sachs 1995: 2). Second, at times, it 
seems that the IMF confuses the ability of the borrower to repay with its demands for 
economic reorganization in the borrowing nation. Overall, one could also question the 
economic efficiency of its subsidizing interest on loan system, where loans pay below 
market rates in situations where the borrower is unable to raise funds through the bond 
market.   
In sum, these points are summarized in a point borrowed from Stiglitz, who says that from 
Keynes‘s IMF to today‘s IMF there is a loss in intellectual coherency (Stiglitz 2002b: 196-
7, 38). While it may have been Keynes‘s intent when he pushed for the creation of the IMF, 
the institution does not now conceive of itself as a deficit financier, committed to 
maintaining economies at full employment. Rather, it has taken on the pre-Keynesian 
position of fiscal austerity in the face of a down-turn, doling out funds only if the 
borrowing country conforms to the IMF‘s views about appropriate economic policy, which 
almost always entail contradictory policies leading to recessions or worse.
358
 
On principal, the IMF and other international institutions should provide public goods not 
provided by the market.
359
 Centrally, these institutions should either provide or operate 
under an international legal framework for overcoming problems of market failure, 
comparable to domestic institutions providing that role within national economies. Sachs 
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 For the argument of appointing the IMF as international lender of last resort, see Cline (2005).  
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 Instead of a one-size-fits-all standardization, the question of how to best manage a recovery is difficult, 
and the answer clearly depends on the cause of the problem. For many downturns, the best prescription is the 
standard Keynesian one: expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. (Stiglitz 2002b: 121)  
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 See Eichengreen (1991: 166-7) for a listing of proposals dating back to the 1930s, and before the IMF, on 
setting up various pools of funding for extending loans in crisis times, among these the Kindersley-Norman 
Plan (1931), echoing the idea of a previous plan by Hjalmar Schacht, and a ―normalization fund‖ (1933).  
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(1995: 9) analyses that the international framework is inadequate in three central areas: 
currency instability, creditor panic and financial insolvency of sovereign borrowers.  
Discussions about setting up an international lender of last resort intersect with the 
argument for international debt arbitration in an essential way. Arbitration does not rule out 
an international lender of last resort, nor vice-versa. In sequencing events, international 
arbitration paves the way, in a sense, since it would sort out the economically unsustainable 
and odious debts from the system.  
The Triffin dilemma 
Instead of a global currency under a system with in-build corrective mechanisms, the world 
operates with the US dollar as its central monetary unit. It can be said that the economic 
crises of 2007-08 was derived from the fundamental problem of reliance on the role of the 
US dollar as reserve currency in the Bretton Woods system (see chapter 5). Generally, these 
problems arise when any one national currency doubles as global reserve currency.  
Problems appear with the tension that arises between national monetary policy and global 
monetary policy. This paradox is called the Triffin-dilemma, after Robert Triffin, who first 
defined it in 1960. The Triffin-dilemma is reflected in fundamental imbalances in the 
balance of payments (the national account of the monetary transactions between the country 
and the rest of the world) and specifically the current account (together with the capital 
account, the current account forms the total of a country‘s balance of payments) when the 
national currency, here the US dollar, must simultaneously both flow out of and in to the 
US. On the one hand, the US must run a current account deficit to provide liquidity for the 
conversion of gold into US dollars. More dollars in the system leads to speculations about 
the dollar being overvalued. This causes people to convert US dollars to gold and take it 
offshore. With less gold in the country, the speculations increased regarding the US dollar 
being overvalued. On the other hand, the US must run a current account surplus to maintain 
confidence in the US dollar. Currency inflows and outflows of equal magnitude cannot both 
happen at the same time, you cannot have a simultaneous surplus and deficit. In practice, 
dollars flowed out of the US in three ways: through the Marshall plan, through US defense 
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spending and through Americans buying imported goods. This led to the number of dollars 
in circulation soon exceeding the amount of gold backing them up.
360
  
The solution to this Triffin-dilemma was to not only reduce the number of dollars in 
circulation by cutting the deficit, but also to raise the interest rates to attract dollars back 
into the US. However, this would have directed the US economy towards recession. 
Eventually, in August 1971, US president Richard Nixon pulled out of the Bretton Woods 
system by announcing that the dollar could no longer be exchanged for gold. This 
withdrawal, in combination with raising interest rates led to accumulated debts of poor 
countries, as seen in chapter 2.  
Following the release of the US dollar from the gold standard, the USD maintained its role 
as the global reserve. This has meant that eventually, currencies of the global trading 
system have moved towards the US dollar.
361
 Part of the reason for the central role of the 
dollar is the general belief that the US economy has been perceived to be stable. However, 
the role of the US dollar as the world‘s dominant currency has come under threat with the 
global economic crisis of the 2009, when export-surplus economies will look to diversify 
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 The reason behind the accumulation of US debt today goes back to the setting up of the Bretton Woods 
system. Echoing the rhetoric of the HIPC debt relief program, the US could be entitled not only a Heavily 
Indebted Prosperous Country (to echo Greenhill and Pettifor 2002), but also the Heaviest Indebted Country. 
The reason behind this is important to explore not only from the angle of international lending in general, but 
specifically how this has affected the indebtedness of poor countries. In May 2010, the IMF warned the USA 
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 The majority of international debts is also noted in USD, a quick look at the composition of sovereign 
debt, for instance in the Global Development Finance reports reveal this clearly. 
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their dollar reserve into other currencies over the next decade (Independent Strategy 
2009).
362
  
Following the financial crisis of 2007-08, Zhou Xiaochuan (2009), governor of the 
People‘s Bank of China, specifically pinpointed the Triffin-dilemma as the very root cause 
of the economic meltdown. As a remedy, Zhou proposed strengthening existing, but largely 
dormant Special Drawing Rights, the global currency units administered by the IMF. The 
SDRs would gradually replace the US dollar as a global reserve currency. According to 
Zhou, an important part of the reason behind the collapse of the Bretton Woods system was 
that the system did not adopt Keynes‘s bancor. This would be in the best interest of both 
the US and the rest of the world (Bergsten 2009), see also the discussion in Chapter 5.
 
A 
cautious step towards the direction of activating SDRs was taken at the G-20 summit in 
London 2009, where the IMF was assigned to create and distribute USD 250 billion SDRs, 
a decision referred to earlier. But there are also other processes in motion. In oil trading, 
some Arab states have liaised with China, France and Russia to replace the dollar with a 
basket currency (Fisk 2009). In this scheme, the set deadline for the currency transition is 
2018. 
7.2 Lenders, borrowers and the market 
Over time, sovereign defaults have taken place both repeatedly, and often regarding the 
same borrowers (Suter and Stamm 1991). Eichengreen (2001: 162) asks why creditors are 
willing to lend repeatedly to problem debtors? Referring to a potential short memory 
syndrome amongst creditors may not hold. Instead, the explanation Eichengreen reaches is 
that the damage to creditworthiness due to default could be repaired by a credible change in 
regime. In addition to this justification, a few other explanations are in order. Among these 
are the fundamentals of the world economy, where the basis of the world‘s finance system 
is actual money, such as cash and deposits. Together these account for nearly 6 000 billion 
if converted into USD. However, in comparison to this figure, differently negotiated debts 
and other forms of money in circulation, such as liquidity created by derivatives, equals an 
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amount that is nearly a hundredfold. The total amount of this substitute money is nearly 
USD 750 000 billion.
363
   
World GDP is nearly USD 60 000 billion.
364
 Put differently, ―real money‖ in circulation is 
roughly a tenth of the world‘s GDP, whereas various forms of substitute money accounts 
for 10 times as much as the annual GDP. The total value of various types of liquidity has 
exploded in recent years. The type that has increased the most is a type of ‖virtual money‖ 
created by means of derivatives. In 1990, cash and other forms of money constituted four 
per cent of the GDP at the time, or nearly USD 1 000 billion. At the same time, subsidized 
money, such as bank drafts, credit based on shares and derivates mounted to around USD 
30 000 billion dollars. In two decades, the GDP of the world has nearly doubled. The 
amount of real money has five-folded. Replacement money based on various forms of 
credit has 25 folded. Here, it is of interest to return to Hyman Minsky, who said that the 
accumulation of debt is a key mechanism for pushing an economy toward a crisis (chapter 
1). If Minsky (1982) is grouped with John Kenneth Galbraith (1994) and Charles 
Kindleberger (1986; Kindelberger and Aliber 2005), in short, we see that what they all said 
is that the debt of the various actors in an economy can only increase to a certain level, after 
which the bubble bursts. Minsky called this pyramid financing. These developments are 
important to understand in terms of analyzing the overall development of the global 
economy. As for the particular situation of poor countries and their drawn-out situation of 
problem debt, crises situations of the global economy are widely felt, as discussed in 
chapter 2. But while the causes of economic crises vary, the consequences of the crises are 
similar. In the 1930s, Irving Fisher concluded, based on the experiences of the depression at 
the time that too big a debt burden leads to deflation and the threat of this drives the market 
into a state of tension.  
Previously, this thesis has explained how the world economy rests on a structure where 
countries in deficit have had to compensate for this by taking loans. In addition, a series of 
gradual shifts has led to the strengthening of the position of the lender and on the expense 
of the borrower (chapter 2). In this context, three additional matters need to be addressed. 
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First, while the creditors have reason to show ―good business‖ as well as ―good expertise‖, 
meaning little credit default among their debtors, they also have no reason to maintain bad 
credits for the sake of doing so. In fact, the opposite holds. Second, the discussion of odious 
debt clarified the difference between odious and unsustainable debts. The discussion also 
led to a proposal that we should consider merging the assessments of these debts. However, 
it is equally important to explore the path beyond this proposal and take a closer look at the 
role of odious debt in international law. Finally, economic theory presupposes equal rights 
in the market between creditors and debtors. Contrasting the dominant rights of the 
creditors in international lending to those of the borrower opens up to a discussion about 
the functioning of the market. 
The interest of the creditor 
This thesis has discussed not only the shift away from responsibility from the lenders and 
onto the borrowers, but also the push by public institutions encouraging private lenders to 
take on more risk (chapter 2). Also, this thesis has discussed the different statuses of 
lenders in terms of their priority in being reimbursed (collective action clauses). Here, the 
underlying analysis is less about the specific differences in weights among lenders, and 
more on the principle of the different positions of power in legal terms that the groups of 
lenders operate under. The argument is that arbitration of international debts would cut 
across perceived obstacles, treating the market participants equally, and ultimately working 
in favor of both creditors and debtors. Broadening the foundation for the argument in favor 
of arbitration of international debts, five observations regarding the frames of the 
underlying dynamics and statistical methodology are listed. Assessments about debt 
burdens and poverty reductions are made on these observations. 
First, foreign aid and foreign investments are known to come with lucrative business deals 
for business from the donor country. In this way, official aid easily becomes an interest of 
lucrative business for the donor.  
Second, a related point is that international lenders have every incentive to show profitable 
business. The business of the creditor is lending. This goes for both official and private 
lenders. This is important to keep in mind, since lenders build their reputation and business 
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on their success.
365
 One way of assessing this success is to show a convincing record of 
credit risk assessment, an important factor here being a minimal bankruptcy percentage 
among their debtors. The lack of clear rules regarding sovereign debt restructuring leads to 
a holdout problem, where the status quo is preferred to the unknown. 
Third, not only is it in the interest of the international lending and development institutions 
to show their business acumen in a favorable light, but, as previously discussed (chapter 2), 
these institutions have also acquired a monopolistic control over the production of the 
statistics. The World Bank, in particular its Global Development Finance, seems to have 
taken over as the centre for financial information regarding developing countries. Today, it 
seems that the OECD, the Bank for International Settlements, BIS, along with the IMF, 
UNCTAD and other UN organizations have put their own data collection and methodology 
aside and rely on GDF statistics when producing their own statistics and charts. This brings 
with it the ambiguous observation that simultaneously, while poverty reduction is its core 
mission, or business, the World Bank is also the provider of this data.
366
 This is unfortunate 
as certain data speaking in favor of the World Bank, is thus cast under a cloud of doubt 
regarding the objectivity of the information. 
Fourth, underpinning the perceived problem of self-promotion amongst international 
organizations, aided by statistics that they have monopoly production rights to, runs a 
deeper problem, which concerns the way statistics are gathered and interpreted. This 
problem is specifically concerned with the picture international agencies present of world 
economic growth and developments in poverty reduction. Freeman (2009) shows that the 
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international scene, while covering both the lenders‘ and the borrowers‘ perspectives, Michael Tomz (2007) 
concludes in his historical and empirical study that, among other things, reputation has consistently guided 
international lending. He found little evidence of punitive behavior by lenders on borrowers, a finding that is 
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much employed measurement of economic performance, the Purchasing Power Parity, PPP, 
is premised on fundamental flaws. The PPP builds on comparing what one international 
dollar can purchase in an economy, over time and between countries. A systematic 
reduction in the prices of consumption goods in the poor countries however, Freeman 
argues, does not translate into a linear reduction in poverty. Even more so, PPP statistics 
made globalization look good. They also make the World Bank and the IMF look good. 
Worryingly, evidence drawn from PPP calculations has led to misleading conclusions 
supporting misleading policies (Freeman 2009: 1433).  
Fifth, if turning towards economic reasoning, we find additional reasons supporting the 
arguments of introducing arbitration of international debts. One such reason relates to 
banking regulation. This involves in particular how international banks regard their loans to 
poor countries. More specifically, it involves the effect of these loans on the capital 
requirements according to the set of minimal capital requirements for banks, also called 
Basel II (for an accessible explanation of the history, aims, and criticism of the Basel-
principles and the process, see Balin 2008). With the end of the petrodollar boom and the 
ensuing banking crises of the early 1980s, the need for a common banking capitalization 
standard appeared on the agendas of many of the lenders. In 1988, the G-10 (plus Spain), 
forming the Basel committee, came to a final agreement under the International 
Convergence of Capital Measurements and Capital Standards, known informally as ―Basel 
I‖ (Balin 2008: 2). In 2004, this agreement was updated to Basel II, which included a 
consideration of the risks according to the recommendations by credit risk assessors. In 
short, the Basel agreement focuses on credit risk and states that banks with international 
presence are required to hold a minimal capital sum equal to eight per cent of the risk-
weighted assets (BIS 2004).
367
 It is also the Basel regulations that allow lending to 
sovereigns without capital requirements. This underlines the assumption by private 
creditors that sovereign lending is risk-free. From another angle, that of the business 
perspective of the lending bank, loans that require, or tie, significant amounts of capital 
requirements – such as outstanding sovereign debt – could be worth writing off.368 In 
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chapter 2, I wrote that relative to the UN system, the World Bank and the IMF, the real 
forces in setting the rules for the global financial system are the Basel institutions and the 
Financial Stability Board, FSB. The real power is housed in these forums, as they are the 
ones that have coordinated the bailouts and consequently set new regulations for the future. 
The Basel institutions and the FSB, however, operate outside democratic mechanisms, as in 
those being affected by the decisions not having a voice.  
Together, all these observations fit under a common banner since they revolve around the 
business of international lending. The full picture is yet more complicated. The full picture 
includes the nature of the global financial system without universally adopted rules, 
regulations or responsibilities. This allows for widely different interpretations of practice 
and perceived rules of conduct. For one, civil society maintains that the willingness to 
sustain problem debt is little more than a political power play by which the rich keep 
extracting money from the poor. Two, the neoliberal policies of free markets and foreign 
direct investments in the poor world foster exploitative situations of power and control over 
national resources. Third, cross-conditionality between, in particular, agreements of the 
WTO and the granting of new loans, deeply intertwine conditions for loans with trade 
mechanisms (for a separate treatment of trade see chapter 5). Four, the North-South 
financial streams, as in the costs of servicing loans, can be seen as counter-streams to 
development aid. If we imagined the international flow of funds as arrows going up, down 
and along the sides of our world, between the North and the South, it is tempting to play 
with the idea of just subtracting the flows from each other. However, just as poor countries‘ 
deficits are not automatically helped by injections of development aid into social projects, 
or into the balance of payment as compensation for export earnings, as a prolonged 
overhang of debt has transformed into widespread economic deficits, a closer look at the 
                                                                                                                                                    
idea the Basel committee had was that large banks should calibrate their capital requirement based on their 
own internal risk models. But the dangers of permitting banks to police themselves were made amply clear 
in the latest crisis. When financial regulations are devised by a coterie of global regulators in distant 
venues, it is bankers and technocrats who gain the upper hand. Returning the process to national capitals 
would shift the balance of power to domestic legislatures and national stakeholders. Bankers and their 
economist allies may rue this, but it is as it should be. Politicization is the necessary antidote to 
technocrats‘ tendency to be captured by banks. Democratic accountability is our only safeguard against a 
return to light regulation.‖ (Rodrik 2010a).  
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flows reveal them not being perfect substitutes for each other.
369
 The power of the creditor 
versus the debtor creates a crucial dynamic. Ironically, creditors may not be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of this situation. Here, the uncertainty surrounding restructuring procedures in 
general works against all players, and subgroups within these groups. For all concerned, it 
is not evident to know when restructuring should or could take place and with whom that 
decision should rest.
370
  
The interest of the borrower 
International lending has gradually and cumulatively moved towards protecting and 
furthering the rights of the lender (see chapter 2). This shift increased the space of the 
lender while narrowing that of the borrower. Introducing rule of law, where the borrowers‘ 
rights are protected, provides a helpful structure within which to strike a more just balance 
(see chapter 3). It is here that the question of odious debt arises again. Here, the angle is the 
risk that emerges for the borrower when sovereign external debt is replaced with domestic 
debt.  
Replacing external debt with internal debt may be a consequence of debt relief (see chapter 
2), or the undesired consequence of increased aid budgets (chapter 6) or the outcome of an 
active policy to reduce dependency strings to the international financial organizations (see 
earlier in this chapter). Alongside export-led growth policy in some countries (chapter 5), 
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Ethiopia‘s public debts. But there are political differences between rules. Karlsson-Tuula (2007: 1-2) 
compares national bankruptcy laws and lists France, Greece, Italy and Japan as countries promoting 
reorganization of business instead of liquidation. Finland and Germany have also moved in this direction. 
Under the US Bankruptcy Code, the debtor continues to run his business under the reorganization procedure. 
The difference being that the debtor has changed identity and has become a new entity called ―debtor in 
possession‖. In Sweden, for instance, this does not take place. The debtor continues to run his business in the 
same legal form as before reorganization. 
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demand-led accumulation of private debt is the second model, or growth path, suggested 
for poor countries (Torres 2010: 235). Traditionally, the research into debt has focused on 
external debts for two reasons (Panizza 2010: 91). The first being that while external 
borrowing can increase a country‘s access to resources, domestic borrowing only transfers 
resources within the country, or from private to public holders. Second, since central banks 
in poor countries cannot print the hard currency necessary to repay external debt, eternal 
borrowing is usually associated with vulnerabilities that may lead to debt crises. Panizza 
(2010) asks if countries are, by transforming their debts in this way, in fact, reducing their 
risks at reasonable cost. He suggests that the opposite may be true. For low-income 
countries external debts are long term and may carry occasional concessional interest rates, 
substituting these with domestic loans can be an extensive an complicated affair in the long 
run. In addition, local debt comes with shorter maturity than much of the external debt, and 
therefore has to be refinanced more frequently. These two factors mean that borrowers 
increase rollover risk as they reduce foreign exchange risk, he writes. But, he concludes, 
better research on debt structures and more research on vulnerabilities is needed to assess 
the risks.
371
 In addition, and as discussed in chapter 4, rollover of debt complicates juridical 
affairs in terms of odious debt. Countries with access to the financial markets have 
deepened their domestic bond markets and along with this, they have eliminated their 
capital controls. This, in turn, leads investors to flood the markets – given the size of 
external flows compared to local markets – resulting in local markets becoming flooded 
during boom periods and during bad times. As investors flee, this causes increased 
volatility. During booms, it is difficult for the Central Bank to manage monetary policy. 
Earlier, the justifications and parameters for setting up an independent panel to deal with 
problem debt, odious debt and unsustainable economic debt have been outlined. Elsewhere, 
The largely legal discussion regarding the viability of dealing with odious debt on its own 
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 This also build on the experience from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, which revealed that statistics 
for official reserves did not include the authorities‘ financial commitments in the forward exchange markets 
or to private sector financial institutions which in both cases reduced the foreign exchange available to meet 
external debt service. Hence, that experience serves as an example of how the traditional indicators of country 
risk being designed for the assessment of risk are far less well suited as functional tools of debt management. 
(Cornford 2009: 2) This ties back to the earlier note of debt sustainability having replaced the concepts of 
debt management and country risk (chapter 2).  
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have been recaptured (Sehm-Patomaki 2011). For immediate purposes, suffice it to say that 
odious debt might constitute the basis for the emergence of a qualified exception to the rule 
in international law that public debts acquired by previous rules must be repaid. If so, an 
arbitration panel can be seen as a first step in such a direction, if the aim is later considered 
important.  
The interest of the market 
The NPV value and sustainable debt are ways in which indebtedness of poor countries is 
assessed (see chapter 2). Here, this business of lending (as introduced earlier in this 
chapter) is magnified by focusing on the essential component of risk in economic activity. 
At a first glance, loan contracts are agreements entitling creditors to agreed repayments 
according to the agreed schedule and agreed interest rate. However, as seen, there are cases 
where loans have been used as political instruments, and their purpose falls outside the 
assumed economic framework, and therefore reasonable doubt is cast regarding some of 
their repayment. But even when a loan is issued for sound economic purposes, every loan 
agreement includes risk premiums. Bankers know that some loans will not be repaid. In a 
standard market economy, fees and prices charged to clients must accommodate these 
costs, a procedure that is both economically and ethically justified.
372
 The borrower may 
well go into bankruptcy, and countries have laws on how such bankruptcies are worked out. 
Well-managed lenders will, of course, loose relatively little. In turn, lenders unfit for the 
market may be wiped out by losses. Some credit risk can be avoided, and hedging is 
available. Conscientious scrutiny of borrowers, lending limits, or checks on how prior loans 
were used, including hold-ups of further loans if the wasting of resources is discovered, 
reduce the total risk in the lender‘s very own interest.373 Additionally, these mechanisms 
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 The business of international lending is placed in the frames of economics both by Stiglitz (2002b: 201) 
and Raffer (2001a: 1-3; 2007b: 237-8, 242; 2007c: 13-5). Here I rely on Raffer‘s (2007b) illustration. A 
discussion pointing in this same direction, but without reaching as far is found in Claessens (2010), who 
stresses the importance of risk management by both the borrowers and the lenders.  
373
 Claessens (2010: 77) points out that there are, of course, differences between a corporate loan and a 
sovereign loan, already in the corporate loan being enforceable, where in situations when the costs of 
reimbursements are seen to exceed the benefits, the sovereign can voluntarily default. This, of course, leads to 
the discussion of repudiation, reputation and consequences for future borrowing for the sovereign.  
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perform important allocative tasks, assuring that money is put to good use. Risk makes 
creditors cautious, a fact that serves as the main incentive against loose lending. The 
success of market economies is based on linking decisions and risks. But in contrast, in 
international lending, an important rationale for debt management policies has been to 
secure the interests of the creditors. By cutting back on indebted nations‘ government 
spending and liquidating state property, and by liberalizing their trade, indebted states 
would relieve sources for repaying their loans and reorient themselves towards the 
preferred track of good governance. Still, a basis for the functioning of the market 
mechanisms is that economic decisions must be accompanied by (shared) responsibility; 
whoever takes entrepreneurial decisions must also carry entrepreneurial risks. The credit 
risk of the lending party is thus that the borrower fails to repay what he owes. In practice, 
the only way for a creditor to protect against credit risk is to require adequate securities and 
to add a risk premium on top of the interest rate, often according to the credit rating of the 
borrower. If this link between action and responsibility is severed – as it was in centrally 
planned economies – market efficiency is severely disturbed (Raffer and Singer 2001: 
195).
374
 To dress this in economic terms, international administration of official debts 
resembles that of the planned economy where the supply curve was elastic and there was no 
accountability.
375
 Shifting all responsibilities onto debtors − as done in sovereign lending − 
encourages economically and ethically compromised behavior.
376
 Most recently, this same 
                                                 
374
 Instead, as Stiglitz notes (2002b: 202), the IMF, concentrating on the symptoms rather than the root causes, 
defends its interventions by saying that without them, the indebted country will default, and as a result it will 
not be above to get credit in the future. A coherent approach would have recognized the fallacy of this 
argument, Stiglitz says. If capital markets work well, then they are forward-looking in assessing what interest 
rates to charge they look at the risk going forward. A country discharging a heavy debt overhang, even by 
defaulting, is in better shape to grow and therefore more able to repay any additional borrowing. This is part 
of the rationale for bankruptcy in the first place. 
375
 An elastic supply curve stands for the supply of a good being horizontal and constant, or disconnected to 
the demand of the product. In the planned economies, for instance, consumer goods were produced according 
to an overall plan, regardless the demand for the product.  
376
 The private banker involved in sovereign lending not bothering about economic fundamentals is explicable 
and − from a business-administration point of view − rational. The understanding that neither legal principles 
enforced elsewhere nor economic facts would affect sovereign debts was de facto supported by the 
international financial institutions. (Raffer 2007b: 221)  
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mistake was repeated in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, when banks where 
bailed out but the dysfunctional financial system was left unreformed (Torres 2010). Such 
incomplete crisis responses lead to various kinds of perverse effects, such as exploding 
sovereign indebtedness, which, in turn, ultimately leads to weaker government finances and 
national economic instability.  
In sovereign lending, it is up to the borrower to bear the risk, just as it is up to the bank to 
clarify for the borrower what the risks are. If not, the ultimate burden falls on the taxpayers, 
who end up paying for the speculative business game the lender and borrower are playing. 
This is exactly the fall out that financial crises have led to and what people are protesting 
against.
377
 This also fits into the framework of the mentioned odious debts (see also chapter 
4). It is in guaranteeing the functioning of the banking system, that the deposit insurance 
and the lender of last resort come into play
378
. These are essential for the sound operation of 
the banking business. In other words, approaching the issue from the creditors‘ point of 
view, delaying a solution to problem debt becomes costly to them, too (Raffer and Singer 
2001: 172).
379
 In addition to the previously discussed malpractice, if looked at from a strict 
economic angle, creditors get less than originally stipulated since dragged out debt 
                                                 
377
 This does not mean that this captures the breadth of the case presented by protestors. Of course, many 
protest about the larger picture of most globally introduced neoliberal policies, the way these are furthered by 
the international financial institutions, or the general domination of the North on the South. 
378
 The difference between these two is that a lender of last resort provides funds to the institution, whereas 
the deposit insurance protects the deposits up to a certain sum. A deposit insurance can be divided, in 
particular regarding the limit between risk free deposits that are guaranteed by the taxpayers and deposits 
made to a higher interest rate due to a higher element of risk. In the latter case, it is normal for the depositor to 
bear the credit risk. And in that case, there should not be an automatic third part standing for the losses if the 
risks are realized.  
379
 Sachs (1995: 13) contrasts Macy‘s Department Store‘s to the Russian Government‘s stopping of debt 
service, both in January 1992. Macy‘s filed for Chapter 11 protection, and received an immediate and 
automatic debt standstill. Three weeks later, Macy‘s arranged for a new loan as debtor-in-possession 
financing. Russia, in contrast, informed the G-7 creditors that it would be unable to service its debts. The lack 
of formal insolvency procedures meant no standstill. It took Russia a year to reach an agreement for 
rescheduling its debts. Importantly, in the meantime, Russia was facing intense international political pressure 
by some governments to repay some of its debts. 
270 
 
restructuring leads not only to accumulated debts but also to a deterioration of the economy 
of the indebted – thus less chance of being repaid.380  
From the point of view of a functioning market, the estimated large and growing sums of 
illicit financial flows, mounting to between a good USD 800 billion to a trillion in 2006 
(Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2006: 9) translates into lost incomes for poor countries. This 
income is lost in the form of tax income, VAT income and customs income to mention but 
a few. To repair the leaking holes in this financial vessel, numerous mechanisms must be 
put in place, including banking regulations. Overall, this matter falls outside the present 
focus, and the reach of international arbitration. The matter deserves a mention here 
because it links illicit financial flows to odious debt. A case of odious debt to a poor 
country is not helped by the debt having been channeled unofficially, and unrecorded, back 
to a donor country.  
Looking to the future, and based on the arguments made, three proposals stand out. First, as 
a remedy to the moral hazard problem which arose in the 1970s as a consequence of 
jurisdiction of credits moving to lending nations, leading to countries borrowing as much as 
they can, Bulow (2002: 245) sees that if domestic courts had jurisdictions over lending 
nations, foreign lenders would basically be in the same boat as domestic creditors. Here, it 
is of interest to note that the ultimate goal of any of these proposals is not to decrease 
financial flows per se. Unless, of course, we divide financial flows into productive flows 
and speculative flows. If so, then the decrease in speculative flows would be preferred to 
the decrease in productive flows.  
Second, Bulow (2002: 252-3) proposes separating foreign aid from debt relief, where a 
country‘s borrowing capacity is based on market factors, such as the strength of its own 
property rights system and the attractiveness of investment in the country. By following an 
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 Further, an important share of debts exists on paper only, and cannot be recouped. These phantom debts 
are no longer claims. If they were eliminated, and if damage compensation was paid in cases where creditors 
caused unlawful damages, bona fide creditors would recover larger shares of their claims from insolvent 
debtors. In sum, economic facts eventually asset themselves – what cannot be paid will not be paid. (Raffer 
2007b: 245-6) This is linked to the discussion separating between so called odious debts and economic 
insolvency, a discussion that is further extended in chapter 4.  
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integrated program of switching the hard loans to aid and switching jurisdiction over all 
future international debt to borrower-country courts, we would probably reduce the 
maximum amount a country could borrow, although this might be partly offset by increases 
in other types of private investment that would no longer be crowded out by debt. Debt 
restructuring would probably surface at lower levels of debt. But in return the process 
might be less painful, because all foreign and domestic creditors could be treated under the 
same system. However, the ultimate goal is not to increase capital flows but to foster trade 
and encourage efficient investment.
381
 Claessen (2010) proposes better government debt 
management, including examination of whether contingent liabilities from public/private 
risk sharing might be altered in ways that ease public responsibility. Also, he recommends 
that governments better coordinate their relevant official entities that have responsibilities 
for foreign liability and risk management. Other proposals would provide better risk-
mitigation option for the sovereign debtor. For instance, governments could consider 
issuing their bonds with interest payments indexed to output or commodity prices.  
Third, and slightly more radical, loans could be turned into grants (Raffer and Singer 2001; 
172). For instance, one could ask why rich governments should be in the business of 
loaning to poor governments in the first place (Bulow 2002: 244). Rather, soft aid and hard 
loans do not fit seamlessly (as seen in chapter 6).
382
  
7.3 The case for internationalizing the principles behind ‘Chapter 9’  
In chapter 4, the question of bail-outs and bail-ins was left hanging. More precisely, this 
question spreads out into a discussion whether all lenders are taking equal losses, or so 
called ―hair cuts‖, or if lost loans are being compensated for. Are all lenders treated the 
same? Are debts forgiven or paid off by some other mechanism? Who pays the price and 
what effects does this have on the economic future of the indebted country? By reasoning 
along the paths of economic efficiency and justice, this section addresses these particular 
concerns.  
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 As also Nissanke and Ferrarini (2004) stress, debt relief must be set in a broader policy context providing 
means or instruments to deal with adverse terms of trade chocks. 
382
 For the practicality of how loan- or credit agreements are set up, including cross disciplinary dimensions, 
see Anders (2005: 47-56). 
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The economics of international lending 
In the early 2000s, we note an almost global belief in the free market and ever-increasing 
economic growth.
383
 This belief constitutes a corner stone not only in the planning of debt 
relief programmes but also in assessing the eligibility of candidate nations. It is also central 
in international lending policy. But this enthusiasm challenges some fundamental 
assumptions of economics on at least five accounts.  
The politics of the free market is based on the belief that the invisible hand guides 
economic activity towards profitable activity. But, as a first point, the liberalization drive as 
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s cannot be justified by orthodox economic theory (Raffer 
and Singer 2001: 48-9). Rather, the broad implementation of free trade in the name of 
economic growth and poverty alleviation are not supported by economic theory (one size 
does not fit all) or even less by empirical evidence (as with the theoretical cases, the 
empirical material is flawed and ambiguous) (Deraniyagala and Fine 2006: 46-7). Further, 
this global liberalization program can be dismissed on three accounts (Rodrik 2007a: 16-8). 
Firstly, it is a political model housed in economic wording and simple rules of thumb, 
rather than sound application of models of neoclassical economic principles. Two, it 
overlooks the impossibility of removing all distorted margins simultaneously (institutional 
or otherwise), and thirdly, the consensus by which the models are implemented represents a 
laundry-list approach versus a strategic-list approach. Three, orthodox economics in its 
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 Yet, Costabile (2007) re-awakens Keynes‘s Plan and argues for the Plan as a remedy for today‘s 
disequilibria in international monetary arrangements. In analyzing Keynes‘s Plan, she (2007: 20-1) argues that 
these asymmetries should be cut at their roots. Crucially, not only would international imbalances (normally 
arising between symmetric countries) be discouraged by the use of penalties; most importantly, what would be 
disempowered is the basic source of international imbalances that is the basic asymmetry between countries 
issuing the international money and countries deprived of this privilege. The monetary system envisaged by 
Keynes is symmetric for three reasons. Firstly, the link between the gold and international liquidity is severed, 
in the sense that the distribution of international liquidity becomes independent from the distribution of gold 
reserves among countries. Secondly, national currencies stand on a par, since none of them is allowed to work 
as the international currency. Thirdly, any remaining imbalances between countries (now made symmetric by 
the operation of the system), would be kept under control via the penalties envisaged by the Plan. Importantly, 
only the combination of these measures gives rise to international symmetry, while each measure taken in 
isolation is unable to generate this result. 
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proper form is context specific and emphasizes the appropriateness of national solutions 
(Rodrik 2007a: especially 3, 4, 29, and 31). Debt relief programmes, including the 
requirements they bring with them, in contrast, are devised on the presumption that the 
same model fits all candidates, an assumption that translates into a curious mix of ideology 
and bad economics (to borrow from the main message of Stiglitz 2002b). 
Second, textbook economics promote free and fair participation in the marketplace, in a 
world of perfect information available to all. Taking a step back to observe the economic 
order as if from the outside, the global economy is not only based on unequal starting 
positions in the global race for economic profit, but in addition, the system was set up 
according to the policies of those in power positions in the 1940s.
384
 So far, the initiatives 
to pre-empt crisis or the response to crises have not involved changes in this world order. 
Instead, the international financial institutions and leading economies have focused on more 
general and less practical measures of stimulating the economy, strengthening institutions 
and stabilizing the system.
385
 Regarding what is useful in terms of reforms in the present 
system from a poor country‘s perspective, the problem is that the Bretton Woods 
institutions represent the creditor interests. Under conditions of systematic deficit – at times 
caused by the declining relative prices of a country‘s export to import for raw materials, or 
from the unproductive use of loaned funds, along with accumulating interests – a deficit 
country has few choices but to take on more loans.
386
 Not only are the starting positions of 
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 The constitution of the IMF includes equal treatment of all member countries. Raffer and Singer (2001: 12) 
concludes that in practice, ―surveillance‖ of industrial, or rich and surplus, countries is vague, whereas the 
―surveillance‖ for poor, or deficit, countries resembles policing from Washington. Raffer and Singer see that 
restoring symmetry means either more effective pressure on surplus countries or a relaxation of the present 
pressure on deficit countries.  
385
 See for instance the communiqué issued by the G-20 summit held on 15 November 2008 in Washington, 
D.C., as referred for instance in the New York Times (2008). For a listing of IMF‘s achievements, as seen 
from within, see for instance Boorman (2003: 7). 
386
 As seen in Chapter 2, the undercurrents here were composed of a system providing larger loans which 
spread default risk in combination with the introduction of floating-rate loans. Together these two, in turn, led 
to broadened lender participation. Lipson (1981: 609-10) explains further that the development of the 
Euromarket is important to the study of the debt problem. First, the privatization of the balance-or-payments 
financing reduced the role of official aid donors and elevated the importance of commercial debt negotiations. 
Second, some arrangements for handling commercial debts are linked directly to Euromarket lending 
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nations randomly assigned, but also the unequal and ad hoc treatments of sovereign debts 
of different countries stand in contradiction to the fundamentals of economic reason. On the 
one hand, this stands in contrast to the ideology that both the Fund and the World Bank are 
based on the doctrine of economic neutrality, and are defined as non-political institutions 
whose tasks are supposed to be technical.
387
 On the other, and moral considerations aside, 
the fact that the sovereign debts of different countries are treated unequally contradicts the 
very fundamentals of economic reason. 
Second, in situations where financial crises occur, or economic efficiency fails, one way in 
which economists explain this is through external forces, for instance the limited access to 
information.
388
 Market failures appear when individuals in pursuit of their own interest may 
                                                                                                                                                    
procedures. Third, to understand pressures for change within the regime one must consider the overall 
problem of deficits and their financing. If the debt regime cannot be reduced to the credit markets, neither can 
it be understood without paying close attention to them.  
The rapid growth of off-shore markets began in the 1960s, when US structures were progressively tightened, 
multinational corporations were forced to look beyond New York and Chicago for worldwide financing. They 
found it when familiar money-market banks began producing dollar-denominated deposits in their London 
branch offices. As the market grew, its functions expanded from simple commercial lending to balance-of-
payments financing. Many potential borrowers were state agencies or para-statal enterprises. These state 
enterprises traditionally claimed sovereign immunity from foreign commercial laws. Larger loans were shared 
among several major banks and scores of smaller ones. This technique was especially useful in lending to 
sovereign borrowers because lenders were less experienced in that area. By using syndicated loans, essentially 
unknowable default risks could be spread over a large number of banks. A second important development 
came in 1969, when short-term interest rates soared above long-term rates. Learning from experience, they 
introduced floating-rate loans, shifting the uncertainty over interest rates to the borrower. These innovations 
broadened lender participation and so facilitated sovereign borrowing on a truly massive scale. With these 
technical features in place and with interest rates consistently more attractive (to both depositors and 
borrowers) than those in domestic markets, the supply of Euromarket funds has expanded steadily.  
387
 It was Keynes‘s idea that the BWIs should be as neutral as possible. Again, for the sake of noting it, 
Keynes also spoke for an Anglo-American dominance of the BWIs. He proposed that these two countries 
should not only settle the charter between themselves but also permanently conceive of the management and 
effective voting power of the institutions. Importantly, Keynes wanted the tax on balance of trade recycled to 
deficit countries, not used to finance international organizations (Raffer and Singer 2001: 11). 
388
 Exogenous accounts of financial crisis assume that the market participants constantly adjust their 
behaviour based on new information outside the market. The endogenous account, however, say that financial 
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not further the general interest. This is addressed in the literature on asymmetric 
information, where agents may not take actions in the best interest of those for whom they 
are supposed to be acting. (Stiglitz 2006: 159)
 389
 This is also addressed under the sub-
heading of moral hazard, pointing toward situations where lenders have insufficient, or 
false, information regarding the borrower‘s intended use of the borrowed funds. Often, 
moral hazard is mentioned in connection to the borrowers and their incentives to take on 
too much debt, and swallow the risk of default due to a perceived expectation of a bailout 
by the international community. Claessen (2010), and also Cline (2005), specifically argues 
against this perception, partly on the grounds that the policymakers of borrowing nations 
have learned from past experience that the funds available are usually, too little, too late 
and under too strict conditions to serve as a crisis-halting tool. As has been argued in this 
thesis, the problem of moral hazard is not necessarily (only) with borrowers, but rather, 
with lenders.
390
 In these cases, moral hazard is not merely connected to immoral borrowing, 
but to immoral lending, as when lenders operate under the assumption that the international 
financial institutions will bail them out in case problems arise.
391
 This leads borrowers to 
feel that borrowing is easier than would otherwise be the case.
392
 Hence, both asymmetric 
                                                                                                                                                    
crisis begin inside finance, for instance by cycles or internal laws of finance à la Minsky or Polyani. See 
Sinclair (2010) for an analysis. 
389
 The asymmetry of information and moral hazard aspects of international lending were initially addressed 
in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and further elaborated in Eaton et al. (1986). 
390
 In a market economy, the lender bears the consequences of making a bad loan. Instead, and repeatedly, the 
IMF programs provide funds for governments to bail out Western creditors. The creditors, anticipating an 
IMF bailout, have weakened incentives to ensure that the borrowers will be able to repay. A bailout in the 
event of a crisis is like ―free‖ insurance. A lender takes less care in screening applicants, and borrowers are 
encouraged to incur excess risks without worrying about it. (Stiglitz 2002b: 201-2) If both sides of the 
equation are facing moral hazard, they can be seen as cancelling each other. This would mean that there is no 
moral hazard. 
391
 A policy that can be criticized for leading to private profits with socialized risks. 
392
 On the notion that in crises times, the private sector eggs the international financial institutions to bail out 
the debtor, and seeing the claims of the international financial institutions as effectively junior compared to 
those of private borrowers, and if there is a moral hazard problem, it would be better, from an efficiency point 
of view, if the international financial institutions could make a prior commitment not to bail out countries in 
distress (Bulow 2002: 236). In fact, Bulow (2002: 238) proposes that the seniority of the loans of the 
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information and moral hazard are central in international loaning.
393
 The invisible hand 
does not work in markets with imperfect information, a characteristic of all markets 
(Stiglitz 2008: 2).
394
 International loaning does not seem to operate on the premises of the 
free market. 
Third, economics and economic activity are based on the chase for economic profit. So is 
lending and international lending. Returns on investment, funded by borrowing, is a way of 
creating future profit. And so far, global growth has been plotted as an upward curve. But 
global economic growth may not always be positive, either now or as part of a larger future 
trend. For instance, some research (World Commission on the Social Dimensions of 
Globalization 2004, table 10, §174, see also figures from Maddison 2005) highlights the 
trend that since the 1990s, global economic growth per capita has been slower than during 
previous decades. In addition, the growth has been divided unequally both within the 
groups of industrial and developing countries.
395
 Looking closer at the increase in growth 
per capita, only 16 developing countries grew over three per cent per year in 1985-2000. 
On the other hand, 55 developing countries grew with two per cent per year and in 23 
countries, the population growth was negative. (World Commission on the Social 
                                                                                                                                                    
international financial institutions simply means that in the event of default, other official creditors will 
supply new loans or subordinate their own claims to a sufficient degree, or a combination of these, so that in 
an accounting sense the international financial institutions will be repaid without substantial real cost to the 
private sector. If this is the case, Bulow proposes that the appropriate economic analysis is to amalgamate all 
official loans and treat official debt to private sector loans as junior. 
393
 The terms are central also because they stretch beyond the contracts of the lending agency and the 
borrowing nation. The actual cost of this imperfect information can be argued as being borne either by the 
population of the indebted county or by the taxpayers of the lending nation or the funding bodies they work 
with.  
394
 Lipson (1981: 615, 617) inquires into how highly competitive commercial lending can act cooperatively to 
prevent defaults. He suggests one possible answer is in collective action, where syndicate lending involves 
considerable interdependence among banks. Banks have ample incentives to cooperate to avert default and 
relatively few incentives to cheat on collective arrangements. For international banks, organized among 
themselves, the prospect of their collective sanction is almost certain to deter default among sovereign 
borrowers. Such default would deprive debtors of virtually all international credit. 
395
 For an account of the rise in inequality in the US, see for instance Hahnel (2005: 15-8). 
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Dimensions of Globalization 2004: §175) Simultaneously, also the differences in income 
between the world‘s rich and poor have increased (World Commission on the Social 
Dimensions of Globalization 2004: §176). This translates into poor countries and poor 
groups within countries sliding into further poverty as the number of poor increase, whilst 
the riches of the rich increase.
396
 These observations lend further support for the caution 
against mere extension of repayments as an instrument to increase the possibility of 
repayment.  
Fourth, during the past decades, the financial world has seen the emergence and expansion 
of credit derivatives, or financial instruments aimed at protecting the risks of financial 
transactions.
397
 The rapid development of the complicated derivatives is a partial reason 
behind the financial crisis of 2008. The complicated design of these derivatives leads to 
difficulties in tracing where the risk has ultimately been transported to. Derivatives also 
present a challenge to price. Consequently, this leads to a form of reliance by banks on a 
third party, often a large international actor, and their assumed expertise in pricing the 
derivative instruments. The third party, in return, may have their own bias according to 
which they form and give advice.
398
 But even more importantly, this advice of course often 
                                                 
396
 Agreeing with the observation that economic growth has slowed down, K.S. Jomo and Jacques Baudot 
(2007: xvii−xviii) show that the evidence for economic globalization promoting growth throughout the world 
while bringing about global convergence in terms of economic development, incomes and human welfare, 
rests on weak grounds. They also find that the polarized debate regarding economic world inequalities is 
problematic, concluding that the evidence is contradictory and outcome depends mainly on what is being 
measured and how. 
397
 A derivative instrument is a financial contract reflecting the value of an underlying asset. For instance, 
traders can agree to make a deal at a certain price at a given date in the future. Although both parties take on 
some risk (the seller would benefit from higher future prices and the buyer would equally benefit from lower 
prices in the future), the reason for turning to derivatives lies in eliminating the risk of uncertainty. 
Derivatives can further be divided into two groups, standardized (over-the-counter) and customized (exchange 
traded) contracts. The type of contracts, covering both groups, are futures (setting a future date to the deal), 
options (the parties have the option of making the deal at the negotiated price in the future) or swaps (the 
parties can swap contracts), or some combination of these. For an analysis of credit derivatives, se for 
instance Skeel Jr and Partnoy (2007). 
398
 One type of advisory body is credit rating agencies, whose activities are associated with a number of 
criticisms both regarding their independence as well as their expertise. For instance, due to the few main 
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fails, as the models say little about the future, but rather, are based on past performances.
399
 
In the prognosis, the assumption is that the future unfolds in the same way as the past has 
done, which might not be the case. In the models, the parameters are assumed to be 
constant over time but as crises erupt, models crash and the parameters are no longer valid. 
Impractically, this happens in the very situations when one would need the assistance of 
models. This line of argument is also applicable to the way (private) creditors create their 
loaning strategies. It is also applicable to the assessments according to which a country is 
expected to carry its debt burden.
400
    
Fifth, in the absence of symmetry in the world economy, Raffer and Singer (2001: 12) note 
that the Bretton Woods institutions are driven to treat all problems of foreign exchange 
deficits as internal to the policies of these deficit countries. The international financial 
institutions are also driven to disregard all factors external to the deficit countries, from 
debt pressures to deteriorating terms of trade and protectionist barriers to their trade and 
their access to technology. The underlying analogy with profligate and ―economical‖ 
individuals is one of the economic fallacies of composition, which occurs when moving 
from individuals to countries or from countries to regions of the world, they say. What is 
good for one country is not necessarily good for the broader community. Yet, the country-
by-country approach of stabilization and structural adjustment programs disregards such 
fallacies of composition. Raffer and Singer (2001: 12-3) further cement this point by 
highlighting the country-by-country pressure on deficit countries to expand exports and to 
                                                                                                                                                    
actors and the difficulty new actors encounter as they enter the field, the market can be described as 
oligopolistic. In addition, intimate associations, at times in the form of dependency relations, between those 
who rate credits and those who constitute the object of these ratings raises doubt over the neutrality of the 
advice. But perhaps above all, the financial crisis emerging in 2008 serves as a reminder of the fact that the 
accuracy, and therefore the value, of the ratings is doubtful, or perhaps even detrimental, to those following it.  
399
 For instance, one of the features of Basel II, the current set of minimal capital requirements for banks, is an 
increased reliance on private credit rating agencies and risk management models by the banks themselves 
(Lannoo 2009).  
400
 The proposal by Panizza (2010) to strengthen debt management capacity in debtor countries to help their 
policy-makers manage their individual situations is thus a welcomed one. While the proposal is certainly 
helpful, with important promise for the future, it is unfortunately, not sufficient in terms of resolving the 
present situation.  
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be more ―outward-oriented‖.  If many countries are simultaneously pressed to expand their 
export of the same commodities, the predictable outcome is oversupply, collapse of prices 
and deterioration of terms-of-trade. Given this, the deteriorating terms-of-trade are not an 
exogenous fact of life to which countries must adjust, but the result of the adjustment 
process itself. In fact, the gap in commodity policy twists the approach to adjustment and 
makes it ―a factor in immiserization rather than salvation‖. 
Entangling policy from theory 
These five observations sit uncomfortably in the puzzle of orthodox economics. Ill-defined 
policies are based on unfounded empirical outcomes, unequal opportunities of participation 
in the market place, the obvious bias of the international financial institution toward the 
rich countries, the recognition of market failures and indebted countries being pressured 
away from international economic competition because of their debt burdens. Unfounded 
policies must be separated from economic theory.
401
 Instead, the balance between social 
justice and economic fairness – or the growing tension between social and financial risks – 
provides a useful entry point into the discussions on how to solve the debt problem (as 
addressed by Palley 2003 and Soederberg 2005). Stiglitz (2002b: 206) calls for coherence 
in IMF‘s actions, saying that a coherent theory of the capital market would have had the 
IMF looking to alternatives to the billions and billions provided in bailout packages. 
Perhaps another key weaknesses in the approach of the international financial institutions to 
economic reform is the failure to recognize that structural adjustment at the domestic level 
is meaningless without corresponding adjustment at the global level (Cheru 2006: 40). In 
connecting these dots of ill-defined and ill-grounded policies, the emerging image of the 
debt problem starts to resemble more of a political matter than an economic equation. This 
political matter is further supported by economic sanctions, meaning both that economic 
sanctions are a political tool, while enforcing the idea that problem debt is a political 
question. But before looking closer at political approaches to problem debt, let us see how 
                                                 
401
 Or, in the words of economists: Development works, development policy does not (Rodrik 2007b), ―Blame 
the economists, not economics‖ (Rodrik 2009), and ― the problem is not the failure of economics, but the 
failure to apply economic principles to practical policy work‖ (Easterly 2002), and finally, that the policy 
prescriptions of the international financial institutions do not match textbook economics (Stiglitz 2002b: 105-
6, 125-6). 
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economic reason is applicable on debt relief and the dealings with sovereign debt in 
general.  
Caution is in order not only regarding the disentangling of promoted policy from theory. 
Caution is in order also regarding the fundamental assumptions in economics. In the 
context of problem debt of the poor countries, I would separate out three particular 
considerations from the many that can be raised. First, in economics, the assumed static 
parameters are a prerequisite for creating models. In turn, among economists, this creates a 
reliance on the static principles the ceteris paribus assumption creates, where models are 
developed with only the named parameter(s) changing at a time, assuming everything else 
remains static. This being so, the approach also closes out the possibility of changing the 
fundamentals of, in this case, the economic order. But also, it makes it possible to derive 
statements of laws and regularities which appear of general applicability (Cox 2010). In 
contrast to this, but in accordance with the approach of this thesis, we have critical theory, 
which stands apart from the prevailing order by asking how the world has come about, 
instead of just accepting it as it stands (Cox 2010).  
A second consideration is about equilibrium, the central node in economics. I will here 
raise two of these considerations, representing different dimensions. First, equilibrium in 
welfare is seen in Pareto-optimality, describing a situation optimal to everyone and where 
an increase in anyone‘s welfare would decrease the welfare of someone else. As seen, debt 
relief is never Pareto-improving, but what is more, Pareto-optimality also assumes free and 
fair participation in the markets in a world without overarching arrangements promoting the 
rich countries. Second, the existence of multiple simultaneous equilibria makes it difficult 
to coordinate financial markets. For instance, multiple equilibria in the asset market where 
banks runs themselves arise because of expectations regarding the future cause of defaults 
in situations which are economically sound today (Sachs 1995: 3). In addition, political 
governance is subject to multiple equilibria, where several centers of power maintain in 
society together, each alone may be too weak to attempt to usurp the state‘s monopoly of 
force (Sachs 1995: 6). If financially weak states are unable to mobilize resources to protect 
the monopoly of power, they risk falling into a Hobbesian ―war of all against all‖ (Sachs 
1995: 6). 
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Third, but perhaps most importantly, and striking at the core of economics, is the fact that 
the omission of the role of history and the forceful use of power in international relations 
shade a part of the image of the debt problem.
402
 This translates of course also into the 
consequent normative prescriptions. In a way, this may be further stretched to be seen as 
creating persistent headwind against rule-of-law and consequent democratization both in 
the poor countries and in their surroundings. Again, the omission of history is crucial 
particularly if contrasted to the approach of critical theory, a theory asking how things have 
come about, as mentioned a moment ago. Here, critical theory, unlike ―problem-solving 
theory‖, does not take institutions or social power relations for granted (Cox 2010). Critical 
theory is concerned with the continuing process of historical change, and in that sense, it is 
a theory of history.  
This means that while economic insolvency procedures provide an answer to the problem, 
it is of equal importance to devise the mechanism so that it is not only aligned with 
economic efficiency where insolvent entities are dealt with in an appropriate fashion, but 
that it must also allow space for the learning from past experience, including taking into 
consideration issues of fairness and equal participation mechanisms in the decision-making 
process. In other words, among corrections of the global economic structures, a solution to 
the problem involves careful construction of a system allowing for not only the 
restructuring of debts, but also for mechanisms involving the rights of the indebted – in line 
with statutory insolvency laws. In line with this thinking, the proposals for arbitrating 
international debt gain further weight (see Raffer 1990).  
Just before turning to the practicalities of implementing principles of bankruptcy 
internationally, it is of interest to link the discussion about economic risk to the previous 
line of thinking about a global lender of last resort. Here, the apparent contradiction 
between a guarantee of credit versus the risk a creditor should bear in a market economy is 
                                                 
402
 In the words of Robert Cox (2010), ‖[h]istory [..] is not a sequence of events but a holistic way of 
thinking about the world. The current academic fashion breaks the world down into politics, economics, 
anthropology and so forth. A historical outlook means taking things occurring within a historical context 
all together. Yet this is very demanding, because one person can hardly accomplish such a view. But one 
person can at least have an approach that says that everything must be understood‖. 
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resolved by recalling that a lender of last resort should provide credit for a solvent entity 
only. 
Internationalizing ‘Chapter 9’ in practice  
Advancing towards the practicalities of setting up an international version of the principles 
of ‗Chapter 9‘, two main issues need to be identified and isolated. The first is about 
separating strives for democracy from attempts by some to assess the democracy of others. 
The second is about maintaining the separation between economic insolvency and odious 
debt, as dealt with in chapter 4.  
In dealing with ex ante and ex post assessments of the level of democracy practiced in 
countries, serving as a basis for lending decisions, one of the suggestions was about 
creating a Democracy Panel (Pogge 2008a: 259-61), consisting of legal experts, monitoring 
the degrees of democracy in countries. The various proposals and arguments behind them 
have been raised earlier, so here, let us raise different dimensions regarding this line of 
thinking. To the extent that the proposal overlaps also other proposals, and using the Panel 
as an example, four main dimensions – or cautions – are in order.  
First, the immediate concern regards the idea that one rules over others. The risk of 
perceived bias, and therefore objective credibility, is high. The approach is problematic also 
from the point of view that not all borrowing from a regime – or from a non-democratic or 
even an odious regime – is bad debt (see for instance Bolton and Skeel 2007: 85; Ben-
Shahar 2007: 62-3). The practical concern is about Western democracies ruling over, or 
judging, other nation-states. Predicting this, and to avoid suspicions of self-serving 
politicians, Pogge suggests that the panel be made up of lawyers, or jurists. This, however, 
brings on a second concern, which is precisely why the panel would be made up of lawyers 
– will they have enough expertise knowledge beyond the law, including political science, 
economics and political processes? To strip this question, imbued with rhetoric, of any 
unintended polemics against lawyers, and instead stress the importance of securing 
adequate, deep and wide expertise, it is necessary to underline that the composition of such 
a panel would have to be multidisciplinary. Further, international work requires funding. To 
this end, a third caution concerns the composition of funding for the panel, and more 
specifically, that if the panel is funded with official means, does this mean that private 
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lenders and credit institutions, would be granted access to free assessments? This could lead 
to the business aspect of lending being suffocated. Instead, and quite counterproductively, 
if the people of the borrowing nation are held responsible for the repayments, also in the 
case of sovereign default, the panel would erase the business function of international 
sovereign lending. Four, could the panel be seen as an insurance mostly benefiting the 
creditors (whose credit risk decreases)? The flip side of the coin, representing that of poor 
countries being allowed access to lending markets, could possibly already be covered by 
the lending supplied by the IMF and the World Bank as threshold loans, or loans opening 
the door to other lenders. In short, the reaction to setting up a democracy panel is cautious. 
Second, arguments related to odious debts are often mixed and matched with a myriad of 
other issues, such as poverty in general, acute economic insolvency or in relation to the 
political system of the indebted country, past or present (as concluded in chapter 4). In turn, 
it is also not rare to find confusing arguments about economic insolvency related to odious 
debt or the political system of the indebted country. Having clarified this, and picking up 
loose ends from previous chapters, we can conclude by separating out seven main 
principles for setting up a mechanism for internationalizing the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘:  
First, it is essential to maintain odious debt separate from economic insolvency. Having 
said so, the streams should intersect under the arrangement of an independent international 
arbitration panel, where one leg comes from ‗Chapter 9‘ (economic insolvency) and the 
other concerns odious debt. The decision-making body is neutral and independent from 
both parties involved. 
Second, the processing order is to first deal with claims of odious debts and once these have 
been dealt with, claims of economic insolvency are put on the table. It is essential that the 
most vulnerable sectors of the sovereign debtor‘s society are protected, so that the basic 
needs of the population are provided for before debts are collected.   
Third, dealing with debts in this way also implicitly carries a warning to creditors against 
unlawful and irresponsible behavior. In an indirect way this may serve as an ex ante 
mechanism for international lending decisions. 
Fourth, the decision of a nation to declare default is always political. The economics of the 
matter is that this is because the single creditor, but usually many altogether, is assumed to 
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have a less restricted view into the overall financial situation than the indebted nation itself. 
Ultimately, though, this is a political matter because a nation possesses theoretically 
immense resources to draw from in the form of taxation, privatization, saving and perhaps 
diversification of exports. Yet, it is for the national government to judge when the threshold 
of austerity measures is passed, or politically non-sustainable.  
Fifth, the institution of an automatic stay is of importance, once an international insolvency, 
or arbitration, case is opened. This is to avoid creditors‘ runs on the debtor‘s remaining 
assets and to allow for an orderly procedure to take place.  
Sixth, both issues are dealt with on a case-by-case basis and in retrospect. The arbitration 
panel concept brings with it rulings ranging from 0-100 per cent of the debts being 
repayable. This means that it is not an automatic charity from the rich towards the poor, but 
a fair dealing with both parties as equal counterparts.  
The final, and seventh, point is about the comprehensiveness of procedure and consistency 
in methods. To avoid conflicting rulings and to work toward consistency, it is of 
importance to have one authority carrying out the rulings. Further, all claims on one 
particular debtor are being dealt with in one comprehensive process, in order to accomplish 
medium term debt sustainability and to avoid free riders, or creditors benefiting from 
negotiations conducted by others.   
In response, and to tie up, these principles meet under the banner of implementing 
internationally the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ of declaring bankruptcy for a debtor with 
governmental powers, a municipality, according to the US Insolvency Code. Transporting 
the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ internationally, the only element that would need to be added 
is an international arbitration panel. This is because, at present, there is no international 
judiciary body with the competence and capacity to assess and solve problems of over-
indebtedness of sovereigns vis-à-vis their creditors.  
In its early stages, the arbitration panel should operate on a provisionary basis, and the 
panel should be composed of an equal number of arbiters nominated by both the creditor 
and the debtor. Following this, and to allow for the decision-making to take place through 
simple majority, the arbitrators should nominate an additional arbitrator.  
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This procedure is not unknown in international politics. It is applied in bilateral cases 
between countries. Also the informal character of the arbitration body poses no obstacles, 
as the current ways of dealing with debt also functions without any binding quality in 
international law, but rather, on a provisionary basis. The present dealings are based on the 
political will and preferences of the creditors, and the dealings are also characteristic by the 
lack of alternatives for the debtors. International arbitration according to this model 
presented would be highly flexible, and highly non-bureaucratic. This means that the panel 
should not require significant international structure, as the process would remain largely in 
the hands of the parties involved. Whereas proposals of linking the panel to an existing 
organization have been argued against, there is merit in the idea of setting up a small 
technical secretariat at an institution. It might be considered, however, to set up a small 
technical secretariat at an institution which itself is neither debtor nor creditor – such as the 
UN (as proposed by, for instance Erlassjahr 2001). The secretariat‘s task would be to 
support the process of data harmonization according to international standards, auditing, 
filing, documenting, whilst simultaneously providing technical support to the arbiters, and 
organizing the hearing of stakeholders according to procedural standards. 
Implementing internationally the principles of ‗Chapter 9‘ of the US Bankruptcy Code 
according to these seven elements not only overcomes the perceived structural, ethically 
questionable and unjust imbalances between the lenders and the borrowers, but is also be 
likely to lead to more efficient dealings with the debts of poor countries.  
286 
 
8.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has argued for global arbitration as a way of dealing with problem debt in a way 
that is just and that adheres to economic reason. Until the early 2000s, global arbitration 
received limited attention, academically and in practice. In the last few years, however, an 
interest has surfaced both in the theory of global arbitration and in transforming the theory 
into practice.  
To begin with, this thesis has shown that this interest is colored by three sets of approaches, 
which together constitute the debates about problem debt. These different approaches 
reflect the varying principles that have been proposed. First, some argue that problem debt 
is not the concern of the creditors, or those of surplus economies, and therefore, there is no 
reason to compensate those in deficit. This is built upon the argument that in a free 
globalized world, it is up to each nation to do as best it can in the global race for profits. To 
the extent that debt relates to poverty, it should be dealt with by means of development aid, 
or charity.
403
 A second set of approaches identify a moral dimension to the situation that 
combines high levels of poverty and vulnerability to economic shocks in indebted poor 
countries. Often, they assess that this debt will never be repaid anyway so therefore, its 
cancellation would not cause commotion on the financial markets. And even if debt 
cancellation would rock the financial markets, the moral implications of the action are 
balanced to outweigh the economic consequences.
404
 The radical fringe of this group 
proposes repudiation of debt as a reaction to unfair North-South relations.
405
 A third group 
is driven by an interest in global governance and is concerned with reforms of the global 
order. It is in this group that one comes across analyses on the accumulation of debts, and 
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 This is the official policy line among multilateral organizations and creditor nations, or development aid 
donors. Evidence of this is found in the fact that debt relief is placed under development aid.  
404
 Civil society voices carry the farthest of this group. 
405
 Jubilee South is an example of the radical fringe of the mobilizations by civil society around debt.  
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various explanations for this.
406
 Amongst these explanations, associations to the structural 
mechanisms of world trade are dominant. Importantly, what unites all three groups is a 
concern about the absence of formal institutionalization under commonly shared principles 
in dealing with sovereign default. This absence on an international level is particularly 
intriguing since most market-based economies apply solid insolvency procedures on a 
national level. And on a more intuitive level, global finance would seem to call for global 
regulatory mechanisms.  
This concern has been the driving force throughout the preceding pages, as this thesis has 
listened to, debated and argued with views from all three groups. Sympathizing most 
immediately with the third approach concerned with global governance, the attention has 
been drawn to two conflicting regimes: that of the international financial order and that of 
the universal human rights. On the one hand, the current economic system, resting on 
pillars devised in the 1940s, includes policies and mechanisms that are associated with debt 
creation in deficit zones or poor countries (chapter 2). Even so, there is a case for the 
overwhelming burdens of sovereign debt preventing the national economic development of 
poor countries, and leading to increased poverty. Equally, there may be reason behind 
claims that the dealings with debt may actually have had a negative effect on debt burdens 
(chapter 2). On the other hand, within the human rights regime, the universally agreed 
economic and social rights of each human being have been underlined in particular (chapter 
3). But today, debt repayments are prioritized over human rights. With this, this thesis has 
suggested that the economic order and the human rights regime are not only contradictory, 
but that economic interests are allowed to dominate over fundamental rights. Consequently, 
this thesis has pointed to this need to loosen the knot where these arrangements intersect − 
namely, the situation of problem debt in poor countries. Alongside this contradiction, there 
are claims that some debt of poor countries is odious (chapter 4). An underlying theme 
throughout this thesis is that the situation that was laid bare with the debt crisis in 1982 is 
still not resolved. Rather, its presence maintains and highlights poor countries‘ vulnerability 
to external shocks, as seen in the last years of the first decade of the 2000s when food and 
fuel crises were followed by financial crises. Matters are not helped by the fact that none of 
the current policies or mechanisms provide for a systematic process of dealing with the 
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 Raffer and Singer (2001), Herman et al. (2010a). 
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problem debt of poor countries − or elsewhere, as seen again in the Euro zone. Instead, a 
consequence of the current system is that it has given rise to inconsistencies and 
inadequateness and therefore, unpredictability in dealing with problem debt as it regularly 
rolls over into crises situations. 
Meanwhile, in addition to the two conflicting regimes of universal human rights and the 
global economic order, the current international system is organized according to dual, and 
partly contradictory, ambitions. On the one hand, the ambitions stress the importance of the 
promotion of economic growth (chapters 2 and 5) while simultaneously, and on the other 
hand, they speak for moral considerations of alleviating global poverty (chapters 3 and 6). 
World trade, global production and perhaps above all, foreign investments, are actively 
driven and promoted across the globe (chapters 5 and 7). Simultaneously, we see record 
levels of poverty and yawning economic gaps, or deficits (chapters 3 and 5). Thus, to fill 
these, there is a created need for borrowing. As markets, economies and nations are 
liberalized, and while the economic race accelerates, development aid expands into now 
including debt relief and trade-supporting schemes for poor countries (chapters 5 and 6). At 
times, as shown, the current system even contradicts against economic reason (chapters 2 
and 7). This contradiction is clearly visible in the situations of, and consequent dealings 
with, problem debt of poor countries.  
Yet, today‘s arrangements of international lending do not satisfy either of the parties. At 
one end, the indebted and poor nation is driven into a corner, leaving the country dependent 
on the random goodwill of its creditors. At the other, the creditor is not only driven by a 
game, or race, of contradicting rules under the aim of being the first one in and the first one 
out (apart from economic analyses and with no international legal framework upon which 
to rely), but simultaneously, the lender is paralyzed from taking legal action under the 
suspicion that the international financial institutions largely drive their own interest above 
other lenders‘ (chapters 4 and 7). These arrangements are but two elements out of several in 
the international financial system that are in need of an upgrade. Actually, as shown, the 
system may be in need of more than an upgrade. The present system does not manage risk, 
however that is to be interpreted, but rather, by not operating according to economic reason, 
it creates risk (chapter 7). On top of externalities and lack of information as common 
examples of malfunctions in the economy, the agency problem of the lender being shielded 
from credit risk adds substantively to the list of concerns. The relevant issue becomes 
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acting on the need for not only regulating behavior but also adjusting the structures. In fact, 
the institutionalization of debt relief itself is an indication of the weakness of the global 
economic system. This can be seen not only in the nature of debt relief, but also in terms of 
the projected ongoing need for debt relief into the future, as laid out in chapter 2. Rather 
than adjusting the order itself, systemic imbalances are met by institutionalized measures of 
development aid and debt relief (chapters 2, 5 and 6).  
This is where we stand now. This is also why this thesis has suggested that what is 
precisely needed is a change in the fundamentals of the system, rather than counter-
measures to balance consequences of structural disharmony (chapters 2, 5, 6 and 7). The 
implementation of such a system, or procedure, should be put in place on neutral ground 
(chapters 2, 3 and 4). The thesis has argued that an impartial, independent panel or tribunal 
to arbitrate international debt fits these criteria. Importantly though, this panel must be 
designed following certain criteria, of which four in particular stand out (chapters 2, 4 and 
7). First, reflecting national jurisdiction, the restructuring process of sovereign debt must 
include debtor protection. Second, a referee meets the criteria of dealing with debt on 
multiple legal strands. This satisfies the requirement of being able to deal with problem 
debt that is claimed to be either odious or economically unsustainable, and specifically in 
that successive order. Third, the governmental powers of the indebted nation must be 
protected. Fourth, it is for the debtor to declare default and thus initiate a process of 
arbitration. This is because, ultimately, the decision is based on national policy preferences 
(chapters 2 and 7). 
Reflecting these conditions, the particular principles used as a guide are those of ‗Chapter 
9‘, or insolvency proceedings for a municipality, as found under Title 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code (chapter 1). This is where this thesis departs from the mainstream 
discussion proposing insolvency principles according to ‗Chapter 11‘ of the same Title, or 
principles of corporate debt restructuring. The justification is that the principles on which 
‗Chapter 9‘ rests allows not only for an independent panel to rule, but also for protecting 
the rights of the debtor. In addition, the principles protect the governmental powers of the 
indebted while also automatically introducing a stay mechanism. This objective and 
impartial approach has been the inspirations for, common thread and constant aim of my 
thesis, and in drawing these conclusions, it is now time to assess both the high points and 
significance of this proposal along with its scope and limitations. This takes us back to the 
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initial question of balancing the relationship between economic efficiency, here seen as 
economic reason, and global justice (chapter 1), and now also with the additional issues of 
assessing the scope and limitations of arbitrating international debts. Together, these four 
criteria of economic reason, global justice, and the possibilities and limitations emerge as 
central to this thesis of arbitrating problem debt. Among these, the two issues of economic 
reason and justice are related, and form a cross-pressure, as both are of central importance 
in determining the way ahead. The two latter issues − those of possibilities and limitations 
− are contingent on these first two. My point of departure was that in a national context, 
countries adopt bankruptcy, or insolvency, proceedings for reasons of both economic logic 
and equity (chapters 4 and 7). Therefore, it is reasonable to apply the same principles on an 
international level. 
In line with economic reason  
Beginning with the principle of economic reasoning, it is important to note that without a 
bankruptcy regime, or statutory law, parties are confined to relying on contract law (Stiglitz 
2010a). This presents five main problem areas. For one, it is difficult to write contracts 
which take into account unanticipated contingencies. Two, it is inevitable that negotiations 
will need to deal with unforeseen elements. Three, without a commonly and universally 
agreed framework, a great burden is placed on contracting parties to monitor other contracts 
by their counterparties and the influence of these on their own contracts (as addressed in 
chapter 3). This is demanding not only in terms of expertise but also administratively and 
financially. Four, conflicting interpretations of the contracts, or failure to meet the contract 
by either party, could result in important delays as a result of strategies employed by either 
party (chapter 7). Five, and related to the previous point, this leads to jurisdiction-shopping, 
or searching for the most friendly forum, which, in turn, makes the shopping process a very 
political process. This political process should be made fair. And furthermore, from the 
point of view of global economics, the aim should be that of a single system for relief, a 
system that includes mechanisms with the goal of reaching a timely and comprehensive 
debt restructuring initiative that gives the debtor economy space to grow (chapter 4; 
Herman et al 2010c: 492). 
The present belief on which international lending rests is that governments will fully 
service their debts to ensure continued access to credit. This belief is brought into question 
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in two ways. First, it is of course essential that creditors feel sufficiently confident in their 
property rights of the loan, that they will be protected to undertake their lending function, 
as trust forms the core of economic transactions (chapter 7). However, this directs the 
discussion towards dealings with odious debt, and the role of creditor responsibility and the 
assumption of them acting in good faith, where a failure to do so would sever this 
agreement (chapter 4). In this context, the claim is precisely that the property rights be 
annulled, if the loans are ruled to be odious. This would mean that these loans were not 
used in the interest of the population, but rather, they constitute debts incurred by dictatorial 
regimes for their own benefit (absence of consent) and taken on against the interest of the 
population of a state (absent of benefit), without its consent and in full awareness of the 
creditor (credit awareness).  
Second, in itself, this belief in continued debt servicing by governments is an uncertain 
incentive for loaning in general (see Stiglitz 2010a). Rather, this perceived insurance has 
led to current practices with an incentive for countries to over-borrow during boom periods, 
and for creditors to lend more that what may be adequate, or prudent, for the borrower 
(chapter 3, 5 and 7). The issue of how much is prudent to borrow, or to lend, can be further 
magnified. It may not necessarily be only a matter of prudence, but a matter of the borrower 
bearing a disproportional part of the credit risk (chapter 7). Again, this imbalance in the 
sharing of credit risk further distorts economic functions and makes lending to poor 
countries seem more like a political act than an economic equation. It also increases the 
credit risk, and thus jeopardizes the probability of reimbursements.  
Having listed how the absence of universally agreed sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanisms conflict with economic reason, the approach is now reversed to assess how 
principles of insolvency on an international level would add economic reasoning to debt 
restructuring. This is done by dividing economic logic into functions of both ex post and ex 
ante (these were discussed specifically in relation to odious debt in chapter 4). Ex post, an 
efficient bankruptcy regime minimizes the financial losses associated with restructuring 
(chapters 2 and 7). This concerns both losses for creditors and debtors. In a national 
context, the aim is thus to eventually raise the national output and income. Doing away 
with odious debt before dealing with the economic sustainability of debt potentially 
decreases the overall debt at an early stage. Ex ante, the application of bankruptcy 
proceedings affects how borrowers behave and how creditors assess the credit risk (chapter 
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7). A properly balanced regime should deter borrowers in trouble from undermining the 
sustainability of their debts by excessively postponing their moment of default (chapter 2). 
In this way, a bankruptcy regime affects the probability of default, and consequently, it also 
affects the recoveries in the event of a default (chapter 2). Ultimately then, it affects the 
costs and extent of borrowing. Further, from the point of view of economic reason and 
justice, it is essential that all creditors are treated fairly and equally during bankruptcy 
proceedings (chapters 2 and 4). Here, equity works in two directions (Stiglitz 2010a). On 
the one hand, borrowers are protected from exploiting lenders and on the other hand, 
lenders are protected from borrowers who strip the assets and plunder the coffers of the 
borrowing entity. In addition, ex ante, the application of odious debts would lift national 
principles of creditor responsibility and rule of law into the international system of global 
governance. 
In other words, transaction costs of addressing insolvency can be much reduced with a 
proper set of laws, a bankruptcy court to adjudicate them, and incentives to promptly bring 
the parties to a resolution that they would regard as fair (Stiglitz 2010a). To ensure 
promptness, a well-designed process should give debtors the opportunity to call default 
through a structured process (chapter 2; Herman et al. 2010c: 492). This would also have a 
positive effect on the externalities in the form of problems with agency and credit risk 
management, where the lender would again be directly linked to the loan and bear the risk 
(chapter 7). Based on the experience of Germany and Indonesia in a negotiated 
arrangement versus that of Argentina and Russia in unilaterally enforced negotiations, 
future lending would suffer little or at least less in under a negotiated arrangement (chapter 
7). 
Importantly, introducing international insolvency principles for nations would cut through 
many of the problems of the current system associated with lack of economic reason. It 
would also allow for resolving problem debt according to particular national circumstances. 
Yet, it would not set a universal cap on particular national debt levels, nor would it interfere 
in the national policy space. In fact, to the contrary, international insolvency procedures 
could widen and deepen the policy space for indebted countries. Moving forward from here 
takes us to the justice aspect, which forms the second pressure on solving problem debt, 
next to economic reason. After that, we will return to the question of how realistic it is to 
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mobilize support for institutionalizing arbitration of global debt (as discussed in chapters 1 
and 3).  
In line with global justice 
The justice aspect is closely linked to the discussion about the possibilities and potential of 
the proposal, a matter focused on after having looked at the form of arbitrating problem 
debt. Since the institutional and sovereignty aspects are discussed later on, here, the focus is 
on the minimal requirements the proposal must fulfill to properly address the criteria of 
economic reason and global justice. Leading up to those requirements, however, it is 
important to recall that this thesis has highlighted that global poverty manifests a grievous 
injustice, according to a shared notion of Western normative political thought. This thesis 
has shown how this injustice is created through global institutional arrangements driven by 
the rich nations, arrangements that make the rich both causally and morally intimately 
involved in the fate of the poor (chapter 3; and for the extended argument, see Pogge 
2008b). This order regularly produces extreme poverty and effectively excludes the poor 
from a fair share of the value of exploited natural resources. It also upholds a radical 
inequality that evolved through a historical process pervaded by crimes. Realistically then, 
the rich can end their involvement in perpetuating poverty in poor countries, but only by 
ending such poverty through economic reform. If feasible reforms are blocked by others, 
then the rich may in the end be unable to do more than mitigate some of the harms they also 
help produce. But even then, a difference would remain, because their effort would fulfill 
not a duty to help the needy, but a duty to protect the victims of any injustice to which the 
rich contribute. The latter duty is, other things being equal, much more stringent than the 
former, especially when the rich can fulfill it out of the benefits they derive from this 
injustice. This means that dealing with problem debt must be seen as a negative duty, a duty 
of not contributing to the imposition of a global institutional order that predictably and 
avoidably renders the basic universally agreed human rights of other human beings 
unfulfilled, and not because they must honor a positive duty to help others in need when 
they can at little cost to themselves. This leads to the main argument for introducing justice 
in the sovereign restructuring processes, which is that the current ad hoc, official and 
market-based insolvency regimes for sovereigns have been excessively creditor friendly − 
and costly for poor countries (chapters 2 and 7; Herman et al 2010c: 498). Now, through 
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the introduction of arbitration of sovereign debt, and possibly later accompanied by 
consequent reforms, the rich can gain support by showing concretely that their relations to 
the rest of the world are not solely devoted to cementing their economic hegemony and that 
the global poor will be able to peacefully achieve a considerable improvement in their 
circumstances. As a first step, this thesis has shown that this improvement would mean a 
respect for social and economic rights. This would be a way for the rich countries to, by 
way of action, refute the conviction, understandably widespread in the poor countries, that 
they remain indifferent to the misery of the poor, or at least until the poor have the 
economic and military power to do the rich serious harm. And only in this way can the rich 
undermine the popular support that aggressive political movements of all kinds can derive 
from this conviction.  
Stepping down from this philosophical justification to continue on a more practical path, it 
is important to note that long-term plans to economic development poor countries can be 
successful only after removing the oppressive debt overhang (Raffer and Singer 2001: 195). 
This means that doing away with odious debt first, and then, second, dealing with problem 
debt from an economic sustainability point of view would free resources and thus open up 
new fields in terms of the design and focus of both trade and development aid (chapters 5 
and 6). The principles of a fresh start should be seen in terms of human development. In 
more concrete terms, the burdens of debt readjustment should not affect the economic and 
social human rights of the inhabitants of the country undergoing debt restructuring (chapter 
3). Further, this could point towards a theoretical argument for support among the creditor 
governments for this idea, since it would create a lesser need for funding now paid out in 
development aid and trade support (chapters 5 and 6).  
A formal international scheme reflecting principles of bankruptcy on a national level 
requires more than a moral appeal for cooperation (chapter 3). What is needed is an agreed 
binding commitment to the outcome of the arbitration. By way of comparing the minimal 
requirements for this collectively agreed and imposed authority to today‘s arrangements, 
this authority would need to guarantee debtor‘s protection. This is one of the central 
justifications for promoting principles familiar from ‗Chapter 9‘, as opposed to other 
Chapters under Title 11 concerning bankruptcies of individuals or corporations. 
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Incorporating such considerations of fairness and developmental effectiveness into a new 
sovereign insolvency restructuring mechanism would boost its credibility. This would take 
place not only with debtors, but with all parties, since the reduction of uncertainty that 
would occur under clear rules, along with the knowledge that any post-restructuring debt 
situation would at least start out being sustainable, and would instill greater authenticity 
with both parties (Herman et al. 2010c: 495).  
As shown, sovereign debt restructuring according to an international edition of the basic 
concepts of ‗Chapter 9‘ provides a viable solution to problem debt. The model merely 
replicates what states agree is fair on national levels. Principles for insolvency proceedings, 
or bankruptcy, for a nation would certainly be different from bankruptcy proceedings for a 
corporation. And since principles for sovereign insolvency proceedings do not exist, such 
elaborations are by force theoretical, normative – and speculative. 
This requires us to proceed further down the practical path, and highlight that central to the 
argument of this thesis is that under the umbrella of an international version of ‗Chapter 9‘ 
– be that under the FTAP heading or some other − many proposals regarding debt-lifting 
could be accommodated. The institutional form would erase the risk of multiple forums 
submitting inconsistent decisions. The model could be implemented as an orderly 
framework to determine which part of their debts insolvent debtors can or should actually 
pay. The sovereignty of the indebted country is respected, and all creditors would be 
equally treated. The job description of the arbiter‘s could include the assessment (and 
consequent repudiation) of odious debt, determining the economic sustainability of the 
debtor (yet still a disputed and vague concept), and the drafting of a repayment plan 
together with the nation-states. Abiding by the rule of law allows for the rights of the 
debtors to be treated on par with the creditors. The creditors‘ claims would be compensated 
according to the debtor‘s ability to service its debt stock. In the case of odious debts and the 
proposals for an arbitration panel or tribunal, once a debt is ruled odious it should not be 
paid. This could, for instance, be the case for loans deliberately made to dictators – 
although perhaps rolled over many times since. And in addition, a successful process could 
be beneficial to North-South relations.  
The possibilities and the limitations 
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The viability of the upgrade of the economic order as called for above is dependent on the 
principles upon which it rests. In turn, the principles determine the possibilities and 
potential of the implementation. There are, of course, two ways of approaching this. One is 
the political possibility of launching an arbitration process (chapter 3). Another is the 
potential of the arbitration process itself. The latter approach leads further to a subset of 
issues framing the limitations of the initiative.  
The obstacle to the beginning of a debt arbitration process is political, not legal or 
economic (chapters 2, 3 and 4). And since initiatives have emerged from the creditors‘ side, 
from academia and from civil society, one cannot conclude that the implementation is 
categorically opposed by any particular group. Rather, the hesitation comes with the 
features of the presented models. From a global justice point of view, it is essential to 
dissect the particular features of proposed models for restructuring sovereign debt. Quick 
conclusions tend to identify creditors as the main obstacle. The line of reasoning is that it is 
difficult to tempt creditors to commit themselves to an outcome which may not be in their 
immediate favour. But as shown, extending the timeframe for implementing an orderly 
mechanism for working out debt only decreases the probabilities of reimbursement and the 
amounts repaid (chapters 2 and 7). Intuitively, this may sound uneconomical, but it can be 
understood from the perspective of economists being trained to prefer stable and 
predictable environments (chapter 7). A promise of reimbursement tomorrow is preferred to 
action spinning too many simultaneous factors out of the econometrically oriented 
economists‘ control. In the meantime, at least, new credit agreements could be encouraged 
to include a clause that loans are subject for international arbitration, upon the initiative of 
the debtor. 
Debtors again are hardly in favour of an agreement cementing already perceived 
asymmetries. Introducing principles familiar from ‗Chapter 9‘ would correct these 
asymmetries. Further, only by removing the debt overhang can the policy space for poor 
countries increase. One can say that solving problem debt is essential for other plans for 
developing poor societies to take place. But, recalling from the above, it is not the 
individual players who should devise an impartial entity to decide over problem debt. Since 
this has been discussed before, the focus shifts here to three additional matters.  
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These three final aspects pertaining to the state sovereignty in arbitration of international 
debt and institutionalization of the process must still be addressed. First, international 
arbitration of debts actually provides a path towards at least maintaining, perhaps 
increasing, the national policy space, or sovereignty, of poor countries (chapter 3). In 
addition, the current complex relationship between international law and sovereign state 
autonomy opens up the possibility of a more cautious rule of law conception of 
sovereignty. Understanding rule of law in this way could bring with it elements for global 
justice. Yet, it is important to recall that enforcement of agreements is exercised by 
sovereign states. This is why before launching an arbitration process, the national 
governments would have to sign on to the agreement, or to abiding by the ruling of the 
arbiter.  
Second, regarding institutionalization, a minimal condition of ethical and institutional 
legitimacy was set (chapter 4). This thin concept allows for respect for the autonomy of 
diverse cultures and histories. The institutionalized framework would be set up as a 
provisional panel, with a view to potentially becoming a specialized mechanism or 
institution. This is not only because institutional decisions and the implementation of them 
takes time and that a provisionary panel could be set up faster, smoother and in a less 
expensive way, it is also because of the present asymmetrical decision-making in the 
international institutions today. This latter matter is not completely separated from problem 
debt of poor countries. In practice, the formalization could take shape in an international 
Debt Court of some sort (Herman et al 2010c: 498-496), or a less formal institutionalization 
of an arbitration panel (Raffer 1990), or a combination of the two, for instance so that the 
loose institutionalization paves the path for stronger institutionalization (chapter 4). In 
either case, the importance is that the principles of this formalization align with the 
principles for bankruptcy granting rule of law, protecting the governing powers of the 
indebted while granting continued access to financing during the standstill. To avoid 
multiple forums ruling in contradictory terms, and to avoid the problem with ―jurisdiction 
shopping‖, it is essential to agree upon a single forum ruling in the case of problem debt, be 
that claims of odious debt or on the grounds of economic sustainability. The proposal of 
granting seniority protection to those supplying financing in the interim period must be 
looked further into (Herman et al 2010c: 492). 
298 
 
Third, and perhaps most central, is the need for further research into the concept of ―debt 
sustainability‖, a concept that is returned to in most chapters. Impractically, this concept is 
vague and opaque (see specifically chapters 2, 3 and 4). First, the concept must be lifted up 
from its economic seat and broadened to include dimensions of human development. 
Second, the concept must be devised into a practical form so that it is easily applicable for 
the entity in charge of deciding on the sustainability of a country‘s debt. 
Regarding the potential an institutionalized uniform arbitration process could bring with it, 
it is of course important to note the possible waves such a process would create. These 
waves relate to the potential that would appear following the implementation of the process, 
but also the limits the process encounters. First, removing the debt overhang would not in 
itself, necessarily or automatically provide the key to every, or any, kind of development 
plan. It would, however, facilitate other processes. The most important ones are perhaps 
that although debt restructuring would allow a breathing space for poor countries, while 
altering the behavior of lenders ex ante, it would not impact on the economic structures 
associated with problem debt. Out of these economic structures, global trade has emerged 
as the most important regime among these (chapter 5). Further, debt restructuring would 
also not decrease the overall need for development aid (chapter 6). In fact, following the 
arbitration of debts, certain tasks, such as the poorest countries seeking assistance to reach 
the Millennium Development Goals, are perhaps better left to development aid than 
financing and loaning departments. (Herman et al 2010c: 492) 
With this, and in conclusion, we have seen how problem debt of poor countries negates 
against the logic of economic effectiveness whilst simultaneously contributing substantially 
to the persistence of severe poverty. By disentangling economic, political and legal 
dimensions of problem debt, this thesis has contributed with an approach which brings 
some order to an otherwise messy discussion. An international debt arbitration mechanism 
replicating principles from ‗Chapter 9‘ meets the criteria of economic reason and global 
justice. At the same time, it bears the potential of serving as a gateway to discussions for 
additional transformations. The delay in setting up a coordinated, fair and democratic 
decision-making forum for dealing with debt in a sustainable manner has led civil society to 
perceive solutions problem debt emerging as a means of control by the rich over the poor 
rather than as problem of implementation. Meanwhile, the effects of reoccurring financial 
crisis are felt far and wide. And with the globalizing world economy, yet closer and more 
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immediate future interaction seems in store. The horizon of international debt management 
must reach beyond topped-up debt relief schemes. Better yet, dealings with debt would 
benefit from adopting the principles of economic reason and fairness. Short-term solutions 
of crisis management should be replaced by a longer-term understanding of economic and 
political viability. Arbitrating international debt proposes a formula intended to give effect 
to both those objects. There may be a better one, and we should keep an open mind, but the 
aim is clear. This brings on the final words, which are to underline that in order for it to 
gain legitimacy and be economically efficient, any future arrangement must be set up 
according to democratic mechanisms regarding participation and decision-making, relying 
on democratic principles and abiding by the rule of law. As shown, arbitration of 
international debt is certainly viable. Whether or not this analysis is correct, it is equally 
clear that arbitrating international debt is only one of several transformations required for 
launching a process of democratization or justice of the world economy, or towards 
democratic and just global governance. No doubt, there are chapters yet to be written on 
this subject. 
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